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Abstract 
 
Recent research in Terror Management Theory (TMT) has found that mortality 
reminders below conscious awareness can lead to avoidant responses towards cancer-
screening. Following this, the current research programme used a TMT framework to 
evaluate if mortality reminders could result in analogous responses towards a novel 
device for indicating Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) risk; the ―CVD Risk Biochip‖. 
Three central studies (Studies 1, 2 and 4) were designed to examine if various 
mortality reminders would elicit more avoidant responses towards the ―CVD Risk 
Biochip‖ than control topics. The third of these studies (Study 4) also investigated 
whether or not the nature of the device itself served to dissociate an individual 
towards CVD, thereby moderating existential concerns. An additional study (Study 3) 
examined whether or not one of the mortality reminders from the first two studies 
(Heart Attack Salience) leads to the suppression of death-related thoughts. When 
taken together, the results of these studies demonstrate that devices like the CVD Risk 
Biochip may have a beneficial effect on the potential uptake of screening behaviours 
generally and highlight the potential for cross-cultural variability in responses 
towards TMT methodologies. The findings of the programme also suggest some 
unique recommendations for the future study of TMT, including the performance of 
initial qualitative investigations of the cultural worldviews of a particular cohort 
before examining TMT processes and the necessity of controlling for the confounding 
effects of word frequency and word ambiguity in future ―death-thought accessibility‖ 
research. 
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Chapter 1: General Overview of the Current Research Programme 
 
Despite the fact that humans arguably possess a strong biologically wired self-
preservation instinct, people frequently make health decisions that have the potential 
to compromise their well-being.  For example, people often engage in behaviours that 
are risky such as dangerous driving, unsafe sex and the use of tanning beds; or avoid 
health-protective behaviours like failing to attend their General Practitioner (GP) 
regularly or avoiding participation in relevant screening behaviours for 
Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) such as cholesterol tests. A growing body of research 
in the area of Terror Management Theory (TMT) has begun to suggest that many of 
these sorts of risky health decisions are often strongly influenced by the presence of 
existential anxiety (e.g. Taubman - Ben-Ari, Florian & Mikulincer, 1999; 
Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldenberg & Pyszczynski, 2002; Miller & 
Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004; Routledge, Arndt & Goldenberg, 2004; Taubman - Ben-
Ari, 2004; Jessop, Albery, Rutter & Garrod, 2008; Arndt et al., 2009). In other words, 
this research has begun to demonstrate that the adoption of risky health behaviours 
may be determined more by an individual‘s attempts to avoid existential anxiety than 
by the physically protective capacity of the behaviours themselves.   
 
Some recent TMT research in this area has found that unconscious existential anxiety 
can lead to avoidant responses towards cancer-screening. For instance, Arndt, Cook, 
Goldenberg & Cox (2007) demonstrated that thinking about contracting cancer can 
cause people to suppress thoughts concerning death and can lead them to exhibit 
greater psychological avoidance of cancer-screening behaviours. In a similar vein, 
Goldenberg, Arndt, Hart & Routledge (2008) found that mortality reminders reduced 
women‘s intentions to conduct breast self-exams to screen for cancer and 
Goldenberg, Routledge & Arndt (2009) found that mortality reminders made women 
exhibit greater patterns of avoidance towards mammograms. Following this research, 
the current research programme was established in order to investigate whether or not 
existential anxiety could interfere with people‘s intentions to use a novel Point-of-
Care Testing (POCT) technological device that has been proposed by the Biomedical 
Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin City University (i.e. the ―CVD Risk Biochip‖ 
system) for the measurement of CVD risk. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is a miniature device designed to detect the concentration 
levels of a number of different proteins in the blood in order to deliver a fast but 
highly accurate indication of an individual‘s future risk for developing CVD. The 
chip itself contains several different ―detection zones‖; each of which contain 
antibodies with a fluorescent dye attached to them that specifically bind to a 
particular protein in the blood. Depending on the concentration of one of these 
proteins in the blood, an equivalent amount of fluorescent signal is emitted from the 
corresponding detection zone. When taken together, the detected concentration levels 
of these proteins can indicate a person‘s future risk for developing CVD. Some 
proposed advantages of this device include the removal of costs for transporting 
blood samples to an external laboratory for tests of CVD risk and the minimisation of 
the number of steps required to carry out a risk assessment of this kind. By 
introducing this new device, the BDI have also proposed to move CVD risk 
assessment from its current settings in the hospital and laboratory to GP‘s offices, 
ambulances and ultimately the home. However, there are several potential 
disadvantages in placing a device like the CVD Risk Biochip in a home setting over 
conventional clinical analyses, including its limitation to measuring only a few 
proteins in the blood and the fact that a physician would be able to better interpret the 
results by referring to the patient‘s medical history. Furthermore, since CVD is an 
illness where death is a very real consequence, thoughts relating to the development 
of the illness may create high levels of anxiety concerning death in the patient that 
may inhibit their uptake of such a device (e.g. Cameron & Leventhal, 1995; Aikens, 
Michael, Levin & Lowry, 1999; van Steenkiste, van der Wijden, Timmermans, Vaes, 
Stoffers & Grol, 2004). Indeed, as described above, an analogous effect has already 
been demonstrated in TMT literature relating to cancer screening (Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). 
 
Arising from these concerns, the current research programme was established in order 
to investigate whether or not existential anxiety could act as a barrier to the voluntary 
uptake of the CVD Risk Biochip in a GP‘s office or home setting. More specifically, 
it was reasoned that thoughts about using the CVD Risk Biochip could increase an 
individual‘s death-related cognitions due to the inherent associations between CVD 
and death, leading such individuals to avoid the uptake of this device and to exhibit 
less favourable attitudes towards it in order to sidestep the potential existential 
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anxiety associated with its use. The following chapter introduces these central 
research questions and the theoretical framework pertaining to the current research 
programme in greater detail and provides a literature review of research areas relevant 
to the programme.   
 
The first two studies in the programme are then described in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. In line with TMT, these first two studies examined whether or not 
getting participants to think about their death (Mortality Salience) or having a heart 
attack (Heart Attack Salience; a unique measure designed for these studies) and 
subsequently distracting them would lead to more avoidant responses towards the 
CVD Risk Biochip than participants who were asked to think about a death-neutral 
topic. These studies found that neither a cohort of participants aged over 55 years 
(Study 1) nor a cohort of participants aged 40-55 years (Study 2) displayed significant 
differences between the experimental and control conditions on dependent variables 
of attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the device and commitment towards 
its use.   
  
In order to investigate the possibility that the potentially very threatening nature of 
thinking about a heart attack led participants in the Heart Attack Salience groups in 
the first two studies to suppress death-related thoughts to a greater extent than 
expected, a third study was conducted. More specifically, this third study, which is 
documented in Chapter 5, was designed to check if ―death thought accessibility‖ 
(DTA) would be higher among participants who were given a Heart Attack Salience 
task when they were placed under conditions of increased cognitive load compared to 
participants who were given a distraction task following Heart Attack Salience and 
two analogous groups of participants who received a Control task. The results of this 
study revealed no significant differences between any of these groups of participants 
in the number of death-related word fragments completed by them on a standard DTA 
measure. The study also uncovered a potential set of limitations regarding the 
measurement of death-thought accessibility in the TMT literature. In particular, there 
was strong evidence of the confounding effects of word frequency and word 
ambiguity in the standard DTA measure used in the study.  
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Following the findings of the first three studies in the research programme, a fourth 
and final study was conducted, which is outlined in Chapter 6. This study contained 
an alternative measure of priming existential concerns to the measures used in the 
first three studies in the programme. Specifically, half of the participants in this study 
received a ―Creatureliness Prime‖ adapted from other TMT research (e.g. Goldenberg 
et al., 2001) in place of the Mortality Salience or Heart Attack Salience condition, 
while the other half received a ―Uniqueness Prime‖. The former measure consisted of 
getting participants to think about the creaturely aspects of being human; an 
existential prime which had resulted in significantly greater avoidant responses 
towards cancer-screening in prior TMT research (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2008; 
Goldenberg et al., 2009). The latter measure involved asking participants to think 
about the uniqueness of humans as compared to other animals (i.e. the control group 
relating to this methodology). In line with prior TMT research, it was predicted that 
those participants who were given the Creatureliness Prime would demonstrate more 
avoidant responses towards the device than those who received the Uniqueness 
Prime. Additionally, this study investigated if there would be differences in 
participants‘ reactions towards the CVD Risk Biochip after they had self-esteem 
experimentally manipulated by having them reflect on an important personal failure 
or success (as per Routledge et al., 2010). Following prior TMT research, it was 
predicted that those participants who had their self-esteem experimentally lowered 
would demonstrate more avoidant responses towards the device than those 
participants who had their self-esteem experimentally boosted. Despite the above 
predictions, the results of the fourth and final study failed to demonstrate that there 
were any barriers to the use of the CVD Risk Biochip resulting from receipt of the 
Creatureliness Prime and a distraction or having one‘s self-esteem experimentally 
threatened. 
 
As an alternative to these TMT effects, the final study also investigated the possibility 
that the CVD Risk Biochip promotes feelings of disembodiment or dissociation 
towards the risk information that it provides, thereby effectively resulting in a 
diminished response of existential anxiety towards the device. This idea was based on 
ideas from philosophy and sociology of technology literature that has suggested that 
technological devices like the CVD Risk Biochip that predict the future through 
abstractions (i.e. by using codes and quantified ratios) tend to appear intangible and 
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disembodied to the normal subject, leading to more ambivalent and ―cool‖ responses 
towards them (e.g. Baudrillard, 1995; Prior, Wood, Gray, Pill & Hughes, 2002). 
Accordingly, this alternative hypothesis predicted that participants would demonstrate 
strong feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards the risk information that the 
device provides regardless of their experimental condition. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, participants suggested that they would easily be able to relate such risk 
information to their experiential knowledge of their own health.   
 
The final chapter in this thesis (Chapter 7) explores the results of the four studies in 
the current research programme with respect to the broader context of TMT and 
health-related research in general and examines the implications of the results of the 
programme for TMT and the promotion of health threat detection behaviours. 
In this regard, the combined results of the four studies in the research programme 
appear to suggest that existential concerns do not operate as a barrier towards devices 
like the CVD Risk Biochip. A central implication of these findings is that POCT 
devices like the CVD Risk Biochip may have improved uptake to other forms of 
health threat detection, potentially due to the fact that they furnish an individual with 
a risk status for developing a condition rather than indicating the presence or absence 
of a condition. In order to ensure such improved uptake, it may be particularly 
important to emphasize that such devices have the potential to be used by lay people 
to monitor their health status and to explicitly frame such POCT devices as providing 
an indication of ―risk‖ for developing a condition. Additionally, such POCT devices 
provide individuals who are potentially at risk for developing CVD with the capacity 
to monitor their condition; thereby endowing them with a sense of autonomy in 
relation to their health. Furthermore, none of the central hypotheses derived from 
TMT research were supported by the results of the current research programme. A 
likely explanation for such a pattern of results is that TMT may not work in an Irish 
context; an idea that is supported by prior TMT studies involving Irish participants 
and qualitative research that has found that Irish people hold cultural representations 
of death that may protect them from existential anxiety. This may mean that TMT 
processes are not as cross-culturally reliable as TMT authors assume. 
 
There are numerous contributions that the current research programme has made to 
the study of TMT. Firstly, the relationship of existential concerns to CVD and heart 
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attacks and the application of TMT to the uptake of POCT devices are issues that 
have not been previously been explored through a TMT framework. As a result, the 
current research programme extends TMT to these areas of study. Secondly, the 
content analyses of the Heart Attack Salience task in the first three studies highlighted 
the potential validity of this task as a method of priming death-related cognitions and 
illustrated that it has the capacity to elicit death-related thoughts to the same extent as 
Mortality Salience. Thirdly, by highlighting the potential for cultural representations 
of death that may protect individuals from existential anxiety, the current research 
programme also brings forward central questions of the cross-cultural reliability of 
TMT research. Some of the central implications of this finding are that TMT 
processes may not easily transfer to cultures where death is openly discussed and that 
the meaning and value-oriented contents of cultural worldviews should not be taken 
for granted in future TMT research. Instead, future TMT research should initially 
investigate such aspects of culture in a more qualitative fashion or with reference to 
anthropological evidence derived from a particular cultural context. Finally, some of 
the findings in the results of Study 3 appear to reflect the potential for word frequency 
and word ambiguity to have confounding effects on the measurement of DTA in 
TMT research. This uniquely highlights the need to control for such effects in the 
future measurement of this construct.  
 
There are a couple of additional strengths of the current research programme that 
should be highlighted. Firstly, the current studies attempted to control for potential 
gender differences in the uptake of health threat detection devices and the possibility 
of gender-related differences in TMT-related processes. Although gender-related 
differences have been previously examined in TMT to a minor extent (e.g. Arndt, 
Greenberg & Cook, 2002; Hirschberger et al., 2002; Taubman Ben-Ari & Findler, 
2003; Arndt et al., 2007), they have not been given a central platform in some of the 
more central developments of the theory (e.g. the dual-process model of TMT 
defences proposed by Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1999, or the Terror 
Management Health Model proposed by Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Through some 
moderate support for gender-related differences with respect to health threat detection 
behaviours, the current research programme calls attention to the potential necessity 
for gender-related concerns to be factored into future TMT research. Additionally, the 
current research programme examined TMT mechanisms in the context of POCT by 
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targeting middle-aged and older adult participants for its principal research questions 
rather than employing the typical convenience samples of psychology students used 
in most of the prior TMT research, thereby providing a potentially more ecologically 
valid context for the examination of existential concerns.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and General Introduction to the 
Current Research Programme 
 
Before exploring the methodological framework of the current research programme in 
detail, it will be necessary to give an account of evidence from the domain of health 
psychology concerning the psychological minimisation of health threats and research 
that has uncovered patterns of defensive avoidance in relation to disease detection 
behaviours. In addition to providing such an account, the literature review which 
follows will introduce TMT and some of its most important constructs before 
describing the emerging developments in TMT relating to proximal and distal 
defences and the burgeoning Terror Management Health Model (TMHM). Following 
this, some of the most significant contributions that the theory has made to the 
understanding of risky health behaviours and, more recently, to the psychological 
avoidance of cancer-screening behaviours will be documented. Finally, this literature 
review will furnish the reader with some background information concerning POCT 
and the development of POCT devices for indicating CVD risk before the details of 
the CVD Risk Biochip system itself and the central ideas governing the current 
research programme are presented.  
  
2.1 Health Threat Minimisation and Health Threat Detection Behaviours 
A plethora of evidence from the health psychology literature suggests that people 
often minimise the importance and relevance of a health threat in order to deny their 
vulnerability to it (for a review of some of the most pertinent literature relating to this 
topic, see Ditto & Croyle, 2003). A key research program that has examined the 
psychological minimisation of health threats in this fashion is the so-called 
―Thioamine Acetylase (TAA) Enzyme Paradigm‖, which has its origins in the 
experimental work of Jemmott, Ditto & Croyle (1986). These researchers created a 
procedure which involved inviting participants into a laboratory in order to ―test‖ 
them for the presence of a fictitious condition called ―TAA Deficiency‖; an alleged 
enzyme deficiency that the researchers led their participants to believe had been 
recently discovered and which supposedly constituted a ―risk factor for mild but 
irritating pancreatic disorders‖. Following an explanation of the deficiency and a 
description of a simple diagnostic test for detecting it, participants were then asked to 
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either self-administer the test themselves or given the opportunity to have a health 
professional administer the test to them. Those participants who agreed to take the 
test were then either given feedback that suggested that they had the deficiency 
(positive feedback) or given feedback that suggested that they did not have the 
deficiency (negative feedback) and were subsequently administered a questionnaire 
about their judgements of the seriousness of the enzyme deficiency.  
 
A body of research has been conducted using comparable procedures to those 
described above. The questionnaires that are typically administered to participants 
following their receipt of the information about the enzyme deficiency and their own 
risk information tend to assess their judgements about the seriousness of the enzyme 
deficiency, the validity of the diagnostic test that was performed or similar questions 
relating to these participants‘ perceptions about the importance or relevance of the 
health threat to their own health. Through this experimental paradigm, research has 
suggested that those participants who receive positive feedback tend to rate the 
deficiency as significantly less serious than those who receive negative feedback (e.g. 
Jemmott et al., 1986), that those participants who receive positive feedback tend to 
perceptually distort the feedback presented to them about the deficiency compared to 
those who receive negative feedback (e.g. Ditto, Jemmott & Darley, 1988) and that 
participants who are given positive feedback tend to provide higher estimates of the 
prevalence of the deficiency in the general population compared to those who receive 
negative feedback (e.g. Croyle & Sande, 1988). Additionally, Ditto & Lopez (1992) 
found that those participants who were given feedback suggesting that they were 
deficient in the fictitious ―TAA enzyme‖ tended to rate the test results as less accurate 
when they were led to believe that the deficiency represented a health threat 
compared to a different group of participants who were led to believe that the enzyme 
deficiency represented a beneficial or benign condition. 
 
Many of the above findings with the ―TAA Enzyme Paradigm‖ have also been 
replicated with analogous experiments that have involved participants‘ appraisals of 
risk factor estimates in real-life screening situations. A consistent finding in this 
literature is that individuals who are told that they possess risk factors for a well-
known health threat tend to downplay the seriousness of the risk relative to those 
individuals who are told that they do not have the risk factor (e.g. Eiser, Sutton & 
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Wober, 1979; Ditto et al., 1988; Croyle, 1990; Croyle, Sun & Louie, 1993; Croyle, 
Sun & Hart, 1997). For example, Croyle (1990) discovered that those participants 
who were informed that their blood pressure was above average tended to rate high 
blood pressure as a less serious health threat than those participants who were told 
that their blood pressure was normal. Similarly, Croyle and colleagues (1993) found 
that participants who were told that their cholesterol level was at an undesirably high 
level were significantly more likely to consider high cholesterol levels to be a less 
serious threat than participants who were told that their cholesterol level was at a 
more desirable level.  
 
In addition to such patterns of health threat minimisation, another strategy that people 
appear to adopt in order to cope with a serious health threat is ―defensive avoidance‖ 
(i.e. when one avoids becoming fully informed about a health threat as a way of 
circumventing the potential for receiving disconcerting information; Thompson, 
Robbins, Payne & Castillo, 2011). Despite the fact that this sort of avoidant thinking 
may be particularly dangerous when the health threat in question is a dangerous 
disease or serious health condition, there is much evidence to suggest that people 
often display such patterns of avoidance when they perceive that a particular health-
relevant behaviour could threaten their health status, irrespective of whether or not 
such behaviours serve a health-protective function (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; 
Cameron, 1997; Luce & Kahn, 1999; Kahn & Luce, 2003; Brett, Bankhead, 
Henderson, Watson & Austoker, 2005). For instance, in a meta-analysis of the 
persuasive impact of fear appeals in relation to health threats, de Hoog, Stroebe & de 
Wit (2007) found that priming a participant‘s vulnerability to a severe health threat 
tends to consistently trigger a response among such participants of minimising the 
relevance or importance of the health threat.  In this regard, Millar & Millar (1993, 
1995) have distinguished between health threat detection and health-promotion 
behaviours in their capacity to threaten an individual‘s health status. They argue that 
health threat detection behaviours (e.g. screening for cholesterol) potentially pose a 
threat to a person‘s perceptions of good health leading to negative and avoidant 
responses towards these behaviours, whereas health-promotion behaviours (e.g. 
reducing the fat in one‘s diet) provide a positive route to improving a person‘s health 
and well-being.  For example, Millar (2006) found that participants who were 
characterised by a repressive personality (using the method of classifying repressors 
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established by Weinberger,1990) tended to spend less time reading health threat 
detection behaviour messages and recalled fewer of them than health-promotion 
behaviour messages. Such participants also displayed weaker intentions to perform 
health threat detection behaviours compared to health-promotion behaviours. In a 
related vein, Arndt et al. (2007) have argued that avoidant responses towards health 
threat detection behaviours are likely to result from the paradox that arises between 
knowledge of a health threat and fear of that knowledge. Finally, Cameron (1997) has 
also pointed out that health threat detection behaviours such as screening are 
qualitatively different to other types of health-protective behaviours in the sense that 
they do not directly reduce the risk for the onset of the particular health threat of 
interest.   
 
These patterns of minimisation and avoidance have been increasingly demonstrated in 
the health psychology literature with respect to diseases of the heart. In a series of 
early studies on this research topic, Horowitz and colleagues (Horowitz et al., 1980; 
Horowitz et al., 1983) found that the stress of discovering that one is at high risk for 
developing heart disease can lead to continual and persistent denial of this 
information. Avis, Smith & McKinlay (1989) also found in their large-scale study of 
732 men and women between 25-65 years of age from Massachusetts that a high 
percentage of their participants who were identified as being at risk for developing 
coronary heart disease consistently rated their risk of having a heart attack within the 
following 10 years as less than that of their peers. A growing body of evidence since 
these early research studies has demonstrated that many people tend to minimise the 
importance and relevance of CVDs and their related symptoms to their own health 
(e.g. Croyle et al., 1993; Mengden et al., 1998; Ketterer et al., 1998; Newell Girgis, 
Sanson-Fisher & Savolainen, 1999; Emslie, Hunt & Watt, 2001; O‘Carroll, Smith, 
Grubb, Fox & Masterton, 2001; Ketterer et al., 2004; Van Steenkiste et al., 2004; 
Caldwell, Arthur, Natarajan, & Anand, 2007; Huerta, Tormo, Egea-Caparrós, Ortolá-
Devesa & Navarro, 2009). For instance, Van Steenkiste and colleagues (2004) 
demonstrated qualitatively that people tend to minimise their likelihood of developing 
CVD and that preventive steps towards CVD are often impeded by fears of 
developing the illness.  
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Some of the research on the minimisation and avoidance of CVD and its related 
symptoms has explicitly focused on the causal determinants of such patterns of 
avoidance, such as individuals‘ feelings of perceived vulnerability and loss of control 
in the face of CVD-related stimuli. In this regard, Cameron & Leventhal (1995) found 
that people who possess stable beliefs about their vulnerability to CVD tend to avoid 
fear-provoking stimuli relating to CVD that could remind them of this perceived 
vulnerability. Emslie et al. (2001) have also shown that the avoidance of CVD-related 
stimuli may be related to persistent views that CVDs are very sudden and potentially 
fatal and, consequently, that many patients feel that it is better ―not to know‖ if one 
has a heart-related disease or not. Elsewhere, O‘Carroll and colleagues (2001) found 
that patterns of defensive avoidance following a myocardial infarction are often the 
result of an individual‘s beliefs that health outcomes are largely unmodifiable and due 
to chance factors. Similarly, Caldwell and colleagues (2007) found that both men and 
women‘s avoidant behaviours relating to a diagnostic cardiac measure were rooted in 
fears of a loss of personal control, potential future medical complications and an 
uncertain future where their agency may be substantially impaired.   
 
There are a number of consequences of such patterns of denial and self-exemption 
with respect to CVD and its associated risk factors. For instance, the self-exemption 
of CVD and its related symptoms to their own health can lead people to continually 
engage in behaviours that are known to lead to the development of CVD, such as 
smoking (e.g. Peretti-Watel, Halfen & Grémy, 2007). Additionally, emerging 
research has demonstrated that health threat minimisation can lead people to deny or 
forget the presence of previously diagnosed risk factors for CVD such as high 
cholesterol and hypertension (e.g. Irvine & Logan, 1994; Croyle et al., 2006). Such 
patterns of denial may even persist for males after they have experienced a 
myocardial infarction or have been diagnosed with coronary artery disease (e.g. 
Ketterer et al., 1998; Ketterer et al., 2004). These patterns of denial and avoidance in 
relation to CVD are particularly relevant to some of the emerging research and theory 
from within the TMT paradigm that has examined how people‘s receipt of mortality 
reminders can lead to their subsequent adoption of risky health behaviours or their 
defensive avoidance of health threat detection behaviours such as cancer screening. 
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2.2 Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
TMT has emerged in the last 20 years as a leading social psychological theory of 
human motivation with the capacity to explain much behaviour that is unique to 
humans. Current research in TMT has replicated some of the above findings from 
health threat minimisation and disease detection research, while providing a 
framework that potentially explains the motivations behind why people behave in 
these ways when their health is threatened. The theory itself is based on the writings 
of a cultural anthropologist named Ernest Becker (e.g. 1973, 1975), who was 
interested in the internal motivations behind behaviours that are unique to humans. In 
particular, Becker was interested in questions like ―Why do humans value symbolic 
thought?‖, ―Why is self-esteem so important to people?‖ and ―Why do people from 
different cultures come into serious conflict with each other over their beliefs?‖  
 
In order to get answers to these sorts of questions, Becker felt it was important to first 
identify the kinds of traits and attributes that are specific to humans. Like Otto Rank 
and Søren Kierkegaard before him, he noted that one of the things that make us 
distinctly different from other animals is our specially equipped intelligence, which 
has granted us with the ability to conceptualise reality in terms of cause-and-effect 
relationships, the capacity to think hypothetically about the future and the cognitive 
faculties necessary for self reflection (Becker, 1973). Although these cognitive 
capabilities have many advantages to us (e.g. the design of many devices that are 
based on exploiting the cause-and-effect processes of electricity and the ability to 
make provisions for the future), a potential disadvantage that they bring with them is 
a growing awareness of our mortal and transient existence. According to Becker, this 
awareness of our mortality has the potential to create feelings of paralysing terror 
(often termed existential anxiety), when taken together with our biologically-wired 
Darwinian self-preservation instinct. In order to alleviate this terror, Becker (1973, 
1975) argued that we have created culture; a system of values that allows us to feel as 
if we are meaningful contributors to something greater than our own animal 
existence. He also proposed that culture provides, to some extent, a sense of symbolic 
immortality that allows us to temporarily ―deny death‖ by enabling us to associate 
ourselves with a system of valued ideas and practices that will outlive us. In addition 
to providing the possibility of symbolic immortality, culture may even provide us 
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with the possibility of a more literal sort of immortality (e.g. in the case of religion) 
by means of an afterlife.  
 
In line with Becker‘s writings, the original proponents of TMT (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986) posited that humans have evolved a ―Cultural 
Anxiety Buffer‖ (CAB) in order to defend against existential anxiety. The CAB is a 
system of defence against existential anxiety that allows people to perceive 
themselves as valuable contributors to a meaningful universe and includes two central 
components; cultural worldviews and self-esteem. According to TMT authors, the 
construction and maintenance of cultural worldviews (i.e. systems of belief rooted 
within a particular cultural tradition) allow humans to inject meaning and permanence 
into their lives by creating transcendent standards of value and providing them with a 
sense of belonging to structures that have the potential to endure and outlive 
themselves and their offspring (Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1991). Self-
esteem, on the other hand, is an individual‘s own sense that they are living up to the 
standards of value provided by culture. People gain this sense that they are upholding 
cultural values through the consensual validation of their peers towards their 
behaviours (Solomon et al., 1991). In light of this proposal that the central structures 
of the CAB provide people with an avenue of defence against existential anxiety, 
TMT has predicted that a substantial amount of human social behaviour is concerned 
with the maintenance and defence of cultural worldviews and self-esteem. In order to 
test their more specific ideas about people‘s reactions towards death, TMT 
researchers have put forward three central hypotheses; the Mortality Salience 
Hypothesis, the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis and the Death-Thought Accessibility 
Hypothesis.  
 
The Mortality Salience Hypothesis suggests that explicitly reminding people of their 
own mortality will lead to increases in their need for faith in cultural worldviews as a 
means to protect them from existential anxiety. Evidence in support of this 
proposition has been demonstrated in a number of studies which have shown that 
those participants who were reminded of their mortality responded more favourably 
to others who could be seen to uphold their own cultural values (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1990) and more negatively to others who could be seen to have violated cultural 
standards of justice (e.g. Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 
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1989; Greenberg et al., 1995; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). TMT studies have also 
shown evidence for this hypothesis by demonstrating that mortality reminders can 
lead people to engage in a range of culturally defensive behaviours such as displaying 
greater in-group preferences and out-group biases (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990), 
displaying increases in nationalism (e.g. Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 
2000; Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003), upholding their own political 
ideals more staunchly (e.g. Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon & Chatel, 
1992), upholding the values of the cultural worldview that is most available to them 
at a particular time (e.g. Walsh & Smith, 2007), derogating those who threaten their 
cultural worldview and supporting those who champion their cultural worldview (e.g. 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon & Breus, 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; 
Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 2000). 
Furthermore, affirming an important cultural value has been found to reduce 
worldview defences and the accessibility of death-related thoughts following 
mortality reminders (e.g. Schmeichel & Martens, 2005), providing further support for 
the idea that cultural values are important structures that are used by people to reduce 
their existential anxieties. Additional evidence in support of this hypothesis has 
demonstrated that thoughts concerning symbolic immortality can serve to reduce 
existential concerns (e.g. Florian & Mikulincer, 1998), that focusing on creaturely 
aspects of being human leads to greater disgust at the human body and an increase in 
cultural worldview defences (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg, Cox, 
Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 2002; Goldenberg et al., 2008) and that 
existential anxiety itself tends to increase a need to distinguish humans from other 
animals (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001). 
 
Some studies on the ―natural TMT experiment‖ that constituted the terrorist attacks of 
11
th
 September 2001 have also added support to the Mortality Salience Hypothesis. 
For instance, TMT researchers have found that the terror resulting from the attacks 
themselves and their aftermath had the effect of increasing American citizens‘ 
performance of altruistic and pro-social behaviour (Kumagai & Ohbuchi, 2002), 
escalating their search for meaning and value in life (Pyszczynski et al., 2003), 
heightening their support for American foreign policy (Landau et al., 2004b) and 
intensifying their commitment to exploring their own identity (Dunkel, 2002). 
Young-Ok & Schenck-Hamlin (2005) also found that there was a widespread increase 
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in the number of racist comments made about Arab Muslims among American-born 
citizens following these terrorist attacks. 
 
The second major TMT hypothesis, the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis, proposes that, if a 
psychological structure serves as a buffer for existential anxiety, then providing 
measures to strengthen that structure should decrease an individual‘s existential 
anxiety and providing measures to weaken that structure should increase their 
existential anxiety. This hypothesis has been supported through many studies that 
have examined the anxiety-buffering effects of self-esteem, which have found that 
participants who had their self-esteem experimentally increased through positive 
feedback reported less anxiety towards mortality reminders than controls who 
received neutral feedback (Greenberg et al., 1992b; Schmeichel et al., 2009), that 
participants with dispositionally high self-esteem exhibited less defensive reactions to 
a health threat like denying one‘s vulnerability and mortality (Greenberg et al., 1993; 
Schmeichel et al., 2009) and that high levels of self-esteem reduced the cultural 
worldview defence effects that occur as a result of receiving mortality reminders (e.g. 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Some studies that have investigated this hypothesis have 
also shown that reminding people of their mortality can lead to increases in defensive 
self-esteem strategies that serve to maintain or enhance an individual‘s sense of self-
worth when faced with the terror of death (e.g. Mikulincer & Florian, 2002) and that 
subtle mortality reminders can increase an individual‘s perception that there is social 
consensus for their beliefs (e.g. Osborn, Johnson & Fisher, 2006). Additional 
evidence supporting this hypothesis has shown that the following alternatives to self-
esteem can also provide buffering effects to existential anxiety; high levels of health 
optimism (e.g. Arndt, Routledge & Goldenberg, 2006), high levels of self-efficacy 
with regard to specific behaviours (e.g. Miller & Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004) and 
secure attachment rather than insecure attachment (e.g. Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; 
Taubman-Ben-Ari, Findler & Mikulincer, 2002). 
 
A third major hypothesis derived from TMT, the Death-Thought Accessibility 
Hypothesis, has been investigated in several different contexts over the last fifteen 
years or so but was first explicitly formalised by Schimel, Hayes, Williams & Jahrig 
(2007). Schimel et al. (2007) have suggested that this hypothesis is a direct corollary 
of both the Mortality Salience Hypothesis and the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis; i.e. that 
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if a structure such as the CAB provides a buffer against the awareness of mortality, it 
follows that threatening this structure should increase an individual‘s awareness of 
mortality. One line of research that has supported this hypothesis has involved an 
examination of threats to the perceived stability of romantic relationships (since being 
in a romantic relationship could be seen to provide a buffer against existential 
anxiety). In this regard, Florian, Mikulincer & Hirschberger (2002) found that, when 
participants in their study were asked to think about problems in their romantic 
relationships, they tended to become more aware of death-related concepts. Similarly, 
Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum & Malishkevich (2002) found that thinking about 
separations from a romantic partner (either following death or a relationship 
breakdown) led participants to become more aware of their own mortality. In a 
related vein, Bassett (2005) found that threatening the valued cultural worldview 
component of marriage among students from Louisiana led to increases in their levels 
of implicit death-related denial. This dimension was measured on a task that involved 
pairing death-related words (death, die, dying) to self-words (me, my, mine) in 
comparison to pairing the same death-related words to other words (they, them, 
theirs). Those participants who read an essay that derogated the idea of the sanctity of 
marriage took a longer amount of time to pair self-words to the death-related words 
than they took to pair the other words to the death-related words.   
 
More recent research involving the Death-Thought Accessibility Hypothesis has 
focused more specifically on the inverse aspects of the Mortality Salience Hypothesis 
and the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis that the hypothesis suggests. For instance, Schimel 
et al. (2007) explored whether or not threatening valued components of worldviews 
would lead to increases in the awareness of death (the inverse of the Mortality 
Salience Hypothesis). Across four studies, these researchers found that Canadians 
who read an essay that derogated a valued component of their national identity (i.e. 
the Canadian system of receiving free healthcare from the government) tended to 
experience a greater accessibility of death-related concepts than Canadians who read 
an equivalent essay that derogated a valued component of Australians‘ national 
identity. Additionally, they found that participants who aligned themselves with a 
creationist worldview displayed higher increases in their availability of death-related 
concepts after reading an essay that disparaged the creationist worldview in 
comparison to creationist participants who read a neutral essay and participants who 
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aligned themselves with an evolutionist worldview who read the essay that 
disparaged creationism. Hayes, Schimel, Faucher & Williams (2008) also explored 
whether or not threatening self-esteem would lead to increases in death awareness 
(the inverse of the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis). They found that threatening 
participants‘ self-esteem in the following three ways led to increases in the 
accessibility of death-related concepts; i) presenting participants with negative 
feedback about their intelligence, ii) suggesting to participants that their personalities 
did not fit the profile for them to successfully pursue their chosen career path and iii) 
informing participants that they would have to give a speech for which they had not 
prepared. Routledge et al. (2010) replicated Hayes et al.‘s (2008) results through their 
findings that participants who were asked to think about a time when they failed to 
live up to an important value exhibited increases in their awareness of their own 
mortality in comparison to participants who were asked to think about a time when 
they succeeded in living up to an important value.  
 
Using the above hypotheses as a conceptual framework, TMT has been supported by 
more than 300 studies conducted in over a dozen countries, ranging in focus in the 
examination of behaviours as diverse as conspicuous consumption (e.g. Solomon, 
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 2004, Arndt, Solomon, Kasser & Sheldon, 2004), 
relationship attachment (e.g. Hart, Shaver & Goldenberg, 2005) and risky driving 
(e.g. Taubman - Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Taubman -Ben-Ari et al., 2000). A recent large-
scale meta-analysis of the Mortality Salience Hypothesis in the TMT literature 
involving 277 studies has demonstrated that thinking about death consistently 
produces moderate to large effects on attitudinal and behavioural dependent variables, 
with no moderation of Mortality Salience effects by sample size (Burke, Martens & 
Faucher, 2010). This meta-analysis included an extensive search for unpublished 
TMT studies and revealed no evidence of publication bias towards studies with 
moderately or highly significant results after revealing a fail-safe N of 4,239 (i.e. the 
number of unpublished or future studies averaging null results that would be 
necessary to reduce the overall effect size for the meta-analysis was more than 15 
times the number of studies examined in the analysis itself).  
 
Despite the consistent support for the central hypotheses arising from the theory, 
many critics of TMT have focused on its potential incompatibility with current 
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evolutionary theories. For instance, Leary & Schreindorfer (1997) and Buss (1997) 
argued that TMT authors have not made a strong case that terror management 
processes increase an organism‘s chances of survival and reproduction. These authors 
suggest that, according to evolutionary theories, anxiety evolved as a way of 
promoting survival (e.g. through ―fight or flight‖ mechanisms). Thus, reducing 
anxiety in the manner suggested by TMT authors should function to reduce survival 
chances. In a similar fashion, it could be argued that TMT conflicts with direct 
causation theories of emotion (e.g. Rozin, 1976; Keltner & Gross, 1999) that suggest 
that the central function of emotion is to directly cause particular behaviours (e.g. 
disgust makes one avoid unsafe foods, anger makes one fight, sadness makes one 
seek sympathy, etc.). However, Solomon, Greenberg & Pysczynski (1997) have 
pointed out that existential anxiety is not specifically linked with promoting survival, 
nor is it always directed towards specific behaviours. Instead, existential anxiety can 
be seen as an unfortunate by-product of the human capacity for hypothetical thought. 
This is because existential anxiety is a pre-contemplative form of anxiety that occurs 
towards mortality reminders, does not always involve behaviours directly and often 
involves an abstract conception of death. Indeed, TMT research has consistently 
demonstrated that people often try to distract themselves from existential anxiety by 
adopting rationalising defences rather than directly adopting certain behaviours (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1990; Silvia, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 2003; Walsh & Smith, 2007). 
In contrast, other forms of anxiety which promote an organism‘s survival chances 
tend to be more directly related to life-threatening situations and tend to result in the 
performance of specific behaviours. Importantly then, existential anxiety does not 
have to occur in response to an imminent threat as an individual may reflect on her 
mortality and subsequently experience existential anxiety at a time when there is no 
immediate danger present. In this fashion, Solomon et al. (1997) argue that removing 
existential anxiety would not necessarily decrease an organism‘s chances of survival 
as the anxiety itself is not inherently linked to a specific life-threatening situation. 
Similarly, TMT has shown that existential anxiety does not necessarily result in the 
performance of particular behaviours but may involve a distraction from the emotion 
itself through processes of rationalisation. 
 
Proponents of TMT have also suggested that their findings that people often engage 
in behaviours that are detrimental to their health and well-being cannot be easily 
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explained by evolutionary theory or direct causation theories of emotion. For 
instance, neither theory can readily account for the defensive avoidance of disease 
detection behaviours that TMT authors have uncovered (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2000; 
Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009) as such 
behaviours often pose specific life-threatening consequences for individuals. In 
contrast, TMT has begun to account for such behaviours as an attempt on the 
individual‘s part to distract themselves from the potential existential reminder of 
engaging in disease detection behaviours. Additionally, Terror Management defences 
can be regarded as adaptive and functional in several ways. For instance, Solomon et 
al. (1997) propose that the Cultural-Anxiety Buffer is adaptive in its ability to remove 
anxiety, thereby allowing for humans to pursue other activities unabated by 
existential anxiety. Although it can be argued that this is merely an indirect form of 
adaptation, the removal of existential anxiety through the maintenance of self-esteem 
and cultural worldviews has very real advantages like preventing humans from 
wallowing in despair so that they can participate in goal-directed behaviours like 
finding a mate.  
 
Another criticism of TMT relates to its central contention that the main purpose for 
self-esteem is to act as an anxiety buffer by providing an individual with a sense that 
they are living up to cultural standards of value. Leary (2004) argued that this idea 
implies that self-esteem must have evolved after culture; an idea which is very 
difficult to test experimentally. He suggests that, although one could argue that the 
belief systems and practices of a culture have developed to attenuate the 
unpleasantness of existential anxiety, self-esteem may have emerged as an anxiety 
buffer merely as a by-product of social-acceptance striving. Ryan & Deci (2004) also 
criticised TMT researchers‘ conceptions of self-esteem by suggesting that they only 
amount to a contingent self-esteem, which is  based on fear and anxiety, rather than 
considering the possibility that self-esteem could arise out of the more positive 
process of an individual‘s motivations towards self-improvement and meaning-
making (what they call true self-esteem). In response to these criticisms, Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel (2004) have argued that contingent self-
esteem must be satisfied before anything like true self esteem could be sought by an 
individual and that self-esteem and culture evolved simultaneously in humans in a 
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gradual process, involving increasingly complex representations of symbolic meaning 
as death became more salient to them due to their evolving cognitive capabilities.  
 
Another common criticism of TMT is that the theory itself cannot account for forms 
of human motivation that are distinct from self-preservation. For example, Muraven 
& Baumeister (1997) and Buss (1997) have pointed out other types of motivations, 
such as sexual motivations, experiencing pleasure, avoiding pain and exploring or 
developing one‘s sense of self, cannot be subsumed under the basic motive of self-
preservation. Although it is clear that other such motives exist in the human 
experience, Solomon et al. (1997) argue that the self-preservation motive must be 
satisfied before any additional motives can be sought. Additionally, it is important to 
point out that TMT does not attempt to account for every type of human motivation, 
instead focusing on the uniquely human problem of existential anxiety. Furthermore, 
while many existing theories of motivation focus on ―how‖ particular social 
behaviours occur, most of these do not even attempt to explain ―why‖ they occur. In 
contrast, TMT attempts to explain why people think and respond in particular ways 
towards existential anxiety and therefore the theory can be seen to have applied value 
with respect to its prediction of human behaviour. 
 
Aside from these criticisms of the scope of TMT, there are a number of potential 
challenges for TMT research that have been identified. For instance, research by 
Wisman & Koole (2003) has indicated that mortality reminders can lead to increased 
affiliations between groups of people, even between groups of people with opposing 
worldviews. As a result, they suggest that TMT authors need to account for this 
additional type of defence, which they argue cannot be simply accounted for through 
the types of defences that are proposed by the theory in its current form. The majority 
of TMT research has also been conducted in Western cultures. Since TMT 
hypothesises that there are unique cultural defences against death following the work 
of Ernest Becker, the explanatory power of TMT processes may be limited to those 
cultural groups that have been studied thus far by TMT researchers. Additionally, 
according to Paulhus & Trapnell (1997), there may be differences between Western 
individualist cultures and Eastern collectivist cultures in their responses to existential 
anxiety as collectivist cultures tend to be more concerned with maintaining the 
current social structure than individualist ones. As a result, TMT defences may be 
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more pronounced in collectivist cultures; an area of interest that warrants future 
investigation. Although a growing body of TMT research has been conducted in non-
Western countries over the last fifteen years, including a number of research studies 
conducted in Iran, Israel and China, more TMT research needs to be conducted in a 
variety of cultural settings in order to establish its external validity. A further 
challenge to TMT research is to extend its findings beyond convenience samples of 
psychology students. Although there have been several studies that have examined 
the effects of existential anxiety across different periods of a person‘s lifespan (e.g. 
Cicirelli, 2002; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005; Maxfield et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), these studies are in the minority 
within the broad TMT literature.  
 
Despite these potential limitations, TMT researchers have clearly demonstrated that 
existential anxiety produces behavioural and cognitive defensive responses that are 
specific to death-related anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997b) and 
not related to some other effect of experiencing anxiety toward an aversive event like 
making values or worrisome future concerns salient (Greenberg et al., 1995). In order 
to test the theory itself, these researchers have also come up with various unique ways 
of operationalising their ideas. Typically, their experiments prime participants to 
think about their own mortality or an alternative aversive control stimulus like dental 
pain with two standard open-ended questions; an experimental manipulation more 
commonly referred to as Mortality Salience. There have also been a number of 
alternatives to the Mortality Salience manipulation, the most common of which is a 
method which primes participants to think about the similarities between humans and 
other animals or the differences between humans and other animals (e.g. Goldenberg 
et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 2002; Goldenberg et al., 2008). This manipulation has 
been found to work similarly to the Mortality Salience manipulation in TMT studies 
that have focused on the body as a source of self-esteem. In these studies, participants 
tend to favour emphasising the distinctness of humans from other animals when they 
are reminded of their own mortality (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001). Also, when human 
similarity to other animals is emphasised, people have been found to become less 
interested in the physical aspects of sexual relations but not the romantic aspects of 
such behaviours (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2002). Detailed explanations for why this 
occurs are given by both Goldenberg (2005) and Becker (1973); both of whom have 
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underlined how creaturely (i.e. explicitly mortal) aspects of the human body are 
problematic for humans as they serve as reminders of their physicality, similarity to 
other animals and vulnerability to death and decay.  From this perspective, people 
tend to want to cover up the more animalistic parts of the body like the genitals, tend 
to conceal unflattering bodily processes such as flatulence and excretion from others 
and even attempt to divert themselves from bodily aches, pains and bleeding in order 
to avoid the fact that these aspects of the body could potentially form a representative 
picture that suggests to them that they are no more than slowly rotting pieces of meat. 
Additionally, from this perspective, humans tend to value culture for its potential to 
distinguish them from other animals that do not appear to possess similar systems of 
meaning and transcendence. 
 
2.3 Proximal and Distal Defences in TMT 
A more recent trend in TMT literature has been to look at the role that the awareness 
of death plays in everyday human behaviour. Specifically, this research has examined 
whether or not there are differences in people‘s behavioural responses when death-
related thoughts are conscious or when they are outside immediate focal awareness. 
In this regard, TMT researchers have proposed two distinctly different defensive 
mechanisms that people use to protect themselves from existential anxiety. These 
separate defensive mechanisms relate to death thoughts that are conscious or death 
thoughts that are just below conscious awareness, which have been termed proximal 
defences and distal defences respectively. 
 
Proximal defences are conscious defensive strategies that constitute an individual‘s 
attempts to remove mortality reminders from their immediate conscious awareness 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Since conscious attention initiates the logical processing of 
information, TMT authors argue that mortality reminders must be defended at more 
or less the same level of abstraction when such reminders are made conscious to an 
individual (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Consequently, proximal defences often 
constitute rationalising threat-focused methods that serve to remove death-related 
thoughts from one‘s focal attention. These sorts of rationalising methods often 
comprise cognitive distortions that serve to deny one‘s vulnerability to mortality 
reminders or health-promoting promises that contiguously deal with mortality 
concerns by sublimating them (Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 2000). By using 
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such proximal defensive strategies, individuals can directly counter anxiety 
concerning death by pushing the problem into the distant future, thereby temporarily 
abating the terror that can be derived from existential anxiety. In support of the 
existence of proximal defences, TMT studies have found that conscious awareness of 
one‘s mortality does not lead to symbolically defensive responses such as the defence 
and maintenance of cultural worldviews and self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Arndt et al., 1997a; Arndt et al., 1997b; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Instead, such 
awareness has been found to lead to a greater suppression of death thoughts (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997b), exaggeration of one‘s health and 
hardiness (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2000) or rationalising commitments to health 
behaviours such as undertaking to go on a diet or get more exercise (e.g. Arndt, 
Schimel & Goldenberg, 2003). This evidence for proximal defences also provides a 
rebuttal to the common criticism of TMT that people rarely experience conscious 
thoughts about death that have profound effects on them (e.g. Muraven & 
Baumeister, 1997); proximal defences tend to remove the immediate threat of 
mortality reminders from focal attention by pushing them towards the fringes of 
consciousness.  
 
However, since the proposed function of proximal defences is to simply avoid 
existential anxiety, TMT authors argue that they are not sufficient in assisting people 
to face up to the inevitability of death. Consequently, they have proposed that people 
need a different set of defences that they refer to as ―distal defences‖ to prevent 
mortality reminders from re-entering conscious awareness (Greenberg et al., 2000). In 
addition to preventing further conscious awareness of mortality reminders, distal 
defences also prevent more subtle mortality reminders from entering a person‘s 
conscious awareness (Pyszczynski et al., 2000). Distal defences typically operate by 
utilising the CAB; i.e. the use of distal defences entails an individual‘s attempts to 
invest in cultural worldviews and the maintenance of self-esteem. Through the use of 
the CAB in this way, distal defences tend to prevent mortality reminders from re-
entering consciousness by allowing people to perceive themselves as valuable 
contributors to a meaningful universe (Pyszczynski et al., 2000). Research in support 
of this type of defence has demonstrated that relatively subtle mortality reminders can 
produce more vigorous worldview defence than explicit mortality reminders 
(Greenberg et al., 1994), that subliminal presentation of death-related words leads to 
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greater worldview defence compared to supraliminal presentation of the same words 
(Arndt et al., 1997a), that accessibility of death-related thoughts is higher after a delay 
or distraction occurs (Greenberg et al., 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Arndt et al., 
1997b) and that impaired cognitive processing resources tends to lead to increased 
death-thought accessibility and cultural worldview defence immediately after 
mortality is made salient (Arndt et al., 1997b). Accordingly, distal defences may be 
activated either following a proximal defensive response to an explicit mortality 
reminder, when an individual encounters a mortality prime under conditions of high 
cognitive load, when mortality primes are presented in a subliminal fashion or when a 
delay or distraction occurs after a conscious mortality prime. 
  
An important clarification was made by Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski & 
Solomon (2001) to the mechanism behind distal defences. These authors were 
interested in whether the opportunity to defend one‘s worldview when in a distal 
mode of defence leads to a dissipation of the awareness of one‘s mortality or to an 
active suppression of mortality-related thoughts. They demonstrated that the former 
explanation for distal defences appeared to be more appropriate through their finding 
that furnishing American participants with conditions of high cognitive load did not 
lead to increases in their accessibility of death-related concepts after they had 
received a Mortality Salience task and the opportunity to defend their cultural 
worldview (in this case, they were given the chance to give their reactions towards an 
anti-American essay). In other words, these participants, who were unable to suppress 
death-related thoughts in a proximal fashion due to their high cognitive load, 
exhibited lower levels of mortality awareness following reminders of mortality and a 
cultural worldview defence; presumably because the opportunity to defend their 
cultural worldview led to a dissipation of the impact of mortality reminders. In other 
words, this distal defence helped participants to ―deny death‖ by undercutting the 
potential for mortality reminders to re-enter their conscious awareness. This finding 
was subsequently replicated in Study 2 of Schimel et al.‘s (2007) research programme 
where they found that Canadian participants who defended a valued component of 
their cultural worldview did not display any increase in their accessibility of death-
related concepts compared to Canadian participants who were not given the 
opportunity to defend a valued component of their cultural worldview. 
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Following this establishment of proximal and distal defence processes within 
Mortality Salience, TMT research has begun to establish that there is evidence for a 
temporal sequence involving these defences (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2000; Arndt, 
Greenberg & Cook, 2002). More specifically, this research has demonstrated that, 
following an explicit mortality reminder, an individual will engage in proximal 
defence strategies in order to attempt to remove them from their conscious awareness 
and will then proceed to engage in distal defences as a way of keeping these mortality 
reminders from re-entering their consciousness. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of 
the particulars of this potential temporal sequence (adapted from Arndt et al., 2002). 
As illustrated in this diagram, upon presentation of explicit mortality reminders, an 
individual will initially engage in proximal defence strategies in order to suppress 
death-related thoughts. Once such thoughts have been removed from conscious 
awareness and there is a delay, mortality reminders have the potential to re-emerge 
into conscious awareness (i.e. these thoughts become highly accessible to the 
individual). Similarly, if an individual receives subliminal death-related information 
or receives a mortality reminder when under conditions of increased cognitive load, 
there is the possibility that thoughts concerning death might emerge into the 
individual‘s conscious focus. Following this possibility that mortality reminders may 
re-emerge into consciousness, a worldview-related defence or similar strategy to 
circumvent these reminders will become available to the individual. As depicted in 
the diagram, the availability of these strategies will depend on situational influences 
(e.g. if a self-esteem relevant behavioural strategy or a personal worldview defence 
strategy is primed by the situational context) and individual differences in the 
importance of certain constructs (e.g. defending American culture might be a relevant 
construct for Americans but not for Canadians). Correspondingly, whatever strategy 
becomes most readily available to the individual as a result of these situational 
influences and individual differences will be the one adopted by the individual as a 
distal defence with the express purpose of distracting themselves from their own 
mortality.  
 
 
  
 
 
 27 
 
Figure 2.1: Temporal Sequence for Proximal and Distal Defence Processes (adapted from 
Arndt et al., 2002) 
 
Explicit Mortality Reminders 
Proximal Defence 
Suppression of Mortality 
Reminders  
Delay 
High Accessibility of Mortality 
Reminders 
Available Distal Defence 
Strategy 
Subliminal Mortality Reminders Mortality Reminders with High 
Cognitive Load 
Distal Defence 
Situational Influences Individual Differences 
Avoidance of Mortality 
Reminders 
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It should be noted that this ―Dual Processing Theory‖ of proximal and distal defence 
processes towards existential anxiety posited by TMT researchers appears to be at 
odds with other theories of how emotion shapes behaviour. For instance, Baumeister, 
Vohs, DeWall & Zhang (2007) have put forward an alternative dual processing 
theory which suggests that people‘s emotional responses tend to operate as a feedback 
system where there is a distinction between how automatic affect and conscious 
emotions affect their behaviour. Baumeister and colleagues suggest that people tend 
to initially experience automatic affective responses towards emotionally arousing 
situations. These automatic affective responses constitute immediate positive or 
negative emotional feedback towards the emotionally arousing situation via their 
amygdala (e.g. the arousal of the sympathetic or parasympathetic branches of the 
Autonomic Nervous System), which can trigger instantaneous behavioural responses 
in individuals. An example of such a behavioural response following automatic affect 
is fleeing from a snake that one encounters in long grass (i.e. the sympathetic branch 
of the Autonomic Nervous System is activated and one flees immediately before 
taking a more conscious decision towards some action). After this immediate 
affective response has taken place, Baumeister et al. (2007) argue that people tend to 
consciously experience more specific emotions as a way of learning from the 
emotionally arousing situation. To return to the previous example, after fleeing from a 
snake that one encounters in long grass, one might experience the conscious emotion 
of fear towards snakes. This conscious emotion may then lead one to avoid situations 
where one may encounter snakes in the future such as walking through long grass in 
the particular area where the emotionally arousing situation occurred. Furthermore, if 
one encounters a similar situation in the future, Baumeister et al. (2007) argue that 
one might experience an immediate automatic affective response towards that 
situation which may lead to immediate action. For instance, when one finds oneself at 
the area of long grass where a snake was previously encountered, one may experience 
an automatic affective response (i.e. arousal of the sympathetic branch of the 
Autonomic Nervous System), which may lead one to avoid the scene.  
 
An extension of this theory was subsequently proposed by Baumeister & Masicampo 
(2010) in their theory of conscious thought. Like Baumeister et al. (2007), these 
authors argued that bodily and sensory responses towards stimuli in the environment 
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(such as automatic affective processes) tend to occur in the absence of consciousness. 
In contrast, Baumeister & Masicampo (2010) argue that conscious thought tends to 
occur as a reconstructive process that involves the collecting together of past 
experiences that have been encountered by an individual via automatic bodily and 
sensory responses and reassembling these images or memories of experiences into 
meaningful sequences of thoughts. These sequences of thoughts can lead an 
individual to experience conscious emotions, which have adaptive potential as 
indicated by Baumeister et al. (2007), or they can subsequently be used as a 
communicative tool to teach others what one may have learnt from experience. 
Alternatively, such conscious thoughts about prior experiences can lead to the mental 
simulation of possible behavioural scenarios, which can be adaptive for exploring 
options in complex decisions. Similarly, the simulation of possible behavioural 
scenarios can be helpful in understanding the perspectives of others in one‘s social 
environment that may be in the process of encountering similar situations which one 
may have experienced in the past. In this way, Baumeister & Masicampo (2010) 
argue that all conscious thought tends to arise from the re-structuring of prior bodily 
and sensory experiences and that such thought may have unique adaptive advantages.   
 
It is clear that Baumeister et al.‘s (2007) theory of emotional feedback and 
Baumeister & Masicampo‘s (2010) theory of conscious thought appear to contradict 
the Dual Processing Theory proposed by TMT. Specifically, while TMT authors 
distinguish between conscious proximal defences and pre-conscious distal defences 
towards existential anxiety, these experiences are distinct from conscious emotions or 
thoughts about emotionally arousing situations and automatic affect as they appear to 
occur in an inverse relationship. In other words, while Baumeister and colleagues 
(2007, 2010) suggest that pre-conscious emotional responses tend to occur before 
conscious emotions or thoughts, TMT authors argue that conscious thoughts of death 
tend to precede pre-conscious reactions towards death. Nonetheless, this seeming 
disparity between the theories of Baumeister and colleagues (2007, 2010) and TMT 
can be accounted for when one considers the apparent uniqueness of existential 
anxiety as an emotion. Firstly, existential anxiety appears to be distinct from other 
forms of emotion that involve the re-structuring of prior bodily and sensory 
experiences since the individual who thinks about death does not necessarily need to 
have experienced death or a near-death experience. As a consequence, it appears 
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likely that conscious thoughts about death tend to precede preconscious reactions 
towards existential anxiety in the manner proposed by TMT. Additionally, in contrast 
to other emotions such as fear which can be measured by self-report and 
physiological measures, existential anxiety appears to be a pre-contemplative form of 
anxiety towards the concept of death that often cannot be directly measured in the 
same way. For instance, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) found that asking participants to 
think about their death did not significantly increase their physiological arousal from 
baseline responses. Nonetheless, they demonstrated the potential indirect emotional 
effects of existential anxiety in their study by the findings that those participants who 
were asked to think about their death tended to significantly increase their negative 
reactions towards cultural violators compared to controls. Similarly, Greenberg et al 
(1995) found that participants who had been asked to think about an upcoming exam 
tended to self-report significantly more negative affect than controls on the Positive 
and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) but that asking participants to think about death 
did not significantly increase self-reports of negative affect on the PANAS in 
comparison to controls. However, their participants who were asked to think about 
death displayed significantly greater negative reactions towards cultural violators than 
control participants and participants who had been asked to think about an upcoming 
exam. Following such findings, it appears that existential anxiety may be a unique 
type of emotion that does not normally lead to concrete emotional expressions but 
may lead to indirect effects on thought and behaviour. Indeed, Becker (1973) and the 
central proponents of TMT (e.g. Solomon et al., 1997) propose that existential anxiety 
does not tend to normally be experienced directly as an emotion precisely because 
people have adapted defence mechanisms that tend to prevent its emotional 
manifestation. In sum, it appears that existential anxiety may be a unique form of 
emotion that does not find expression in the same manner as other forms of emotion 
captured by theories of emotion such as those put forward by Baumeister and his 
colleagues (2007, 2010) precisely because of the operation of proximal and distal 
defences.  
 
2.4 Proximal and Distal Defences and Health Behaviours 
A growing strand of TMT research concerning proximal and distal defences has 
begun to look at the sorts of health-related behaviours that people are likely to adopt 
when mortality is made salient to them. TMT researchers have suggested that when 
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death anxiety is operating at an unconscious level, defensive behaviours towards this 
anxiety (i.e. distal defences) are often determined more by their capacity to increase 
an individual‘s self-esteem rather than by how healthy or physically protective they 
are (Routledge et al., 2004; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Specifically, research into 
the unhealthy effects of distal defences has found that people tend to want to engage 
in risky activities that may serve to bolster their self-esteem such as illicit drug-taking 
(Hirschberger et al., 2002), risky sexual behaviours (Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004), 
smoking (Arndt et al., 2009; Hansen, Winzeler & Topolinski, 2010; Martin & 
Kamins, 2010), using tanning beds (Routledge et al., 2004; Arndt et al., 2009), 
reckless driving (Taubman - Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Taubman -Ben-Ari, et al., 2000; 
Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2003; Jessop et al., 2008; Arndt et al., 2009), scuba-
diving (Miller & Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004) or military activities (Taubman - Ben-Ari 
& Findler, 2006) when death thoughts are below conscious awareness. It is important 
to note that a particular risky behaviour must be relevant to an individual‘s self-
esteem before they are likely to adopt it as a distal defence strategy (Taubman - Ben-
Ari et al., 1999). Indeed, TMT researchers argue that people often undertake risks in 
order to avoid subsequent reminders of their mortality either because denial of the 
probability of death makes them less sensitive to risks or because they overemphasize 
the potential gains (e.g. to their self-esteem) that they might receive from such risk-
taking behaviours (Miller & Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004). However, people do not 
always engage in risky behaviours when death anxiety is on the fringes of 
consciousness. For instance, it has been demonstrated that death anxiety that is below 
conscious awareness can also lead to increases in an individual‘s interest in health-
promoting behaviours like exercise if the behaviours are relevant to their sense of 
self-efficacy (Arndt et al., 2003) or if the health-promoting behaviours are relevant to 
the person‘s self-esteem (Arndt et al., 2009). Furthermore, TMT authors suggest that 
people tend to adopt either risky or health-oriented behaviours when they are in a 
distal mode of defence against mortality reminders to the extent that such behaviours 
either allow them to perceive themselves as valuable cultural contributors or serve to 
boost or maintain their sense of self-esteem (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). 
 
In contrast, when death anxiety is operating at a more conscious level, TMT 
researchers argue that people use pseudo-rational methods to deny vulnerability to 
risk-taking behaviours, avoid risk-taking behaviours altogether or display greater 
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willingness to engage in health-promoting behaviours (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). 
Research into these proximal defences has found that conscious thoughts of death 
lead people to exhibit increased intentions to exercise (Arndt et al., 2003), increased 
intentions to use sun-screen (Routledge et al., 2004), increased avoidance of stimuli 
that enhance their self-awareness (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski & 
Solomon, 1998; Silvia, 2001) and increased denial of their vulnerability to a health 
threat (Greenberg et al., 2000; Arndt, et al., 2007). This demonstrates that people who 
are presented with explicit mortality reminders use whatever means are readily 
available to deny their vulnerability to risks to their health or to distract themselves 
from these risks (as per Pyszczynski et al., 2000). Goldenberg & Arndt (2008) have 
also suggested that an individual will be more likely to engage in a particular form of 
proximal defence to the extent that the behaviours associated with such a defence are 
readily available to them and have the capacity to remove existential concerns. In line 
with this latter point, Arndt et al. (2003) have proposed that proximal defences could 
be used to encourage health-promotion, as this type of defence can involve an 
increased desire to engage in health-promoting behaviours if such behaviours are 
made explicitly available to people and are deemed to be self-efficacious to them.  
 
2.5 Terror Management Health Model (TMHM) 
Following the establishment of the sorts of proximal and distal defences in relation to 
health-related behaviours described above, Goldenberg & Arndt (2008) developed 
TMHM in order to account for how awareness of death can differentially lead to 
proximal or distal defensive behaviours depending on whether mortality reminders 
are either operating below conscious awareness or are within an individual‘s 
conscious focus. The central idea behind the TMHM is that, depending on the level of 
conscious activation of mortality reminders and the availability of resources to defend 
against such reminders, an individual will adopt either the available proximal defence 
strategy that functions most effectively to remove mortality reminders from their 
awareness or the available distal defence strategy that best operates to place 
themselves at a remove from mortality reminders so that they may not re-enter their 
conscious awareness. Additionally, there are three specific propositions of the 
TMHM; each of which is described in the paragraphs that follow.  
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The first proposition of the TMHM is that an individual will engage in threat-
avoidance or health-oriented behaviours in the face of conscious mortality reminders 
to the extent that one or other of these proximal defensive strategies is effective in 
facilitating the removal of the mortality reminders from immediate cognisance. 
However, self-oriented defences that may be used as distal defensive strategies (e.g. 
engaging in behaviours that relate to an individuals‘ sense of self-esteem) should not 
function to remove mortality reminders from conscious awareness.  
 
The second proposition of the TMHM states that, when mortality reminders are just 
below one‘s conscious awareness, an individual‘s health decisions will often be 
determined more by the relevance of such health decisions to their worldviews and 
self-esteem rather than the capacity for such health decisions to benefit their health. In 
this way, health-oriented or risky health decisions will be adopted by the individual to 
the extent that these behaviours either serve to position them as important 
contributors to their cultural worldview or serve to boost their self-esteem. An 
important exception to the assumption of this proposition that health motivations will 
be less imminent when thoughts of death are non-conscious is where an individual‘s 
desire to be healthy is itself a source of self-esteem. Indeed, as Goldenberg & Arndt 
(2008) note, esteem-relevant health behaviours may be particularly useful in 
preventing mortality reminders from re-entering one‘s cognizance in such instances. 
Additionally, if one‘s health status is under existential threat, behavioural patterns 
which function to remove this threat or place it at a distance could be seen to boost 
one‘s esteem. 
 
The third and final proposition of the TMHM suggests that non-conscious mortality 
reminders that involve a degree of awareness about one‘s own body should inform 
the health behaviours one chooses to adopt as a distal defence measure. More 
specifically, when the physical or creaturely aspects of humans are primed and these 
mortality reminders are below conscious awareness, this proposition suggests that an 
individual will seek to engage in health behaviours that are less bodily-oriented (e.g. 
health screenings) in order to avoid the potential for these behaviours to remind them  
of their own creaturely nature. Figure 2.2 below provides a broad illustration of the 
central points of the TMHM and its three central propositions (derived from 
Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008).  
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Figure 2.2: Visual Illustration of the TMHM (adapted from Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008) 
 
2.6 TMT and Health Threat Detection Behaviours 
Recent TMT research (some of which has been explicitly derived from the TMHM 
described above) has looked at how anxieties concerning death can act as a barrier to 
health threat detection behaviours like cancer screening. Although a number of TMT 
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studies had previously demonstrated that proximal defence strategies involving the 
denial of one‘s vulnerability to a health threat are typically employed as a means to 
avoid health-related information that has the potential to provide mortality reminders 
(e.g. Greenberg et al., 1993; Greenberg et al., 2000), one of the first research 
programmes to explicitly investigate whether patterns of defensive avoidance are 
adopted by individuals in response to mortality reminders was carried out by Arndt et 
al. (2007). Across five studies, these authors examined the cognitive associations 
between cancer and death-related thoughts and some of the potential implications of 
such associations for cancer-screening behaviours.  
 
In the first three studies in their programme, Arndt et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
thinking about developing cancer and its effects on the body can prompt people to 
initially suppress thoughts concerning death. In fact, their research indicated that 
getting participants to think about what would happen to them when they developed 
cancer (i.e. ―Cancer Salience‖) prompted more death-thought suppression than 
getting participants to think about what would happen to them when they died 
(Studies 1 & 2). Additionally, these authors found that there was an increase in the 
accessibility of death-related concepts among participants either when they were 
primed to think about cancer under conditions of high cognitive load (i.e. by having 
to mentally rehearse a 10-digit number; Study 2) or when they were subliminally 
primed to perceive the word cancer (Study 3). However, while two of these studies 
were sufficiently powered (Study 1 contained a sample size of 50 participants in 
preparation for a 3x1 ANOVA and Study 3 contained a sample size of 55 participants 
for a 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA), there was an insufficient sample size of 44 
participants in Study 2 in preparation for a 2x2 ANOVA. It should also be noted that 
these first three studies in their research programme tended to focus on male or 
female participants separately (e.g. Studies 1 and 2 in their research programme 
focused on female participants alone and Study 3 in their research programme 
contained 43 men and 11 women). Despite such limitations, when taken together 
these studies support the propositions that there is an immediate spreading activation 
from the concept of cancer to the concept of death and that cancer-related thoughts 
are also potentially more threatening than thoughts about death, thereby leading to an 
increased suppression of death-related thoughts following cancer-related thoughts. 
Arndt et al. (2007) argued that this increase in the suppression of death-related 
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cognitions associated with thoughts concerning cancer may reflect the fact that cancer 
represents a more tangible manifestation of death rather than an abstract 
representation of death. Consequently, they suggested that thoughts about cancer may 
be more threatening to an individual than thoughts concerning death, leading to 
sustained proximal defences towards confrontations with cancer.  
 
In addition to demonstrating the effects of thinking about cancer on the suppression 
of death-related concepts, Arndt et al. (2007) were interested in how such processes 
might affect people‘s health decisions in the more ecologically valid context of 
thinking about one‘s risk for developing cancer. More specifically, they were 
interested in whether cancer-related suppression would have substantial effects on an 
individual‘s intentions to perform cancer screening behaviours. Firstly, in Study 4 of 
their programme of research, the authors gave forty female participants bogus 
information that related a growth hormone linked to a person‘s height with breast 
cancer. Specifically, they informed half of their participants that they were at risk for 
breast cancer on the basis of their height and half of their participants that they were 
not at risk for breast cancer on the basis of their height. Immediately after receiving 
this information, each participant was presented with a task to complete that had been 
designed to measure the accessibility of death-related thoughts. In line with health 
psychology literature of a similar nature (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; Croyle et al., 
1993), they found that those female participants who were led to believe that breast 
cancer was not relevant to their health did not suppress thoughts about cancer as 
much as those who were led to believe that they were at-risk for cancer. Additionally, 
the authors examined the potential effects of thinking about cancer on individuals‘ 
intentions to participate in screening behaviours in Study 5 of their research 
programme; a highly powered study which contained a total of 83 participants in 
preparation for a 2x2 ANOVA. In this study, female participants expressed lower 
intentions to perform breast self-exam behaviours and male participants expressed 
lower intentions to perform testicular self-exam behaviours after thoughts about 
cancer were made salient to them and they were placed under a high cognitive load 
relative to controls who had thoughts about asthma made salient to them. In other 
words, participants who were in a distal mode of defence tended to express lower 
intentions to perform health-oriented behaviours relating to cancer screening; 
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presumably because such health-oriented behaviours had the potential to threaten 
their health status.  
 
Some more recent TMT research has specifically focused on how mortality-related 
concerns can affect women‘s perceptions and intentions relating to breast cancer 
screening practices. Goldenberg and colleagues (2008) found that reminding women 
about their own mortality by presenting them with an essay that emphasised the 
similarity between humans and other animals led to defensive avoidance of breast 
self-exam cancer screening behaviours compared to control participants who were 
given an essay that emphasised the distinction between humans and animals. More 
particularly, across three studies, these TMT researchers demonstrated that the 
awareness of human creatureliness can i) lead younger women to reduce their 
intentions to conduct breast self-exams after receiving a Mortality Salience task and 
subsequent distraction, ii) lead younger women to conduct shorter exams on a plastic 
breast model, and iii) lead older women to perform shorter breast self-exams on 
themselves. Such findings are consistent with a notable meta-analysis pertaining to 
breast self-exams from the health psychology literature, where it was uncovered that 
two of the main reasons for avoiding breast self-exams were anxiety relating to the 
procedure and fear of cancer (Brett et al., 2005). Furthermore, each of these studies 
were highly powered; the first two studies contained 93 female undergraduate 
participants and 84 female undergraduates respectively, while the third study used a 
highly ecologically valid sample of 99 women aged 35 and over who were deemed to 
be at greater risk for breast cancer.  
 
In two further studies, Goldenberg and colleagues (2009) also found that 
mammograms may pose an existential threat to both younger and older adults. In the 
first of these studies (n = 89), creaturely reminders led younger women who were 
high in neuroticism (i.e. due to their high scores on the Neuroticism subscale of the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory) to be less willing to imagine undergoing a 
mammogram when their mortality had been made salient to them compared to highly 
neurotic younger women who had their mortality made salient to them and were 
given reminders of human uniqueness. In the second of these studies, Goldenberg et 
al. (2009) further examined the existential threat posed by mammograms with a more 
ecologically valid sample of 84 women aged between 38 and 77. Highly neurotic 
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older women from this study who were given creaturely reminders just before they 
received a mammogram perceived a greater amount of discomfort with the procedure 
compared to highly neurotic older women who were given reminders of human 
uniqueness before they received a mammogram. These findings show that creaturely 
reminders can have significantly negative effects on women‘s intentions to perform 
gender-relevant cancer screening practices and can even have negative effects on 
their experiences of such practices. 
 
Rather than exhibiting such patterns of avoidance, Cooper, Goldenberg & Arndt 
(2011) found that women who were attending a mammography clinic for a 
mammography screening were more likely to display intentions to perform breast self 
examination when breast self exams were framed as empowering rather than when 
breast self-exams were framed as having a practical value (Study 1). Similarly, in a 
second study in their research programme, these authors found that women who were 
given information about breast cancer that contained mortality reminders and were 
subsequently distracted were more likely to report a heightened sense of 
empowerment after performing a breast self-exam framed as empowering than either 
women who did not receive a mortality reminder or women who were not exposed to 
the message that breast self-exams may be empowering.  
 
2.7 Point-of-Care Testing (POCT) 
POCT refers to any form of diagnostic testing that may be performed outside of a 
central clinical laboratory and at the point of patient care (Willmott & Arrowsmith, 
2010). Due to the potential for POCT devices to be used at point of patient care 
settings such as the home, a patient‘s workplace or school, a General Practitioners‘ 
offices, a mobile nursing practice, an ambulance, an emergency department or an 
intensive care unit in a hospital, POCT is generally regarded as a form of diagnostic 
testing that will aid immediate and appropriate action towards a potential health risk 
(e.g. Price, St. John & Hicks, 2004; von Lode, 2005). A key objective of this sort of 
testing is to provide rapid test results that will help to quickly generate appropriate 
treatment decisions for patients and improve clinical or economic outcomes (Price, 
2001). As such, these devices tend to be designed to be easy to use in order to assist 
in the immediate ruling in or out of a potential diagnosis, to reduce the number of 
steps required necessary for the detection of a significant health threat and to aid in 
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appropriate health decisions that may be made even by patients themselves at the 
point of care (Price et al., 2004).  
 
Some of the qualities that are considered ideal for POCT devices are portability, 
robustness, ability to reliably cope with small sample sizes, ability to produce 
accurate results in a timely fashion, amenability to quality control checks and ease of 
use and maintenance (Willmott & Arrowsmith, 2010). With this in mind, modern 
POCT devices have developed to the point where they are extremely easy to use and 
very reliable if they are handled correctly and operated according to specific 
guidelines (Price et al., 2004). These devices are particularly useful in the ―ruling in‖ 
of a diagnosis to enable appropriate action, ―ruling out‖ of a diagnosis or health-
related judgement and in situations where the test results suggest that the 
implementation of an intervention or modification of a current intervention for a 
patient‘s chronic disease would be beneficial to their prognosis (Price, 2002). POCT 
can also assist in the reduction of errors associated with clinical laboratory testing that 
relate to the misidentification of blood or tissue samples and the reduction of 
problems associated with sample collection and transport such as contamination and 
incorrect result interpretation (Drenk, 2001). This is because POCTs, such as the so-
called ―lab-on-a-chip‖ technologies, eliminate some potentially unnecessary steps in 
diagnosis such as washing processes between sample preparations (Lee, Kim, Chung, 
Demirci & Khademhosseini, 2010) and can remove the need for sample storage and 
transportation by allowing for testing to occur in situ on disposable ―cassettes‖ (von 
Lode, 2005). There are also economic advantages associated with POCT such as the 
reduction of costs associated with central laboratory services, transport costs for 
samples, reduced length of stay in the Emergency Department and more appropriate 
or rapid triage of patients. These advantages of POCT have been demonstrated 
consistently in a variety of experimental and clinical trials (e.g. Kendall, Reeves & 
Clancy, 1998; Hudson, Christenson, Newby, Kaplan & Ohman, 1999; Altieri & 
Camarca, 2001; McCord et al., 2001; Price, 2001; Stubbs & Collinson, 2001; 
Christenson & Collinson, 2004; Cramb, 2004; Price et al., 2004; Yang & Zhou, 2006; 
Dittmer et al., 2010; Du et al., 2011).  
 
A growing trend in POCT is the development of miniaturized and user-friendly 
diagnostic devices. The increased miniaturization of POCT devices means that 
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sizeable equipment and resources associated with central clinical laboratory services 
no longer need to be used in cases where an appropriate POCT device may be 
available. Specifically, such miniaturisation is thought to offer reductions in sample 
volumes and reagents associated with diagnostic testing, which could lead to smaller 
and more portable devices at lower manufacturing costs compared to many of the 
current central laboratory systems (von Lode, 2005). Similarly, the user-friendliness 
of such devices means that hospital staff and even patients themselves can learn to 
use these devices without having to undergo the extensive training of a laboratory 
clinician (e.g. Hicks, 2004; Spriggs, 2004). These developments have had the effect 
of moving certain forms of diagnostic testing that were previously confined to the 
central clinical laboratory towards hospital bedsides, ambulances and home settings 
(Bissell & Sanfilippo, 2002). The use of POCT at hospital bedsides has been found to 
give nurses a sense of empowerment as they can get results quickly and discuss them 
with a physician or act on them directly (Hicks, 2004). Point-of-care self-testing in 
home settings also has the effect of empowering patients with chronic conditions (e.g. 
Spriggs, 2004). Nonetheless, there are some recognised problems with POCT, 
including inefficient or inappropriate use, inappropriate maintenance and storage of 
the devices and accompanying chemical reagents, transmission of infection resulting 
from inappropriate sterilisation and risks associated with misinterpretation of results 
(Plebani, 2009). As a result, POCT guidelines suggest that laboratory personnel 
should be involved in the selection of devices, training of individuals to perform 
POCT for cardiac markers and the maintenance of equipment (e.g. Gouget, Barclay & 
Rakotoambinina, 2001; Nichols et al., 2007; Christenson & Azzazy, 2009). The most 
common POCT devices are the blood glucose monitors used by diabetics (Chan, 
Rozmanc, Seiden-Long & Kwan, 2009). Other common forms of POCT include 
blood coagulation monitors for haemophiliacs, salivary assays for the detection of 
HIV and serological diagnostic testing for rheumatoid arthritis. 
 
2.8 CVDs and POCT with Cardiac Markers 
A CVD is any disease that affects the heart itself or the system of blood vessels 
leading to and from the heart, including Coronary Heart Disease, stroke and other 
circulatory diseases. Such diseases are the number one cause of death globally each 
year (World Health Organisation, 2011). In Ireland, approximately 10,000 people die 
each year from CVD (Irish Heart Foundation, 2012) and sudden cardiac arrest as a 
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result of some form of CVD kills approximately 5,000 people every year (Irish Heart 
Foundation, 2011). CVDs are typically caused by the narrowing of a person‘s 
coronary arteries (those arteries that supply blood directly to the heart muscle tissue 
or myocardium) due to the build-up of fatty deposits or ―plaques‖ along the inner 
walls of these arteries, often as a result of elevated plasma cholesterol, smoking, 
hypertension and obesity. Such a build-up of plaques in an individual‘s arteries can 
lead to an inadequate supply of oxygen and nutrients to their heart (called ―cardiac 
ischemia‖). Sustained cardiac ischemia often results in myocardial infarction (the 
complete blockage of the supply of blood to the heart, more commonly known as a 
―heart attack‖) or heart failure (the weakening of the heart muscle to such a degree 
that it can no longer pump enough blood to meet the demands of the body).  
 
There are several reasons for the emergence of CVD-related POCT devices. Firstly, it 
has been estimated that between 35-70% of patients presenting at emergency 
departments with chest pain are false positives, producing negative economic 
consequences (McCord et al., 2001). Over-the-counter CVD-related POCT devices 
would remove the necessity for many of these patients to present themselves to 
emergency departments. Conversely, it is estimated that approximately 2-5% of 
myocardial infarction patients are incorrectly discharged from emergency 
departments in the United States each year, accounting for the highest incidence of 
medical malpractice lawsuits against emergency department physicians, according to 
the National Academy of Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory Medicine (Nichols et al., 
2007). Indeed, a current report has indicated that the number of false-negative 
discharges for myocardial infarction is particularly high in Ireland, at an estimated 
5% of discharged patients receiving an incorrect diagnosis (McDonnell, Hearty, 
Leonard & Kennedy, 2009). The development of CVD-related POCT devices for use 
by GPs who have easy access to their patient‘s medical records could remove the 
potential for such problems.  
 
On a related note, primary prevention of CVD has been regarded as particularly 
important due to the large number of fatalities or disabilities that occur after a primary 
coronary event (Kanstrup et al., 2002). Indeed, while myocardial infarction and its 
related syndromes often manifest in easily identifiable symptoms such as angina 
pectoris (severe chest pain due to a lack of oxygen to the heart muscle), fatigue or 
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dyspnea (shortness of breath), heart failure symptoms are non-specific, its clinical 
signs are not particularly sensitive and many diagnostic tests that are easily available 
are not always accurate enough to aid in a correct diagnosis (Peacock, 2002). The de-
centralised testing of CVD from laboratory settings would potentially resolve these 
sorts of mounting issues. 
 
Following some of these growing concerns in CVD detection and an escalating global 
interest in disease prevention, there has been a recent increase in the development of 
new POCT diagnostic instruments for the assessment of an individual‘s risk for 
developing CVD and that can be used without the need for a clinical laboratory 
(Christenson & Collinson, 2004). It is ultimately hoped that the development of these 
sorts of devices will de-centralise CVD diagnostic testing by providing quick and 
easy-to-use technologies that test for cardiac distress and provide a stratification 
index for an individual‘s future risk of developing CVD (McDonnell et al., 2009). 
Encouragingly, the POCT devices that have been developed so far (using biochemical 
markers of cardiac injury, also referred to as cardiac markers) have been consistently 
found to improve turn-around times and length of hospital stays for cardiac patients 
(e.g. Hudson et al., 1999; Altinier et al., 2001; Christenson & Collinson, 2004; 
Christenson & Azzazy, 2009). The use of such devices has also been found to allow 
all investigations and management decisions regarding cardiac risk resulting from 
suspected cardiac-related symptoms to be performed within a single clinical visit, 
thereby reducing the need for follow-up clinical visits (Cowie et al., 2003) and these 
devices have started to become a central part of therapeutic and interventional 
guidelines for individuals who are at risk for developing CVD (Christenson & 
Azzazy, 2009).  
 
In addition to such benefits, the investigation and use of cardiac markers in POCT has 
moved the diagnostic study of diseases within the bracket of CVD away from the 
biomedical concept of ―acute myocardial infarction‖ as a cut-off point for the 
indication of myocardial injury towards a degree of ―acute coronary syndromes‖ (e.g. 
Apple et al., 2006; Yang & Zhou, 2006; Body, 2008; Ryan et al., 2009; Scirica, 
2010). Consistent with the emerging concept of continuous myocardial injury (Wu et 
al., 1999), acute coronary syndromes vary from myocardial infarction to very minor 
heart problems like unstable angina, where myocardial injury indicated from cardiac 
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markers is reversible and does not yet correspond to CVD (Christenson & Azzazy, 
2009). POCT devices that use biomarkers of myocardial injury can provide a 
convenient route to the timely diagnosis, prognosis, monitoring and risk stratification 
of  acute coronary syndrome (Azzazy & Christenson, 2002), whereby reversible 
myocardial injury can be detected at an early stage and dealt with before the onset of 
CVD (Rathore et al., 2008). The rapid ruling-in or ruling-out of an acute myocardial 
infarction can also be delivered in ambulance or emergency room settings by serial 
measurements of cardiac markers (Stubbs & Collinson, 2001). These biomarkers may 
also be helpful for quickly diagnosing individuals who present to an emergency 
setting with suspected cardiac problems but obtain an uninterpretable ECG reading or 
have atypical symptoms (Hudson, et al., 1999).  
 
The cardiac markers used in these devices are proteins detectable at elevated levels in 
the bloodstream during the development of CVD, or after myocardial injury has taken 
place (McDonnell et al., 2009). Appendix A describes some of the most common 
cardiac markers that are used in POCT; Myoglobin, Creatine-Kinase-MB (CKMB), 
Cardiac Troponin T (cTnT), Cardiac Troponin I (cTnI), B-type natriuretic peptide 
(BNP) and C-Reactive Protein (CRP). Ideally, cardiac markers for use in POCT 
should be highly sensitive, highly specific, released quickly by the body and would 
remain elevated for a lengthy timeframe (Yang & Zhou, 2006). Unfortunately, such 
criteria have yet to be met with any of the current cardiac markers when they are 
measured individually (McDonnell et al., 2009).  
 
Following this limitation of CVD POCT-related devices which take singular 
measurements of cardiac markers in this fashion, there has been a growing trend 
towards diagnosis based on the use of several cardiac markers in combination in order 
to provide better risk stratification for mortality and myocardial injury (e.g. Newby et 
al., 2001; McCord et al., 2001; Ng et al., 2001; Ordóñez-Llanos et al., 2006; Kurihara 
et al., 2008; McCann et al., 2008; Rathore, Knowles, Mann & Dodds, 2008; McCann 
et al., 2009; Oemrawsingh et al., 2011). There is growing evidence to suggest that 
multiple markers help to speed up the ruling out of acute myocardial infarction and 
prevent unnecessary admissions to clinical settings (Aldous, in press). Diagnostic 
devices which analyse multiple cardiac markers together have also been found to 
determine the presence or absence of abnormal concentrations of several cardiac 
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markers in combination in an individual‘s bloodstream within a shorter time-frame 
than central laboratory testing methods (Yang & Zhou, 2006).  
 
The use of these devices typically involves placing a small quantity of blood onto a 
gel test strip or microfluidic chip that contains groups of antibodies which bind 
specifically to particular cardiac markers (Hudson et al., 1999). In order to allow the 
blood sample to flow along these test strips or chips into the detection zones where 
the groups of antibodies are located, nanostructures such as plastic capillaries or 
colloidal microbeads are typically embedded into the flow channels to optimise the 
speed of blood flow into these areas (e.g. Lee et al., 2010; Du et al., 2011). Clinical 
trials with such devices have found that they are rapid and easy to use without 
sacrificing analytic performance (e.g. Kurihara et al., 2008), that they can identify 
significantly more ―marker-positive patients‖ than laboratory-based single-marker 
testing (e.g. Newby et al., 2001) and that they can aid in the rapid discharge of 
hospitalised patients that are in the low-intermediate risk category (e.g. Rathore et al., 
2008). For example, using the ―Triage® Cardiac Panel‖ (Biosite) involving the point-
of-care measurement of 3 cardiac biomarkers (cTnI, CK-MB and Myoglobin), 
Rathore and colleagues (2008) were able to discharge one-third of their patients who 
had presented to an emergency department with ischemic chest pain.  
 
Although much of the current CVD-related POCT devices have been designed for use 
in ambulances or emergency departments, it has been suggested that the diagnostic 
testing of cardiac markers could be extended to primary care settings such as the 
home and GP‘s offices (e.g. Christenson & Collinson, 2004; von Lode, 2005). This 
suggestion is based on the idea that obtaining multiple measures of established 
cardiac biomarker levels at once can give an indication of early signs of myocardial 
injury that may be reversible by appropriate preventative steps (Yang & Zhou, 2006; 
Scirica, 2010). In this way, it is possible that emerging POCT devices for cardiac 
biomarkers could give an indication of an individual‘s future risk of developing CVD, 
thereby allowing for preventative measures to be taken in primary care settings. One 
such diagnostic device, the CVD Risk Biochip for the detection of future risk of 
developing CVD, is the main focus of the current research programme. 
 
 
  
 
 
 45 
2.9 The Current Research Programme 
The BDI in Dublin City University has proposed a novel POCT system for the rapid 
and easy assessment of CVD risk. The proposed system itself consists of two 
components; a ―CVD Risk Biochip‖ and a ―CVD Risk Biochip‖ reader. The ―CVD 
Risk Biochip‖ (See Figure 2.3) is a small device designed to detect the concentration 
levels of a number of different cardiac markers (e.g. Myoglobin, cTnI, CRP and 
BNP) in order to deliver a fast but highly accurate indication of an individual‘s future 
risk of developing CVD. In addition to the high specificity of the chemical 
components involved, the concentration levels of these cardiac markers would be 
tested on the chip itself in order to minimise the number of steps required to carry out 
a risk assessment of this kind. In this way, the system that the BDI have proposed 
would be relatively simple to use in order to enable a quick and easy assessment of 
cardiac risk.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: CVD Risk Biochip (Approximate Size) 
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the proposed CVD Risk Biochip could work. After a small 
pinprick of blood is taken from the patient, this blood sample would be placed on to 
the sample zone of the CVD Risk Biochip (Figure 2.4i). Tiny capillary-like structures 
on the chip would then allow this blood sample to flow from the sample zone across 
the surface of the chip (Figure 2.4ii) until it reaches a number of individual detection 
zones (Figure 2.4iii). Each of these detection zones would contain antibodies that 
specifically bind to a particular cardiac marker and have a fluorescent dye attached to 
them. Consequently, when the blood sample reaches the detection zones, the cardiac 
markers that are present in the blood sample specifically bind to the appropriate 
antibodies that are located in each of these zones and emit a certain amount of 
fluorescent signal which corresponds to the concentration levels of each of the 
appropriate cardiac markers that are present in the blood sample. 
  
 
 
 46 
 
Figure 2.4: Schematic of CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip itself is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader (See Figure 2.5) in 
order to measure the concentration levels of each of the cardiac markers of interest. 
Once the CVD Risk Biochip is inserted, the CVD Risk Biochip Reader measures the 
amount of fluorescent signal from each of the detection zones and indicates these 
concentration levels in a display. When taken together, these concentration levels can 
be taken to indicate a person‘s future risk for developing CVD.   
 
 
Figure 2.5: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
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The introduction of a device such as the CVD Risk Biochip has the capacity to move 
CVD risk assessment from its current settings in the hospital and laboratory to GP 
offices, ambulances and ultimately the home. This would provide benefits to the 
patient such as the ruling in or out of cardiac ischemia in the home, pre-hospital 
ambulance testing for patients suspected of suffering from myocardial infarction or 
heart failure, testing for heart failure in the GP‘s office and lower costs in the ruling 
in or out of heart problems than those associated with Electrocardiogram readings 
(Christenson & Collinson, 2004). By obtaining multiple measures of cardiac 
biomarker levels at once, the CVD Risk Biochip would also provide a quick 
indication of any minor damage to the heart that could lead to the later development 
of CVD. In this way, the CVD Risk Biochip would give an indication of the level of 
risk that an individual may have of developing CVD, provide GPs and patients with 
appropriate risk information in order that they may take appropriate steps to prevent 
the development of CVD and reverse the negative effects of early myocardial 
damage. However, there are several potential disadvantages in using a device like the 
CVD Risk Biochip in a POCT setting such as the home in favour of utilising central 
clinical laboratory services. These limitations include the fact that the device is 
proposed to measure only a few cardiac markers and the fact that a physician would 
be able to better interpret the results by referring to a patient‘s medical history. 
Furthermore, since CVD is an illness where death is a very real consequence, 
thoughts about developing the illness may create high levels of anxiety concerning 
death in the patient that may inhibit their uptake of such a device (e.g. van Steenkiste 
et al., 2004). Indeed, as discussed extensively above, an analogous effect has already 
been uncovered in TMT literature relating to cancer screening, where it was found 
that providing mortality reminders to participants led them to exhibit more 
defensively avoidant patterns of behaviour towards breast self-examinations, 
testicular self-examinations and mammograms (Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). 
 
Following on from such ideas, the current programme of research focused on whether 
or not existential anxiety could inhibit a person‘s uptake of the CVD Risk Biochip 
when such a device is made available for them to use. Specifically, the research 
programme examined whether or not a background context of existential concerns 
would lead to defensively avoidant responses towards the device as a distal defence. 
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The current research programme also focused on priming distal defences in 
participants in this way because distal defences are thought to be the mode of TMT 
defence that operate most consistently for people in everyday life (i.e. as thoughts of 
death and anxiety are not generally in one‘s focal attention; Muraven & Baumeister, 
1997). Distal defences typically involve behaviours or psychological processes which 
are purportedly adopted as ways of avoiding further reminders of one‘s mortality in 
order to prevent such reminders from re-entering conscious awareness (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000). In this 
way, the central studies in the current research programme (Studies 1, 2 and 4) were 
designed to simulate the sorts of conditions where participants would have been most 
likely to encounter existential anxiety in relation to the CVD Risk Biochip. In other 
words, these studies investigated whether or not existential anxiety below conscious 
awareness would lead people to be more avoidant of the device as a way of 
sidestepping reminders of mortality that may be associated with its use (i.e. whether 
or not they would exhibit lower behavioural intentions and commitment towards the 
device than controls). Additionally, the research programme explored whether or not 
these individuals would exhibit less favourable attitudes towards the device when 
existential concerns were just below their conscious awareness compared to controls. 
In sum, the programme was principally designed to test whether or not existential 
concerns that are below the level of consciousness could lead to greater defensive 
avoidance of the CVD Risk Biochip.  
 
In order to further explicate the applied value of these central research questions, it is 
useful to refer to current research in CVD and the previous TMT research regarding 
cancer-screening. Firstly, since there are high mortality rates associated with CVD 
(e.g. CVD has been reported to account for 36% of all deaths in Ireland; Irish Heart 
Foundation, 2012), use of a device like the CVD Risk Biochip has the potential to 
indicate that an individual has a high risk for developing CVD; an indication which 
could be seen to comprise a significant mortality reminder. As a result, the most 
likely way of avoiding mortality reminders associated with thoughts about using a 
device like the CVD Risk Biochip would appear to constitute defensive avoidance 
towards the device. Previous TMT cancer-screening research (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009) and theoretical reviews of TMT 
health-related research (e.g. Goldenberg, 2005) have also suggested that existential 
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concerns that are below the level of consciousness can lead to greater defensive 
avoidance of health-protective behaviours that have a potentially life-threatening 
component or which involve some degree of confrontation with the human body. 
Furthermore, according to proposition two of the TMHM (Goldenberg & Arndt, 
2008); health-oriented or risky health decisions will be adopted by an individual when 
mortality reminders are non-conscious to the extent that such behaviours serve to 
boost their self-esteem or provide protection for them against blows to their self-
esteem. In the current research programme, behavioural patterns of defensive 
avoidance could be seen as an effective distal defence strategy to prevent the potential 
blow to an individual‘s self-esteem of receiving information that they are at risk for 
developing CVD. This idea is derived from health psychology literature which has 
shown that people often tend to display patterns of defensive avoidance towards 
certain health-oriented behaviours when they perceive that performing such 
behaviours could threaten their health status (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; Cameron, 
1997; Luce & Kahn, 1999; Kahn & Luce, 2003; Brett et al., 2005) and that health 
threat detection behaviours have generally been found to have a greater capacity to 
threaten an individual‘s health status compared to health-promotion behaviours (e.g. 
Millar & Millar, 1993; Millar & Millar, 1995; Cameron, 1997; Millar, 2006).  
 
In the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, such patterns of ―distal defensive avoidance‖ 
might resemble the processes depicted in Figure 2.6 below. As illustrated in this 
diagram, individuals who receive mortality reminders (e.g. thinking about one‘s own 
death or thinking about having a heart attack), a distraction (e.g. reading a mundane 
death-neutral literature passage) and an introduction to the CVD Risk Biochip might 
exhibit more negative appraisals of the device, lowered behavioural intentions to use 
the device and lowered commitment to use the device compared to baseline responses 
on these dimensions. 
 
  
 
 
 50 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Potential Responses towards CVD Risk Biochip following Existential 
Reminders, a Distraction and an Introduction to the Device. 
 
Following the potential for such patterns of ―distal defensive avoidance‖ with respect 
to the CVD Risk Biochip, the principal aim of the current research programme was to 
examine whether or not an individual‘s experience of existential anxiety below 
conscious awareness could have an influence on their subsequent attitudes and 
behavioural intentions towards the device and commitment towards its use. As 
described above, in accordance with previous research and theoretical accounts that 
have made predictions about TMT within potentially analogous contexts 
(Goldenberg, 2005; Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008; Goldenberg et al., 
2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), existential anxiety below conscious awareness may 
inhibit the selective uptake of the CVD Risk Biochip by an individual as a means of 
avoiding further mortality reminders and this may serve as a means to maintain their 
self-esteem by circumventing a significant threat to their health status. 
Simultaneously, existential anxiety below conscious awareness may arouse negative 
attitudes in an individual towards such a device. In sum, the current research 
programme was devised in order to evaluate whether or not existential concerns that 
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are just below someone‘s conscious awareness could have an effect on their attitudes, 
intentions and commitments to use the CVD Risk Biochip. By investigating such 
research questions, the programme constitutes a unique application of TMT to the 
uptake of POCT devices and seeks to explore the relationship between death-related 
thoughts and CVD-related events like heart attacks for the first time. Additionally, as 
with a number of recent TMT research studies involving cancer-screening behaviours 
(e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), the current research 
programme extends TMT to middle-aged and older adult participants for its principal 
research questions rather than employing the typical convenience samples of 
psychology students used in most of the prior TMT research, thereby providing a 
potentially more ecologically valid context for the examination of existential 
concerns.  
 
In line with the above ideas, the first two studies in the current programme of research 
were constructed in order to investigate whether or not getting participants to think 
about their own personal death or what would happen to them if they experienced a 
heart attack (as opposed to reminding them about a control topic such as dental pain), 
and subsequently distracting them so that these thoughts were at the fringes of 
consciousness but still readily accessible, would decrease their intentions and 
commitments to use the device and lead them to elicit more negative attitudes 
towards the device as a means of sidestepping the potential threat to their health status 
that use of the device could entail. Following previous TMT research (e.g. Greenberg 
et al., 1994; Greenberg et al., 2000; Arndt et al., 2007), both of these studies primed 
participants to experience a distal mode of defence (i.e. an unconscious TMT 
defence) towards death rather than a proximal mode of defence (i.e. a conscious TMT 
defence) by furnishing participants with a distraction task to complete after they were 
asked to think about their own death, having a heart attack or the control topic of 
dental pain. These studies are documented in Chapters 3 and 4 which follow. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
 
Study 1 was primarily focused on whether or not unconscious existential anxiety 
would pose a barrier to male and female participants aged over 55 years of age with 
respect to their intentions and commitment to use the CVD Risk Biochip and whether 
or not such anxiety would have an impact on their accompanying attitudes towards 
the device. The study employed participants over 55 years of age as they were 
deemed to be the most relevant age cohort for this study. More specifically, 
advancing beyond 55 years of age had been previously identified as the most 
powerful independent risk factor for developing CVD (World Health Organization, 
2004). In addition to seeking the recruitment of an ecologically valid sample of this 
nature, the current study controlled for potential gender differences in health threat 
detection behaviours.  
 
TMT research relating existential concerns to health threat detection behaviours has 
yet to examine health threats for which the risk of development is not specific to a 
particular gender. Indeed, although the first three of Arndt et al.‘s (2007) studies 
involving participants responses towards thoughts about contracting cancer tended to 
focus on cancer in a more general sense, these studies focused on male or female 
participants separately (e.g. Studies 1 and 2 in their research programme focused on 
female participants alone and Study 3 in their research programme contained 43 men 
and 11 women). Additionally, their studies which examined behavioural intentions 
towards cancer screening focused on the gender-specific screening behaviour of 
breast exam intentions or testicular cancer self-examination intentions (Studies 4 and 
5). Similarly, Goldenberg et al. (2008), Goldenberg et al. (2009) and Cooper et al.‘s 
(2011) studies were only relevant to women. However, CVD can be considered to be 
a set of diseases that is not gender-specific like breast cancer or testicular cancer. For 
instance, it has been estimated that 5,000 women die from CVDs in Ireland each year 
(Irish Heart Foundation, 2011); approximately half the estimated average annual 
mortality rate for CVDs in the country (Irish Heart Foundation, 2012). While such 
statistics suggest that CVD may be equally relevant to both genders, there is also 
evidence to suggest that males and females may exhibit different patterns of health-
relevant behaviours. For instance, some prior TMT health research uncovered gender-
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related differences in the willingness to perform risky health behaviours resulting 
from existential anxiety (e.g. Hirschberger et al., 2002; Taubman Ben-Ari & Findler, 
2003). Furthermore, there is an abundance of health psychology research that 
suggests that gender is a significant component in the adoption of health-related 
behaviours. 
 
3.0.1 The Impact of Gender on Health Behaviours 
Gender has consistently been found to contribute to individual participation in health-
related behaviours (for an extensive review of some pertinent literature pertaining to 
this area see Courtenay, 2000a). In general, men tend to participate in a greater 
number of behaviours that are damaging towards their health than women and many 
studies have demonstrated that men tend to have more severe drinking problems and 
tend to drink more frequently than women (e.g. McCreary, Newcomb & Sadava, 
1999; Huselid & Cooper, 1992; Stillion, 1995). Men are also more likely than women 
to engage in substance abuse (Cotto et al., 2010). Furthermore, men are more 
predisposed to participate in a broad range of physically dangerous activities 
(Garrison, McKeown, Valois & Vincent, 1993). For instance, men are considered to 
be more reckless drivers than women (Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2003) and it is 
estimated that men are three times more likely than women to drink and drive and are 
less likely to report that they regularly wear a safety belt than women (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2000). Men are also more prone towards using 
violent behaviour to achieve their ends than women (Wallner & Machatschke, 2009). 
A corollary of the above findings is that women tend to be less prone to self-
destructive forms of behaviour than men. 
 
In addition to engaging in less behaviour that is detrimental to their health and well-
being, women have also been found to engage more frequently in health-oriented 
behaviours and health-seeking information than men (Liang, Shediac-Rizkallah, 
Celentano & Rohde, 1999). In this regard, women are inclined to report attending a 
physician more regularly than men (Parslow, Jorm, Christensen, Jacomb & Rodgers, 
2004). With regard to cancer screening, women attend screening for colorectal cancer 
more often than men despite the fact that men have a higher risk of developing this 
form of cancer (Evans, Brotherstone, Miles & Wardle, 2005), women express greater 
intentions to participate in screening behaviours associated with cancer detection than 
  
 
 
 54 
men (Janda et al., 2004) and women have better knowledge of risk factors for cancer 
(Wardle, Waller, Brunswick & Jarvis, 2001) and warning signs for cancer 
(Brunswick, Wardle & Jarvis, 2001) than men. Women are also more likely to feel 
relieved and less likely to feel indifferent towards test screening results than men 
(Marteau, Dundas & Axworthy, 1997).  
 
There is also consistent evidence to suggest that women tend to cope with stress in a 
more constructive fashion than men. In this regard, a meta-analytic study by Tamres, 
Janicki & Helgeson (2002) found that women were significantly more likely to use 
active coping strategies, to seek social support for both instrumental and emotional 
reasons and to engage in problem-focused coping compared to men. Furthermore, 
men were found to consistently use more avoidant patterns of behaviour as a way of 
coping with personal health problems (Tamres et al., 2002). Elsewhere, it has been 
found that women generally tend to use a greater number of social support networks 
than men in dealing with stress (e.g. Baum & Grunberg, 1991; Lynn et al., 2009). 
Women may even tend to participate in a greater amount of health-related research 
than men (e.g. Van Wijk, Huisman & Kolk, 1999).   
 
Gender differences in health behaviours have been attributed to stereotype gender 
behaviours that are culturally conditioned. In this regard, Courtenay (e.g. 2009; 
2000a; 2000b; 1998) has argued through social constructionist theory that women and 
men behave in different ways in their cultural environments due to concepts about 
femininity and masculinity that are culturally conditioned from birth. For example, 
boys are encouraged to be less dependent than girls from an early age (e.g. Aries & 
Olver, 1985; Lytton & Romney, 1991) and are sometimes actively discouraged from 
seeking help from their parents or other adults (e.g. Fagot, 1984). This idea has been 
supported by a recent comprehensive research study by Lynn and colleagues (2009) 
involving 950 participants, which found that women tend to engage in a greater 
number of reassurance-seeking behaviours linked to health worries than men. 
Courtenay (2009) also argues that gendered demonstrations of avoiding health 
behaviours and engaging in risky behaviours are extremely important for men in 
many developing countries in order to maintain a patriarchal sense of power (e.g. in 
countries such as India where men are culturally constructed as being more self-
sufficient, healthy, physically stronger, and hence, more powerful). As a 
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consequence, men from these cultures may demonstrate risky behaviours and avoid 
health-oriented or health-seeking behaviours that they consider to be more feminine 
in character in order to project a masculine image and to uphold cultural standards of 
masculinity (e.g. Courtenay, 2000a; Courtenay, 2000b; McCreary, Saucier & 
Courtenay, 2005).  
 
Although such gender differences in health behaviour patterns appear to be robust, 
they may decrease with age (e.g. Airey et al., 1999; Liang et al., 1999; Tseng & Lin, 
2008). For instance, several studies have found that there is a general pattern of 
reduced risk-taking behaviours and increased health-enhancing behaviours among 
both males and females as they get older (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Airey et al., 
1999). For instance, while young college-going males tend to report being less 
vulnerable or susceptible to health risks than their female counterparts (e.g. Boehm et 
al., 1993), this difference may diminish by older age (e.g. Liang et al., 1999; Tseng & 
Lin, 2008). This could be seen to result from fixed gender roles of younger male 
adults giving way to increasing concerns about diseases and health status as they 
grow older (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Apostolidis et al., 2009). However, self-
efficacy with respect to the health behaviours involved may have an important role in 
this pattern (Grembowski et al., 1993). Moreover, this moderating effect of age on 
gender differences in relation to health behaviours is only supported in some of the 
literature on this topic; there has been some research to suggest that gender 
differences in health behaviours persist in older adults (e.g. Chan & Jatrana, 2007). 
As a result, the moderation of gender differences in health behaviours with age 
requires further investigation in order to confirm or deny whether or not these effects 
are reliable and generalisable to multiple populations of participants. Consequently, a 
decision was made to include gender as a covariate in each of the planned analyses in 
the current study that related to attitudes, behavioural intentions and commitment to 
use the CVD Risk Biochip in order to control for potential gender differences on 
these dimensions.  
 
3.0.2 The Current Study 
While factoring in gender and age-related concerns in the manner described above, 
the current study examined whether or not unconscious existential anxiety would 
have an impact on older adults‘ reactions towards the CVD Risk Biochip. More 
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specifically, the current study investigated if getting people to think about their own 
death (Mortality Salience) would decrease their intentions to use the device and lead 
to more negative attitudes towards it compared to participants who were asked to 
think about a control topic. Following previous TMT research relating to cancer-
screening (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), it 
was predicted that participants over 55 years of age would exhibit less favourable 
attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip and would be less likely to express 
behavioural intentions or commitments to use the device after they were made aware 
of their mortality and subsequently distracted when compared to participants who did 
not have their mortality made explicitly salient to them.  
 
This study also investigated whether or not asking people to think about having a 
heart attack (i.e. ―Heart Attack Salience‖) and then distracting them from these 
thoughts would similarly decrease their intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip and 
lead them to elicit more negative attitudes towards the device than controls. Indeed, if 
CVD is associated with thoughts of death, priming thoughts relating to the former 
should increase thoughts about the latter through a spreading activation between the 
concepts of CVD and death (e.g. Arndt et al., 2002; Arndt et al., 2007). Following 
this logic, one group of participants in this study were primed to think about ―heart 
attacks‖. Participants were asked to ―think about having a heart attack‖ rather than 
being asked to ―think about developing CVD‖ because it was reasoned that a heart 
attack represents a significant CVD-related event that is particularly tangible and 
occurs at a specific point in time. In contrast, since CVD may develop over a number 
of years, thinking about developing CVD may represent a less tangible and vaguer 
temporal event. Another reason for using the term ―heart attack‖ over CVD arose 
from the possibility that participants may not have known what the term CVD 
explicitly meant, whereas ―heart attack‖ is a term that is used in common parlance 
and is a major component of CVD. Following these considerations, it was predicted 
that participants would display less favourable attitudes towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip and would be less likely to express behavioural intentions or commitments to 
use this device after they were asked to think about having a heart attack and were 
subsequently distracted relative to participants who were asked to think about a 
control topic.   
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3.1 METHOD 
   
3.1.1 Design 
This study incorporated a three group independent measures design as a function of 
the salience task that participants received. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the Control condition, the Mortality Salience condition or the Heart Attack Salience 
condition respectively. The study employed the block randomisation method with 
respect to the questionnaire booklets that participants received; allowing for 
participants to be equally allocated to each group as the recruitment progressed. Since 
the effect sizes for studies involving a Mortality Salience induction are typically quite 
large (average Cohen‘s d = 1.2, as reported by Arndt & Vess, 2008), the study 
contained 13 participants per cell in order to obtain sufficient statistical power of 0.80 
(as per the tables provided by Cohen, 1992) in preparation for a three group 
MANCOVA design with two dependent variables (i.e. a total of 78 participants). 
 
3.1.2 Participants 
Seventy-eight participants over 55 years of age volunteered to participate (35 males 
and 43 females). Recruitment was carried out via contact with Active Retirement 
Groups and additional organizations accessible to the researcher that contained 
individuals within this age range. A named person from each of these groups 
established initial contact with group members and introduced the research study to 
them as one that related to ―aspects of health and better ways of knowing about your 
health‖. Those participants who indicated an interest in participating in the study were 
contacted independently by the researcher with a view to arranging individual or 
group meetings where the research could be conducted in a controlled environment 
(e.g. in a boardroom or office). When a controlled environment was not readily 
available, participants completed the questionnaire in their homes, where they were 
supervised to ensure that they were not distracted and that each of the sections of the 
questionnaire were completed in the order in which they were presented. 
Additionally, before taking part, all participants had to confirm that they had never 
experienced a significant negative heart-related event (e.g. a heart attack) on the 
Consent Form (Appendix B1) that they were given to sign and complete. 
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3.1.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was sought and granted for the programme from the Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee. Before participating, all candidates were 
given a Plain Language Statement (Appendix B1) to read. This Plain Language 
Statement indicated that they were free to withdraw at any time, acknowledged the 
source of funding and confirmed that all data would be stored anonymously and 
confidentially. Potential participants were then given the opportunity to ask any 
questions that they had in relation to the Plain Language Statement and Questionnaire 
Booklet. Once they were satisfied, those who agreed to take part in the study 
proceeded to sign a Consent Form (Appendix B1), where they indicated their 
intention to participate and confirmed that they had never experienced ―a negative 
heart-related event (e.g. a heart attack)‖. 
 
Once they had completed and signed the Consent Form, participants were given one 
of three possible Questionnaire Booklets (see Appendix C1-C3 for the Mortality 
Salience Questionnaire, the Heart Attack Salience Questionnaire and the Control 
Questionnaire respectively). They were instructed that each Questionnaire Booklet 
contained various sections that would require them to give their attitudes and opinions 
on various topics, including questions relating to health and healthcare. In particular, 
participants were instructed that they would be asked to give their opinions on a novel 
diagnostic device that was currently being developed, which they were assured was a 
genuine device. The first part of the questionnaire booklet included either a Mortality 
Salience task, or a Heart Attack Salience task or a Control task, depending on the 
condition to which the participant was assigned. This was followed by a distraction 
task taken from the TMT literature, information on the CVD Risk Biochip, a measure 
of attitudes towards the device, a measure of behavioural intentions to use the device 
and a novel measure which gave participants the opportunity to commit to using the 
device. Participants were instructed to complete each section in the questionnaire in 
the order presented and not to skip between sections. Completion of one of the 
Questionnaire Booklets took an average of about 20 minutes. Afterwards, participants 
were debriefed by the researcher as to the full nature of the study and they were each 
given the opportunity to discuss any queries or concerns that they may have had in 
relation to the study. A Debriefing Sheet (Appendix G1) was also given to 
participants to take away. This Debriefing Sheet contained slightly more detailed 
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information concerning the design, aims and objectives of the study than the 
information that had been provided to participants in the debriefing session. 
 
3.1.4 Materials 
3.1.4a Mortality Salience/Heart Attack Salience/Control Tasks    
Participants received a Mortality Salience task, a Heart Attack Salience task or a 
Control task. The Mortality Salience task is the most widely used task in TMT 
studies, having been used in over a hundred TMT studies as a way of reminding 
people about their mortality (e.g. Burke et al., 2010). The task consists of two open-
ended questions that allow participants to explicitly think about their own death and 
what may happen to them when they physically die. These questions are ―Please 
briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouse in you‖ and 
―Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead‖. As described above, the Heart 
Attack Salience task was developed specifically for this study in order to allow 
participants to explicitly think about having a heart attack and what would happen to 
their bodies if they were to experience a heart attack. In this way, the Heart Attack 
Salience task removed the word ―death‖ from the two open-ended questions and 
replaced it with the word ―heart attack‖. The Control task was analogous to the other 
tasks and involved replacing the subjects ―death‖ or ―heart attack‖ with ―dental pain‖ 
(a similarly aversive topic that does not relate to issues surrounding mortality; e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1995). 
 
3.1.4b Distraction Task          
Prior TMT research has established that individuals engage in distal defences when 
thoughts of mortality are just below their conscious awareness (e.g. Pyszczynski et 
al., 1999). Therefore, a distraction task is typically administered to participants in 
TMT research in order to allow conscious mortality concerns to subside before the 
dependent measures are introduced. The distraction task used in this study consisted 
of a short literary passage for participants to read accompanied by a couple of 
questions which were purported to assess participants‘ opinions about certain aspects 
of the passage. The passage itself was an extract from ―The Growing Stone‖ short 
story by Albert Camus (1957), taken from ―Exile and the Kingdom‖. This extract and 
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the accompanying questions have been used as a distraction task in this way in 
several prior TMT studies (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994). 
 
3.1.4c CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet       
The distraction task in the Questionnaire Booklets was followed by an information 
sheet regarding the CVD Risk Biochip. This information sheet was developed in 
consultation with a core member of the BDI in order to accurately represent the 
proposed workings of the CVD Risk Biochip. Scientific references and technical 
words were replaced, where possible, with lay terms and the information sheet was 
designed to conform to Plain Language guidelines (e.g. Plain English Campaign, 
2008). Several diagrams illustrating the workings of the CVD Risk Biochip were also 
included with permission from the BDI.  
 
3.1.4d CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale        
A CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale was developed for the current research study in 
order to specifically tap into participants‘ attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip. 
The scale took the form of a series of opinion statements rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale, from ‗strongly disagree‘ to ‗strongly agree‘. Items focused on attitudes towards 
diagnostic testing for patient use (e.g. ―Moving diagnostic testing from hospital 
settings to the home is a great idea.‖), emotional reactions towards the device (e.g. 
―The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious and intimidated‖) and evaluations of 
its usefulness (e.g. ―The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more 
active approach to their health‖). Several of these items were developed with 
reference to the content of items from the Krantz Health Opinion Survey (KHOS; 
Krantz, Baum & Wideman, 1980). For instance, the item from the KHOS ―It's almost 
always better to seek professional help than to try to treat yourself‖ was modified to 
become ―Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals‖.  
  
3.1.4e CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intention Scale      
The CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intention Scale used in the Questionnaire 
Booklets contained 3 items adapted from the ―Breast Self Exam Intention 
Questionnaire‖ that had been used in previous TMT literature (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008). These items measured participants‘ current feelings about 
using the CVD Risk Biochip (e.g. ―At this moment, the thought of using the CVD 
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Risk Biochip is particularly unappealing‖) and represented differing degrees of 
emotion at the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip in the future. Three additional 
items were also developed to assess participants‘ potential future intentions to use the 
CVD Risk Biochip (e.g. ―If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is 
highly likely that I would buy it‖).  
 
3.1.4f “De Facto Intentions” Measure        
The back page of the questionnaire invited participants to sign up for a pilot study 
involving the CVD Risk Biochip. This page gave the following instructions to 
participants: 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. 
However, once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may 
require some people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be 
interested in taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your 
contact details on the sign-up sheet that you will now be presented with. These 
contact details will be kept in a secure location and would only be forwarded 
on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the pilot investigation go 
ahead.   
 
Below these instructions, a space was provided for participants to provide their name 
and contact details. This sign-up sheet was included as a way of measuring 
participants‘ ―De Facto Intentions‖ to use the device (i.e. their commitment to use the 
device in the future). Any of the sign-up sheets that contained a participant‘s contact 
details were separated from the remainder of the Questionnaire Booklets and kept in a 
location that remained separate from the Questionnaire Booklets in order to ensure 
the confidentiality and anonymity of participants. The anonymous Questionnaire 
Booklets that had contained a sign-up sheet with contact details were also marked in 
order to account for which participants had indicated their commitment to use the 
device in the proposed pilot study. 
  
The central rationale behind the use of the sign-up sheet in the current study was to 
control for the possibility that hypothetical bias might have had an impact on 
participant‘s responses to the behavioural intentions items, since it was reasoned that 
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participants in this study may have been uncertain that the CVD Risk Biochip was a 
genuine device, despite the assurances of the researcher. Hypothetical bias refers to 
an individual‘s overestimation of their potential performance of a particular behaviour 
in a situation where the presence of a hypothetical scenario places the possibility of 
the individual‘s performance of the behaviour in question at a distance (Ajzen, Brown 
& Carvajal, 2004). Such biases have often been found in health psychology literature, 
where weak links are frequently reported between behavioural intentions and actual 
behaviour (e.g. Morrwitz, Johnson & Schmittlein, 1993; Sutton, 1998; Sheeran, 2002; 
Bhattacherjeea & Sanford, 2009; Carrington, Neville & Whitwell, 2010). Research 
into hypothetical bias has also found weak links between peoples‘ attitudes and their 
actual behaviours (e.g. Fazio & Williams, 1986; Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Ajzen & 
Sexton, 1999; Ajzen, 2000). Despite these problems, the ―corrective entreaty‖ method 
suggested by Cummings & Taylor (1999) has been found to successfully reduce 
hypothetical bias by instructing participants to specifically picture themselves in the 
hypothetical scenario of interest (e.g. Brown, Ajzen & Hrubes, 2003; Ajzen et al., 
2004). Such a methodology has the potential to remove the tendency for participants 
to overestimate readiness to perform socially desirable behaviours and underestimate 
readiness to perform socially undesirable behaviours through their commitment to 
performing the behaviour of interest (Ajzen et al., 2004). Following this, the current 
study provided participants with the opportunity to commit to using the device in a 
proposed pilot study, thereby attempting to circumvent the potential for hypothetical 
biases that may have been present in the attitudes and behavioural intentions scales. 
In this way, it was hoped that the De Facto Intentions measure would tap into 
participants‘ actual intentions to use the device.  
 
3.1.5 Pilot Evaluation 
An initial pilot phase of the questionnaire booklets was carried out to ensure that the 
questionnaire items were easy to understand and made sense to participants and that 
the instructions to participants were clear. Within this pilot phase, the first 10 
participants were given a pilot evaluation questionnaire after completing the research 
questionnaire. This pilot evaluation questionnaire asked each participant whether or 
not they found any aspect of the Questionnaire Booklet that they received to be 
unclear or ambiguous and to specifically indicate if there were any items that they 
found to be ambiguous, misleading or difficult to understand. The pilot evaluation 
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questionnaire also asked participants to indicate how long it took them to complete 
the Questionnaire Booklet (15-20 minutes on average). None of these participants 
found any of the questions to be ambiguous, misleading or difficult to understand and 
each of them indicated that they found the questionnaire to be interesting and easy to 
read. This finding was not unusual, as all of the information sheets and questions 
were developed with reference to Plain Language guidelines (Plain English 
Campaign, 2008). Consequently, it was decided that none of the information in the 
Questionnaire Booklets needed to be revised or reworded and that the pilot data could 
be used in later data analyses.    
 
3.1.6 Ethical Issues 
There were a number of ethical considerations with regard to the current study, which 
were raised at the time that Ethical Approval was sought from the Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee.  
 
One component of this study that could have been seen to contain a mild risk for 
participants was the completion of the Mortality Salience task, which asked 
participants to think about their own death. This is because participants may have 
become significantly distressed at the prospect of having to write about their own 
personal death. However, in comparison to other aversive events, Mortality Salience 
does not appear to elicit observable increases in negative affect on self-reports or 
physiological measures of anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1992b; Greenberg et al., 1995). 
For example, Studies 2 and 3 of Greenberg et al (1995) found that asking participants 
to think about death did not significantly increase self-reports of negative affect on 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) in comparison to controls who had 
been asked to think about television. In contrast, participants who had been asked to 
think about an upcoming exam were found to self-report significantly more negative 
affect than controls. Additionally, discussions of death and mortality are encountered 
by most people in everyday life (e.g. by reading a newspaper report, hearing of a 
neighbour‘s death or attending the funeral of a loved one). Therefore, it was argued 
that getting participants to think about death and mortality should not constitute a risk 
that is greater than one which is normally encountered in everyday life. It should also 
be noted that TMT authors have never reported that any of their participants had 
become extremely upset or distressed in reaction to the Mortality Salience task. 
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Whereas some participants may have expressed slight discomfort at the prospect of 
thinking about their own death, they have always indicated in debriefing sessions that 
they did not object to being asked to think about this topic and that they did not find it 
to be particularly stressful (Tom Pyszczynski, personal communication, 26th August 
2008). The same was found to be the case with participants in the current study, 
although one individual declined to participate further upon encountering the 
Mortality Salience task. Nonetheless, this individual did not appear to be distressed 
about the prospect of completing this task; instead she indicated that she would 
simply prefer not to complete the task.  
 
In a similar vein, the Heart Attack Salience task could have been seen to contain a 
mild risk for participants as it had the potential to trigger unpleasant memories about 
past experiences with heart disease (e.g. due to the death of loved ones from heart 
problems). However, in the same way that people encounter the issues of death and 
mortality on a daily basis, heart problems and issues surrounding CVD risk are 
frequently discussed in newspapers and other forms of media (e.g. advertisements for 
heart attack panic buttons or statistics on the prevalence of CVD). Additionally, in 
their study on Cancer Salience, Arndt et al. (2007) did not find that their participants 
were overly distressed at the prospect of thinking about developing cancer. Therefore, 
if thinking about developing cancer did not provoke significantly high levels of 
distress among Arndt et al.‘s (2007) participants, it was reasoned that it would be 
unlikely for participants in the current study to find thoughts about having a heart 
attack to be overly distressing, as the level of threat associated with both of these 
types of thought could be considered to be broadly similar (i.e. cancer and heart 
attacks both have high mortality rates). Finally, in order to control for the possibility 
that people who had previously suffered from heart problems might become 
emotionally distressed by the Heart Attack Salience task, the Consent Form contained 
a statement where participants had to confirm that they had never experienced a 
significant negative heart-related event (e.g. a heart attack).  
 
An additional potential concern in the current study was that its true nature was 
hidden from participants. Although this may be seen as a mild form of deception, it is 
important to note that certain psychological research questions require an element of 
deception in order to avoid the conscious reactions of participants towards the 
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variables of interest (Bröder, 1998). This was true of the current study because it 
involved the effects of existential anxiety on participants‘ attitudes and behavioural 
intentions. If participants had known that the study involved the effects of existential 
anxiety on their attitudes and intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip, they may have 
biased their responses (Bröder, 1998). Many previous studies have used a similar 
method to this one in order to remove such biases. According to Section 8.07 of the 
American Psychological Association‘s ―Ethical principles of psychologists and code 
of conduct‖ (2002), deception in psychological research is permitted if it has been 
determined that non-deceptive methods are not feasible and that the deception is 
justified by the applied value of the study in question. The current study could be seen 
to have had significant applied value in its potential for uncovering a barrier to 
people‘s willingness to engage in health-promoting behaviours and, consequently, the 
mild deception was considered to be justified. Additionally, it should be noted that 
participants in TMT studies have not been found to become upset or distressed by this 
mild deception in hundreds of studies with thousands of participants that have used a 
similar methodology to this one (Tom Pyszczynski, personal communication, 26th 
August 2008). Finally, a thorough debriefing was given to participants after they 
completed a questionnaire that revealed the purpose of the study, any deceptions used 
(such as the full nature of the research study and the purpose of the De Facto 
Intentions Measure), and why they were needed to study the question at hand. No 
participants raised any concerns or complaints over how the study was conducted. 
 
3.1.7 Data Analyses 
3.1.7a MANCOVA Analysis          
In order to assess if there were differences in a participants‘ positive or negative 
appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip as a function of their experimental condition, a 
one-way between-groups multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was 
planned for the attitudes and behavioural intentions data as dependent variables with 
gender included as a covariate. Despite the fact that the design of the current study 
could be seen to contain two high-threat conditions (i.e. Heart Attack Salience and 
Mortality Salience) and a neutral condition, thereby potentially increasing the 
possibility of a Type II error, a three-group MANCOVA was deemed appropriate in 
this case for a couple of reasons. Firstly, Heart Attack Salience is a novel measure for 
priming existential threat that had never been used in any prior TMT studies. 
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Consequently, this measure could not be clearly assumed to represent either a high, 
medium or low-threat condition. Additionally, it was deemed necessary to conduct a 
three group MANCOVA rather than two separate MANCOVAs between each of the 
respective high threat groups and the control group in order to avoid capitalising on 
chance. More specifically, since multiple statistical tests of significance can 
significantly increase the likelihood of committing a Type I error (e.g. Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2007) and Type II are less serious than Type I errors in 
behavioural science research (e.g. Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000), it was deemed more 
appropriate to conduct a single MANCOVA on the three groups. 
 
It was also deemed necessary to include gender as a covariate in this analysis for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the plethora of research on gender differences in health 
behaviours has suggested that men are less likely to perform health-oriented 
behaviours than women, particularly when these sorts of behaviours involve health 
threat detection of some kind (e.g. Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, et 
al., 2004). This effect has also been corroborated by some prior TMT literature, 
which noted gender differences in the willingness to perform risky behaviours (e.g. 
Hirschberger et al., 2002; Taubman Ben-Ari & Findler, 2003). Additionally, although 
some research has suggested that this effect diminishes as individuals become older 
(e.g. Airey et al., 1998; Liang et al., 1999; Tseng & Lin, 2008), some research has 
suggested that gender differences in health behaviours persist in older adults (e.g. 
Chan & Jatrana, 2007). Consequently, it was deemed necessary to remove any 
potential bias in attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip 
as a function of gender by including this variable as a covariate in subsequent 
analyses. 
 
3.1.7b Logistic Regression  
A logistic regression was planned for the De Facto Intentions Measure as a dependent 
variable in order to assess if a participant‘s gender or assignment to one of the three 
experimental groups would help to predict the odds of whether or not they chose to 
sign up for the purported pilot study pertaining to the CVD Risk Biochip. As with the 
MANCOVA, gender was included in the logistic regression model from the outset in 
order to control for the potential differences between males and females in pursuing 
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health-oriented behaviours (e.g. Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, et 
al., 2004).  
 
3.2 RESULTS 
3.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
Demographic information pertaining to the total sample is given in Table 3.1.  
 
Variable N % 
Age   
55-64 54 69.2 
65+ 24 30.8 
Gender   
Male 35 44.9 
Female 43 55.1 
Table 3.1: Demographic Information for Study 1 
 
 
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Participants had given a rating for each item on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
and the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale on a 5-point Likert scale, 
from 1 = ―Strongly Agree‖ to 5 = ―Strongly Disagree‖. However, prior to analyses, 
all items on these scales that were negatively phrased (e.g. ―The CVD Risk Biochip 
will only serve to frighten people about their health‖) had their scores reversed so that 
all of the values reflected the same directionality. What remained was a 5-point scale, 
from 1 = highly negative to 5 = highly positive behavioural intentions or attitudes 
towards the device. The mean and standard deviations for the individual items in the 
Attitudes and Behavioural Intentions Scales are provided in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively and reflect these re-scored values. 
  
 
 
 
 Mortality Salience Heart Attack 
Salience 
Control Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 4.35 0.75 4.58 0.64 4.35 0.69 4.42 0.69 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 2.54 1.39 2.62 1.39 2.50 1.33 2.55 1.36 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
4.08 0.80 3.92 0.89 3.96 0.96 3.99 0.88 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people 
about their health. 
3.69 1.29 4.27 0.92 3.35 1.23 3.77 1.21 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 4.35 0.69 4.54 0.65 4.23 0.86 4.37 0.74 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the 
home is a great idea. 
3.73 0.92 4.04 1.31 3.85 1.08 3.87 1.11 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 3.77 1.37 4.15 1.26 3.77 1.31 3.90 1.31 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a 
more active approach to their health. 
4.42 0.64 4.27 0.67 4.04 1.00 4.34 0.79 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 4.27 0.67 4.46 0.95 4.35 0.94 4.36 0.85 
Table 3.2: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale by Condition (Re-scored Values) 
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 Mortality Salience Heart Attack 
Salience 
Control Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it 
is highly likely that I would buy it. 
3.65 1.13 3.19 1.30 2.96 1.59 3.27 1.36 
2. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is 
highly likely that I would use it. 
4.54 0.86 4.58 0.86 4.46 0.91 4.53 0.87 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful 
device but I probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
3.73 1.28 3.96 1.28 3.81 1.13 3.83 1.22 
4. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use 
the CVD Risk Biochip. 
3.65 1.19 3.31 1.44 3.27 1.54 3.41 1.39 
5. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk 
Biochip is particularly unappealing. 
3.73 1.22 3.88 1.37 3.65 1.44 3.76 1.33 
6. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk 
Biochip makes me feel uncomfortable. 
3.85 1.26 4.42 1.07 3.85 1.29 4.04 1.22 
Table 3.3: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale by Condition (Re-scored Values) 
 6
9
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3.2.3 Principal Component Analysis  
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was performed on both the CVD Risk Biochip 
Attitude Scale and the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale. PCA was 
chosen over Factor Analysis following Hair et al.‘s (2007) recommendation that PCA 
is preferable when the central focus of the analysis is data reduction. A central aim of 
the analyses was to ensure that all items on each scale represented a single construct 
(i.e. attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip and behavioural intentions towards the 
use of the CVD Risk Biochip respectively) in order to ensure that there was sufficient 
statistical power for the planned MANCOVA to follow.  
 
An additional aim of the current analysis arose from the desire to find a central 
component for each of the scales that contained both positively phrased items and 
negatively phrased items in order to control for ―acquiescence response set‖ answers. 
Acquiescence response set is the tendency of certain individuals to respond in 
agreement to answers on questionnaires, irrespective of their content (Cronbach, 
1946), and has long been regarded as a threat to the validity of scale development. 
One way to control for acquiescence response set is to vary the valency of questions 
in a scale so that they are phrased in both positive and negative ways (Winkler, 
Kanouse & Ware, 1982). Following this logic, the wording of the items on each scale 
had been varied so that the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale contained five 
positively-valenced items and four negatively-valenced items, while the CVD Risk 
Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale contained three positively-valenced items and 
three negatively-valenced items. Additionally, it was deemed necessary for a potential 
construct arising from the PCA to contain several responses that were positively 
phrased and several responses that were negatively phrased. In light of this 
consideration, it was decided that the component that best represented several 
responses from both negatively phrased and positively phrased answers would be 
kept for subsequent analysis if two component solutions emerged from the PCA 
which equally accounted for the percentage of variance exhibited by items in the 
scale. 
 
3.2.3a PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
Before PCA was carried out on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale data, its 
suitability for PCA was assessed by observing the correlation matrix and the anti-
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image correlation matrix, performing a Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin analysis and running 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity. Initial inspection of the correlation matrix revealed many 
coefficients of 0.3 and above, suggesting that the data might be suitable for PCA. 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) achieved statistical significance, also 
supporting the data‘s suitability for PCA. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) value was 
0.82, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1974) and most of the 
Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) that were produced in the anti-image 
correlation matrix were above the recommended value of 0.7 (as per the 
recommendations of Pett, Lackey & Sullivan, 2003).  
 
Despite the suitability of this data for PCA, one of the items, ―Diagnostic Testing 
should be left to the Professionals‖, obtained an MSA value of 0.67. As indicated 
above, a central aim for the PCA on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale was to 
achieve a resultant component with both negatively phrased and positively phrased 
items that related to participants‘ appraisals of the CVD Risk Biochip. Since this 
particular item did not specifically refer to the device and contained a slightly low 
MSA value, it was determined that the item might represent a different construct to 
the appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip (i.e. the item might relate to the broader 
construct of attitudes towards diagnostic testing). Consequently, this item was 
removed and the initial suitability analyses were re-run with the remaining eight 
items. These suitability analyses revealed an improvement in the KMO value (0.83), a 
strengthening of the MSA values in the anti-image correlation matrix (all MSA values 
>0.75) and the Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity also achieved statistical significance. 
Accordingly, the remaining eight items were deemed suitable for PCA. 
 
The unrotated PCA solution for these remaining eight items revealed the presence of 
two components with eigenvalues exceeding 1. These components explained 48.26% 
and 14.69% of the variance respectively. The scree plot for this analysis also revealed 
a clear break after the third component. According to Hair et al (2007), it is best for 
any individual component to account for at least a single variable (i.e. an eigenvalue 
over 1) in order for that component to be retained for interpretation. Additionally, Pett 
et al. (2003) note that extracted factors are expected to account for 50-60% of the 
variance in social science studies. Following these ideas, a decision was made to 
retain the two components for further investigation. In order to assist the 
  
 
 
72 
interpretation of these components, an Oblimin rotation was performed. As per Hair 
et al.‘s (2007) recommendations, in cases where components are only moderately 
correlated, it may be considered more appropriate to use an oblique rotation like 
Oblimin. An Oblimin rotation was chosen over a Varimax rotation in this case as the 
Component Correlation Matrix revealed a moderate correlation of 0.37 between the 
two components. A result more closely approaching simple structure was obtained 
from the Pattern Matrix (Table 3.4) rather than the Structure Matrix (Table 3.5). 
Therefore, the former Matrix was chosen as a means to interpret the component 
loadings for the rotated solution in line with Pett et al.‘s (2003) recommendations.  
 
Item Component 
1 2 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten 
people about their health. 
0.91 -0.20 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 0.76 0.01 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 0.67 0.21 
4. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the 
home is a great idea. 
0.66 -0.06 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a 
more active approach to their health. 
0.60 0.38 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 0.52 0.47 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device -0.06 0.88 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about 
my health 
0.02 0.79 
Table 3.4: Pattern Matrix for the Oblimin Rotation Solution for the 8-Item 
      Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
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Item Component 
1 2 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten 
people about their health. 
0.84 0.13 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 0.76 0.29 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 0.75 0.46 
4. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to 
the home is a great idea. 
0.74 0.60 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to 
take a more active approach to their health. 
0.70 0.67 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 0.64 0.19 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device 0.26 0.85 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered 
about my health 
0.31 0.79 
Table 3.5: Structure Matrix for the Oblimin Rotation Solution for the 8-Item  
Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
Examination of this Matrix revealed that there were four items that loaded 
substantially on to the first component, with each of these items obtaining a factor 
loading above 0.65. Despite this finding, the rotated components revealed the 
presence of cross loadings on two of the variables in the Pattern Matrix. Although the 
loadings on these items were higher for the first component, the loadings for both of 
these items were above 0.3 for the second component. It was also discovered that 
there were two items that loaded strongly on to the second component. These items 
were; ―The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device‖ and ―The CVD Risk 
Biochip makes me feel empowered about my health‖. A decision was made to 
remove these latter two items and to re-run the PCA analysis on the remaining 6 
items. The main rationale for this decision was the consideration that the content of 
both of these items represented a degree of positive appraisal towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip. In contrast, the four items with clear strong loadings on the first component 
contained a mixture of both positively phrased and negatively phrased items. Since 
the main purpose of this PCA was data reduction and this component appeared to 
account for a greater percentage of variance explained, it was decided to retain the 
items in the first component and to re-run the analysis. This component also 
contained both negatively phrased and positively phrased items concerning 
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participants‘ attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip, suggesting that it is unlikely 
that this component contained items with an ―acquiescence response set‖ bias. 
Additionally, since the oblique rotation may have distorted the loadings of the two 
items with cross-loadings on both components, these two items were included in the 
PCA which followed. 
 
Table 3.6: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 6-Item 
Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
Appropriate analyses of the remaining 6 items revealed that they were suitable for 
PCA [many correlations >0.3 in the correlation matrix (Table 3.6), a significant 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity, a KMO value of 0.83 and the remaining MSA values 
>0.7]. The unrotated PCA solution revealed the presence of a single component (see 
Table 3.7 for factor loadings) as there was only one component with an eigenvalue 
over one and an examination of the scree plot revealed a clear break after the second 
component. This component accounted for 56.50% of the variance alone. Although 
this percentage of variance is slightly lower than the variance explained by the eight-
item two-component solution, this solution still managed to account for a realistic 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 M   SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip will 
only serve to frighten people 
about their health. 
1.00      3.77 1.21 
2 The CVD Risk Biochip is a 
valuable new device. 
0.45 1.00     4.37 0.74 
3. Moving diagnostic testing 
from hospital settings to the 
home is a great idea. 
0.56 0.36 1.00    3.87 1.11 
4.  The CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel anxious 
0.51 0.51 0.25 1.00   3.90 1.31 
5.  The CVD Risk Biochip will 
encourage people to take a 
more active approach to their 
health 
0.50 0.62 0.38 0.49 1.00  4.34 0.79 
6.  The CVD Risk Biochip is an 
unnecessary device. 
0.45 0.57 0.27 0.58 0.62 1.00 4.36 0.85 
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percentage of explained variance in the 50-60% expected range of social science 
research (as per Pett et al., 2003), and managed to do so with a single component 
solution. Additionally, this solution supported the current use of PCA to achieve a 
component solution with a balance of both negatively phrased and positively phrased 
items. A reliability analysis of these six items revealed a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.82, 
indicating that the resultant component was highly reliable.  
 
Item Component 
1 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to 
take a more active approach to their health. 
0.81 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 0.79 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 0.79 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten 
people about their health. 
0.76 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 0.75 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to 
the home is a great idea. 
0.59 
Table 3.7: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 6-Item Solution of the  
       CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
3.2.3b PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
Suitability of the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale data for PCA was 
once again assessed by observing the correlation matrix and the anti-image 
correlation matrix, performing a KMO analysis and running Bartlett‘s Test of 
Sphericity. The correlation matrix revealed many coefficients of 0.3 and above and 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity achieved statistical significance; both supporting the 
data‘s suitability for factor analysis. In addition, the KMO value was 0.81 and all of 
the MSA values in the anti-image correlation matrix were above the recommended 
value of 0.7. The unrotated PCA solution also revealed the presence of a single 
component as there was only one component with an eigenvalue over one and the 
scree plot revealed a clear break after the second component. This component 
accounted for 56.57% of the variance alone, which was within the realistic expected 
range for social science research (as per Pett et al., 2003). This solution also 
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supported the current use of PCA to achieve a component solution with a balance of 
negatively and positively phrased items.  
 
A reliability analysis of the six items revealed a highly reliable Cronbach‘s Alpha of 
0.85. However, this reliability analysis also revealed that there would be a potential 
increase in explained variance by approximately 6% and a very minor increase in 
Cronbach‘s Alpha (of 0.005) if the item ―I would buy the CVD Risk Biochip if my 
GP recommended it‖ was removed. It was reasoned that the increase in explained 
variance if this item was removed could relate to the finding from the Health 
psychology literature that older adults tend to follow their GP‘s recommendations 
closely with respect to their health (e.g. Schofield, Croteau & McLean, 2005). In 
other words, the majority of older participants in this study may have responded 
favourably towards this item due to their high levels of trust for their GPs; a trend in 
participants‘ responses which may have reduced the variation in responses towards 
this item. Indeed, such a reduction in the variation of participants‘ responses was 
confirmed when the high mean (4.53) and low standard deviation (0.87) for the item 
was compared to the other items in Table 3.3. In order to avoid the possibility that 
participants had responded favourably towards this item because of a cohort-based 
trend, it was decided to remove this item and re-run the analysis with the remaining 
five items.  
 
The five items that remained were found to be suitable for PCA as many correlations 
were greater than 0.3 in the correlation matrix (see Table 3.8), Bartlett‘s Test of 
Sphericity returned a significant result, the data had a KMO value of 0.81 and all MSA 
values in the anti-image correlation matrix were greater than 0.7. Inspection of the 
scree plot revealed a clear break after the second component and there was only one 
component with an eigenvalue greater than 1, leading to the conclusion that a single 
component solution was suitable in this case (see Table 3.9 for factor loadings 
relating to this single component solution). As expected from the prior reliability 
analysis, this component accounted for 62.80% of the variance alone, supporting the 
use of PCA to achieve a behavioural intentions scale that represented a single 
construct. A reliability analysis of these five items revealed a similarly highly reliable 
Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.85. Consequently, the five-item solution was retained for 
further analysis. 
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Table 3.8: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 5-Item Solution of 
the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
 
Item Component 1 
1. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip 
makes me feel uncomfortable. 
0.86 
2. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
0.81 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device 
but I probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
0.80 
4. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD 
Risk Biochip. 
0.77 
5. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
0.72 
Table 3.9: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 5-Item Solution of the CVD  
           Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 M   SD 
1.  If I saw this device in a 
supermarket or pharmacy, it 
is highly likely that I would 
buy it. 
1.00     3.27 1.36 
2.  The CVD Risk Biochip sounds 
like it could be a useful 
device but I probably 
wouldn’t use it myself. 
0.45 1.00    3.83 1.22 
3.  At this moment, I feel 
particularly motivated to use 
the CVD Risk Biochip. 
0.52 0.55 1.00   3.41 1.39 
4. At this moment, the thought of 
using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
0.52 0.61 0.50 1.00  3.76 1.33 
5. At this moment, the thought of 
using the CVD Risk Biochip 
makes me feel 
uncomfortable. 
0.41 0.54 0.50 0.73 1.00 4.04 1.22 
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3.2.4 Data Clean-up, Tests of Normality and Transformations of the Data Scales 
Following PCA, each participant‘s scores on the remaining six items on the CVD 
Risk Biochip Attitude Scale were added together to form a composite attitudes score. 
Likewise, participants‘ scores on the remaining five items on the CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intentions Scale were added to form a composite behavioural intentions 
score. Tests of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, Shapiro Wilks statistics, 
histograms with normality plots and Normal Q-Q Plots) on both sets of composite 
scores indicated a negative skew in the data. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to 
transform the data in an attempt to approximate normality in each set of composite 
scores in preparation for the MANCOVA. Following Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2001) 
guidelines, several transformations were attempted for each data set. A logarithm 
transformation to base 10 (LG10) was deemed most appropriate for the composite set 
of attitudes scores as it achieved a set of scores that closely approximated a normal 
distribution, while squaring the behavioural intentions composite scores achieved a 
result that most closely approached normality. These transformed sets of scores were 
used in the analyses that followed. 
 
3.2.5 MANCOVA on the Behavioural Intentions and Attitudes Data 
Before carrying out the MANCOVA, preliminary checks indicated that the 
transformed attitudes and behavioural intentions data sets did not violate its 
underlying assumptions. Specifically, there were no violations of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, absence of univariate and multivariate outliers, absence of 
multicollinearity, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, independence of the 
covariate from the experimental treatment and reliability of the measurement of the 
covariate. Levene‘s test of Equality of Error Variances revealed an insignificant result 
for the attitudes data (p = 0.82) but a significant result for the behavioural intentions 
data (p = 0.04). Because of this latter result, the subsequent MANOVA analysis was 
performed at a reduced alpha level of 0.025, rather than the conventional 0.05 level, 
as per Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2001) recommendations.  
 
The MANCOVA revealed that there were no statistically significant differences 
between the three groups on the combined dependent variables after controlling for 
gender as a covariate: F(4, 146) = 1.21, p = 0.31; Wilk‘s Lambda = 0.94; η² = 0.03. 
As a result, no further post-hoc tests of between-subjects effects were deemed 
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necessary between the groups. Table 3.10 provides Descriptive Statistics for the 
untransformed dependent variables by condition and covariate of gender. The 
MANCOVA also revealed no statistically significant differences between males and 
females on the combined dependent variables: F (2, 73) = 0.79, p = 0.46; Wilk‘s 
Lambda = 0.98; η² = 0.02.  
 
 Condition M SD Gender M SD 
Attitudes Data  Mortality Salience 24.23 4.25 Male 24.29 4.70 
 Heart Attack 
Salience 
25.73 3.86 Female 24.70 4.35 
 Control 23.58 5.14 
Behavioural Intentions 
Data 
Mortality Salience 
 
18.62 4.50 Male 17.69 4.81 
  Heart Attack 
Salience 
18.77 4.54 Female 18.81 5.44 
  Control 17.54 6.35 
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics for the Untransformed MANCOVA Dependent 
              Variable Scores by Condition and Covariate of Gender 
 
3.2.6 Logistic Regression of De Facto Intentions  
In preparation for a logistic regression analysis, each data point was recoded so that 
responses on all of the variables represented binary data (i.e. each data point was 
coded with either a value of 0 or a value of 1 with respect to each of the variables of 
interest). Firstly, the data from the De Facto Intentions Measure (the dichotomous 
dependent variable) was coded with a value of 0 to denote that a participant had not 
signed up for the pilot study and a value of 1 to denote that a participant had signed 
up for the study. Similarly, gender was recoded so that a value of 0 represented a 
female participant and a value of 1 represented a male participant. Finally, the 
condition variable was recoded into two separate binary dichotomous variables. The 
first of these variables, ―MORTCOND‖, indicated whether or not a participant was a 
member of the Mortality Salience condition. A value of 1 on this variable represented 
a participant‘s membership to the condition and a value of 0 represented a 
participant‘s membership to one of the alternative experimental conditions. Similarly, 
the new variable ―HEARTCOND‖ was coded to indicate whether or not a participant 
was a member of the Heart Attack Salience condition, with a value of 1 representing a 
participant‘s membership to the condition and a value of 0 representing a participant‘s 
membership to one of the alternative conditions. A corollary of these values was that 
a value of 0 on both the MORTCOND and the HEARTCOND variables connoted a 
participant‘s membership to the Control condition.  
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Preliminary checks of the data confirmed that there was an absence of 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. A test of the full model with 
three predictors (including the two separate variables to indicate a participant‘s 
membership to one of the experimental conditions) against a constant-only model 
indicated no significant differences; X² (3, n = 78) = 1.62, p > 0.05. This result 
indicated that neither membership to one of the experimental conditions nor gender 
helped to reliably predict whether or not a participant had signed up for the pilot 
study pertaining to the CVD Risk Biochip. Table 3.11 shows regression coefficients, 
Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals relating to odds ratios for 
each of the three predictors.  
 
Table 3.11: Logistic Regression Analysis, Containing Regression Coefficients, Wald 
Statistics and Odds Ratios for the Predictors and the Constant term and 95% Confidence 
Intervals Relating to Odds Ratios for the Predictors  
 
3.2.7 Content Analyses of the Open-ended Salience Measures 
A series of content analyses of participants‘ responses to the open-ended salience 
measures was conducted in order to investigate if either Heart Attack Salience or 
Mortality Salience primed more thoughts about death than the control measure. 
Following Arndt et al.‘s (2007) content analyses of their ―Cancer Salience‖ measure, 
two independent coders (the researcher and an additional coder who was unaware of 
the exact nature of the study) recorded the number of participants‘ death-related 
words ( = 1.00) and the total number of words that they used in their responses to 
the open-ended salience questions ( = 1.00). The coders also independently rated 
participants‘ open-ended responses on the following four dimensions by using a 6-
 95% Confidence Interval 
For Odds Ratio 
Variables B Wald Chi- 
Square 
Odds  
Ratio  
Lower Upper 
MORTCOND -0.17 0.09 0.85 0.28 2.57 
HEARTCOND 0.55 0.84 1.73 0.53 5.64 
Gender -0.18 0.14 0.84 0.32 2.16 
Constant 0.55 1.45 1.73   
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point Likert scale, ranging from 0 = not at all to 5 = very much: a focus on death or 
survival themes ( = 1.00), negativity expressed ( = 0.99), degree of threat 
expressed ( = 1.00) and degree of shallow or deep writing in the open-ended 
responses( = 0.99). The coders‘ ratings on each dimension were then compared and 
their individual Likert scale responses for each item were subsequently averaged to 
form a single set of scores on each dimension as there were high levels of agreement 
between their independent sets of scores. As per Arndt et al.‘s (2007) method, 
separate ANOVAs were conducted on each of these dimensions, except in the cases 
of the negativity and threat dimensions, where an ANOVA was conducted on an 
averaged threat-negativity dimension, as these two measures were very highly 
correlated (r = 0.86).  
 
Separate ANOVAs on the number of death-related words and focus on death or 
survival themes both revealed violations of Levene‘s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances. As a consequence, these ANOVAs were conducted at a reduced alpha 
level of 0.025, rather than the conventional 0.05 level, as per Tabachnick & Fidell‘s 
(2001) recommendations. Even with such reduced alpha levels, both of these analyses 
revealed highly significant main effects of salience condition. Respectively, these 
main effects were; F (2, 75) = 12.30, p < 0.001, ² 0.25 and F (2, 75) = 81.47, p < 
0.001, ² 0.68. Post-hoc tests revealed that there was no significant difference 
between participants‘ responses towards the Heart Attack Salience task (M = 2.50, SD 
= 2.21) or Mortality Salience task (M = 2.46, SD = 2.37) on their number of death-
related words but that there were significant differences on this dimension between 
participants from the Heart Attack Salience and Control conditions (M = 0.23, SD = 
0.43) and that there were significant differences on this dimension between 
participants from the Mortality Salience and Control conditions. Similarly, there was 
no significant difference between participants‘ responses towards the Heart Attack 
Salience task (M = 3.17, SD = 1.05) or the Mortality Salience task (M = 3.00, SD = 
1.09) with respect to their focus on death or survival themes but there were significant 
differences on this dimension between participants‘ responses in the Heart Attack 
Salience and the Control conditions (M = 0.19, SD = 0.63) and between participants‘ 
responses in the Mortality Salience and Control conditions 
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With respect to the combined threat-negativity dimension, an ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of salience condition: F(2, 75) = 14.20, p < 0.001, ² 0.27Post-hoc 
analyses on this dimension revealed significant differences between each of the 
conditions. While participants from the Heart Attack Salience condition (M = 3.25, 
SD = 0.85) experienced significantly more threat-negativity than either the Control 
participants (M = 2.56, SD = 1.07) or the Mortality Salience participants (M = 1.75, 
SD = 1.11) with respect to the open-ended questions, a particularly interesting finding 
was that participants from the Control condition experienced significantly more 
threat-negativity than participants from the Mortality Salience condition.   
 
Finally, while there was no significant main effect of salience condition for the total 
word count in participants‘ responses [F(2, 75) = 1.91, p > 0.05,² 0.11], there was 
a significant main effect of salience condition for the degree of shallow or deep 
writing in participants‘ responses [F(2, 75) = 4.70, p < 0.05,² 0.05]. With respect 
to the latter finding, there were no significant differences between the responses of 
participants from the Heart Attack Salience condition (M = 2.19, SD = 0.85) and 
those participants from either the Control condition (M = 1.63, SD = 1.04) or 
Mortality Salience condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.02). However, the results did indicate 
that participants from the Mortality Salience condition displayed significantly deeper 
writing than participants from the Control condition.  
 
3.3 DISCUSSION 
The central hypotheses pertaining to this study were rejected due to a lack of 
significant differences between the experimental conditions on the main dependent 
variables. Firstly, the pattern of non-significant differences with respect to 
participants‘ behavioural intentions and commitments to use the CVD Risk Biochip 
led to a rejection of the hypothesis that participants would be less likely to express 
intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip after they were asked to think about having a 
heart attack or their own mortality and subsequently given a distraction task to 
complete compared to control participants who did not have mortality or heart attacks 
made salient to them. Similarly, the absence of significant differences between the 
conditions on participants‘ attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip led to a rejection 
of the hypothesis that participants would exhibit less favourable appraisals of the 
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device after they were asked to think about having a heart attack or their own 
mortality and were subsequently distracted relative to control participants. As a side 
note, the finding that there was no significant impact of gender among participants 
from this cohort is consistent with some health psychology literature that 
demonstrates a moderating effect of gender differences in health behaviour patterns 
with older adults (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Liang et al., 1999).  
 
3.3.1 Possible Explanations for the Rejection of the Experimental Hypotheses 
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of significant differences 
between participants who were primed to think about their death or having a heart 
attack and participants who were primed to think about the death-neutral control topic 
of dental pain with respect to their attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip, 
behavioural intentions towards the device and commitment to use it in the future. 
 
One explanation for these sets of results is that the CVD Risk Biochip does not 
contain enough implicit death reminders to create the potential for existential anxiety. 
Following this line of thought, if a device of this kind does not inherently contain 
reminders of mortality, one could argue that the distal defences involving the 
defensive avoidance of behaviours with the potential to detect fatal illnesses that were 
found in other TMT studies (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; 
Goldenberg et al., 2009) do not necessarily apply to the CVD Risk Biochip. However, 
such an idea does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, this explanation does not intuitively make sense, as CVD has an extremely 
high mortality rate and there is widely published information in relation to this, 
including extensive media campaigns in Ireland that has involved the dissemination 
of CVD risk information booklets to schools and workplaces and the broadcasting of 
information about CVD risk on the radio and television (e.g. Irish Heart Foundation, 
2011; Irish Heart Foundation, 2012). It logically follows that CVD should be 
associated with thoughts concerning death. This would also mean that priming 
thoughts relating to CVD and the CVD Risk Biochip should increase thoughts about 
death through a spreading activation of this association between CVD and death, 
following prior TMT research with respect to the spreading activation of death-
related thoughts (e.g. Arndt et al., 2002; Arndt et al., 2007). Additionally, this 
explanation goes against the findings of previous research on the topic of defensive 
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avoidance with respect to behaviours associated with life-threatening conditions. For 
instance, this explanation runs contrary to findings from the analogous TMT research 
programmes (Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), 
who found that explicit mortality reminders prompted an increase in defensively 
avoidant responses towards cancer-screening behaviours. There is also much 
evidence from the health psychology literature to suggest that people often try to deny 
and avoid potential risk information concerning CVDs (e.g. Cameron & Leventhal, 
1995; Luce & Kahn, 1999; Emslie et al., 2001; O‘Carroll et al., 2001; Kahn & Luce, 
2003; Van Steenkiste et al., 2004; Brett et al., 2005; Caldwell et al., 2007).   
 
Another more fundamental reason why the explanation that the CVD Risk Biochip 
does not have the potential to elicit existential anxiety does not make sense relates to 
the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet that was presented to participants in this 
study. Upon further examination of this sheet, it would appear that it contained 
several impersonal mortality reminders. An example of such a reminder was the 
introductory paragraph relating to CVD itself, which indicated that such diseases 
―cause more deaths globally each year than any other disease (approximately 30% of 
all deaths)‖. Other details on the sheet that could be seen to contain mortality 
reminders are the references to how the device works by measuring several proteins 
in the blood and the suggestion that it is necessary to take a small pinprick of blood 
from someone in order to use the device. These references to blood and physical body 
composition could be seen to draw attention to the more creaturely aspects of being 
human. Emphasising creaturely aspects of human existence in this way has been 
found in certain strands of TMT literature to produce the same sorts of responses as 
other types of mortality reminders (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 
2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008). As stated earlier, both Becker (1973) 
and Goldenberg (2005) have given a thorough account of why this effect occurs by 
demonstrating how awareness of the human body can remind humans of their 
physicality, similarity to other animals and vulnerability to death and decay. 
Following such ideas, it is unlikely that the above explanation adequately accounts 
for the results because there would appear to be several mortality reminders present in 
the information presented to participants. 
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Another possible explanation for the absence of any significant moderating effect of 
unconscious existential anxiety on attitudes, behavioural intentions and behavioural 
commitments towards the CVD Risk Biochip is that the sorts of implicit mortality 
reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet that are detailed above could 
have elicited a proximal defensive reaction in participants. As described in Chapter 2 
(pages 1-23 - 1-24), proximal defences in TMT typically consist of rationalising 
threat-focused methods that serve to remove death-related thoughts from the focus of 
attention such as cognitive distortions that serve to deny one‘s vulnerability to 
mortality reminders or health-promoting promises that contiguously deal with 
mortality concerns by sublimating them (as per Pyszczynski et al., 2000). With 
regards to the current study, one could argue that participants used the availability of 
the CVD Risk Biochip as a means to distract themselves from their vulnerability to 
the potential risk of obtaining a diagnosis of CVD after reading the general 
information about CVD-related deaths and the references to blood and physical body 
composition in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet. This explanation arises 
from the facts that 1) the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet, which potentially 
contained mortality reminders, was presented to participants after the distraction task 
had already been presented to them and 2) the behavioural intentions and attitudes 
questions were presented to participants immediately after they had read this 
information sheet. That is to say, the completion of attitude and behavioural 
intentions items immediately after having received a passage to read which contained 
potential mortality reminders may have meant that these mortality reminders were 
still consciously present for participants when they answered the aforementioned 
items.  
 
Although there is mild support for this alternative explanation for the non-significant 
results (i.e. the negatively skewed attitude and behavioural intention results across all 
conditions that were found in this study suggests that all participants reacted 
positively towards the device), it also does not appear to be plausible. First of all, it 
should be noted that negatively skewed results are often associated with attitude and 
behavioural intention scales in health-related research (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001), so there is no reason to suggest that such a pattern of results in the current 
study were specifically related to the potential mortality reminders provided in the 
CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet. This explanation also does not appear to make 
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sense as one would expect that conscious thoughts about participating in behaviours 
relating to the detection of a life-threatening disease would pose a potential threat to 
an individual‘s perceptions of good health following prior health psychology research 
(e.g. Millar & Millar, 1993; Millar & Millar, 1995; Millar, 2006; Caldwell et al., 
2007). According to the first proposition of the TMHM (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008), 
a proximal defence will be adopted in the face of conscious mortality reminders to the 
extent that this defensive strategy is effective in facilitating the removal of the 
mortality reminders from immediate conscious awareness. In the current scenario, the 
threat associated with thinking about using the CVD Risk Biochip would appear to 
offset any cognitive reduction in vulnerability associated with a proximal defensive 
reaction of positive attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the device, 
particularly since proximal defences are purported to be of a somewhat conscious and 
vulnerability-denying nature (e.g. Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; 
Greenberg et al., 2000; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). In other words, agreeing to 
perform the health-oriented behaviour of using the CVD Risk Biochip does not 
appear to represent a defence against conscious mortality reminders. This is because 
an individual who is in a conscious mode of thought would not succeed in avoiding or 
denying mortality reminders by agreeing to perform this health-oriented behaviour 
which has the potential to provide life-threatening information. On the contrary, 
agreeing to perform such a health-oriented behaviour would appear to bring one 
closer to the possibility of receiving further conscious mortality reminders.  
 
A final reason why this explanation does not appear to be credible relates to the 
nature of the potential mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information 
Sheet. Specifically, these potential mortality reminders could be seen as relatively 
subtle and general reminders because they did not explicitly make the participants 
aware of their own personal potential risk of developing CVD. For instance, the 
information provided did not explicitly draw attention to each participant‘s inherent 
risk factor for developing CVD by being over the age of 55 but drew attention to the 
prevalence of CVD in a more general fashion. TMT research into distal defences has 
found that subtle reminders of mortality tend to produce distal defences in 
participants rather than proximal defences (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994), even in the 
absence of a delay or distraction. As a result, the apparent subtlety of the mortality 
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reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip would appear to suggest that a proximal 
defensive reaction would not appear to be at work in this instance.  
 
Following this latter argument that the subtle reminders of mortality that were present 
in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet should have led to distal defences in 
participants, it could be argued that the negatively skewed behavioural intentions and 
attitude responses from participants resulted from a cultural worldview defensive 
reaction from participants from each of the conditions in this study towards such 
reminders. This alternative type of distal effect would consist of participants putting 
their faith in science and upholding the cultural worldviews of scientific progress, 
much like the processes described by Becker in the opening chapters of his 
posthumously published book ―Escape from Evil‖ (1975). In this book, Becker 
suggests that modern Western man has transferred much of his faith that was 
previously in magic, religious or spiritual tradition into modern machines. Machines 
themselves can be interpreted as symbols that embody the very values of scientific 
measurement. In this way, Becker argues that we put our faith in symbols of science 
with the same sort of ritual trust that was previously associated with traditions linked 
with the non-material world:  
Besides our belief in the efficacy of machine control of nature has in itself 
elements of magic and ritual trust. Machines are supposed to work, and to 
work infallibly, since we have to put all our trust in them. And so when they 
fail to work our whole world view begins to crumble-just as the primitives' 
world view did when they found their rituals were not working in the face of 
western culture and weaponry. I am thinking of how anxious we are to find 
the exact cause of an airplane crash, or how eager we are to attribute the exact 
cause of the crash to "human error" and not to machine failure (p. 9, Becker, 
1975).  
 
This sort of distal defence has already been uncovered in some more recent TMT 
research, where it was found that existential reminders led to increased support for the 
cultural worldview of scientific progress among lay participants (e.g. Rutjens, Van 
der Pligt & Harreveld, 2009; Rutjens, Harreveld & Van der Pligt, 2010). In support of 
this sort of distal defence in the current study, one would have expected to find a 
negative skew in participants‘ attitude and behavioural intentions responses towards 
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the device if such a defence were to have been present. As previously stated though, 
negatively skewed data are often associated with attitude and behavioural intention 
scales in health-related research (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Consequently, 
there is no evidence to suggest that these sorts of effects are specific to mortality 
reminders. Additionally, the subtle death reminders that were present in the CVD 
Risk Biochip information sheet did not represent particularly personal mortality 
reminders in the same way that the subtle reminders that were present in previous 
TMT research studies did (e.g., where participants were asked to think about the 
death of a relative or close friend in Study 1 of Greenberg et al., 1994). Instead, these 
mortality reminders were quite general and impersonal. Prior research from health 
psychology suggests that these sorts of general mortality reminders are often 
psychologically minimised by people (e.g. Croyle & Sande, 1988; Van Steenkiste et 
al., 2004; Peretti-Watel et al., 2007). Consequently, it is less likely that these sorts of 
mortality reminders would be particularly threatening to participants who read the 
CVD Risk Biochip Information sheet unless these participants had already been in the 
receipt of mortality reminders of a more personal nature (e.g. by having completed 
either the Heart Attack Salience task or the Mortality Salience task).   
 
Another reason why the distal defensive reaction of supporting a scientific cultural 
worldview does not appear to have been likely among participants in the current 
study is the idea that defensive avoidance would logically seem to be a more effective 
distal defence. By way of explanation, the availability of a defensive avoidance 
reaction in the current study and the greater potential for such a reaction to 
circumvent the possibility of receiving an existentially threatening health status which 
could act as a significant blow to an individual‘s self-esteem (i.e. through removing 
the prospect that one might receive life-threatening information by avoiding the 
potential to acquire such information) would suggest that a defensive avoidance 
strategy may have been a more effective distal defence in this case. Indeed, as 
indicated previously, prior TMT research relating to cancer screening (i.e. Arndt et 
al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009) found that participants 
were more likely to exhibit patterns of defensive avoidance towards the prospect of 
participating in behaviours with the potential of uncovering a life-threatening 
condition after receiving existential reminders that were either conscious or just 
below conscious awareness. In a related vein, Greenberg et al. (2000) demonstrated 
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that providing participants with subtle mortality reminders after an initial explicit 
mortality reminder and a subsequent distraction results in distal defences. These prior 
findings would lead one to have expected a distal defensive reaction of avoidance 
among participants in the current study rather than a pro-scientific bias. However, as 
evidenced by the lack of significant differences in participants‘ commitment to use 
the device following the potential mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip 
Information Sheet and the relatively high number of participants who signed up to the 
study (50 in total), distal defensive avoidance does not appear to have taken place in 
the current study. 
 
The pattern of non-significant differences towards the CVD Risk Biochip across the 
conditions could also be explained by the proposition that participants may not have 
found the device to be particularly relevant to their health. Following on from health 
psychology research on health threat minimisation (e.g. Eiser et al., 1979; Ditto et al., 
1988; Avis et al., 1989; Croyle, 1990; Croyle et al., 1993; Croyle et al., 1997; de 
Hoog et al., 2007), people tend to downplay the seriousness of a health threat in order 
to deny their vulnerability to it, particularly if they are known to have a risk factor for 
developing the disease. Since participants in this study all had a naturally occurring 
risk factor for developing CVD (each participant being over the age of 55), one could 
argue in this way that there may have been no significant difference between the 
groups on the dependent variables because all participants downplayed the relevance 
of the device to their own health, irrespective of their condition. Nevertheless, this 
explanation does not appear to be entirely plausible as, if it were true, one would 
expect all of the participants‘ evaluations of the device to be positively skewed rather 
than the negative skew that was present in their responses. Furthermore, such an 
explanation would seem to imply that participants were explicitly aware of their 
inherent risk factor for developing CVD. However, it is unlikely that participants 
were explicitly aware of such a risk factor while answering the attitude and 
behavioural intention questions as the CVD Risk Biochip information sheet made no 
reference to such a risk factor. In contrast, the above listed studies from the health 
threat minimisation literature all made their participants explicitly aware of having a 
risk factor for an illness or health deficiency. 
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A final potential explanation for the lack of significant differences between the 
groups on behavioural intentions and attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip relates 
to the age of the participants in the study. As previously noted, participants were only 
eligible to take part in this study if they were over the age of 55; a recruitment 
strategy that had been designed so that participants were more likely to find the CVD 
Risk Biochip to be of relevance to their health (i.e. since being over the age of 55 
constitutes a naturally occurring risk factor for developing CVD). However, it is 
possible that this cohort of participants did not demonstrate any significant 
differences in their attitudes, behavioural intentions or commitments to use the device 
on the basis of receiving a Mortality Salience task because of an attenuating effect of 
existential anxiety with advancing age. This explanation also has the advantage of 
accounting for the similar patterns of non-significance for those participants who 
were asked to think about having a heart attack. In this regard, one older lady who 
participated in this study spontaneously referred the current research study to her own 
experiences of existential anxiety at different periods of her life after she had been 
fully debriefed as to the nature of the current study. This lady indicated that the death 
of her mother from cancer when she was in her 50s had made her experience a high 
level of anxiety in relation to her potential genetic risk for developing cancer later in 
life. In contrast to this period of conscious existential anxiety, she explained that in 
more recent years her fears of death had diminished as a result of the fact that she had 
subsequently confronted the deaths of many of her close friends and relatives.  
 
In this way, older participants such as those from the current study, may be more 
accustomed to thinking about death and may subsequently experience less existential 
anxiety towards thoughts about death or having a heart attack. Although there are 
limited TMT studies involving older samples of participants such as the current study, 
these studies have tended to support the suggestion that there is a moderating effect of 
existential anxiety with increases in age (e.g. Cicirelli, 2002; Maxfield et al., 2007). 
There are several potential explanations for such a moderating effect of existential 
anxiety with advancing age. Firstly, there is the possibility that the frailty of the 
processes of refusing to consciously face one‘s own mortality or denying one‘s death 
becomes ever more apparent as one grows older. Although most people acknowledge 
the inevitability of their own death, they normally consider it to be a remote future 
event with little relevance to their present circumstance (Tomer, 1994). However, as 
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an individual gets older and experiences the deaths of more and more relatives and 
close friends, the remoteness and abstract possibility of death begins to diminish, 
while a conscious awareness of the concrete possibilities of one‘s own death becomes 
increasingly difficult to avoid. This inherent difficulty for older adults to avoid the 
possibility of their own demise is further compounded by the increasing prevalence of 
reminders of mortality from their own bodies (e.g. visible signs of aging and faltering 
bodily functions). The increase in the availability of specific death-related thoughts 
that might accompany this landscape of mounting mortality reminders might 
somewhat diminish the anxiety-arousing potential of such reminders (Thorson & 
Powell, 1988), in a similar fashion to the way that extended periods of forced 
exposure to a frightening stimulus can serve to diminish their capacity to frighten an 
individual in the behavioural therapy known as ―flooding‖. This sort of habituation 
towards the subject of death may lead to a moderating effect of existential anxiety in 
older adults‘ responses towards Mortality Salience and Heart Attack Salience.   
 
Another explanation for the potential attenuating effect of death anxiety in older 
adults is that this cohort may have had a greater amount of time and opportunity to 
provide for their own personal accounts of the meaning of existence. As Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1956) proposed in his famous essay ―Being and nothingness‖, reflection on 
death for most people equates to a reflection on the potential meaninglessness of 
existence. In order to oppose such meaninglessness, we often yearn and search for a 
certain amount of symbolic meaning and purpose for our existence throughout much 
of our adult life. Indeed, Becker (1973; 1975) suggested that a large part of an 
individual‘s adult life concerns a search for symbolic meaning to existence through 
the adoption of what he called a ―causa sui project‖. This causa sui project involves 
an active participation in any activities that allow oneself to be represented as a 
meaningful contributor to one‘s symbolic social or cultural world. For instance, a 
doctor might affirm symbolic meaning for her existence through the processes of 
helping others in her social world through her medical practice. Elsewhere, Erik 
Erikson (e.g. Erikson, Erikson & Kivnick, 1986; Erikson & Erikson, 1997) put 
forward a similar idea when he suggested that the middle stage of adult life represents 
a developmental challenge of ―Generativity vs. Stagnation‖, where an individual is 
often involved in tasks which involve the perpetuation of culture through their 
profession and transmission of cultural values to their offspring. If the individual is 
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successful in these tasks, by the time they reach the next developmental challenge of 
―Integrity vs. Despair‖ in old age, Erikson argues that they will have become content 
at having reached a deeper sense of meaning and purpose to their existence. 
Similarly, Thorson & Powell (1988) have suggested that attenuating age-related 
effects on death anxiety could arise from older adults having resolved mortality fears 
as a result of greater opportunities to review their life histories.  
Erikson also proposed that the final years of life, represented by the challenge of 
―Integrity vs. Despair‖, involve a certain amount of withdrawal from our daily ritual 
engagements in order to achieve ―transcendence‖. Such a withdrawal has the potential 
for the individual to lose the sense of belonging that they may have experienced in the 
previous stage of ―Generativity vs. Stagnation‖. However, if the individual has 
achieved a sense of meaning and purpose for their lives through a successful 
completion of this latter stage, they tend to achieve ―transcendence‖ at the stage of 
―Integrity vs. Despair‖. Importantly, this idea of "transcendence" does not necessarily 
represent a religious dimension but a sense of positioning the self in a broader and 
more meaningful context (e.g. as an important cultural contributor); a positioning of 
the self that may reach beyond the linear confines of our typical relationship with the 
concept of time. This process of transcendence in older adults has been termed 
gerotranscendence by the social gerontologist Lars Tornstam (1994), who describes it 
as ―…a shift in meta-perspective, from a materialistic and rational vision to a more 
cosmic and transcendent one, normally followed by an increase in life satisfaction‖ 
(p. 203).   
 
Tornstam, like Erikson before him, suggested that the process of life review in older 
adults is a means to achieve a sense of this ―gerotranscendence‖ by evaluating 
whether or not one has led a meaningful life. Even Becker (1975) viewed the process 
of transcendence as the final way that the individual ultimately resolves the problem 
of mortality, or the ultimate way of ―denying death‖ by finding a sense of faith in the 
meaning of one‘s own existence; ―Man transcends death…especially by finding a 
meaning for his life, some kind of larger scheme into which he fits‖ (p. 3, Becker, 
1975). Or, as Erikson puts it: ―At the end of life, we may find that some rudimentary 
hope has blossomed into a mature faith in being that is closely related to essential 
wisdom‖ (p. 218, Erikson et al., 1986).  
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To conclude, it would appear that a possible explanation for the lack of significant 
differences between the groups on any of the dependent variables in the current study 
was that there was a diminished effect of existential anxiety among older participants 
in this study who may have achieved a sense of ―gerotranscendence‖. This 
diminished effect of existential anxiety among such participants would mean that they 
failed to exhibit differences from a baseline level in their attitudes towards the CVD 
Risk Biochip, behavioural intentions towards the device and commitment to use the 
device in a proposed pilot study as a result of receiving either a Mortality Salience or 
a Heart Attack Salience task. These participants may have also exhibited positive 
appraisals towards the device due to a growing interest in health-related concerns 
characteristic of their age cohort (e.g. as per Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Apostolidis et 
al., 2009); an explanation which finds partial support in the results of the content 
analyses of participants‘ open-ended responses to the salience measure, which are 
examined below. 
 
3.3.2 Content Analyses of the Salience Measure 
The findings from the content analyses of the salience measure task suggest that 
Heart Attack Salience was just as likely to elicit thoughts concerning death as 
Mortality Salience. This is because both the participants who received a Heart Attack 
Salience task and the participants who received a Mortality Salience task produced a 
significantly greater number of death-related words and focused on significantly more 
death and survival themes than participants who received a Control task, but there 
were no significant differences on these dimensions between the responses of 
participants who received the Heart Attack Salience task and those who received the 
Mortality Salience task. This finding is slightly different to Arndt et al.‘s (2007) 
finding that participants elicited a significantly greater number of death-related words 
and focused on significantly more death and survival themes in their responses 
towards Cancer Salience compared to participants who received a Mortality Salience 
task. Nevertheless, these results demonstrate that the Heart Attack Salience measure 
appears to have primed thoughts of death to the same degree as the Mortality Salience 
measure. Consequently, the results suggest that the Heart Attack Salience measure 
can be considered as a valid measure for priming thoughts concerning death in 
participants. In this way, receipt of a Heart Attack Salience task and a subsequent 
distraction should have led to distal defences in participants following the logic of 
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TMT (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; 
Arndt, et al., 2007).  
  
The findings that participants who completed the Heart Attack Salience task and the 
Control task both tended to experience significantly greater feelings of negativity and 
threat in comparison to participants who completed the Mortality Salience task is also 
interesting as it would appear to suggest that thinking about more concrete health-
related concerns (i.e. heart attacks and dental problems) may be more threatening to 
older adults than thinking about the more abstract concept of death itself. This may 
relate to the finding from the health psychology literature that older adults display 
increasing concerns about their health status (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Apostolidis 
et al., 2009). In other words, while older adults may not find death itself to be 
particularly threatening, they may find health concerns that impede their current 
quality of life to be threatening. In this respect, dental pain may represent a more 
tangible negative threat to older adults than death itself as older adults are more likely 
to have direct experience with this sort of pain and may see this sort of pain as a 
barrier to their quality of life. However, as older adults are also likely to know friends 
or relatives who have experienced life-impeding effects of heart attacks, they may 
consider heart attacks to represent a more negative threat than both dental pain and 
the abstract concept of death itself; the latter of which may always be perceived as an 
end-point to embodied existence rather than a prolonged suffering through health 
concerns. Although these ideas would need to be tested empirically in order to 
establish their validity and reliability, they appear to already have some 
correspondence with health psychology research that has found that adults display 
increasing concerns about their health status as they get older (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 
1994; Apostolidis et al., 2009). 
 
Finally, the finding that only the Mortality Salience task elicited deeper writing 
among participants suggests that thinking about death in an abstract fashion may lead 
older adults to adopt a more thoughtful or philosophical state of mind compared to 
thinking about health concerns such as dental pain or heart attacks. Indeed, it is worth 
noting in this respect that older adults from the Mortality Salience condition were 
more likely to refer to philosophical, worldview or spiritual ideas in their open-ended 
answers than older adults from either the Heart Attack Salience condition or the 
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Control condition. One participant suggested that ―My spirit will leave the body and I 
hope to go to somewhere beautiful‖ when they were asked to think about their own 
personal death. Several other participants also mentioned the possibility that their soul 
or spirit would ―leave their bodies‖ when they died and that this soul or spirit would 
then proceed to ascend to heaven or somewhere where they would meet loved ones 
that had already departed. In contrast, some other participants gave a staunch atheistic 
account of what would happen to them when they died. For instance, one participant 
suggested that ―Once dead, that is a finality for me as a being. I have no beliefs in any 
form of afterlife, and as a biologist have that as an absolute certainty‖. Others 
responded with a slightly more philosophical approach to the question of what would 
happen to them when they physically died, with one participant noting that the 
following would occur; ―Cessation of being of which one may or may not be aware 
depending on the nature of the event.‖  
 
These responses of participants are interesting when one considers the previously 
mentioned finding that these adults tended to consider death to represent a less 
negative threat than either heart attacks or dental pain. Taking these two findings 
together, it is possible that representing death in a more spiritual or philosophical 
fashion may help older adults to moderate the looming threat of death itself. This idea 
is supported by much TMT research that has found that philosophical and spiritual 
explorations of meaning can help people to moderate their experience of existential 
anxiety (e.g. Dunkel, 2002; Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Additionally, this idea appears 
to correspond with the previously mentioned literature that suggests that death 
anxiety decreases while spirituality or philosophical enrichment of life increases as an 
adult grows older (e.g. Erikson et al., 1986; Thorson & Powell, 1988; Tornstam, 
1994; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). In sum, it appears that older adults represent death 
in a deeper fashion, which may account for their seemingly lower experiences of 
death anxiety.  
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
 
Following the potential explanation that the results of the first study occurred due to a 
diminished effect of existential anxiety with older participants and the partial 
evidence for a degree of ―gerotranscendence‖ in participants‘ open-ended responses 
towards the Mortality Salience task, an investigation into the health psychology 
literature pertaining to the relationship between age and anxieties related to death was 
conducted. It was deemed necessary to explore whether or not previous research into 
death-related anxiety had uncovered the age-related differences in death anxiety that 
were partially suggested by the results of the first study. This was because it was 
reasoned that an examination of this literature might shed light upon whether or not a 
younger age cohort would be more prone to the effects of defensive avoidance 
towards the CVD Risk Biochip arising from existential anxiety in preparation for a 
second study in the research programme.  
 
4.0.1 Experiences of Death Anxiety in Older Adults in Context 
The relationship between death anxiety and age has been examined in the health 
psychology literature for over forty years. Although many early studies in this area 
failed to find a significant relationship between death anxiety and age (e.g. Templer, 
Ruff & Franks, 1971; Viney, 1984; Vargo & Black, 1984; Wagner & Lorion, 1984), 
these studies tended to either treat the standard Templer Death Anxiety Scale 
(Templer, 1970) as a single construct or used less robust scales of measurement  
(Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999). However, with the advent of an adjustment to Templer‘s 
scale by Thorson & Powell (1994), the study of death anxiety shifted towards the 
recognition that it is a multi-dimensional construct. For instance, DePaola, Neimeyer, 
Griffin & Young  (2003) found in their study that older respondents were less 
concerned with death preventing them from completing many of their life goals and 
they argued that this may be because older adults have already accomplished these 
goals. Since then, literature in this area has tended to demonstrate a significant 
decline in death anxiety from mid-life to old age (see the extensive reviews of this 
literature by Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999; Neimeyer, 
Wittkowski & Moser, 2004). In particular, research in this area has demonstrated that 
by age 60, death anxiety for both men and women tends to stabilise at a uniformly 
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low level (Russac, Gatliff, Reece & Spottswood, 2007). The bulk of this research also 
suggests that older adults are more consciously aware of death and less frightened of 
conscious death reminders due to their increasingly frequent encounters with them. 
For instance, De Raedt & van Der Speeten (2008) found that young and middle-aged 
adults took longer to process death-related words compared to older adults.  
 
More recently, TMT studies have begun to examine the moderating effects of death 
anxiety with increases in age. For instance, Maxfield et al. (2007) found that, in 
contrast to younger adults who tend to demonstrate harsher judgment patterns after 
Mortality Salience, older adults tended to evaluate moral transgressors in significantly 
more lenient ways after they had been provided with subtle mortality reminders. 
Elsewhere, Cicirelli (2002) suggested that older adults tend to have a willingness to 
accept death and deal with mortality at a proximal level of defence, presumably 
because they have had greater opportunities to deal with the prospect of their own 
demise. In line with this idea, he found that older adults were more willing to engage 
with thoughts of death at a conscious level when they had high religiosity, high social 
support and a more internal locus of control.  
 
With a more health-related slant, Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler (2005) have 
highlighted the fact that there may be age-related differences in proximal and distal 
defensive reactions towards health-promoting behaviours. In their research, they 
found that proximal defences make younger and middle-aged adults more willing to 
engage in health-promoting behaviours but that older adults are less inclined to 
express intentions to change their health behaviours when mortality concerns are 
conscious. In relation to distal defences, Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler (2005) also 
found that younger adults and older adults with high self-esteem do not express a 
willingness to change their health behaviours after their mortality has been made 
salient but that middle-aged adults and older adults with lower self-esteem do express 
a willingness to change their health behaviours under analogous conditions. The 
authors suggested that these complex findings represented more symbolic reactions 
on behalf of the participants towards mortality concerns at an unconscious level and 
that these reactions differed due to age-related differences in the perceived level of 
threat of mortality concerns. They argued that young adults may not be concerned 
with changing health behaviours that are aimed at preserving life as they may not 
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consider these health behaviours to be particularly relevant to them. In contrast, they 
suggested that middle-aged adults might be more greatly concerned with their health 
and may want to ensure that their health is sufficiently maintained. They also argued 
that older adults who have come to terms with the idea of their own death 
(represented by those participants with higher levels of self-esteem) may no longer be 
terrified by it and therefore these adults may be less concerned with efforts to increase 
their lifespan through the adoption of health behaviours. In contrast, they suggested 
that older adults who have not come to terms with their death (represented by those 
participants with lower levels of self-esteem) may be motivated to increase their 
lifespan by engaging in a greater number of health behaviours.  
 
The above research supports the explanation that the non-significant results of the 
first study in the current programme may have arisen from a diminished effect of 
existential anxiety among the older adults. This is because these adults may have 
already dealt with the possibility of their own demise through representing their 
selves in a more transcendental fashion (e.g. Erikson et al., 1986; Thorson & Powell, 
1988; Tornstam, 1994; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). In contrast, middle-aged adults 
appear to be at greater risk of exhibiting patterns of defensive avoidance towards 
behaviours such as using the CVD Risk Biochip due to their greater experience of 
death anxiety (e.g. Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999; 
Neimeyer et al., 2004). Becker (1973) himself suggested that this period represents 
the point where an individual is most saddled with existential anxiety as they struggle 
to achieve symbolic meaning to their existence through their causa sui project. 
Indeed, the middle adulthood stage of ―Generativity vs. Stagnation‖ has even been 
proposed to represent the period of an individual‘s life that involves the most active 
attempts to meaningfully contribute to their social and cultural world (e.g. Erikson et 
al., 1986; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). Following such ideas, middle aged adults may 
be particularly vulnerable to the defensive avoidance of disease detection behaviours 
(such as using the CVD Risk Biochip) following mortality reminders due to their 
seemingly greater experience of the effects of existential anxiety. Additionally, the 
potential existential threats to middle-aged adults‘ health status and corresponding 
threats to their self-esteem posed by the prospect of receiving negative health-related 
information concerning CVD would appear to make defensive avoidance a likely 
behavioural strategy for such a cohort (e.g. following proposition two of the TMHM; 
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Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). In light of such propositions, it was decided to conduct a 
second study with a middle-aged cohort of adult participants using the same 
experimental questionnaire and design as the first study in order to examine whether 
or not unconscious mortality reminders would lead them to exhibit greater patterns of 
defensive avoidance towards the CVD Risk Biochip in this way.   
 
4.0.2 The Current Study 
This study focused on participants aged 40-55 years of age in order to investigate 
whether or not unconscious existential anxiety would act as a barrier to their potential 
uptake of the CVD Risk Biochip and their accompanying attitudes towards the 
device. However, it was reasoned that a middle-aged cohort of participants may have 
found CVD less relevant to their health (as per Jemmott et al., 1986). Consequently, it 
was considered important to include an indication of middle-aged risk in the 
development of CVD in the Questionnaire Booklets for this study. In order to 
accomplish this, an additional paragraph was added to the CVD Risk Biochip 
Information Sheet. This paragraph explicitly outlined middle-aged risk in the 
development of CVD before participants completed the measures pertaining to their 
attitudes, behavioural intentions and commitments to use the CVD Risk Biochip. This 
paragraph was based on the results of a study by Lloyd-Jones, Dyer, Wang, Daviglus 
& Greenland (2007); a highly cited research study with a sample size of 14,526 men 
and women, which found that even the presence of a single risk factor for CVD in 
middle-age was associated with a substantial increase in an individual‘s lifetime risk 
for death from CVD and a shorter survival from the disease.  
 
Following these minor alterations to the design and materials, the predictions for 
Study 2 were analogous to those of Study 1. Specifically, it was predicted that 
participants aged 40-55 years of age would display less favourable attitudes towards 
the CVD Risk Biochip and would be less likely to express intentions to use the device 
or commitments to use the device after they were reminded of their mortality and 
were subsequently distracted compared to control participants who were not reminded 
of their mortality. Additionally, in line with the predictions of the first study, it was 
predicted that participants in the second study would exhibit less favourable attitudes 
towards the CVD Risk Biochip and would be less likely to express intentions to use it 
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after they were asked to think about having a heart attack and were subsequently 
distracted compared to control participants.   
 
4.1 METHOD 
 
4.1.1 Design and Participants 
The design of this study was based on Study 1; thereby incorporating a three group 
independent measures design as a function of the salience questionnaire that 
participants received. Block randomisation was used in order to randomly assign 
participants to the Control condition, the Mortality Salience condition or the Heart 
Attack Salience condition respectively. Seventy-eight participants aged 40-55 
volunteered to participate (42 males and 36 females). As with Study 1, this sample 
size was sought in order to obtain sufficient statistical power of 0.80 (as per the tables 
provided by Cohen, 1992) in preparation for a three group MANCOVA design with 
two dependent variables. Recruitment was carried out by a snowball sampling 
method, where networks of the researcher disseminated information leaflets to 
potential participants (See Appendix H1 for a Sample Information Leaflet) and 
advised them to contact the researcher if they were interested in participating in the 
study once they had the opportunity to consider the information contained in the 
leaflet. The researcher subsequently arranged a suitable time and convenient location 
for those participants who indicated an interest in participating in the study in order 
for them to complete a Questionnaire Booklet. As with the first study, participants 
completed the questionnaire in their own homes when a controlled environment was 
not readily available. These participants were supervised to ensure that they were not 
distracted and to confirm that the questionnaire was completed in the order presented. 
Additionally, as with the first study, all participants had to confirm that they had 
never experienced a significant negative heart-related event (e.g. a heart attack) on the 
Consent Form (See Appendix B2) they were given to sign before they were deemed 
eligible to take part.  
 
4.1.2 Procedure and Materials 
The procedure was almost identical to the procedure for Study 1 (see pages 1-58 – 1-
59). As before, each participant was initially given a Plain Language Statement and 
Consent Form to complete (See Appendix B2) before completing one of three 
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Questionnaire Booklets (See Appendix D1-D3). Each Questionnaire Booklet 
consisted of either the control measure or one of the salience measures, a distraction 
task, the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet, the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale, 
the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale and the De Facto Intentions 
Measure. There was one minor alteration to the materials, which constituted the 
inclusion of an additional paragraph in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet in 
the new Questionnaire Booklets. As described above, this additional paragraph was 
derived from the results of a study by Lloyd-Jones et al. (2007) and contained the 
following information in order to ensure that the participants considered CVD to be 
relevant to their health: 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that people with just one risk factor for Cardiovascular Disease in 
middle age have a strong chance of developing the disease in later life. 
Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of death from 
Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for the disease. 
 
4.1.3 Ethical Issues 
Study 2 was characterised by many of the same ethical considerations that had been 
previously encountered in Study 1 (e.g. deception, priming thoughts of death and 
priming thought of having a heart attack). These considerations were dealt with in the 
same manner in which they had been dealt with in the first study. However, a novel 
ethical concern arose in the second study in view of the fact that participants were 
given the amended CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet containing an indication of 
middle-aged risk for the development of CVD. This new passage could be seen to 
have contained a mild risk for participants as it could have triggered unpleasant 
feelings of vulnerability and phobic responses towards developing CVD. 
Nonetheless, this type of information was not considered to constitute a risk to 
participants that departed from normal everyday experiences. This is because risks for 
developing CVD and similar heart-related illnesses are frequently reported in media 
that is in the public domain such as newspapers, magazines and documentaries. 
Following submission of an ethics application, the DCU Research Ethics Committee 
granted Ethical Approval for the study.  
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4.1.4 Data Analyses      
In a similar fashion to Study 1, a MANCOVA was planned for the attitudes and 
behavioural intentions data with gender as a covariate and a logistic regression was 
planned for the data pertaining to the De Facto Intentions Measure. MANCOVA was 
chosen for the former sets of data in order to investigate if there were differences in 
middle-aged participants‘ attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip as a function of receiving a Mortality Salience, Heart Attack Salience or 
Control task and being subsequently distracted. As per Study 1, a three-group 
MANCOVA was deemed appropriate with two potentially high-threat conditions and 
a neutral condition in spite of the possibility of a Type II error because a) Heart 
Attack Salience is a novel measure for priming existential threat that had only 
previously been used in the first study of the current programme where no significant 
differences had been uncovered between the Heart Attack Salience and control 
groups on the main dependent variables (i.e. this measure could not be clearly 
assumed to represent either a high, medium or low-threat condition) and b) the 
alternative possibility of conducting two separate MANCOVAs between each of the 
respective high threat groups and the control group would have increased the 
probability of statistically capitalising on chance, thereby increasing the probability of 
committing a more serious Type I error. Once again, gender was included as a 
covariate to control for the possibility that participants‘ positive or negative appraisals 
of the CVD Risk Biochip were the result of gender differences in health-oriented 
behaviours (as per Tamres et al., 2002; Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; 
Janda, et al., 2004; Lynn et al., 2009). Logistic regression was chosen for the latter 
data set in order to assess if a participant‘s gender or assignment to one of the three 
experimental groups would help to predict the odds of whether or not they chose to 
sign up for the proposed CVD Risk Biochip pilot study. 
 
4.2 RESULTS 
 
4.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
Participants between the age of 40-55 were recruited (M = 49, SD = 3.53; with 10 
missing values). The sample consisted of 42 males (53.8%) and 36 females (46.2%). 
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4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
As with Study 1, all items from the attitudes and behavioural intentions scales that 
were negatively phrased had their scores reversed so that all of the values reflected 
the same directionality (i.e. each participants‘ score on a particular item now 
represented a score on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 = highly negative to 5 = highly 
positive). Descriptive statistics for the re-scored items in the CVD Risk Biochip 
Attitude Scale and CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale are given in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 4.1: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale by Condition (Re-scored Values)
 Mortality Salience Heart Attack 
Salience 
Control Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 4.50 0.65 4.42 0.76 4.46 0.58 4.46 0.66 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 2.42 1.21 2.85 1.16 2.73 1.51 2.67 1.30 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
3.92 0.74 3.92 1.06 3.81 0.90 3.88 0.90 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people 
about their health. 
4.12 0.65 3.77 1.21 3.50 0.99 3.79 1.00 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 4.54 0.51 4.35 1.02 4.50 0.58 4.46 0.73 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home 
is a great idea. 
3.92 0.74 3.85 1.19 3.77 1.11 3.85 1.02 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 4.19 0.90 4.19 0.98 4.00 1.23 4.13 1.04 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more 
active approach to their health. 
4.08 0.98 4.08 0.98 4.08 0.85 4.08 0.92 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 4.50 0.58 4.38 0.85 4.38 0.75 4.42 0.73 
 1
0
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 Mortality Salience Heart Attack 
Salience 
Control Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is 
highly likely that I would buy it. 
3.46 1.03 3.62 1.36 3.38 1.13 3.49 1.17 
2. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly 
likely that I would use it. 
4.50 0.51 4.77 0.43 4.73 0.45 4.67 0.47 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful 
device but I probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
3.65 1.06 3.85 1.26 3.62 1.24 3.71 1.18 
4. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD 
Risk Biochip. 
3.35 1.29 3.27 1.46 3.23 1.24 3.28 1.32 
5. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip 
is particularly unappealing. 
4.04 0.82 3.85 1.22 3.92 1.09 3.94 1.05 
6. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip 
makes me feel uncomfortable. 
3.96 0.92 4.08 1.13 4.23 1.07 4.09 1.03 
Table 4.2: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale by Condition (Re-scored Values)
 1
0
5
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4.2.3 Principal Component Analysis  
The questionnaire data for the second study did not fit a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) model for either scale based on the results of the PCA from the first 
study. This lack of model fit may have arisen due to characteristic differences 
between the sample cohorts in the first and second study. More specifically, the 
sample in the second study potentially represented a group of participants who were 
conceptually distinct from participants in the first study with regard to their 
experience of death anxiety due to their age (as per the literature concerning the 
relationship between death anxiety and age; e.g. Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; 
Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999; Neimeyer et al., 2004). Consequently, it may have been 
inappropriate to predict theoretical relationships among observed and unobserved 
variables in a CFA due to this potential theoretical distinction between the samples of 
the two studies. In light of this and because of the fact that the principal purpose of 
this analysis was data reduction, PCA was performed on both the CVD Risk Biochip 
Attitude Scale and the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale in the same 
manner as the first study.  
 
As with the first study, a central aim of the analyses was to find a single construct to 
represent attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip and behavioural intentions towards 
the use of the CVD Risk Biochip respectively. Following the logic of the first study, 
it was also considered important for each of these constructs to contain both 
positively phrased items and negatively phrased items in order to control for 
acquiescence response set answers (as per Winkler et al., 1982).  
 
4.2.3a PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
Suitability analyses of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale for PCA found that a) 
there were many correlation coefficients of 0.3 and above in the correlation matrix, b) 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity achieved statistical significance [X² (36) = 306.04, p < 
0.001] and c) the KMO value exceeded the recommended value of 0.6 (0.82). Despite 
this apparent suitability of the data for PCA, one MSA value in the anti-image 
correlation matrix obtained an MSA value of 0.60, which was below the 
recommended value of 0.7 (as per Pett et al., 2003). This item (―Diagnostic Testing 
should be left to the Professionals‖) had achieved a similarly low MSA value in the 
results of the first study and had been considered to potentially represent a different 
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construct to that which was of interest. As a result, it was deemed appropriate to 
remove this item from the scale for subsequent analyses.  
 
Analysing the correlation matrix also indicated that the item ―The CVD Risk Biochip 
is an exciting new device‖ was correlated strongly with both ―Valuable New Device‖ 
(0.79) and ―Unnecessary Device‖ (0.75). Such a high correlation with other items in 
the scale suggested that the item could potentially be redundant, particularly since 
both correlations were close to 0.80 (as per the recommendations of Pett et al., 2003). 
Since this item had a high correlation with two other items and had a low MSA value, 
it was decided to remove it from the scale for subsequent analyses. The remaining 
seven items on the scale were then reassessed for their suitability for PCA. Once 
again, the data appeared to be suitable for PCA; obtaining a strong KMO value (0.81), 
a statistically significant Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (21) = 189.44, p < 0.001], 
most correlations in the correlation matrix over 0.3 (see Table 4.3 for the correlation 
matrix and descriptive statistics pertaining to it), all MSA values above 0.70 and all 
correlations between the items less than 0.70.  
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 7-Item Solution for 
the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
The unrotated PCA solution for these remaining seven items revealed the presence of 
a single component with an eigenvalue exceeding 1. Examination of the scree plot 
also revealed a clear break after the second component. This single component 
explained 50.13% of the variance among the items, which was within the expected 
range for social science studies indicated by Pett et al. (2003). This set of items also 
maintained a balance of both negatively phrased and positively phrased items, thereby 
avoiding the potential problems of acquiescence response set answers. A reliability 
analysis of these seven items revealed a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.82, with each item 
contributing significantly to the variance explained by the component. Following 
these results, the single component solution was deemed appropriate and each of the 
remaining seven items was retained for further analyses. Table 4.4 provides factor 
loadings for this single component solution. 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M   SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel empowered about my 
health. 
1.00       3.88 0.90 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip will 
only serve to frighten people 
about their health. 
0.34 1.00      3.79 1.00 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip is a 
valuable new device. 
0.58 0.31 1.00     4.46 0.73 
4. Moving diagnostic testing 
from hospital settings to the 
home is a great idea. 
0.52 0.35 0.48 1.00    3.85 1.02 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel anxious. 
0.31 0.50 0.28 0.28 1.00   4.13 1.04 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip will 
encourage people to take a 
more active approach to their 
health. 
0.44 0.20 0.37 0.33 0.33 1.00  4.08 0.92 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip is an 
unnecessary device. 
0.55 0.34 0.67 0.44 0.49 0.55 1.00 4.42 0.73 
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Item Component 1 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 0.84 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health.  
0.77 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 0.77 
4. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
0.69 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more 
active approach to their health. 
0.65 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  0.62 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
0.58 
Table 4.4: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 7-Item Solution for the CVD Risk  
Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
4.2.3b PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
The data pertaining to the six items on the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions 
Scale were determined to be appropriate for PCA after observing that they produced 
many coefficients of 0.3 and above in the correlation matrix, a significant Bartlett‘s 
Test of Sphericity [X² (15) = 197.58, p < 0.001] and a KMO value of 0.72. Although 
two of the MSA values in the anti-image correlation matrix were below the 
recommended value of 0.7 (0.68 and 0.65 respectively), they were not considered to 
depart sufficiently from this recommended value to be of great concern, particularly 
since there were no clear conceptual reasons for removing these items from further 
analyses. Consequently, each of these six items was retained for PCA.  
 
The unrotated PCA solution revealed the presence of a single component as there was 
only one component with an eigenvalue over one and the scree plot revealed a clear 
break after the second component. This component accounted for 55.55% of the 
variance alone and achieved a good balance of both negatively phrased and positively 
phrased items. A reliability analysis of the six items revealed a highly reliable 
Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.83. This reliability analysis also revealed a potential increase 
in explained variance by approximately 6% and a minor increase in Cronbach‘s 
Alpha (of 0.007) if the item ―I would buy the CVD Risk Biochip if my GP 
recommended it‖ was removed. Since this item also achieved a mean and standard 
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deviation that appeared very close to a ceiling effect (M = 4.67, SD = 0.47) in contrast 
to other items from the scale (see Table 4.2), it was decided to remove this item and 
re-run the analysis with the remaining five items.  
 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 5-Item Solution of  
the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
 
The items that remained were found to be suitable for PCA; all of the correlations 
were greater than 0.3 in the correlation matrix (see Table 4.5 for the correlation 
matrix and corresponding descriptive statistics), Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity returned 
a significant result and the data obtained a KMO value of 0.69. Although two MSA 
values were still below the recommended value of 0.7 (0.65 and 0.63 respectively), 
they were not worryingly low and these items contributed significantly to the variance 
explained. Analysing the scree plot revealed a clear break after the second component 
and there was only one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1, leading to the 
conclusion that a single component solution was suitable in this case (see Table 4.6 
for factor loadings). As expected from the prior reliability analysis, this component 
accounted for 61.12% of the variance alone, supporting the use of PCA to achieve a 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 M   SD 
1.  If I saw this device in a 
supermarket or pharmacy, it is 
highly likely that I would buy it. 
1.00     3.49 1.17 
2.  The CVD Risk Biochip sounds 
like it could be a useful device 
but I probably wouldn’t use it 
myself. 
 
0.52 1.00    3.71 1.18 
3.  At this moment, I feel 
particularly motivated to use the 
CVD Risk Biochip. 
 
0.58 0.48 1.00   3.28 1.32 
4. At this moment, the thought of 
using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 
0.54 0.41 0.77 1.00  3.94 1.04 
5.  At this moment, the thought of 
using the CVD Risk Biochip 
makes me feel uncomfortable. 
0.30 0.49 0.41 0.60 1.00 4.09 1.03 
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behavioural intentions scale that represented a single construct. A reliability analysis 
of these five items revealed a similarly highly reliable Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.84.    
 
Item Component 1 
1. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes me 
feel uncomfortable. 
0.87 
2. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
0.85 
3. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly likely 
that I would buy it. 
0.76 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
0.72 
5. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
0.70 
Table 4.6: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 5-Item Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intentions Scale 
 
4.2.4 Data Preparation and Clean-up 
In order to form composite scores for the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale, each 
participant‘s scores on the remaining seven items of the scale were added together. 
Similarly, participants‘ scores on the five remaining CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural 
Intentions Scale items were added to form a composite behavioural intentions score. 
Separate tests of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, Shapiro Wilks statistics, 
histograms with normality plots and Normal Q-Q Plots) were then performed on each 
of the sets of composite scores. Although the composite behavioural intentions data 
appeared to closely approximate normality, there was a slight negative skew in the 
composite attitudes data, which was apparent from the histogram and a Shapiro Wilks 
value with p < 0.05. Upon further inspection, two cases were identified as univariate 
outliers (with values of 17 and 11 respectively); both of which had values of over 3 
standard deviations lower than the mean (M = 28.62, SD = 4.42). One of these cases 
was identified through Mahalanobis distance as a very high multivariate outlier with p 
< 0.001. As there was a medium sample size in this study, it was deemed necessary to 
replace this score with a less deviant one rather than deleting the offending score in 
order that the extreme score was still represented in subsequent analyses by a low 
value. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest replacing such an outlying case with a 
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raw score on the offending variable that is one unit higher or lower than the next most 
extreme score in the distribution. In this case, the outlying value of 11 (which had 
been identified as both a univariate and multivariate outlier) was replaced with a 
value of 16 as the next lowest score in the distribution was 17. Although this altered 
score remained as a univariate outlier in the data set, it was no longer deemed to be a 
multivariate outlier. This minor alteration significantly improved the negative skew of 
the data set, achieving a Shapiro Wilks value and histogram shape that approximated 
normality more closely. Consequently, this slightly modified composite attitudes data 
set was retained for further analyses.  
 
4.2.5 MANCOVA on Behavioural Intentions and Attitudes towards CVD Risk 
Biochip Scales 
In order to assess if there were differences in the participants‘ positive or negative 
appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip as a function of their experimental condition, a 
one-way between-groups MANCOVA was carried out with the attitudes and 
behavioural intentions data included as the dependent variables and gender as a 
covariate. As with Study 1, gender was included as a covariate in order to remove any 
potential bias in attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip 
that may have arisen due to gender differences in the performance of health-related 
behaviours (e.g. Tamres et al., 2002; Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, 
et al., 2004; Lynn et al., 2009). 
 
Preliminary testing for the assumptions of MANCOVA revealed no serious violations 
in normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices, multicollinearity, independence of the covariate from the 
experimental treatment and reliability of the measurement of the covariate. The 
MANCOVA analysis (see Table 4.7 for Descriptive Statistics) revealed that there 
were no statistically significant differences between the three groups on the combined 
dependent variables after controlling for gender as a covariate: F(4, 146) = 0.48, p = 
0.75; Wilk‘s Lambda = 0.97; η² = 0.01. Consequently, no further post-hoc tests of 
between-subjects effects were deemed necessary between the groups.  
 
Interestingly, the MANCOVA analysis revealed that the covariate of gender reached 
statistical significance on the combined dependent variables: F (2, 73) = 3.19, p = 
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0.048; Wilk‘s Lambda = 0.92; η² = 0.08. However, when the results for each 
dependent variable were considered separately with post-hoc ANOVAs, neither sets 
of differences reached statistical significance (p > 0.05 in each case).  
 
 Condition M SD Gender M SD 
Attitudes Data  Mortality Salience 29.27 3.24 Male 27.81 3.89 
 Heart Attack 
Salience 
28.73 5.04 Female 29.69 4.36 
 Control 28.04 4.18 
Behavioural 
Intentions Data 
Mortality Salience 18.46 3.57 Male 18.33 4.15 
 Heart Attack 
Salience 
18.65 5.09 Female 18.69 4.91 
 Control 18.38 4.83 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for the MANCOVA by Condition and Covariate of Gender 
 
4.2.6 Logistic Regression of De Facto Intentions  
A logistic regression was performed on the De Facto Intentions Measure as a 
dependent variable in order to assess if the participant‘s gender or assignment to one 
of the three experimental would help to predict the odds of whether or not they chose 
to sign up for the proposed CVD Risk Biochip pilot study. As with Study 1, gender 
was included to control for the potential differences between middle-aged males and 
females in pursuing health-oriented behaviours (e.g. Tamres et al., 2002; Parslow, et 
al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, et al., 2004; Lynn et al., 2009). Furthermore, in 
preparation for the logistic regression, the dependent variable, gender and 
membership to experimental group data were each coded in an identical fashion to 
Study 1 in order that responses on all of the variables represented binary data.  
 
Preliminary checks of the data confirmed that there was an absence of 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. A test of the full model with 
three predictors (including the two separate variables to indicate a participant‘s 
membership to one of the experimental conditions) against a constant-only model 
indicated a significant difference; X² (3, n = 78) = 13.30, p < 0.05. This suggested that 
the combined predictor variables reliably distinguished whether or not a participant 
had signed up for the pilot study pertaining to the CVD Risk Biochip. Table 4.8 
shows regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence 
intervals relating to odds ratios for each of the three predictors. According to the 
Wald criterion, only gender, and not membership to one of the experimental groups, 
reliably predicted if a participant had signed up to the pilot study or not; X² (1, n = 78) 
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= 8.99, p > 0.005. Additionally, a new model was run with gender omitted as a 
predictor. This model was not reliably different from the constant only model; X² (2, 
n = 78) = 1.58, p > 0.05, confirming the finding that gender was a significant 
predictor of signing up for a CVD Risk Biochip pilot study. The odds ratio of 7.77 
demonstrates that there was a significant increase in the odds of signing up for the 
pilot study if a participant was female. Consequently, the results of the logistic 
regression clearly demonstrate that, irrespective of group membership, females were 
more likely to sign up to the pilot study than males.  
 
 95% Confidence Interval 
For Odds Ratio 
Variables B Wald Chi- 
Square 
Odds  
Ratio  
Lower Upper 
MORTCOND 0.20 0.09 1.22 0.34 4.39 
HEARTCOND 0.47 0.44 1.59 0.40 6.27 
Gender 2.05 8.99 7.77 2.03 29.70 
Constant 0.10 0.05 1.11   
 Table 4.8: Logistic Regression Analysis, Containing Regression Coefficients, Wald 
Statistics and Odds Ratios for the Predictors and the Constant Term and 95% Confidence 
Intervals Relating to Odds Ratios for the Predictors 
 
4.2.7 Content Analyses of the Open-ended Salience Measures 
As with the first study, a series of content analyses were conducted to check whether 
or not the Heart Attack Salience and Mortality Salience task elicited more thoughts 
concerning death among participants than the Control task as per Arndt et al. (2007) 
and to investigate if the former two tasks elicited more negative emotions, a greater 
experience of threat and a deeper writing style then the latter task. Two independent 
coders (the researcher and an additional coder who was unaware of the exact nature 
of the study) recorded the total number of death-related words ( = 1.00) and the total 
number of words ( = 1.00) used by participants in their open-ended responses. The 
coders also independently rated these responses with a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 = not at all to 5 = very much on the same four dimensions that had been used 
in the first study; degree of focus on death or survival themes ( = 0.99), negativity 
expressed ( = 0.98), degree of threat expressed ( = 0.98), and shallow or deep 
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writing of the responses ( = 0.99). The coders‘ ratings on each of these dimensions 
were subsequently compared and their individual ratings of each item were averaged 
to form a single set of scores on each dimension due to high levels of agreement 
between these independent sets of scores. Following this, separate ANOVAs were 
conducted in order to establish if there were significant differences between the 
groups on each dimension.  
 
The ANOVA on the number of 6.death-related words and degree of focus on death 
and survival themes dimensions were both conducted at a reduced alpha level of 
0.025 as per Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2001) recommendations, rather than the 
conventional 0.05 level following the finding that both of these sets of data violated 
the assumption of Levene‘s Test of Equality of Error Variances. The former analysis 
revealed a main effect of the salience condition that participants received; F (2, 75) = 
40.23, p < 0.001, ² 0.52. Tukey post-hoc analyses revealed that there were a 
significantly greater number of death-related words in responses from participants in 
the Heart Attack Salience group (M = 3.12, SD = 1.51) and the Mortality Salience 
group (M = 2.62, SD = 1.70) compared to participants‘ responses in the Control group 
(M = 0.08, SD = 0.27), but there were no significant differences between the Heart 
Attack Salience group and the Mortality Salience group on this dimension. Similarly, 
the ANOVA relating to the focus on death or survival themes dimension revealed 
main effects of the salience condition; F(2, 75) = 106.77, p < 0.001, ² 0.74. Post-
hoc analysis revealed that the responses of participants from the Heart Attack 
Salience group (M = 3.13, SD = 0.96) and the Mortality Salience group (M = 2.65, SD 
= 0.89) were significantly more focused on death and survival themes compared to 
the responses of participants from the control group (M = 0.17, SD = 0.37) but there 
were no significant differences between the two former groups on this dimension.  
 
The negativity and threat expressed towards the content of the salience task followed 
a slightly different pattern to the results in the first study. Unlike the first study, the 
correlation between these dimensions was not high enough to warrant combining the 
data pertaining to these dimensions together (0.70). The ANOVA concerning the 
degree of negativity expressed by participants in the salience measure revealed no 
effect of condition [F (2, 75) = 3.07, p > 0.05, ² 0.08]. This suggests that there 
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were no significant differences between the responses of participants in the Mortality 
Salience group (M = 2.60, SD = 0.87), Heart Attack Salience group (M = 3.15, SD = 
0.73) or the Control group (M = 2.98, SD = 0.88) with respect to the degree of 
negative emotions that they experienced as a result of completing this measure. 
However, there was a significantly greater degree of threat experienced [F (2, 75) = 
7.29, p < 0.001, ² 0.16] by participants in the Mortality Salience group (M = 2.50, 
SD = 0.86) and participants in the Heart Attack Salience group (M = 3.21, SD = 0.80) 
towards the content in the open-ended questions compared to the amount of threat 
experienced by participants in Control group (M = 2.23, SD = 1.17). Nonetheless, 
there were no significant differences between the Heart Attack Salience group and the 
Mortality Salience group on this dimension. 
 
Finally, there were no main effects of salience condition on the total word count used 
by participants [F (2, 75) = 0.49, p > 0.05, ² 0.01] or on the shallow or deep 
writing dimension [F (2, 75) = 0.06, p > 0.05, ² 0.00]. In other words, there were 
no significant differences in the total number of words used by participants in the 
Mortality Salience (M = 29.23, SD = 17.87), Heart Attack Salience (M = 26, SD = 
13.67) or Control (M = 31, SD = 22.67) groups and there were no significant 
differences between these groups on the degree of deep or shallow writing style 
expressed by their participants in the completion of the salience measure (M = 2.00, 
SD = 0.75, M = 2.08, SD = 0.85 and M = 2.02, SD = 0.88 respectively).  
 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
 
There were no significant differences between the experimental groups on either the 
CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale or the De Facto Intentions Measure, 
leading to a rejection of the hypothesis that participants would have been less likely to 
express intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip after heart attacks or their mortality 
was made salient to them and they were subsequently distracted relative to 
participants who had dental pain made salient to them and were subsequently 
distracted. Similarly, there were no significant differences between the groups on the 
CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale, resulting in the rejection of the hypothesis that 
participants would have less favourable attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip after 
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they had heart attacks or mortality made salient to them and received a subsequent 
distraction relative to participants who had dental pain made salient to them and 
received a subsequent distraction. Despite these non-significant findings, it was 
discovered that female participants in this study were significantly more likely to sign 
up to the proposed CVD Risk Biochip pilot study than male participants. Female 
participants also expressed slightly more favourable attitudes towards the device (as 
indicated by the significant main effect in the MANCOVA for the covariate of 
gender), although this finding did not translate into a significant result upon post-hoc 
analysis of the differences between males and females on the CVD Risk Biochip 
Attitude Scale. 
 
4.3.1 Possible Explanations for the Rejection of the Experimental Hypotheses 
As with the first study, the negative skew in participants‘ responses was unlikely to 
be a result of proximal or distal defences that were elicited by aspects of the 
questionnaire itself (see pages 1-85 - 1-89). Firstly, the lack of significant differences 
between the groups on the dependent variables suggests that it is unlikely that 
potential mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet elicited 
proximal defensive reactions among participants towards the device whereby they 
produced a positive response towards the device as a means of denying their 
vulnerability towards death or having a heart attack (as per Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Arndt, et al., 2007). As with the 
first study, this is because a) it is unlikely that the negatively skewed data resulted 
from mortality reminders as such results are commonly associated with health-related 
research (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), b) the mortality reminders in the 
information sheet were relatively subtle since they did not explicitly make 
participants aware of their personal risk of developing CVD and c) one would expect 
a conscious mode of defence towards health-oriented behaviours with the potential to 
provide life-threatening information to be one of avoidance rather than approach as 
the former proximal strategy would appear to be more effective at removing mortality 
reminders from conscious awareness (e.g. as per Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Greenberg 
et al., 2000; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008).  
 
Similarly, it is unlikely that potential mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip 
Information Sheet elicited distal defensive reactions among participants from each of 
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the experimental conditions, whereby all participants upheld cultural values of faith in 
scientific progress (as per Becker, 1975; Rutjens et al., 2009; Rutjens et al., 2010). In 
keeping with the first study, this is because the subtle reminders of death that may 
have been present in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet did not represent 
personal mortality reminders as with previous TMT research studies. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, it is unlikely that the negatively skewed data were specific to subtle 
reminders of mortality contained in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet as 
negative skews are often associated with attitude and behavioural intention scales in 
health-related research (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). More importantly, the 
availability of defensive avoidance makes it unlikely that participants in the current 
study would have upheld cultural values of faith in scientific progress as a distal 
defence towards subtle death reminders. This is because an avoidance reaction would 
be more effective in circumventing the possibility that participants might receive an 
existentially threatening health status with the potential to confer a significant blow to 
their self-esteem (as per Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008).  
 
The absence of significant differences between the conditions on participants‘ 
attitudes, behavioural intentions or ―De Facto Intentions‖ towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip also suggests that participants in this study did not display distal defensive 
avoidance towards the CVD Risk Biochip after they were asked to think about having 
a heart attack or their own death and were subsequently distracted relative to controls. 
This is because one would have expected there to have been differences between the 
conditions if existential anxiety resulting from thinking about having a heart attack or 
thinking about death were prompting a distal defensive avoidance in participants, in 
line with the prior TMT research relating to cancer screening (i.e. Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Additionally, following previous 
TMT research that has demonstrated that further subtle mortality reminders after an 
initial explicit mortality reminder and a subsequent distraction lead to distal defences 
(e.g. Greenberg et al., 2000), one would have predicted that there would have been 
differences between the conditions if existential anxiety were to have had an effect on 
participants‘ responses towards the device. Furthermore, one would have anticipated 
that there would have been a positive skew in the data pertaining to the dependent 
variables if there was evidence of a general pattern of distal defensive avoidance 
towards subtle reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet. Since none of 
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these proposed effects appears to have taken place, it can be concluded that there is 
no evidence of distal defensive avoidance towards the CVD Risk Biochip in the 
current study. 
 
In a similar fashion to the first study, the absence of significant differences between 
the experimental conditions on any of the dependent variables could lead one to argue 
that the middle-aged participants in this study may not have found the device to be of 
particular relevance to their health. Despite the fact that attempts had been made to 
control for such an effect by explicitly priming middle-aged risk in the development 
of CVD in the Questionnaire Booklets, many studies in the health minimisation 
literature have demonstrated that people often downplay the seriousness of a health 
threat in order to deny their vulnerability to it, even in spite of knowledge that they 
have established risk factors for disease development (e.g. Eiser et al., 1979; Ditto et 
al., 1988; Avis et al., 1989; Croyle, 1990; Croyle et al., 1993; Croyle et al., 1997; de 
Hoog et al., 2007). However, as with the results of the first study, one would also 
have expected participants‘ evaluations of the device to be positively skewed (i.e. 
indicating that they were less interested in the device) if participants were 
downplaying the seriousness of the primed risk factors for developing CVD. In 
contrast, the pattern of participants‘ responses across each of the experimental 
conditions displayed a negative skew, thereby undermining such an explanation. 
 
As the second study did not reveal any significant differences with respect to the 
dependent variables, it would also appear to suggest that a moderating effect of age 
on death anxiety after middle age (e.g. De Raedt & Van Der Speeten, 2008; Maxfield 
et al., 2007; Russac, et al., 2007; Neimeyer et al., 2004; Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999; 
Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; Thorson & Powell, 1988) was not necessarily a central 
component to the similar lack of significant differences between the conditions in the 
results of the first study, contrary to expectations. This is because one would at least 
have expected there to have been significant differences between the Control 
condition and either the Mortality Salience or the Heart Attack Salience condition on 
the dependent variables in the current study if such a moderating effect of age on 
death anxiety had led to the lack of significant differences in the first study. In other 
words, in view of the proposition that the middle stage of life represents the point in 
the life cycle where an individual is most concerned with existential anxiety (as per 
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Becker, 1973) and generating symbolic meaning regarding their own existence (e.g. 
Erikson et al., 1986; Tornstam, 1994; Erikson & Erikson, 1997), one would have 
expected to find significant differences between participants‘ reactions towards the 
main dependent variables in the current study depending on whether they received a 
mortality reminder or not. Given that such a finding did not occur in this study and 
that there was no evidence of TMT defences at work in the first study either, it 
appears more likely that there may have been something particular about the 
description of the CVD Risk Biochip, the questionnaire items or something about the 
nature of the device itself that resulted in a lack of significant differences between the 
conditions in both studies on the main dependent variables of interest. If this were the 
case, one could argue that the CVD Risk Biochip or the questionnaire itself was 
somehow incompatible with typical TMT predictions. Studies 3 and 4, which are 
described in the following two chapters, attempted to further investigate some of 
these issues.  
 
4.3.2 Gender-Related Differences Pertaining to Health Behaviours 
An interesting finding in the current study was that gender appeared to have a 
significant impact on both the combined MANCOVA attitudes and behavioural 
intentions data and the logistic regression data concerning participants‘ intentions to 
sign up for a pilot study of the CVD Risk Biochip. With respect to the former result, 
middle-aged males tended to react less favourably towards the CVD Risk Biochip in 
comparison to middle-aged females. This gender effect did not appear to have 
significance when post hoc analyses were subsequently performed on the behavioural 
intentions and attitudes data separately. However, the latter finding that gender added 
to the predictive power of whether or not a participant signed up for the proposed 
pilot study is especially interesting. Considering the somewhat weak links that have 
been previously found between attitudes and actual behaviour or behavioural 
intentions and actual behaviour (e.g. Fazio & Williams, 1986; Leippe & Elkin, 1987; 
Morrwitz et al., 1993; Sutton, 1998; Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Ajzen, 2000; Sheeran, 
2002; Bhattacherjeea & Sanford, 2009; Carrington et al., 2010), this measure could be 
regarded as more ecologically valid in the sense that participants may have been more 
likely to express their actual intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip when they were 
given the opportunity to sign up for a pilot study involving the device. This is because 
there is an implicit confirmation of the genuine existence of the CVD Risk Biochip in 
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this measure, which may have allowed participants to be relatively certain that the 
device existed and may have made their subsequent commitment to use the device 
more representative of their actual intentions. Consequently, the results of the logistic 
regression with respect to gender suggest that middle-aged males may be more 
hesitant to commit to the actual use of the CVD Risk Biochip compared to middle-
aged females. This finding is consistent with health psychology literature that has 
found that men engage in health-oriented behaviours and health-seeking information 
less frequently than women (e.g. Baum & Grunberg, 1991; Courtenay, 1998; Liang et 
al., 1999; Van Wijk et al., 1999; Courtenay, 2000a; Courtenay, 2000b; Janda et al., 
2004; Parslow et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2005; Courtenay, 2009). 
 
The finding that a participant‘s gender helped to predict whether or not they signed up 
for the CVD Risk Biochip pilot study is also interesting in light of the absence of any 
such effect in the results of the first study. Indeed, there were no demonstrable 
differences between whether or not male and female participants over 55 years of age 
signed up for the pilot study in the first study. In contrast, middle-aged male 
participants were less likely to sign up for the pilot study than middle-aged female 
participants in the second study. When taken together, these results lend support to 
the idea that gender differences in health behaviour patterns decrease with age (e.g. 
Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Liang et al., 1999). Although follow-up studies would be 
needed in order to establish the validity and reliability of this effect, the current data 
could be seen to tentatively support the notion that patterns of health-seeking 
behaviour in females and health-avoidance in males which may result from fixed 
gender patterns handed down from one‘s culture (e.g. Fagot, 1984; Aries & Olver, 
1985; Lytton & Romney, 1991; Tamres et al., 2002; Lynn et al., 2009) give way in 
later life to increasing concerns about diseases and health status as an individual 
grows older and becomes increasingly more susceptible to illness and disease (e.g. 
Courtenay, 1998; Stoller & Pollow, 1994).  
 
4.3.3 Content Analyses of the Salience Measure 
In line with the results of the first study, the findings of the content analyses of the 
salience measure revealed that the Heart Attack Salience task was just as likely to 
elicit death-related words and death and survival themes as the Mortality Salience 
task. Indeed, the Heart Attack Salience and Mortality Salience tasks both produced a 
  
 
 
122 
significantly greater number of death-related words in participants‘ responses than the 
Control task and led participants to focus on significantly more death and survival 
themes than those who received the Control task. These analyses also replicated the 
findings from the first study that there were no significant differences between the 
responses of participants in the Heart Attack Salience and Mortality Salience 
measures on these dimensions. Therefore, these results tend to lend further support to 
the idea that the Heart Attack Salience task is a valid measure for priming thoughts 
concerning death as they suggest that the Heart Attack Salience measure primes 
thoughts of death to the same degree as the Mortality Salience measure. However, 
such results also tend to suggest that Heart Attack Salience is not an analogous 
measure to Arndt et al.‘s (2007) Cancer Salience measure. This is because Heart 
Attack Salience tends to elicit a similar number of death-related words and a similar 
degree of focus on death and survival themes to Mortality Salience, whereas Arndt et 
al. (2007) found that their Cancer Salience measure led to a greater number of death-
related words and a greater degree of focus on death and survival themes in 
participants‘ responses compared to Mortality Salience. Nonetheless, this finding also 
lends further support to the idea that receiving a Heart Attack Salience task and a 
subsequent distraction should lead to distal defensive responses (i.e. following prior 
TMT research, such as Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski 
et al., 2000; Arndt, et al., 2007). 
 
In addition to the above result, participants in both the Heart Attack Salience and the 
Mortality Salience conditions found the content of the salience measure that they 
received to be more threatening than participants in the Control condition and there 
were no significant differences between participants‘ responses towards the Heart 
Attack Salience and Mortality Salience tasks on this dimension. This finding reflects 
the idea that death and heart attacks are potentially very threatening to a group of 
middle-aged participants; potentially because either of these events may impede their 
life goals (e.g. Becker, 1973; Erikson et al., 1986; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). 
Additionally, when related back to the results of the first study, this finding supports 
the proposition that people experience a moderating effect of death anxiety with 
advancing age (e.g. Thorson & Powell, 1988; Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; Fortner 
& Neimeyer, 1999; Neimeyer et al., 2004; Maxfield et al., 2007; Russac, et al., 2007; 
De Raedt & Van Der Speeten, 2008). This is because, in contrast to the middle-aged 
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participants in the second study who found thinking about death to be a very 
threatening prospect, participants in the first study did not find death to be particularly 
threatening.  
 
It is interesting to note that the negativity dimension did not yield significant 
differences between the conditions in this study. Contrary to expectations, 
participants considered thinking about dental pain, death or heart attacks to be very 
negative (each M > 2.5). Many of the participants from this age cohort who wrote 
about dental pain used similar language to those participants who wrote about heart 
attacks or those participants who wrote about death. For instance, a number of these 
participants referred to dental pain as ―almost unbearable‖ and the process of visiting 
the dentist as ―frightening‖. In the same breath, while these people appeared to find 
the experience of dental pain to be one which is particularly negative, they did not 
appear to find dental pain to be quite as threatening as heart attacks or death itself, as 
evidenced by their different responses to the threat dimension. 
 
Finally, there were no significant differences between the conditions in either the total 
number of words used or the degree of deep or shallow writing used by participants. 
While the former result once again tallies with the results of Study 1 and Arndt et 
al.‘s (2007) identical findings, the latter result is distinct from the findings of Study 1 
where it was revealed that older adults who were asked to think about heart attacks or 
death tended to respond with deeper writing than older adults who were asked to 
think about dental pain. This may be because older adults have had greater 
opportunities to think symbolically about heart attacks and death as they may have 
had more exposure to friends and relatives dying or having heart attacks.  
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Chapter 5: Study 3 
 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 taken together suggest that receiving either a 
Mortality Salience or Heart Attack Salience task and a subsequent distraction does 
not appear to lead to significantly more avoidant responses towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip than receiving a control task from either a cohort of participants aged over 55 
years or a cohort of participants aged 40-55 years. However, it is possible that the 
potentially very threatening nature of thinking about having a heart attack led to a 
suppression of death-related thoughts for participants in the Heart Attack Salience 
conditions in these studies, even after the distraction occurred

. Although this was not 
reflected in the results of the content analyses of the first two studies (i.e. since 
participants produced a similar number of death-related words and appeared to 
express a similar degree of focus on death and survival themes in their responses to 
the Mortality Salience and Heart Attack Salience tasks), it is possible that 
participants‘ responses to the open-ended questions about heart attacks 
underestimated the threatening nature of heart attacks to them. In other words, the 
tangible nature of heart attacks may have been experienced as more existentially 
threatening to participants in these studies than they reported. If this was the case, 
participants who completed the Heart Attack Salience task and were given a 
subsequent distraction may have experienced a more sustained suppression of death-
related thoughts in a similar fashion to Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings in Study 1 of 
their research programme that the very threatening nature of thinking about cancer led 
to a continued suppression of death-related thoughts for participants after a similar 
distraction. This may have meant that these participants responded differently 
towards the device than predicted as they continued to suppress thoughts about 
having a heart attack after they completed the distraction task. In contrast, placing 
participants under conditions of increased cognitive load and providing them with a 
Heart Attack Salience task to complete may prevent this increased suppression of 
death-related thoughts, in line with Arndt et al.‘s (2007; Study 2) findings that their 
participants who received a Cancer Salience task to complete while under conditions 
                                                          

 I would like to explicitly acknowledge Dr. Cathy Cox from Texas Christian 
University for suggesting this possibility to me at the Society for Personality and 
Social Psychology Conference 2011 in San Antonio, Texas. Dr. Cox is one of the 
leading proponents of TMT and was a co-author on the Arndt et al. (2007) paper. 
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of increased cognitive load did not display an increased suppression of death-related 
thoughts.  
 
Following the above ideas, a third study investigated if there was a difference in the 
accessibility of death-related thoughts between participants who were asked to think 
about having a heart attack while under conditions of cognitive load and participants 
who were given a distraction task after being asked to think about having a heart 
attack. This method was designed to reveal whether or not participants continued to 
suppress death thoughts after Heart Attack Salience and a subsequent distraction. In 
other words, the current study was constructed in order to clarify the conditions under 
which people suppress death-related concepts after thinking about having a heart 
attack. The study was also designed to clarify whether or not the lack of significant 
differences between the Heart Attack Salience and Control conditions in the first two 
studies of the current research programme resulted from the continued suppression of 
death-related thoughts among participants in the Heart Attack Salience conditions 
after they were given a distraction task. In order to accomplish the above objectives, 
the current study used a methodology derived from the DTA branch of the TMT 
literature. 
 
5.0.1 Death-Thought Accessibility (DTA) in TMT 
The DTA branch of the TMT literature is primarily concerned with the empirical 
assessment of the suppression of death-related thoughts following Mortality Salience 
or similar methodologies that prime existential concerns. Beginning with Greenberg 
et al.‘s (1994) seminal paper, this area of TMT has been important in establishing the 
cognitive processes underlying the management of existential concerns (for a 
comprehensive review of the DTA literature see Hayes, Schimel, Arndt & Faucher, 
2010). In this regard, a plethora of DTA research has found that the extent of the 
suppression of death-related thoughts varies depending on whether these thoughts are 
conscious or they are outside a person‘s focal awareness. Specifically, this research 
has demonstrated that the suppression of death-related thoughts is strong immediately 
after existential concerns are made conscious due to proximal defences and that, 
following this initial suppression, death-related thoughts then become hyperaccessible 
to individuals (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 
2000). Additionally, research from DTA has found that if the cognitive resources 
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required to actively suppress existential concerns are put under increasing demands, 
such as having to retain a piece of information in one‘s short-term memory, that this 
initial suppression process is circumvented and death-related thoughts become 
hyperaccessible to individuals (e.g. Arndt et al., 1997b; Arndt et al., 2007). Similarly, 
Arndt et al. (1997b) found that this initial suppression process is circumvented and 
death-related thoughts become hyperaccessible when death-related words are 
subliminally presented to individuals. In short, the above research has shown that 
death-related thoughts become hyper-accessible to individuals, either after a delay or 
distraction following their initial suppression (e.g. via Mortality Salience) or when the 
death-related thoughts are presented to them in ways that serve to circumvent the 
initial suppression process (e.g. when mortality is made salient to an individual who 
has been placed under conditions of increased cognitive load). Relating this research 
to the wealth of evidence concerning distal defensive strategies such as cultural 
worldview defence and the pursuit of self-esteem relevant behaviours among 
individuals, TMT researchers have argued that it is this hyperaccessibility of death-
related thoughts that prompts these strategies (Hayes et al., 2010).  
 
In order to investigate the degree of suppression of death-related thoughts, TMT 
research on DTA has typically used a word-fragment completion methodology. 
Word-fragment completion methodologies have been used in psychological research 
since the late 1950s (e.g. Miller & Friedman, 1957). Those studies which have 
employed this methodology have mostly been used to demonstrate priming effects or 
have provided evidence to support the cognitive processes underlying conceptual 
activation and memory retrieval (e.g. Bassili & Smith, 1986; Srinivas, Roediger & 
Rajaram, 1992; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Sia, Lord, Blessum, Thomas, & Lepper, 
1999; Smallwood, 2004). The adaptation of this methodology for DTA research was 
originally developed by Greenberg et al. (1994) and derived from prior research 
concerning the trait attributions that people make based on descriptions of others‘ 
behaviours (Bassili & Smith, 1986). As with many other versions of the word 
fragment completion task, this variation of the methodology relies on the notion that 
one can make indirect inferences about the salient cognitions of an individual that are 
below their conscious awareness on the basis of their responses to an ambiguous and 
seemingly unrelated task that allows for such salient cognitions to be revealed (Hayes 
et al., 2010). In this instance, participants are presented with a task where they are 
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asked to complete ambiguous word fragments, several of which can be completed 
either as a neutral or death-related word. DTA researchers argue that the way in 
which these word fragments are completed by participants has the potential to reveal 
the degree to which death-related thoughts are present in their consciousness. In other 
words, these researchers contend that the number of death-related words that 
participants complete in one of these measures can be taken as an indication of 
whether or not death-related thoughts have been made conscious for them or the 
extent to which such thoughts are just below their conscious awareness yet still 
accessible to them.  
 
There have also been a number of alternatives to the word-fragment completion task 
in DTA research. A common alternative to this methodology involves a lexical 
decision task, where participants are asked to distinguish between words (a mixture of 
death-related words, negative words and neutral words) and non-words that are 
presented to them on a computer screen and their reaction times in completing this 
task are recorded (e.g. Bassett, 2005; Koole & Van den Berg, 2005; Schimel et al., 
2007; Hayes et al., 2008). DTA researchers who have used this methodology have 
suggested that a high level of DTA is associated with significantly faster reaction 
times towards death-related words compared to non-words, negative words or neutral 
words and several studies using this methodology have corroborated results from the 
word-fragment completion methodology on this basis (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; Hayes 
et al., 2008). Alternatively, Gailliot, Schmeichel & Baumeister (2006) used a 
methodology where participants were presented with images that could be perceived 
as either death-neutral or death-related. For instance, one of their images could be 
perceived as either a lady sitting in front of a large mirror or as a skull. These 
researchers argued that a participant‘s level of DTA could be inferred on the basis of 
their perception of such images (i.e. if participants perceived such images in the 
death-related mode, it was taken as an indication of a high level of DTA). Using this 
methodology, they were able to add further support to the results concerning DTA 
that had been uncovered in the word-fragment completion studies. 
 
Using the above methodologies, DTA research has been instrumental in uncovering 
the role of proximal and distal defences in TMT (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et 
al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 2000) and has been used to support many of the central 
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tenets of TMT research. For instance, DTA research has demonstrated that 
participants who have their self-esteem temporarily boosted or are given the 
opportunity to defend a valued aspect of their cultural worldview show evidence of a 
reduction in their DTA after Mortality Salience (e.g. Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; 
Mikulincer & Florian, 2002; Jonas & Fischer, 2006). DTA research has also 
uncovered some unique findings in the TMT domain such as the discovery that close 
relationships can moderate the effects of Mortality Salience on DTA (e.g. Mikulincer 
& Florian, 2000), that highlighting the death-related consequences of risky 
behaviours such as binge drinking, unsafe driving and tobacco use can lead to 
increases in DTA following a delay (e.g. Taubman-Ben-Ari, 2004; Jessop & Wade, 
2008; Hansen et al., 2010), that thinking about the creaturely nature of being human 
can lead to an increase in DTA in the distal mode of defence (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 
1999; Goldenberg et al., 2002) and that threatening important values that an 
individual may have can lead to increases in their DTA (e.g. Landau et al., 2004a; 
Hirschberger, 2006).  
 
Most importantly for the current study, Arndt et al. (2007) found that participants 
who were primed with Cancer Salience and given a distraction task to complete did 
not exhibit significantly different levels of DTA compared to control participants and 
that the former participants demonstrated significantly lower levels of DTA following 
a distraction compared to participants who were primed with Mortality Salience. 
However, these TMT researchers also found that participants who were placed under 
high cognitive load and given a Cancer Salience task demonstrated significantly 
higher levels of DTA than a control group who were placed under similar conditions 
of high cognitive load. The researchers reasoned that these combined findings were 
an indication that cancer is more existentially threatening than the abstract concept of 
death itself, leading to a greater initial suppression of death-related thoughts 
following Cancer Salience. In this way, they argued that, when their participants who 
were asked to think about contracting cancer were in a conscious mode of processing, 
they tended to defensively suppress death-related thoughts for a longer time-frame 
than those participants who were asked to think about their own death. In contrast, the 
researchers maintained that those participants who were placed under conditions of 
high cognitive load and asked to think about contracting cancer exhibited high levels 
  
 
 
129 
of DTA as they were unable to suppress death-related thoughts due to being placed 
under increased processing demands.  
 
5.0.2 The Current Study 
Following Arndt et al.‘s (2007) research, it was deemed possible that the potentially 
very threatening nature of thinking about a heart attack led participants in the first two 
studies to continue to suppress death-related thoughts after they were subsequently 
distracted, resulting in different responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip than had 
been predicted through TMT. More specifically, participants from the first two 
studies who received a Heart Attack Salience task and subsequent distraction may 
have used a consciously rational strategy of exhibiting highly positive attitudes 
towards the CVD Risk Biochip and elevated intentions towards the device in order to 
push the problem of death into the future as they were unable to suppress the highly 
threatening and existentially-relevant thoughts about having a heart attack. This is in 
contrast to the proposed distal defensive responses of increased negative attitudes and 
avoidant responses towards the device that were expected among participants 
following Heart Attack Salience and a subsequent distraction. As mentioned 
previously, the possibility that participants in the first two studies exhibited the 
former proximal defensive strategy was considered to be remote for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly, proposition one of the TMHM suggests that individuals will engage 
in a proximal defence strategy to the extent that it is effective in facilitating the 
removal of the mortality reminders from their immediate cognisance (Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2008). As noted in the Discussion section of the first study (pages 1-85 - 1-87), 
this sort of proximal defensive strategy is unlikely to be effective in facilitating the 
removal of mortality reminders since agreeing to use the CVD Risk Biochip could 
potentially lead to the discovery of life-threatening information. In contrast, a 
proximal strategy of defensive avoidance would appear to more readily push 
mortality reminders associated with death into the future. Secondly, the findings from 
the content analyses of responses to the salience measures in the first two studies 
suggest that participants were just as likely to elicit thoughts concerning death and 
death and survival themes after receiving the Heart Attack Salience task as those who 
received the Mortality Salience task (i.e. these measures appear to be comparable in 
their propensity to elicit death-related thoughts). Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, it 
was possible that participants who received a Heart Attack Salience task to complete 
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underestimated the threatening nature of heart attacks in their open-ended responses 
to this task. Following this possibility, it was considered important to investigate the 
likelihood of whether or not proximal defences had occurred in the first two studies in 
order to establish the validity of the results of these studies. Therefore, following 
Arndt et al.‘s (2007) Study 2, it was reasoned that placing participants under 
increased cognitive load might disrupt such a continued suppression process, thereby 
preventing the continued persistence of proximal strategies from occurring after Heart 
Attack Salience. In order to test this possibility, the current study was explicitly based 
on the design of this second study from Arndt et al.‘s (2007) research programme, 
where participants had been given either a Cancer Salience task or the standard 
Control task concerning thoughts about dental pain, in combination with either a 
cognitive load task or a distraction task. As with Arndt et al.‘s (2007) Study 2, the 
Mortality Salience measure was also removed from the design of the current study as 
this measure has already been consistently found to lead to high levels of death-
thought accessibility with both cognitive load and distraction tasks in the TMT 
literature (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 2000).  
 
In sum, the current study was explicitly designed to investigate if participants‘ DTA 
(as measured by the standard word-fragment completion task derived from the TMT 
literature) levels would be higher after Heart Attack Salience when  participants were 
placed under increased cognitive load (in this case, being asked to mentally rehearse a 
number, as per Arndt et al., 1997b) compared to participants who were given the 
same distraction task that had been used in the first two studies of the current research 
programme following Heart Attack Salience. In line with Study 2 of Arndt et al.‘s 
(2007) programme of research, it was predicted that those participants who were 
given the cognitive load task would display significantly higher DTA after Heart 
Attack Salience than those who were given the distraction task following Heart 
Attack Salience. Additionally, in accordance with the findings from Study 2 of Arndt 
et al.‘s (2007) research programme, it was predicted that participants who were given 
the cognitive load task in conjunction with Heart Attack Salience would display 
significantly higher DTA than participants who were given either a cognitive load 
task or a distraction task in combination with the same death-neutral Control task that 
had been given to participants in the first two studies (i.e. where they were asked to 
think about encounters with dental pain). Finally, following the results of the first two 
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studies in the current research programme and Study 1 of Arndt et al.‘s (2007) 
research programme, it was predicted that participants who were primed with Heart 
Attack Salience and subsequently given a distraction task to complete would not 
display significant differences in their level of DTA to either of the Control 
conditions. 
 
5.1 METHOD 
 
5.1.1 Design and Participants 
This study used a 2 x 2 independent measures design as a function of the suppression-
related measures (cognitive load or distraction task) and salience task (Heart Attack 
Salience or Control) that participants received.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to the Cognitive Load/ Heart Attack Salience, Distraction/ Heart Attack Salience, 
Cognitive Load/ Control or Distraction/ Control conditions respectively via block 
randomisation of the Questionnaire Booklets.  
 
Seventy-two undergraduate students from Dublin City University who were enrolled 
in either Nursing or Psychology courses (7 males and 65 females

) volunteered to 
participate. It was not considered necessary to recruit middle-aged or older adults in 
this particular study as the main dependent measure (DTA) did not involve the 
relevance of a CVD-related device to participants‘ health. Additionally, Arndt et al. 
(2007) had demonstrated that thoughts about developing cancer led to increases in 
death-related thoughts among student participants who were placed under conditions 
of high cognitive load. Following their logic, it was reasoned that thinking about 
having a heart attack should lead to similar increases in death-related thoughts when 
student participants were placed under conditions of high cognitive load. A sample 
size of 72 participants was sought in preparation for a 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA. 
As with the first two studies, this sample size of 18 participants per group was 
determined after consulting Cohen‘s (1992) tables in light of the typically large effect 
sizes reported in TMT research (as per Arndt & Vess, 2008). 
                                                          

 It should be noted that, while the gender balance among participants in this study 
was not ideal, it was not expected that female and male participants would exhibit 
differences in their DTA levels, in accordance with Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings that 
both male and female participants were equally likely to exhibit higher DTA levels 
following thoughts about developing cancer.  
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5.1.2 Procedure and Materials 
As with the first two studies, ethical approval was sought and granted for the current 
study from the DCU Research Ethics Committee. After being given the initial brief 
verbal account of the study, participants were given a Plain Language Statement 
(Appendix B3) to read before completing one of the experimental questionnaires. 
This Plain Language Statement indicated the source of funding to participants and 
ensured them that all data would be stored anonymously and that they were free to 
withdraw at any time during the study. Participants were also given the opportunity to 
ask any questions that they had in relation to the study before they begun. Once they 
were satisfied, participants were given one of the Questionnaire Booklets (Appendix 
E1-E4) to complete. 
 
Participants in the two Cognitive Load conditions received Questionnaire Booklets 
where they were initially presented with an eleven digit number, which they were 
instructed to mentally rehearse for later recall (as per Arndt et al., 1997). Participants 
in the Heart Attack Salience conditions then received a task consisting of two open-
ended questions allowing them to explicitly think about having a heart attack and 
what happens to them when they physically have a heart attack (the Heart Attack 
Salience task used in the first two studies). In contrast, participants in the Control 
conditions received a task consisting of similar open-ended questions relating to 
dental pain (the Control task used in the first two studies). Participants in the 
Distraction conditions initially received either the Heart Attack Salience or Control 
task. This was followed by the distraction task taken from the TMT literature that had 
also been used in the first two studies.  
 
After completing one set of the above measures, participants were then introduced to 
the dependent variable, consisting of a DTA measure taken from Greenberg et al. 
(1994). This measure consists of twenty-five word fragments for participants to 
complete with the first word that came to mind, which had been counter-balanced for 
order of presentation. Six of the twenty-five word fragments could have been 
completed with both neutral and death-related words. For example, the word 
fragment ―COFF_ _‖ could have been completed with the death-related word 
―COFFIN‖ or the death-neutral word ―COFFEE‖. The number of death-related words 
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completed by participants was used as an indication of how accessible death-related 
words were to them. 
 
5.1.3 Ethical Issues 
As with the first two studies, the potential risk of getting participants to think about 
having a heart attack was addressed by participants confirming that they had not 
previously experienced a significant negative heart-related event (e.g. a heart attack) 
before taking part in the study. Participants were also assured at the outset of the 
study that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time, without completing 
the questionnaire and without giving any reason for withdrawing in the event that 
they found any of the questions to be unduly distressing. In a similar fashion to the 
first two studies, the concern in relation to the fact that the true nature of the research 
was hidden from potential participants from the outset was addressed by ensuring that 
participants received a thorough debriefing after the study was completed that 
revealed the purpose of the study, any deceptions used, and why they were needed to 
study the question at hand. This debriefing constituted a short Microsoft 
PowerPoint® presentation after participants had finished the Questionnaire Booklets. 
In addition to this presentation, participants were given a Debriefing Sheet (Appendix 
G3) to take away with them. Finally, they were also given the opportunity to raise any 
additional questions or concerns that they had about the study at this point and they 
were given the researchers‘ contact information in the event that they were 
uncomfortable in addressing these concerns in the classroom environment. As with 
the first two studies, no participants raised any concerns or made any complaints over 
how the study was conducted.  
 
In the current study, the procedure for recruitment was explicitly designed in 
accordance with the Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee‘s directions 
in order to ensure that the student participants did not feel subtly coerced into taking 
part in the study. In this regard, students were initially approached at the end of the 
previous lecture of the appropriate course and informed that they had the option to 
participate in a research study concerning ―the relationship between personality 
characteristics and how well people can perform two tasks at the same time‖ during 
the first 20 minutes of the next scheduled lecture of the course. During this first 
contact, the students were instructed that they did not need to show up to the first 20 
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minutes of the subsequent lecture when the study was being conducted in the event 
that they did not want to participate in the study. The students were also assured that 
failure to participate would not affect their ongoing assessment, grades or their 
relationship with the university in any way. At the beginning of the next lecture, the 
participants were then given a verbal account of the study, consisting of the 
description of the study as contained in the Plain Language Statement (i.e. the types 
of tasks that participants would be asked to complete and roughly what the questions 
would be about as per previous TMT research). 
 
5.1.4 Data Analyses 
As mentioned above, the design of the current study was based on Study 2 of Arndt et 
al.‘s (2007) research programme in order to investigate if the cognitive dynamics that 
they uncovered in relation to participants‘ responses to their Cancer Salience task 
were similar to participants‘ responses to the novel Heart Attack Salience task in the 
current research programme. Consequently, the current study also replicated the 
analysis-strategy of Study 2 of their research programme. Specifically, in line with 
Study 2 in their programme, a two-way between subjects ANOVA was performed on 
the DTA measure in the current study in order to investigate if there were differences 
in the number of death-related word stems that participants completed by virtue of the 
suppression-related measure or salience task that they had received.  
 
5.2 RESULTS 
 
5.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
 Demographic information pertaining to the total sample is given in Table 5.1. The 
mean age of participants was 22.93 with a standard deviation of 5.79.  
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Variable N % 
Age   
18-25 52 72.2 
26-42 20 27.8 
Gender   
Male  7 9.7 
Female 65 90.3 
Table 5.1: Demographic Information for Study 3 
 
5.2.2 Data Cleanup and Tests of Normality  
The number of death-related word stems completed in each questionnaire booklet was 
initially summed in order to achieve a single score for each participant on the DTA 
measure. The resultant data set was then subjected to tests of normality (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistics, Shapiro Wilks statistics, histograms with normality plots and 
Normal Q-Q Plots), which revealed a minor positive skew. However, after attempting 
several data transformations according to Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2007) guidelines 
that did not greatly improve upon the normality of the data, it was decided to preserve 
the untransformed data set for the subsequent ANOVA analysis.  
 
5.2.3 ANOVA results for the Death-Thought Accessibility Measure 
A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was performed on the DTA data in order to assess 
whether or not giving participants either a cognitive load or a distraction task had a 
differential impact on the number of death-related word stems completed by them 
following Heart Attack Salience, and whether or not these responses were 
significantly different to the responses of participants who were given either of the 
suppression-related measures in conjunction with the death-neutral Control task. 
Some minor heterogeneity was detected via Levene‘s test of Equality of Error 
Variances (p = 0.04). Consequently, the ANOVA was conducted at a reduced alpha 
level of 0.025, following Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2007) recommendations.  
 
The ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of DTA between the conditions on 
either the suppression-related measures [F (1, 68) =3.85, p = 0.05] or the salience task 
[F (1, 68) = 0.06, p = 0.81] that participants received. Similarly, there was no 
interaction effect on DTA between the two independent measures [F (1, 68) = 0.06, p 
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= 0.81]. Table 5.2 displays Descriptive Statistics for the ANOVA. These results 
suggest that participants who received a Heart Attack Salience measure did not 
exhibit significantly higher DTA compared to control participants, irrespective of 
whether or not they received conditions of increased cognitive load or a distraction 
task.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Death-Thought Accessibility 
 Measure by Salience Condition and Suppression Task 
 
5.2.4 Content Analysis of the Open-Ended Salience Measures 
As with the first two studies, a series of content analyses were performed on 
participants‘ responses to the open-ended salience measures. Following Arndt et al. 
(2007), these analyses were conducted in order to investigate if thinking about having 
a heart attack tended to elicit more thoughts about death, greater negativity and a 
greater degree of threat than thinking about dental pain in participants‘ open-ended 
responses to the Salience measures. Once again, the researcher and an additional 
independent coder who was unaware of the exact nature of the study recorded the 
number of participants‘ death-related words ( = 1.00) and the total number of words 
( = 1.00) in their open-ended responses. Additionally, the coders rated their 
responses on the following four dimensions, using a 6-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 0 = not at all to 5 = very much; degree of focus on death or survival themes ( = 
0.99), negativity expressed ( = 0.97), degree of threat expressed ( = 0.97), and 
shallow or deep writing of the responses ( = 0.98). After each coder had 
independently rated each of the items on these dimensions, these ratings were 
compared and displayed high levels of agreement. Consequently, the coders‘ 
responses on each of the Likert scale items were averaged to form a single set of 
scores on each dimension. As per Arndt et al.‘s (2007) method, separate 2 (Heart 
Attack vs. Control) x 2 (Cognitive Load vs. Distraction) ANOVAs were conducted on 
Salience Task Suppression-Related  
Measure  
M SD    
Heart Attack Salience Cognitive Load 1.94 1.23    
 Distraction 1.56 0.92    
Control Cognitive Load 1.94 0.87    
 Distraction 1.44 0.71    
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each of these dimensions, except in the cases of the negativity and threat dimensions, 
where a 2x2 ANOVA was conducted on an averaged threat-negativity dimension, as 
these two measures were very highly correlated (r = 0.71).  
 
A violation of Levene‘s Test of Equality of Error Variances led to the ANOVA on the 
number of death words in the open-ended questions being conducted at a reduced 
alpha level of 0.025, rather than the conventional 0.05 level, as per Tabachnick & 
Fidell‘s (2001) recommendations. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
salience task [F (1, 68) = 103.99, p < 0.001, ² = 0.61]. In other words, there was a 
greater number of death-related words in participants‘ open-ended responses to the 
Heart Attack Salience task (M = 2.53, SD = 1.40) compared to the Control task (M = 
0.08, SD = 0.28). However, there was no evidence of a main effect of the 
suppression-related measures [F (1, 68) = 0.48, p > 0.05, ² = 0.01] or an interaction 
effect between the two independent variables in combination [F (1, 68) = 0.36, p > 
0.05, ² = 0.01]. The ANOVA results for participants‘ degree of focus on death and 
survival themes also revealed a main effect of salience task [F (1, 68) = 142.74, p < 
0.001, ² = 0.68], but no effect of the suppression-related measures [F (1, 68) = 0.95, 
p > 0.05, ² = 0.01] or interaction between these variables [F (1, 68) = 0.46, p > 0.05, 
² = 0.01]. As with the number of death words, there was a significantly greater focus 
on death and survival themes in participants‘ responses in the Heart Attack Salience 
condition (M = 3.54, SD = 0.89) compared to the responses of participants from the 
Control condition (M = 1.33, SD = 0.66). In a similar fashion, there was a 
significantly greater degree of threat-negativity [F(1, 68) = 28.71, p < 0.001, ² = 
0.30] in participants‘ responses towards the Heart Attack salience task (M = 3.75, SD 
= 0.83) compared to the Control task (M = 2.81, SD = 0.64) but no effect of the 
suppression-related measures [F(1, 68) = 0.40, p > 0.05, ² = 0.01] or an interaction 
between the two variables [F(1, 68) = 0.03, p > 0.05, ² = 0.00].  
 
Finally, with respect to the total word count in participants‘ responses, there were no 
significant main effects for either the suppression-related measures [F (1, 68) = 3.08, 
p > 0.05, ² = 0.04] or the salience task [F (1, 68) = 1.15, p>.05, ² = 0.02] and no 
significant interaction effect of these two variables in combination [F (1, 68) = 0.06, p 
> 0.05, ² = 0.00]. However, the ANOVA results for the deep vs. shallow writing 
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dimension revealed a significant main effect for salience task [F(1, 68) = 8.18, p > 
0.05, ² = 0.11] but no significant difference with respect to the suppression-related 
measures [F(1, 68) = 0.12, p > 0.05, ² = 0.00] and no evidence of an interaction 
between the suppression-related measures and salience task [F(1, 68) = 0.00, p > 
0.05, ² = 0.00]. More particularly, participants in the Heart Attack Salience 
conditions (M = 2.93, SD = 0.97) exhibited a greater degree of deep writing than 
participants in the Control conditions (M = 2.24, SD = 1.07). 
 
5.2.5 Frequency Data for the Word Fragment Completions 
During the data entry stage, it was observed that some of the words that participants 
used to complete the potentially death-relevant word fragments in the word fragment 
completion task tended to recur, regardless of a participant‘s group membership. 
Following this finding, word frequency data was recorded for the death-relevant word 
fragments. In Table 5.3, frequency information is displayed for the death-relevant 
word fragment completions, the most frequent death-neutral word fragment 
completions and the other word fragment completions used by participants. 
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 Heart Attack Salience 
Condition 
Control Salience condition 
Word 
Fragment 
Completion Frequency % Completion Frequency % 
BUR_ _D Buried 25 34.72 Buried 19 26.39 
 Burned 5 6.94 Burned 13 18.06 
 Other (3*) 6 8.33 Other (2*) 4 5.56 
KI_ _ED Killed 17 23.61 Killed 22 30.56 
 Kissed 10 13.89 Kicked 10 13.89 
 Other (3*) 9 12.5 Other (2*) 4 5.56 
DE_ _ Dead 10 13.89 Dead 10 13.89 
 Deal 5 6.94 Dear 6 8.33  
 Other (9*) 21 29.17 Other (10*) 20 27.78 
SK_ _L Skull 7 9.72 Skull 7 9.72 
 Skill 27 37.5 Skill 28 38.89 
 Other (1*) 2 2.78 Other (1*) 1 1.39 
GRA_ _ Grave 4 5.56 Grave 1 1.39 
 Grass 21 29.17 Grass 19 26.39 
 Other (6*) 11 15.28 Other (7*) 16 22.22 
COFF_ _ Coffin 0 0 Coffin 2 2.78 
 Coffee 36 50 Coffee 34 47.22 
 Other 0 0 Other 0 0 
* Numbers in parenthesis after ―other‖ denote the number of other words used to 
complete the corresponding word fragment 
Table 5.3: Frequency Information by Condition for Words Used by Participants in the 
Word Fragment Completion Task 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
 
The lack of significant differences between the experimental conditions on the word-
fragment DTA measure led to a rejection of the hypothesis that those participants 
who were placed under increased cognitive load would be more likely to exhibit 
greater death-related thoughts following Heart Attack Salience than those participants 
who were given the distraction task following Heart Attack Salience. Similarly, the 
prediction that participants who were placed under increased cognitive load would 
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display significantly higher DTA following Heart attack Salience in comparison to 
participants who were given either the cognitive load task or distraction task in 
addition to the death-neutral Control task was rejected following this pattern of 
insignificant results. However, the prediction based on the first two studies that 
participants who were given the distraction task following Heart Attack Salience 
would not display significant differences in their DTA to either of the control 
conditions was supported by the same pattern of non-significant results. 
 
5.3.1 Interpretation of the Main Results 
The finding that participants who were placed under conditions of increased cognitive 
load and given the Heart Attack Salience task did not display significantly higher 
levels of DTA than participants from either of the control conditions suggests that 
placing an increased burden on an individual‘s cognitive system and asking them to 
think about having a heart attack may not lead to a greater availability of implicit 
thoughts of death compared to baseline levels. Such results differ substantially from 
Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings that giving participants an increased cognitive load and 
a Cancer Salience measure leads to significantly higher levels of DTA in comparison 
to giving participants a Cancer Salience measure and a distraction or providing them 
with an analogous control measure. In contrast, the current pattern of results implies 
that Heart Attack Salience and Cancer Salience are not equivalent measures in terms 
of their capacity to elicit existential threat. Indeed, while one would anticipate that 
someone who is given a Heart Attack Salience task to complete would display high 
levels of DTA, at least under conditions of increased cognitive load following 
previous TMT health-related research, due to a spreading activation between thoughts 
of heart attacks and thoughts of death (e.g. Arndt et al., 2002; Arndt et al., 2007), the 
results of the current study suggest that neither conditions of increased cognitive load 
nor a subsequent distraction leads to increases in DTA following Heart Attack 
Salience. Since the results of the content analyses in the current study (discussed 
below) and the results of the content analyses in the first two studies appear to 
suggest that thinking about having a heart attack leads to significantly more thoughts 
concerning death than thinking about a control topic, it is highly unlikely that the lack 
of increases in DTA following Heart Attack Salience in the current study reflects a 
lack of association between thoughts about heart attacks and thoughts of death. 
Consequently, it appears that Heart Attack Salience may somehow circumvent the 
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normal TMT suppression process, where distal defences are exhibited following 
increased cognitive load and thinking about a death-relevant concept.   
 
This circumvention of the normal TMT suppression process with respect to Heart 
Attack Salience may have occurred in the current study due to participants 
minimising the importance and relevance of heart attacks to their own health, 
following previous research on CVD denial and self-exemption (e.g. Avis et al., 
1989; Croyle et al., 1993; Mengden et al., 1998; Newell et al., 1999; Van Steenkiste 
et al., 2004; Peretti-Watel et al., 2007; Huerta et al., 2009). In this way, persistent 
beliefs among participants that heart attacks were not relevant to their own health 
may have undercut the potential for Heart Attack Salience to elicit existential anxiety. 
This may be particularly relevant to the current study, where student participants may 
have held steadfast beliefs that heart attacks were not relevant to their health. This 
explanation is corroborated by findings from the broader literature that younger adults 
often harbour beliefs that they are less vulnerable to health threats (e.g. Jemmott et 
al., 1986; Avis et al., 1989; Wild, Hinson, Cunningham & Bacchiochi, 2001; 
Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005) and also tend to be less likely to engage in 
screening for heart-related diseases (e.g. Davis et al., 1998).  
 
While the hypothesis that participants who were given the distraction task following 
Heart Attack Salience would not display significant differences in their DTA to the 
control conditions was supported, this result may have occurred for different reasons 
to those originally expected. Specifically, it was originally proposed that such a result 
would indicate that thoughts about having a heart attack should lead to a greater 
initial suppression of death-related thoughts, following Arndt et al.‘s (2007) 
explanation of the analogous finding in the results of their first study. However, this 
explanation does not appear to hold up to scrutiny in the current study, following the 
above finding that thinking about having a heart attack under conditions of increased 
cognitive load also failed to lead to significantly greater levels of DTA among 
participants compared to thinking about dental pain. This is because one would have 
expected higher levels of DTA among participants who were under increased 
cognitive load in the event that thoughts about having a heart attack led to a 
substantial suppression of death-related thoughts. In contrast, it appears that thinking 
about heart attacks does not lead to substantially different levels of implicit thoughts 
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concerning death when individuals are either under conditions of increased cognitive 
load or are given a subsequent distraction. This adds further weight to the explanation 
that participants in this study did not relate thinking about having a heart attack to 
their own personal health. In other words, the low DTA levels among either condition 
of participants who received a Heart Attack Salience task appear to indicate that these 
participants failed to find heart attacks to be self-relevant. 
 
5.3.2 Content Analyses of the Salience Measure 
As predicted, the content analyses results clearly demonstrated that thinking about 
heart attacks evoked substantially greater thoughts of death and survival (both in the 
number of death-related words used and the degree of focus on death and survival 
themes), greater negativity and a greater degree of threat among participants than 
thinking about dental pain. Additionally, there were no significant differences in any 
of these dimensions on the basis of the Suppression tasks. This is consistent with 
prior TMT research that has shown that people will always respond to an explicit 
mortality-related measure at a conscious level of awareness (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1994; Arndt et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000). Taken together, these results 
indicate that thinking about having a heart attack results in increased thoughts of 
death and an increased focus on death and survival themes, irrespective of whether or 
not an individual is under cognitive strain. Given the DTA results reported above, 
these results also suggest that there is something unusual about the Heart Attack 
Salience task that made participants exempt themselves from the seeming death-
relatedness of thinking about heart attacks. 
 
Thinking about heart attacks also led to a deeper style of writing than thinking about 
dental pain, suggesting that heart attacks represent a more existentially-relevant 
concept than dental pain. This is interesting in view of the fact that most of the 
participants in this study were younger adults. Thinking about heart attacks may be 
especially threatening for younger adults as it may serve to undermine prevalent 
views that they may have about their own invulnerability (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; 
Avis et al., 1989; Wild et al., 2001; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the lack of significant differences in DTA between those participants 
who were asked to think about having a heart attack and those who were asked to 
think about dental pain appears to suggest that these younger adults may have held 
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steadfast beliefs that heart attacks were not relevant to their own health. Taking these 
results together, the content analysis of the deep vs. shallow writing dimension would 
appear to suggest that younger adults in the Heart Attack Salience conditions 
responded to the open-ended questions with a greater orientation towards symbolic 
meaning than participants from the Control conditions. 
 
5.3.3 Potential Word Frequency Effects in the Word Fragment Completion Task 
Despite the above potential explanations, it is important to note that participants in the 
current study tended to favour certain completions of the potentially death-relevant 
word fragments, regardless of their group membership (see Table 5.3 in the Results 
Section above). In other words, certain word fragment completions were much more 
common than the next most common alternative, irrespective of whether or not a 
participant had received a Heart Attack Salience or Control task. Notably, the word 
fragment COFF_ _ was completed with the word ―coffee‖ by 70 out of the 72 
participants, SK_ _L was completed with the word ―skill‖ by 55 participants, ―GRA_ 
_‖ was completed with the word ―grass‖ by 40 participants and ―KI_ _ED‖ was 
completed with the word ―killed‖ by 39 participants. When comparing these results to 
the word frequency data in Table 5.4 derived from Kilgarriff‘s (1996) word frequency 
analysis of the British National Corpus, it is evident that the words ―coffee‖, ―skill‖, 
―grass‖ and ―killed‖ have notably higher frequencies per million than their respective 
death-related counterparts; ―coffin‖, ―skull‖ and ―grave‖. Additionally, the lemma (or 
headword) ―kill‖ has a distinctly higher frequency per one hundred million words 
than its death-neutral counterpart ―kick‖.   
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Death Completion Frequency  Death-Neutral Completion Frequency  
Buried (Bury*) 2,987 Burned (Burn*) 5,091 
Dead 11, 341 Dear 4, 106 
Grave 1, 740 Grass 4, 143 
Killed (Kill*) 15, 620 Kicked (Kick*) 3, 539 
Skull 1, 234 Skill 11, 423 
Coffin 1, 241 Coffee 6, 614 
*The frequencies of the word lemmas in parenthesis are reported for these word  
   fragment completions. 
Table 5.4: Word Frequencies per Million Derived from Kilgarriff (1996) for the Death 
Completions and Most Common Death-Neutral Completions for Word Fragments in the 
Word Fragment Completion Task 
 
Following such marked differences in word frequencies per million between the death 
completions and participants‘ most common death-neutral completions of the word 
fragments in the word fragment completion task, it is possible that this favouritism in 
participants‘ responses related to a potential confounding influence of word frequency 
effects. In order to fully understand this potential confound in light of the current 
pattern of insignificant results, a brief discussion of the literature on word frequency 
effects is given below.   
 
5.3.3a Word Frequency Effects 
A long history of psycho-linguistic and neuroscience research has investigated the 
processes involved in word recognition and production. It is generally understood 
from this research that, following their initial selection and activation, the syntactic 
properties of words become available to people for later use (Schmitt, Meyer & 
Levelt, 1999). Within this literature, a plethora of studies involving lexical decision 
tasks (i.e. where participants are required to judge whether a string of letters 
constitutes a word or a non-word) have examined whether or not the potential 
frequency of words has an impact on word recognition and production. The majority 
of these studies have found that high frequency words are recognized faster and with 
higher accuracy than lower frequency words (e.g. DeLucia & Stagner, 1954; 
Richardson, 1976; Balota & Chumbley, 1984; Hino & Lupker, 1996; Hino & Lupker, 
2000; Yap, Tse & Balota, 2009) and that high frequency words elicit substantially 
lower event-related potentials (ERPs) and pupillary movements than lower frequency 
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words (e.g. Raynor & Duffy, 1986; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Kuchinke, Võ, 
Hofmann & Jacobs, 2007; Scott, O‘Donnell, Leuthold & Sereno, 2009). A similar 
pattern of findings has come from naming tasks, where participants are required to 
name a picture or a word that they are presented with as quickly and accurately as 
possible; i.e. higher frequency words tend to lead to faster reaction times and greater 
accuracy in naming (e.g. Forster & Chambers, 1973; Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994; Hino 
& Lupker, 1996; Hino & Lupker, 2000). These effects have been termed ―word 
frequency effects‖ and the reliability of such effects has led to their establishment as 
an important variable for models of word recognition (e.g. Morton, 1969; Grainger & 
Jacobs, 1996; Perry, Ziegler & Zorzi, 2007). 
 
Some studies within this word frequency literature have investigated the interaction 
between word frequency and the emotional-arousing attributes of certain words.  An 
early study by DeLucia & Stagner (1954) in this area demonstrated that word-
recognition time was affected by both the frequency of usage of the word and its 
emotion-arousing value. An important later study by Kitiyama (1990) found that 
participants who had words flashed briefly before them on a screen were less accurate 
in their perceptions of low frequency words if the words were highly affective 
compared to low frequency words that were neutral, but that the affectiveness of 
words did not influence the accuracy of their perceptions of highly frequent words. 
More recently, the focus of these studies has turned towards the valence of 
emotionality in word recognition and perception. Kuchinke et al. (2007) found 
evidence from both reaction times and pupillary response data to suggest that their 
participants responded more rapidly to low frequency words that were either 
positively or negatively valenced than low frequency words that were neutral. These 
researchers also found that participants responded faster to positively valenced high 
frequency words than either negatively valenced or neutral high frequency words. 
Scott et al. (2009) replicated the above finding with both behavioural evidence from 
reaction time data and electrophysiological responses data in the form of event-
related potentials (ERPs). Similarly, Méndez-Bértolo, Pozo & Hinojosa (2011) found 
that their participants exhibited slower reaction times and ERPs to low frequency 
words with negative emotional connotations than emotionally-neutral low frequency 
words but that there were no noticeable differences in participants‘ responses towards 
either emotionally-negative or emotionally-neutral high frequency words. Despite this 
  
 
 
146 
strong and pervasive pattern of interaction between word frequency and the 
emotionality of words, these studies have tended to find that people discriminate high 
frequency words faster than low frequency words, irrespective of their emotional 
valence (Kuchinke et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2009; Méndez-Bértolo et al., 2011). 
 
In the context of word fragment completion tasks, a wealth of studies have also 
identified that low frequency words that are explicitly presented to participants in 
word lists prior to performing such tasks tend to prime better performance towards 
the task than higher frequency words (e.g. MacLeod, 1989; MacLeod & Kampe, 
1996; Gomez, 2002; Soler, Ruiz & Dasí, 2002). Additionally, initially presenting 
participants with low frequency words within a text, which either appear to be out-of-
context or are perceptually highlighted (e.g. presenting such words in upper-case or 
within a perceptually difficult-to-read context where spaces between words are 
replaced with numbers), leads to greater priming in their responses to word fragment 
completion tasks when they are compared to the responses of participants who are 
initially presented with higher frequency words under analogous conditions (e.g. 
MacLeod, 1989; Nicolas, Carbonnel & Tiberghien, 1994; Nicolas, 1998; Nicolas & 
Söderlund, 2000). This pattern of results suggested that high frequency words 
produced relatively small explicit priming effects. This is presumably because 
participants in these studies already had a large amount of available information 
stored about these items in their memories, whereas there may have been a smaller 
amount of information available to them concerning the low frequency words (Soler 
et al., 2002). 
 
5.3.3b Word Frequency and Word Ambiguity Effects in the Current Study 
As hinted at above, the favouritism in participants‘ responses to certain word 
fragment completions in the current study may have related to a potential 
confounding influence of word frequency effects. This is because participants may 
have completed certain word fragments as high frequency words, irrespective of 
whether or not they had been primed with mortality-related concerns. For instance, 
the high processing capacity required for participants in the study to produce a lower 
frequency word such as ―coffin‖ might have made them less likely to complete the 
word fragment ―COFF_ _‖ in such a fashion. Instead, these participants may have 
favoured the word fragment completion ―coffee‖ due to its higher word frequency. 
  
 
 
147 
Similarly, a participant might have been more likely to complete the ambiguous word 
fragment ―SK_ _L‖ with the high frequency word ―skill‖ than with the relatively 
lower frequency word ―skull‖. In contrast, participants may have more readily 
completed the word fragment ―KI_ _ED‖ with the word ―killed‖ rather than the word 
―kicked‖ due to the former word‘s higher word frequency. Finally, participants may 
have completed the word fragment ―GRA_ _‖ more often with the word ―grass‖ than 
with the lower frequency word ―grave‖.  
 
Some of the psycho-linguistic and neuroscience literature mentioned earlier would 
tend to support the suggestion that this favouritism in participants‘ responses in the 
current study was a consequence of word frequency effects in participants‘ responses. 
In particular, the findings that higher frequency words tend to be perceived and 
produced much faster and more accurately than low frequency words (e.g. Hino & 
Lupker, 2000; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Yap et al., 2009) and that people tend to 
discriminate high frequency words faster than low frequency words, irrespective of 
their emotional valence (e.g. Kuchinke et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2009; Méndez-
Bértolo et al., 2011) lends support to the idea that participants may have been more 
likely to perceive and reproduce high frequency words than death-relevant words in 
the current study, irrespective of their group membership. In this way, the 
confounding influence of word frequency may have undermined the potential for 
participants‘ responses to the word fragment completion task to account for their level 
of DTA in this study. The implications of these findings for the wider DTA literature 
are further discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
It is important to note that the inverse pattern of word frequency effects relating to the 
explicit priming of words discussed earlier (i.e. MacLeod, 1989; Nicolas et al., 1994; 
MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Nicolas, 1998; Nicolas & Söderlund, 2000; Gomez, 2002; 
Soler et al., 2002) may be less relevant to the version of the word fragment 
completion task used in the current study than the pattern of word frequency effects 
from the studies relating to item generation and recognition mentioned above. This is 
because participants in the current study were either asked to write about heart attacks 
or dental pain before completing the word fragment completion task but were not 
explicitly primed with any of the target words in the word completion task such as 
coffin, buried or skull. Additionally, while the answers that participants wrote in 
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response to the Heart Attack Salience measure often contained such target words, 
these words tended to be embedded within the text in subtle ways. Subtle 
incorporations of target words within a text have not been found to lead to significant 
priming effects on word fragment completions in this way (e.g. MacLeod, 1989; 
Nicolas et al., 1994; Masson & MacLeod, 2000), possibly because such words are not 
as perceptually distinct to people as they may be in a priming task where the words 
are presented explicitly in word lists or in a perceptually distinct context prior to the 
completion of word fragment completion tasks. In contrast, studies that have found 
the prior presentation of low frequency words to lead to better performance of 
participants‘ responses to word fragment completion tasks compared to the prior 
presentation of high frequency words (e.g. MacLeod, 1989; Nicolas et al., 1994; 
MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Nicolas, 1998; Nicolas & Söderlund, 2000; Gomez, 2002; 
Soler et al., 2002) have typically drawn participants‘ attention to target words. 
Consequently, it appears more likely that the inverse pattern of word frequency 
effects relating to item generation and recognition may be more relevant to the 
current study, where participants were more likely to have generated or recognized 
the target words themselves when completing this task rather than either explicitly or 
implicitly referring word fragments back to primed words.  
 
In addition to the potential word frequency effects in the current study that are 
mentioned above, a couple of the purportedly death-related word fragment 
completions could be regarded as relatively ambiguous with respect to their 
relatedness to existential concepts such as death and mortality. In other words, these 
word fragments that were meant to illustrate death-related thoughts could have been 
interpreted in ways that are not specifically death or mortality-related. For instance, 
the word fragment completion ―grave‖ for the word fragment ―GRA_ _‖ could be 
interpreted as referring to the adjective, which means ―serious or important‖, rather 
than the noun, which means ―an excavation in the earth in which to bury a dead 
body‖. Since the adjective form is quite similar in frequency to the latter noun form, 
according to Kilgarriff‘s (1996) word frequency database (1, 138 and 1, 740 
occurrences per one hundred million words respectively), it is difficult to rule out 
whether or not participants who selected this word fragment completion were 
referring to the death-neutral adjective or the death-related noun. In a similar fashion, 
the meaning of the word completion ―buried‖ is not necessarily specifically related to 
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mortality or death-related concerns. This is because the verb ―to bury‖ does not 
necessarily specifically refer to a death-related subject matter and may instead refer to 
a death-neutral activity (e.g. ―The dog buried the toy I gave him in the back garden‖). 
Additional instances of such word ambiguities in alternative DTA word fragment 
completion tasks and their implications are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
It is also worth noting that it is less likely that the word fragment ―DE_ _‖ had the 
same confounding influence of word frequency or word ambiguity as the above-
mentioned word fragments. This is because this word fragment has potential death-
neutral and death-related word fragment completions that are reasonably comparable 
with respect to their word frequency and ―dead‖ is quite clearly a word that has a 
specific relation to mortality. That is to say, this word fragment is probably a suitable 
word fragment as it can be completed with either the specifically death-related word 
―dead‖ or the death-neutral word ―deal‖; both of these words having word frequencies 
that are quite close [11, 341 and 12, 067 occurrences per one hundred million words 
respectively, as reported in Kilgarriff‘s (1996) word frequency database].  
 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, the results of Study 3 in the current research programme revealed no 
significant differences in DTA levels between participants who were either given a 
Heart Attack Salience or control task under conditions of increased cognitive load or 
participants who were given a Heart Attack Salience or Control task and subsequently 
distracted. These results suggest that it is unlikely that the lack of significant 
differences between the Heart Attack Salience and Control conditions in the first two 
studies of the research programme resulted from the continued suppression of death-
related thoughts among participants in the Heart Attack Salience conditions after they 
were given a distraction task. Additionally, the content analyses of the salience 
measure revealed that thinking about having a heart attack led participants to elicit 
significantly more death-related thoughts compared to participants who were asked to 
think about the control topic of dental pain. These latter results suggest that Heart 
Attack Salience is a valid measure of priming death-related thoughts in participants. 
However, by the logic of TMT authors, the low DTA levels exhibited by participants 
who received the Heart Attack Salience measure appears to indicate that participants 
in the current study failed to find heart attacks to be existentially threatening. As 
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discussed above, this lack of existential threat among participants may have arisen 
because Heart Attack Salience somehow circumvents the normal TMT suppression 
process of increased implicit thoughts of death. For instance, participants may have 
minimised the importance and relevance of heart attacks to their own health, 
following previous research on CVD denial and self-exemption (e.g. Avis et al., 
1989; Croyle et al., 1993; Mengden et al., 1998; Newell et al., 1999; Van Steenkiste 
et al., 2004; Peretti-Watel et al., 2007; Huerta et al., 2009). Nonetheless, these results 
should be treated with caution as the current study also revealed that the standard 
instrument in the TMT literature for the measurement of DTA (the word fragment 
completion task) may be confounded by the effects of word frequency and word 
ambiguity.  
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Chapter 6: Study 4 
 
The results of the first two studies demonstrated that neither a cohort of participants 
aged over 55 years nor a cohort of participants aged 40-55 years displayed significant 
differences between the experimental and control conditions in their attitudes and 
behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip and commitment towards its 
use. Specifically, there had been no differences on these dimensions between 
participants who received a Mortality Salience task, a Heart Attack Salience task or a 
Control task and subsequent distraction. Additionally, the results of the third study 
found no significant differences in DTA between participants who were given Heart 
Attack Salience or a control topic to complete and subsequently either distracted or 
put under conditions of increased cognitive load. Although there was the possibility 
that word frequency and word ambiguity effects in the word fragment completion 
task had an influence on the results of this latter study, they appear to suggest that 
there may be something about the Heart Attack Salience methodology that is not 
necessarily as existentially-threatening as either Cancer Salience or Mortality 
Salience itself. This is because the results of the third study depart from previous 
TMT research which found that there were significant differences in death-thought 
accessibility between participants from both Cancer Salience and Mortality Salience 
conditions compared to controls (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997; 
Greenberg et al., 2000; Arndt et al., 2007). Nonetheless, while neither Mortality 
Salience nor Heart Attack Salience may lead to defensive avoidance of health threat 
detection behaviours like using the CVD Risk Biochip when participants are in a 
distal mode of defence, there is the possibility that one of the alternative 
methodologies that TMT authors have used to induce distal defences in participants 
may lead to such patterns of behaviour. The fourth and final study in the current 
research programme was developed in order to test this proposition. 
 
Perhaps the most common alternative to Mortality Salience that has emerged in the 
TMT literature is the ―creaturely‖ methodology developed by Goldenberg et al. 
(2001). As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 1, page 1-22), this methodology involves 
getting participants to think about the creaturely aspects of being human rather than 
getting them to think about their own death or what would happen to them if they 
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were to develop a potentially fatal condition. The control group used with this 
procedure involves asking participants to think about the uniqueness of humans as 
compared to other animals; an alteration designed to provide a more direct 
comparison to the experimental condition. Goldenberg (2005) has suggested that the 
logic behind using this method is that an awareness of the physical body has the 
capacity to remind us that we are mere mortal beings that are similar to animals in our 
physicality and basic urges; an awareness that has the capacity to make us more 
vulnerable to the effects of existential anxiety. The resultant ―Creatureliness Prime‖ 
methodology has been found to obtain analogous effects to Mortality Salience and a 
distraction in several TMT studies (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 
2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008). For instance, Goldenberg et al. 
(2002) found that creaturely reminders and a subsequent distraction led to a decreased 
interest in the physical but not the romantic aspects of sex among participants 
compared to a control group in a similar fashion to previous TMT research by 
Goldenberg et al. (1999) which had found analogous results with the use of Mortality 
Salience and a distraction instead of a creaturely reminder.  
 
More recent research has begun to suggest that the human creatureliness construct 
may be particularly relevant to health-orienting behaviours that involve a degree of 
confrontation with the human body. Importantly, Goldenberg & Arndt (2008) suggest 
that such creaturely reminders that are below conscious awareness can inform the 
health behaviours one chooses to adopt as a distal defence measure (i.e. as a way of 
preventing mortality reminders from entering a person‘s conscious awareness). More 
specifically, the third proposition of Goldenberg & Arndt‘s (2008) TMHM suggests 
that, when the physical or creaturely aspects of humans are primed and these 
mortality reminders are below conscious awareness, an individual will seek to engage 
in health behaviours that are less bodily-oriented (e.g. health screenings) in order to 
avoid the potential for these behaviours to remind the individual of their own 
creaturely nature. In this regard, Goldenberg et al. (2008) found in two of their studies 
that participants who thought about the creaturely aspects of being human exhibited 
significantly greater avoidant responses towards breast self-exams (in both real and 
imagined contexts) than control participants. Since breast self-exams involve a very 
personal and private confrontation with both the physicality of the human body and 
its capacity for developing a life-threatening condition, it is easy to appreciate the 
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potential for such behaviours to represent mortality reminders. Goldenberg et al. 
(2008) suggest that priming the creatureliness of the human body led their 
participants to exhibit more avoidant responses to breast self-exams due to the 
explicit activation of concepts relating to confrontation with the human body that 
creaturely reminders tend to provide. In a similar fashion, Goldenberg et al. (2009) 
found that a Creatureliness Prime in combination with Mortality Salience led women 
who were high in neuroticism (as measured by their high scores on the Neuroticism 
subscale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory) to report reduced willingness to 
undergo a mammogram. They suggested that the combination of these mortality 
reminders led these participants to exhibit such avoidant responses towards 
mammograms because the priming of both their mortality and their physicality made 
them particularly concerned with the possibility of receiving a cancer diagnosis and 
made them uncomfortable with the potential of the procedure itself to provide further 
confrontation with the physicality of their bodies.  
 
In line with these ideas, it is possible that existential concerns relating to the 
creaturely qualities of the human body may constitute a greater barrier to disease-
detection behaviours than Mortality Salience or Heart Attack Salience. More 
specifically in relation to the current research programme, this may mean that 
thinking about the creaturely aspects of being human would lead to more avoidant 
responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip as a Creatureliness Prime of this nature 
may be more specifically related to thoughts of using the device. This is because this 
particular device would make one confront the physicality of the human body by 
requiring a small pinprick of blood to be drawn. Additionally, as with breast-self 
exams, this focus on the physicality of the human body is accompanied by a bodily 
search, in this case of a more microscopic nature through the analysis of blood 
samples, for a potentially life-threatening condition. In other words, thinking about 
the creaturely aspects of being human may be a more pervasive barrier to the use of 
the CVD Risk Biochip than Mortality Salience or Heart Attack Salience because it 
may explicitly illuminate the potential frailty of the human body in the context of the 
use of the device. The use of the device itself also draws one‘s attention towards both 
the mortal process of bleeding and the possibility that one may develop CVD. 
Following this logic, one of the principal reasons for conducting the current study was 
to investigate whether or not priming participants to think about the creaturely aspects 
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of being human would lead to more avoidant responses towards the CVD Risk 
Biochip than participants who were primed to think about the unique aspects of being 
human. In this way, the study examined another facet of TMT in order to investigate 
if this alternative type of mortality reminder would lead to distal defensive avoidance 
towards the device among participants.  
 
In addition to this change in the manner in which participants were to think about 
existential issues, the current study incorporated an examination of whether or not 
state self-esteem would have an effect on participants‘ responses towards the CVD 
Risk Biochip. As outlined in Chapter 2 (page 1-16), the Anxiety-Buffer Hypothesis 
suggests that the experience of high state self-esteem can provide a buffer to the 
effects of existential anxiety, whereas the experience of low state self-esteem can 
make one more vulnerable to the effects of existential anxiety; a suggestion that has 
been supported by a wealth of research on the topic (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1992b; 
Greenberg et al., 1993; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Van Den Boss, 2001; Hart et al., 
2005; Schmeichel et al., 2009; Routledge et al., 2010). Following this prevalent 
finding in the TMT literature, it is possible that the lack of significant effects in the 
first two studies was partly as a result of a failure to control for self-esteem.  
 
Self-esteem had been factored out of the design of these studies as they had been 
partly based on some of the analogous TMT studies relating to cancer-screening, 
which had not controlled for self-esteem (i.e. Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). The authors of these cancer-screening studies thought 
that cancer was sufficiently existentially threatening to circumvent normal anxiety-
buffering effects of having high self-esteem. However, it is possible that heart attacks 
were not sufficiently threatening to participants in the first two studies of the current 
programme in order to bypass the anxiety-buffering effects of high self-esteem. 
Because of this, the current study also included a method that has been used in 
previous TMT research by Routledge et al. (2010) as a way of experimentally 
manipulating high or low self-esteem among participants. By manipulating 
participants‘ self-esteem in this way, the study controlled for the possibility that high 
self-esteem may have moderated the effects of existential anxiety for participants in 
the first two studies.  
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The open-ended questions designed to threaten participants‘ self-esteem were also 
used as an alternative to Mortality Salience in this study. While, the previous TMT 
studies involving health threat detection behaviours that had used the Creatureliness 
Prime methodology had also included a Mortality Salience task (i.e. Goldenberg et 
al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009), TMT suggests that undercutting an individual‘s 
self-esteem should lead to comparable TMT-related defences to Mortality Salience 
(e.g. Schimel et al., 2007; Hayes et al., 2008). Furthermore, a large body of TMT 
research has demonstrated that providing buffers to one‘s self-esteem can lead to a 
moderation of TMT-related effects such as worldview defence and self-esteem 
striving (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1992b; Greenberg et al., 1993; Harmon-Jones et al., 
1997; Mikulincer & Florian, 2002; Schmeichel et al., 2009). It would appear to 
logically follow that undercutting an individual‘s self-esteem should lead to increased 
mortality-related concerns in a comparable fashion to Mortality Salience. In support 
of this proposition, recent TMT research has even found that threatening self-esteem 
experimentally can cause thoughts of death to become more accessible to people (e.g. 
Hayes et al., 2008; Routledge et al., 2010); suggesting that blows to one‘s self-esteem 
are equivalent to non-conscious mortality reminders in the sense that they tend to lead 
to an increase in the accessibility of death-related concepts. It has also been found 
that deficits to self-esteem such as neuroticism or depression can lead to increased 
TMT-related effects such as more vigorous worldview defence or avoidance of body-
related stimuli (e.g. Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 
1996; Goldenberg et al., 1999; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Even more pertinently, there 
is evidence that self-esteem deficits can result in the avoidance of health-orienting 
behaviours when people are in a distal mode of defence (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the TMHM predicts that self-esteem should be particularly 
relevant to individuals when they are in a distal mode of defence (Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2009). In this way, threatening an individual‘s self-esteem could be seen to be 
analogous to presenting participants with mortality reminders when they are in a 
distal mode of defence. Consequently, it was hypothesised that threatening an 
individual‘s self-esteem would lead them to be more defensively avoidant of the CVD 
Risk Biochip as a way of protecting themselves against the potential of receiving a 
further blow to their self-esteem at the thought of using such a device (i.e. due to the 
potential for such a device to furnish one with a threatening health status).  
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As an alternative to the hypothesised TMT effects described above, the current study 
also included an exploration of the possibility that the nature of the CVD Risk 
Biochip itself could promote feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards the 
risk information that it seeks to provide, thereby effectively resulting in a diminished 
response of existential anxiety towards the device. This suggestion is based on ideas 
from philosophy and sociology that suggest that technological devices like the CVD 
Risk Biochip that predict the future through abstractions (i.e. by using an abstract 
representation of CVD risk on a digital screen) tend to appear intangible and 
disembodied to the normal subject, leading to more ambivalent and ―cool‖ responses 
towards them (e.g. Baudrillard, 1995; Prior et al., 2002). The following section will 
expand on these ideas for the purposes of providing a background to this particular 
research question. In order to examine this subject, it is first necessary to examine the 
perspective of the body that is employed through a biomedical lens.  
 
6.0.1 The View of the Body in Medicine and the “Hyper-reality” of Diagnostic 
Technology 
The origins of the dominant externalist view of the human body that may be found in 
modern medicine is often attributed to the writings of René Descartes; a sixteenth 
century French philosopher who has been regarded as the ―philosophical father of 
modern medicine‖ (e.g. Leder, 1992, p.19). Descartes suggested that bodily 
sensations are not something of which we are aware in a conscious sense but that we 
―feel them‖ indirectly. He therefore separated bodily sensations from the perceptual 
faculties and conscious intellect (the latter of which he considered to be distinct from 
phenomenal experience). In this way, Descartes proposed that our subjectivity and 
sense of our ―selves‖ are distinct from our physical experiences and that each is 
governed by processes and laws that remain separate from each other. This 
conception of a split between mental and physical life became known as ―Cartesian 
Dualism‖ and paved the way for the growth of biomedical scientific investigation by 
allowing scholars to conceive of the body as subject to the mechanistic laws of 
causality, much like other components of the physical world. Furthermore, this view 
of the body became the dominant perspective in the treatment of illness; focusing on 
the ―curing‖ of pathological ―symptoms‖ by physico-chemical means. Sachs (1995) 
has pointed towards the fact that medical discourse has perpetuated this conception of 
the body as matter that can be transformed through purely material means. For 
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instance, medical practitioners emphasize that ―a healthy body‖ can be achieved 
through eating less fat, drinking less alcohol, reducing smoking, increasing exercise, 
etc. 
 
The current use of medical technologies that produce images of the body can also be 
seen to perpetuate the Cartesian dualist split, where the patient's "self" is 
distinguished from their "body-as-object" in medical settings. The images that are 
produced in these settings such as x-rays, ultrasounds, digital monitors or machine 
readouts have served to make the body a materially separate entity from the subject 
that inhabits it by providing a context where the body is visually objectified. 
Moreover, diagnostic practice has increasingly begun to focus on these sorts of 
images as a mediator for the interactions between doctors and patients. The images 
themselves are also generally regarded as ―objective indicators‖ of disease or illness 
as compared to patients‘ subjective experiences (e.g. Martínez, 2005; Blaxter, 2009). 
Furthermore, some qualitative research has found that there is a culture among 
medical practitioners of using dehumanizing and desubjectifying language with 
respect to their patients, whereby the patients are discussed as ―bodies‖ that are either 
sick or healthy (e.g. Shaw, 2003). As extensively documented by the famous 
philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault (e.g. 1975; 1977), the ―clinical gaze‖ 
and categorisations of illness brought about through medical expertise in such ways 
are often used strategically as a power structure from which to control ―bodies‖ (for a 
thorough account of the implications of this perspective see Lupton, 1997). In this 
regard, Foucault suggested that the view of the body-as-object often functions in 
medical contexts as a means to manipulate, shape and train bodies in order that they 
may be ―disciplined‖; a way of displacing the power that an individual may have over 
his/her own body into an ―aptitude‖ that may be controlled from outside rather than 
from within (e.g. 1977). Such formulations reconstruct the very determinants of what 
it means to have a body by introducing pragmatic and instrumentalist concerns, while 
further re-constituting bodies and body parts through medical discourse (Lupton, 
1997).  
 
Processes of assessment, identification and treatment according to images of the body 
also lead to an increasing biomedicalisation of patients by medical professionals 
(Salter et al., 2011). In other words, the new ―ways of seeing‖ that the adoption of 
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modern imaging techniques employ can serve to introduce new categories that are 
inherently structured by the screen images, stained samples or machine readouts 
themselves (Ihde, 2001). It has even been suggested that the patients themselves have 
started to become ―virtual‖ in these emerging contexts or have started to disappear 
behind the screens, medical images and bodily constructions employed by medical 
practitioners as the medical discourse and language associated with the use of such 
technology becomes increasingly abstract and technical (Blaxter, 2009). MacLachlan 
(2004) provides a salient practical example of this in his anecdote of a nurse in a 
private ward in a Dublin hospital who was observed to walk into a patient‘s room, 
check the screens, bed-side monitors and charts on each side before promptly exiting, 
while the patient called after her ―Hey, I‘m fine too!‖   
 
In addition to the disassociating effects of such biomedical images for the layperson, 
Prior et al. (2002) have argued that certain aspects of diagnostic measurement may 
appear ―unnatural‖ to them. For instance, the staining processes and electronic 
readers used in diagnostic technology tend to divert patient‘s attention away from 
their bodily processes in such a way that the risk measurement procedures associated 
with these instruments often appear to be less imminently related to their bodies. 
Diagnostic risk estimates are also often based on statistical models that are linked to 
probabilities gleaned from incidence surveys pertaining to a particular illness or 
disease and such abstract risk information can seem intangible to the patient (Prior et 
al., 2002). Indeed, these models are often composed of abstract signs, symbols and 
equations that seem less tangible or less rooted in a person‘s normal experiences of 
their bodies. The abstraction and intangibility of these symbolic future projections of 
illnesses bear a strong resemblance to some of the characteristics of the ―third order 
of simulation‖ identified by the poststructuralist philosopher Jean Baudrillard. 
 
Baudrillard (e.g. 1983; 1995; 2000) has depicted his vision of a ―third order of 
simulation‖ as those simulations which are produced by models of the real world and 
precede an event occurring, thereby creating a prescription of ―reality‖ that is worked 
out and constructed ahead of time. He noted that the existence of this third type of 
simulation produces a social effect where there is a blurring of the lines between what 
is to be experienced and what is experienced. In other words, there is no longer a 
clear dividing line that clearly separates an experience and the anticipation of the 
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experience relating to such simulations for the subject who engages with them. This 
can clearly be seen to relate to technologies that are designed to predict future 
consequences that may have little clear relations to a subject‘s present experiences. 
Due to this confusing lack of a clear delineation between what is real and what is 
predicted, the subject is led to regard such simulations in more emotionally detached, 
disconnected or ―cool‖ ways than more tangible experiences that they may have had 
that are firmly rooted in reality. Furthermore, the ―reality‖ of engaging in such 
simulations is similarly experienced in this cool and detached manner due to the 
blurring boundaries between what constitutes the model and what constitutes ―the 
reality‖. Baudrillard further described the resulting deconstruction of authenticity for 
the subject as the experience of a ―hyper-reality‖; ―the product of an irradiating 
synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere‖ (1995, p. 2).  
  
6.0.2 Potential Mediating or Disembodying Effects of the CVD Risk Biochip 
Relating some of the above ideas back to the current programme of research, the 
CVD Risk Biochip can easily be recognised as a simulation of the third order. This is 
because it is a computerised technology that serves as a model of a possible future 
reality; one which indicates a person‘s likelihood of developing CVD through the 
abstract representation of CVD risk through numbers on a digital screen. Although 
the device uses a drop of the patient‘s blood in its measurement procedure, thereby 
engendering a certain relation to the person‘s bodily experiences as described 
previously, it is arguable from this perspective that the main focus of this procedure is 
on the potential future reality that the device predicts. Indeed, irrespective of the use 
of a blood sample in the measurement procedure that may expose human creaturely 
vulnerabilities, the focus of this type of CVD risk measurement could be seen to 
relate more directly to the abstract information that the device produces. In this light, 
the individual who uses the CVD Risk Biochip may not experience the measurement 
itself in such a way that it is rooted in their normal experiences of the body, time, 
space and relations with other people. Instead, the individual‘s focus on the digital 
screen readings involved in using such a device may promote a more detached and 
disembodied experience of the measurement procedure, as the risk information is 
given as an abstract codified piece of information that suggests their risk with regard 
to a possible future that may be modifiable. In this way, the subject‘s encounter with 
the information derived from the CVD Risk Biochip may be experienced in a 
  
 
 
160 
detached way as ―information to be processed‖ rather than as an imminent reality to 
be dealt with.  
 
Following on from such ideas, it could be argued that the priming of existential 
concerns in the first two studies of the current programme did not have an impact on 
participant‘s appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip as the abstract description of the 
mechanism involved in the device and its potential lack of imminent relatedness to 
bodily processes experienced by a participant may have served to make the potential 
existential threat associated with its risk assessment for the development of CVD 
seem less genuine and more remote to them. This could also explain why participants 
in the first two studies of the current research programme did not display defensive 
avoidant responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip following mortality reminders and 
a distraction in contrast to previous TMT cancer-screening studies (e.g. Arndt et al., 
2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008); participants in the first two studies may not have 
found the device to be intimately connected to their bodies. In order to establish 
whether this potential effect may have occurred in the first two studies it was 
therefore decided to assess whether or not all participants would experience a certain 
detached ambivalence or dissociation towards the risk information that the device 
provides.   
 
6.0.3 The Current Study 
In order to investigate if thinking about human creatureliness or the buffering and 
protective effects of self-esteem would have an impact on participants‘ appraisal of 
the CVD Risk Biochip, the Creatureliness Prime and Self-Esteem task methodologies 
described by Goldenberg et al. (2001) and Routledge et al. (2010) respectively were 
incorporated into the design of the current study. Recruited participants were given a 
questionnaire booklet, which contained one of the Self-Esteem tasks (designed to 
either temporarily increase participants‘ self-esteem or temporarily lower their self-
esteem) followed by an essay to read concerning the creaturely aspects of being 
human or what is unique about being human and a standard TMT distraction task. 
These components of the questionnaires were followed by information regarding the 
CVD Risk Biochip, a measure of attitudes towards the device and two measures of 
participant‘s intentions to use the device; each of which were adapted from the first 
two studies of the current programme.  
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In line with TMT, it was hypothesised that participants who were given the task to 
complete that was designed to lower their self-esteem would demonstrate more 
avoidant responses towards the device than participants who were given the task 
designed to boost their self-esteem (e.g. following Hayes et al., 2008; Routledge et 
al., 2010). Similarly, as per Goldenberg et al. (2008), it was predicted that participants 
who were primed to think about the creaturely qualities of humans and furnished with 
a subsequent distraction would demonstrate greater avoidant responses towards the 
CVD Risk Biochip than participants who were primed to think about human 
uniqueness and provided with the same distraction. Additionally, it was hypothesized 
that participants who received both the task that was designed to lower their self-
esteem and the Creatureliness Prime would exhibit the most avoidant responses 
towards the device. This is because TMT research suggests that the receipt of an 
existential prime (in this case involving human creatureliness) in combination with a 
procedure which has been designed to undercut a protective structure against 
existential anxiety (in this case, the experimental lowering of self-esteem) should lead 
individuals to be particularly avoidant of threats to one‘s health and well-being and 
the confrontation of one‘s body that may accompany health-protective behaviours 
like the uptake of the CVD Risk Biochip (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2005).  
 
Near the end of the questionnaire, participants also received a measure of the extent 
to which the CVD Risk Biochip promoted feelings of disembodiment or dissociation 
towards their bodies (i.e. a scale involving the relatedness of the device to 
participants‘ bodily experiences). This measure was included in order to explore the 
alternative explanation to TMT described above that the device itself may have 
promoted feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards CVD risk information 
among participants, thereby moderating existential concerns they may have had 
relating to the device. Accordingly, it was predicted from this perspective that 
participants would indicate that the information that the CVD Risk Biochip was 
purported to deliver could not be easily related to the general sense of health and 
well-being that they normally experienced from their bodies, particularly in the event 
that these participants did not exhibit avoidant responses towards the device in line 
with TMT. Additionally, since this hypothesis was designed to be an alternative 
explanation to TMT, it was predicted that there would be no significant differences 
between the groups on this dimension. In other words, this hypothesis suggested that, 
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irrespective of experimental condition, all participants would demonstrate strong 
feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards the potential risk information that 
the device was purported to provide. 
 
6.1 METHOD 
 
6.1.1 Design 
This study employed a 2 x 2 independent measures design as a function of a Self-
Esteem task (Self-Esteem Threat vs. Self-Esteem Bolster) and an Existential Prime 
(Creatureliness Prime vs. Uniqueness Prime) that participants received. The 
questionnaire booklets were block randomised before presentation to participants in 
order to assure random assignment to the Self-Esteem Bolster / Creatureliness Prime, 
Self-Esteem Threat / Creatureliness Prime, Self-Esteem Bolster / Uniqueness Prime 
and Self-Esteem Threat / Uniqueness Prime conditions respectively. In line with the 
typically large effect sizes reported in previous TMT studies (Arndt & Vess, 2008), 
the study sought a sample size of 112 participants in preparation for a 2 x 2 x 2 
between-subjects MANCOVA (14 participants per cell as per Cohen, 1992).  
 
6.1.2 Participants 
One hundred and twelve participants aged 40-55 volunteered to participate (42 males 
and 70 females). As with Study 2 in the current programme of research, this age 
range was selected as it roughly corresponds to the period of middle age; a stage in 
adult life that has been proposed to represent a point where people are particularly 
vulnerable to existential concerns (e.g. Becker, 1973; Erikson et al., 1986; Erikson & 
Erikson, 1997; Neimeyer et al., 2004; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005; Maxfield 
et al., 2007).  
 
Approximately one third of those people who participated in the study were Dublin 
City University staff or postgraduate students who were recruited via e-mail contact 
through corresponding e-mail lists, where these potential participants were given 
general information concerning the study (See Appendix I1-I2 for the corresponding 
E-mail and Word Attachment Content). Specifically, this initial e-mail contact 
outlined that the study involved completing a questionnaire ―concerning personal 
reactions towards various topics such as personal life experiences, aspects of health 
  
 
 
163 
and better ways of knowing about your health‖, that staff and postgraduates were 
eligible to take part if they were between 40-55 years of age, that completion of the 
questionnaire should take no more than 30 minutes and that all information given in 
the questionnaire would remain completely anonymous and confidential. Potential 
participants were also advised to contact the researcher if they were interested in 
participating in the study. After a staff or postgraduate member signified their interest 
in participating, the researcher subsequently arranged a suitable time for them to 
complete a questionnaire. Each of these participants then completed the questionnaire 
in a room in the Dublin City University School of Nursing and Human Sciences 
which was deemed to be a controlled environment where participants would be free 
from distractions. Dublin City University staff or postgraduate students who already 
had knowledge of the CVD Risk Biochip were deemed ineligible to participate.  
 
The remainder of the participants were recruited via a snowball sampling method 
through the initial set of staff and postgraduate participants. More specifically, the 
researcher gave information leaflets (See Appendix H2 for a Sample Information 
Leaflet) to each participant after they had completed a questionnaire and requested for 
them to disseminate these leaflets to any of their acquaintances who might fit into the 
40-55 age range. Following contact from those acquaintances of participants who 
indicated an interest in participating in the study, a suitable time and convenient 
location was subsequently arranged in order for them to complete a questionnaire 
booklet. When a controlled room in Dublin City University School of Nursing and 
Human Sciences was not deemed convenient to these participants, they completed the 
questionnaire in their own homes under the supervision of the researcher, who 
ensured that participants were not distracted and that each section of the questionnaire 
was completed in the order presented.   
 
6.1.3 Procedure  
Before completing one of the four Questionnaire Booklets (see Appendix F1-F4), 
participants read a Plain Language Statement and signed a Consent Form (see 
Appendix B4), where they indicated that they were satisfied with the information 
provided to them. They were then instructed to complete each section in the order 
presented and not to skip between sections. In this regard, their attention was 
explicitly drawn to the fact that the questions relating to the essay that they were to 
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read (i.e. the Existential Prime method derived from Goldenberg et al., 2001) did not 
immediately follow the essay itself.   
 
Following these instructions, participants in the Self-Esteem Bolster conditions were 
given a Questionnaire Booklet which initially presented them with two open-ended 
questions that required them to describe a time in which they succeeded in living up 
to an important value. Contrastingly, those in the Self-Esteem Threat conditions were 
given an analogous set of open-ended questions which asked them to describe a time 
in which they failed to live up to an important value. Following this, participants from 
the Creatureliness Prime conditions read an essay that emphasised human 
creatureliness. Alternatively, participants from the Uniqueness Prime conditions read 
an essay that emphasised human uniqueness.  
 
Participants from each of the experimental conditions then completed a TMT 
distraction task, consisting of a short word search puzzle, which was designed to 
remove mortality concerns from immediate awareness. Following this distraction, 
they were presented with the version of the information sheet relating to the CVD 
Risk Biochip that had been previously given to participants in Study 2 of the current 
research programme (i.e. the version which included the paragraph relating to middle 
aged risk in the development of CVD) and the measures of attitudes towards the 
device and intentions to use the device that were previously used in the first two 
studies of the programme. Finally, participants completed a novel questionnaire that 
measured the extent of their feelings of disembodiment and dissociation towards the 
CVD Risk Biochip (the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale; the development 
of this scale is described below). Following completion of the Questionnaire Booklets 
(which took approximately 20 minutes), participants were debriefed about the full 
nature of the study and were given the opportunity to discuss any queries or concerns 
that they may have had in relation to the study. Each participant was also given a 
Debriefing Sheet (Appendix G4) which contained detailed information about the 
design, aims and objectives of the current study. 
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6.1.4 Materials 
6.1.4a Self-Esteem task        
Participants received a Questionnaire Booklet containing a set of two-open ended 
questions that were designed to either temporarily threaten or bolster their self-esteem 
(i.e. Self-Esteem Threat or Self-Esteem Bolster). This procedure had been previously 
used in TMT research by Routledge et al. (2010) in order to investigate the anxiety-
buffering effects of self-esteem and was derived from prior research relating to ―ego-
deflation/ego-inflation‖ (e.g. Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder & Elliott, 1998; Gaertner, 
Sedikides & Graetz, 1999; Green, Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). The validity of this 
procedure as a measure of threatening self-esteem or boosting self-esteem had 
previously been established through the findings that participants who received the 
Self-Esteem Threat task to complete exhibited more negative self-appraisals and 
decreased mood while participants who received the Self-Esteem Bolster task 
exhibited more positive self-appraisals and enhanced mood (e.g. Green et al., 2008).  
 
The task itself involved the completion of two open-ended questions concerning a 
great personal success or a great personal failure that participants may have 
experienced. Specifically, participants in the Self-Esteem Threat conditions were 
asked ―Please briefly think about and describe a time in which you failed to live up to 
one of your most important values. That is, describe one of your greatest personal 
failures.‖ and ―How did this personal failure make you feel?‖ Correspondingly, 
participants in the Self-Esteem Bolster conditions were asked ―Please briefly think 
about and describe a time in which you successfully lived up to one of your most 
important values. That is, describe one of your greatest personal successes.‖ and 
―How did this personal success make you feel?‖ 
 
6.1.4b Existential Prime        
Participants also received one of two essays to read that either emphasised the 
similarity of humans to other animals or emphasised the uniqueness of humans as 
compared to other animals (i.e. a Creatureliness Prime or a Uniqueness Prime). This 
procedure was derived from Goldenberg et al. (2001) and had been specifically 
designed to emphasise either the similarity or difference between humans and other 
animals. The essay that emphasised the similarity between humans and other animals 
had also been used in several prior TMT studies relating to breast-cancer screening 
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and mammography as a way of drawing the attention of participants in those studies 
towards the creaturely nature of their own bodies; while the essay that emphasised the 
uniqueness of humans as compared to other animals had been used as a control topic 
in these studies (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Participants 
from both conditions were informed that the essays had been written by honour 
students at the University of Missouri-St. Louis concerning ―The most important 
thing you have learned about human nature‖. The students were also instructed to 
read the essay carefully as there would be questions relating to the essay at the end of 
the packet. The essay emphasising human creatureliness included the following lines:  
 
The boundary between humans and animals is not as great as most people 
think. Although we like to think that we are special and unique, our bodies 
work in pretty much the same way as the bodies of all other animals. Whether 
you're talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we're all made 
up of the same basic biological products. We're all made up of skin, blood, 
organs, and bones. We're all driven by needs for food, water, sex, and 
comfort. Although some people like to claim that we humans are vastly more 
intelligent than other animals, this doesn't really seem to be true. What 
appears to be the results of complex thought and free will is really just the 
result of our biological programming and simple learning experiences, just 
like all other animals. Research shows that chimps have the capacity for 
language; even pigeons are able to solve pretty complex problems, and all 
animals show caring for and attachment to their offspring. Human beings are 
just another species of animals, maybe a little more intelligent than others, but 
not different in any really important or meaningful way. Seeing ourselves as 
special or different from the cows we eat for lunch or the insects we wash off 
our windshields is just another example of human vanity and self-delusion. 
 
In contrast, the essay emphasising human uniqueness contained the following lines:  
 
The one thing that my education has made clear to me is that, although we 
humans have some things in common with other animals, human beings are 
truly unique. Although our bodies may be pretty similar to simpler species, the 
potential of the human mind and spirit go far beyond anything remotely 
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similar to what is found in simple animals. First there are the obvious things: 
Humans have language and culture. We create works of art, music, and 
literature that enable us to live in an abstract world of the imagination -- 
something no other animal is capable of. Although simple animals may 
communicate with grunts and groans, and chimps can be taught basic sign 
language by humans, this is a far cry from the complex and inspiring works of 
human culture: Shakespeare, Beethoven, and Picasso, to name just a few. 
Unlike animals, humans live in a world of ideas and concepts, morals and 
values. We can even come to understand ourselves, as in the works of the 
great philosophers and psychologists. More importantly, humans have the 
capacity for love, generosity, and kindness ---- putting the welfare of others 
above themselves. We are not simple selfish creatures driven by hunger and 
lust, but complex individuals with a will of our own, capable of making 
choices, and creating our own destinies. Although we certainly have some 
things in common with simple animals, we humans are truly special and 
unique. 
 
6.1.4c Distraction Task        
As described in Chapter 2 (page 1-24), TMT research has established that distal 
defences are used by people as a means to actively avoid the reality of existential 
concerns when such concerns are below conscious awareness (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1994; Greenberg et al., 1999). Typically, TMT studies that have investigated distal 
defences have provided participants with a Distraction Task in order to allow 
conscious mortality concerns to subside before the dependent measures are 
introduced. The Distraction Task used in the current study involved a standard word 
search task that did not contain any death-related words. Similar word search tasks 
have been employed as a delay exercise between mortality-related methodologies and 
dependent variables in many previous TMT studies (e.g. Vess, Clay, Landau & 
Arndt, 2009). 
 
6.1.4d CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet & Attitude/Behavioural Intentions 
Measures 
The CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet used in the current study was the same 
version that was described in Study 2, which included the additional paragraph 
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highlighting the risk of developing CVD in both male and female middle-aged adults. 
As per Study 2, this version of the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet was used in 
order to ensure that middle-aged risk in the development of CVD was made relevant 
to participants. The CVD Risk Biochip Attitudes Scale, CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intention and De Facto Intentions Measure were the same measures that 
were used in the first two studies.  
 
6.1.4e CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale 
Participants also completed a novel questionnaire concerning the disembodiment and 
disassociation of technology. In the absence of an existing validated measure, this 
questionnaire was designed in order to measure the alternative hypothesis of the 
current study; i.e. that the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip may be less 
existentially relevant than the thought of participating in other forms of disease 
detection such as cancer-screening as the device draws one‘s attention away from 
one‘s own body.  
 
The items in the questionnaire were developed from focus group discussion, where a 
group of four participants were asked to give their thoughts about how technology 
might lead to a sense of disconnection and disassociation from one‘s body. 
Specifically, after several questions designed to generate discussion about technology 
and its relationship to the body, participants were given a definition of 
disembodiment as the feeling that ―one‘s consciousness is disconnected from one‘s 
body‖ and were asked to discuss anything about technology in a general sense that 
they thought might relate to this definition. The participants were then asked to 
comment on the previously mentioned vignette that was drawn from MacLachlan 
(2004) concerning the relationship between medical practitioners and patients in a 
modern hospital setting:   
Recently a nurse walked into a patient‘s private room in a Dublin hospital, 
conscientiously and professionally checked the monitors above the bed and to 
each side of it, and strode towards the door; the patient, of whom these 
machines gave some impression, barked ―Hey, I‘m fine too!‖ (p. 139) 
 
Following this, the participants were asked to comment on the suggestion from health 
psychology literature that continual developments in diagnostic technology have 
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contributed to a culture among medical practitioners whereby patients are discussed 
as conscious-less ―bodies‖ that are either sick or healthy (e.g. Martínez, 2005; 
Blaxter, 2009). Finally, the participants were introduced to the CVD Risk Biochip 
and were encouraged to discuss how one might relate the risk information that the 
device is proposed to indicate to one‘s own bodily experiences.  
 
The focus group was recorded via an Apple i-talk© hardware device, which 
constitutes a small microphone that can be attached to a standard Apple i-pod©. The 
subsequent recording was transcribed and the transcript was subject to a thematic 
analysis. From this thematic analysis, the following seven statements relating to the 
CVD Risk Biochip were derived: 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the CVD Risk 
Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily experiences. 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk factors for a disease 
that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal to me. 
3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip are 
more important than my own sense of health and well-being that I experience 
from my body. 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip draws my attention away from my own personal experiences of my body. 
5. I would be sceptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk Biochip that 
reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do not feel relate to my 
feelings of general health and well-being from my body. 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip makes me feel passive towards my body. 
7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on risk factors 
make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and sensations. 
 
Prior to receiving these items in the questionnaire booklet, participants were asked to 
explicitly imagine using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip. This procedure was 
employed as a way of controlling for hypothetical bias, following previous research 
which found that explicitly requesting an individual to imagine performing a target 
behaviour serves to remove overestimations of performing that behaviour in the 
future (e.g. Cummings & Taylor, 1999; Brown et al., 2003; Ajzen et al., 2004). 
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Specifically, participants were given the following passage to read prior to 
completing the above items: 
Diagnostic detection of risk factors for diseases like CVD is potentially 
becoming easier with technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip described 
earlier. Specifically, devices like the CVD Risk Biochip are being developed 
with a view to being used in the home as an indication for future risk of 
developing CVD.  Try to clearly imagine what it might be like to use a 
technology like the CVD Risk Biochip yourself (for example, using the device 
in your own home) and answer the questions that follow. Please indicate how 
strongly you disagree or agree with each of the following statements by 
circling the appropriate number below the statement. Please respond to them 
with your first, natural response. 
 
Participants were then asked to rate their opinions of each of the items on a 5-point 
Likert scale, from ‗strongly disagree‘ to ‗strongly agree‘. 
 
6.1.4f Essay Evaluation         
At the end of the questionnaire packet, participants were provided with six questions, 
which asked them to evaluate the essay that they had read emphasising the similarity 
or difference between humans and other animals. Specifically, participants were 
asked to respond to the following items on a 9-point Likert scale with 1 indicating a 
negative evaluation and 9 indicating a positive evaluation: 
1. How much do you think you would like this person? 
2. How intelligent do you believe this person to be? 
3. How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be? 
4. Is this person’s opinion well-informed? 
5. How much do you agree with this person’s opinion? 
6. From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion is of the topic 
they discussed? 
 
This measure was included in order to assess the degree of positivity or negativity 
that participants expressed towards the authors of the essays. The principal purpose 
for such an assessment was to ensure that the Creatureliness Prime had elicited a 
threatening response among participants. Previous TMT research had used this 
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measure as a manipulation check in this way and had consistently established that the 
Creatureliness Prime elicited significantly more negative reactions among participants 
towards the authors of the essay than the Uniqueness Prime (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 
1999; Goldenberg et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008). It should 
also be noted that participants had not been asked to evaluate the essay immediately 
after they had read it, as previous TMT research had demonstrated that being given 
the opportunity to affirm a viewpoint, e.g. by defending or derogating a person on an 
existentially-relevant topic, can serve to moderate feelings of existential anxiety (e.g. 
Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). Consequently, the questions relating to the essay were 
given to participants at the end of each Questionnaire Booklet, following the 
dependent variables, consistent with previous research (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 1999; 
Goldenberg et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008).  
 
6.1.5 Ethical Issues 
The principal ethical issues relating to the current study are outlined below. These 
issues were brought to the attention of the DCU Research Ethics Committee, who 
granted approval for the current study. 
 
There were a couple of ethical issues that related to the current study that have 
already been addressed in previous chapters concerning some of the prior studies in 
the current research programme. Firstly, participants were unaware of the full nature 
of the current study but were given a full verbal debriefing about the purpose of the 
study, any deceptions used, and why they were needed to study the question at hand. 
Participants were also given the opportunity to ask any questions or raise any 
concerns that they may have had in relation to the current study and they were given a 
Debriefing Sheet to take away with them (See Appendix G4). Additionally, as with 
the second study in the current research programme, participants were provided with 
an amended CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet that contained an indication of 
middle-aged risk for the development of CVD. Since this type of information is 
similar to the sort of information that is commonly provided in public media such as 
newspapers, magazines and documentaries, it was not considered to constitute a risk 
to participants that departed from normal everyday experiences. 
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One novel ethical concern that arose in the current study related to the concern that 
participants who were given the task to complete which asked them to describe a time 
when they failed to live up to an important value (i.e. the Self-Esteem Threat task) 
may have found the completion of this task to be distressing. However, it was 
reasoned that completion of this task did not constitute a substantial risk to 
participants as it is quite normal to encounter a situation where one is asked to 
describe such an experience to one‘s friends or family (e.g. where a friend has failed 
to live up to an important value and consequently requests one to recount a similar 
experience for reassurance purposes). Additionally, this methodology had been used 
in previous TMT research (e.g. Routledge et al., 2010), where participants did not 
find this task to be particularly distressing to complete. Nonetheless, in order to 
ensure that they were not distressed by completion of this task, participants were 
instructed in the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form that they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without completing the questionnaire and 
without giving any reason for withdrawing should they feel unduly stressed by a 
particular question.  
 
An additional ethical concern that arose in the current study related to the completion 
of the Creatureliness Prime. In this regard, it was conceived that reading about the 
creatureliness of humans might act as a trigger for anxiety or stress among individuals 
who felt opposed to the idea that humans have a creaturely nature. However, it may 
be noted that similar ideas are frequently discussed in newspapers and other forms of 
media (e.g. articles or documentaries that describe scientific research supporting a 
Darwinian perspective) and participants who were asked to think about human 
creatureliness in previous TMT that used this particular methodology did not indicate 
that they were particularly distressed or upset by the idea of human creatureliness 
(e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001). Nevertheless, participants were given the opportunity 
to defend against this idea at the end of the questionnaire booklet, where they were 
given the Essay Evaluation which asked them to evaluate the essay that they had read. 
The process of answering this set of questions may have alleviated any of the stress or 
anxiety brought on by considering the subject of the similarity of humans to other 
animals. Following the above ideas, it may be concluded that getting participants to 
think about such ideas did not constitute a risk to them that was greater than those 
encountered in everyday life.  
  
 
 
173 
6.1.6 Data Analyses 
6.1.6a MANCOVA and Logistic Regression      
As with the first and second studies in the current research programme, a 
MANCOVA was planned for the attitudes and behavioural intentions data as the 
dependent variables with gender as a covariate in order to assess if there were 
differences in the participants‘ positive or negative appraisal of the CVD Risk 
Biochip as a function of their experimental condition. As with the first two studies, 
gender was included as a covariate in order to control for the possibility that 
participants‘ attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip may 
have arisen due to gender differences in health-oriented and health-seeking 
behaviours (e.g. Tamres et al., 2002; Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, 
et al., 2004; Lynn et al., 2009). The MANCOVA for the current study was planned as 
a 2 x 2 analysis as a function of the Existential Primes and Self-Esteem task that 
participants received. Similarly, a logistic regression was planned with the De Facto 
Intentions Measure as a dependent variable and Existential Prime, Self-Esteem task 
and gender included as predictors in order to investigate if a participant‘s gender or 
assignment to one of the four experimental groups would help to predict the odds of 
whether or not they chose to sign up for the CVD Risk Biochip pilot study. 
 
6.1.6b ANCOVA          
A 2 (Existential Prime) x 2 (Self-Esteem) ANCOVA was also planned for the data 
from the CVD Risk Biochip Body-relatedness scale with gender as a covariate in 
order to determine whether or not receipt of either one of the Existential Primes or 
one of the Self-Esteem tasks would lead to differing appraisals of how much 
participants considered the proposed risk information to be derived from the CVD 
Risk Biochip to relate to their own sense of health and well-being from their bodies. 
Since the hypothesis relating to this data suggested that, regardless of the 
experimental condition to which they were assigned, each participant would 
demonstrate strong feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards the risk 
information that the device was purported to provide, this ANCOVA was designed to 
test whether or not there were significant differences between the conditions on their 
responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip Body-relatedness scale items. A decision 
was made to conduct this analysis separately from the MANCOVA analysis for two 
principal reasons. Firstly, the items on this scale were deemed to represent a construct 
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that was significantly qualitatively different to the attitudes and behavioural intentions 
data. Additionally, the construction of these items was carried out in order to test the 
alternative hypothesis that the information that the CVD Risk Biochip was purported 
to deliver could not be easily related to the general sense of health and well-being that 
they normally experienced from their bodies; a hypothesis that was itself deemed to 
be qualitatively different from the hypothesis relating to the CVD Risk Biochip 
Attitude and Behavioural Intentions Scales. Gender was also included as a covariate 
in this analysis in order to control for the possibility that females may have exhibited 
different responses on this measure depending on which Self-Esteem task they 
received. This is because previous research has found that women‘s self-esteem is 
often heavily influenced by their sense of body satisfaction (for a review of such 
ideas, see Hesse-Biber, Leavy, Quinn & Zoino, 2006); meaning that women whose 
self-esteem was threatened could have been more defensively avoidant of the 
relatedness of the CVD Risk Biochip information to their own bodies. 
 
6.1.6c ANOVA        
An additional 2 (Existential Prime) x 2 (Self-Esteem) ANOVA was also conducted on 
the Essay Evaluation questionnaire. This was planned in order to check that the 
creatureliness essay was perceived more negatively by participants than the 
uniqueness essay, following previous TMT research (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; 
Goldenberg et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2007).  
 
6.2 RESULTS 
 
6.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
The sample consisted of 42 males (37.5%) and 70 females (62.5%) between 40-55 
years of age (M = 46.9, SD = 4.52; with 12 missing values) who volunteered to 
participate. 
 
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
All items from the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude and the CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intentions scales that were negatively phrased had their scores reversed 
so that all of the values reflected the same 5-point Likert scale, from 1 = highly 
negative to 5 = highly positive. In a similar fashion, items pertaining to the CVD Risk 
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Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale were also scored on a 5-point Likert scale which 
asked participants to indicate how much they agreed with a series of statements 
concerning the relatedness of the CVD Risk Biochip to their bodies. These items were 
re-scored where necessary in order to achieve a series of items that represented a 
range of scores from 1 = not at all body-related to 5 = highly body-related with 
respect to the CVD Risk Biochip. Tables 6.1-6.3 provide means and standard 
deviations (reflecting the re-scored values of participant‘s responses to the individual 
items on these scales). 
  
 
 
 Uniqueness Prime Creatureliness Prime 
 Self Esteem 
Bolster  
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Self Esteem 
Bolster 
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 4.36 0.78 4.64 0.56 4.25 0.89 4.32 0.67 4.39 0.74 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 2.89 1.32 3.11 1.29 3.07 1.25 2.68 1.12 2.94 1.24 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
    health. 
3.79 1.10 3.93 0.60 3.64 1.19 3.57 1.03 3.73 1.00 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
    their health. 
4.07 0.98 3.89 1.07 3.86 0.97 3.82 1.09 3.91 1.02 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 4.32 0.77 4.54 0.51 4.25 0.80 4.11 0.88 4.30 0.76 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
    great idea. 
3.82 0.98 3.86 1.15 3.71 1.15 3.82 1.22 3.80 1.11 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious. 3.96 1.14 4.32 0.91 3.82 1.16 4.18 1.06 4.07 1.07 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more 
    active approach to their health. 
4.11 0.79 4.11 0.99 3.89 1.20 4.04 0.92 4.04 0.98 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 4.32 0.77 4.36 0.83 4.25 0.89 4.18 0.95 4.28 0.85 
Table 6.1: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale by Existential Prime and Self-Esteem (Re-scored Values)  
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 Uniqueness Prime Creatureliness Prime 
 Self Esteem 
Bolster  
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Self Esteem 
Bolster 
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly likely 
that I would buy it. 
3.25 1.15 3.21 1.26 3.11 1.50 3.18 1.31 3.19 1.37 
2. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely that I 
would use it. 
4.39 0.92 4.39 0.57 4.18 1.06 4.18 1.02 4.29 0.91 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
3.39 1.17 3.68 1.06 3.36 1.25 3.46 1.32 3.47 1.19 
4. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
3.11 1.26 3.00 1.41 2.68 1.42 2.71 1.41 2.88 1.37 
5. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
3.57 1.23 3.86 1.01 3.54 1.20 3.61 1.17 3.64 1.15 
6. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes me 
feel uncomfortable. 
3.82 1.19 4.18 0.91 3.96 1.23 3.89 1.23 3.96 1.14 
Table 6.2: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale by Condition Existential Prime and Self-
Esteem (Re-scored Values)  
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 Uniqueness Prime Creatureliness Prime 
 Self Esteem 
Bolster  
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Self Esteem 
Bolster 
Self Esteem 
Threat 
Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the CVD Risk 
Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily experiences. 
3.39 1.23 3.64 1.16 3.36 1.06 3.21 1.07 3.40 1.13 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk factors for a 
disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal to me. 
4.07 0.81 4.18 0.82 4.07 1.12 4.18 1.16 4.12 0.98 
3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip are 
more  important than my own sense of health and well-being that I experience 
from my body 
2.75 1.18 2.93 1.25 2.93 1.28 2.64 1.40 2.81 1.25 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip draws attention away from my own personal experiences of my body. 
3.46 1.04 3.64 0.99 3.39 1.34 3.39 1.26 3.47 1.15 
5. I would be sceptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk Biochip that 
reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do not feel relate to my 
feelings of general health and well-being from my body. 
3.68 0.95 3.93 1.02 3.64 1.03 3.71 1.05 3.74 1.00 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD 
Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my body.   
4.00 0.94 3.93 0.94 3.96 1.17 4.14 0.93 4.01 0.99 
7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on risk factors 
make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and sensations. 
3.96 1.00 3.82 1.06 3.82 1.28 3.89 1.07 3.88 1.09 
Table 6.3: Mean and Standard Deviations for Each Item on the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale by Existential Prime and Self-Esteem Biochip 
(Re-scored Values) 
 1
7
8
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6.2.3 Principal Component Analyses  
The questionnaire data pertaining to the behavioural and attitude scales for the fourth 
study did not fit a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) model based on the results of 
the PCAs from either of the first two studies. Additionally, since the primary reason 
for conducting factor analysis was data reduction in this case, it was deemed 
appropriate to perform additional PCAs on the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale, the 
CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale and the CVD Risk Biochip Body-
Relatedness Scale respectively in a similar fashion to the PCAs for the first two 
studies. 
 
As with the first two studies, the central aim of PCA was to find items that best 
represented single constructs for each of the individual scales of interest for this 
study. An additional aim of PCA was to ensure that the retained items in the CVD 
Risk Biochip Attitude Scale and the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
were of both a positively and negatively phrased nature in order to control for 
acquiescence response set answers (as per Winkler et al., 1982). It was not deemed 
necessary to control for acquiescence response set answers with the CVD Risk 
Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale as the content of these items did not constitute an 
appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip per se but instead asked participants the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with qualitatively different statements concerning the 
relatedness of the CVD Risk Biochip to their bodily experiences. In other words, the 
majority of items on this scale were negatively phrased in substantially different ways 
that may not have been easily answered in an acquiescence response set fashion.  
 
Each of the scales was initially subjected to suitability analyses for PCA. In this 
regard, the data pertaining to a particular scale was deemed suitable for PCA if many 
of the correlations for the items were above 0.3, if the MSA values for individual 
items were above 0.7 and if a statistically significant result on Bartlett‘s Test of 
Sphericity and a KMO value above 0.6 was obtained (following the recommendations 
of Pett et al., 2003).  
 
6.2.3a PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
While the CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale data was initially deemed suitable for 
PCA (as many correlation coefficients for the items were above 0.3, a statistically 
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significant result on Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (36) = 378.64, p < 0.001] and a 
KMO value of 0.82 were achieved and the majority of MSA values produced for 
individual items were above 0.7), it was observed that the item ―Diagnostic Testing 
should be left to the Professionals‖ produced an MSA value of 0.58. As this item had 
achieved similarly low MSA values in the results of the first two studies and had been 
considered to potentially represent a different construct to the other items in the scale, 
it was deemed appropriate to remove this item from subsequent analyses. Further 
suitability analyses for PCA with the remaining eight items suggested that the data 
were now even more suitable for PCA as there was a higher KMO value of 0.84, all 
remaining MSA values were now >0.79 and there was an additional statistically 
significant result on Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (28) = 345.45, p < 0.001].  
 
The unrotated PCA on the eight items revealed the presence of one component with 
an eigenvalue exceeding 1. The scree plot also revealed a clear break after the second 
component. However, this remaining extracted factor only accounted for 49.51% of 
the variance in the data, which was just below the expected range for social science 
studies indicated by Pett et al. (2003).  In light of this slightly lower than expected 
variance explained, and as the item ―The CVD Risk Biochip makes me anxious‖ in 
the unrotated solution to the PCA obtained a low communality result (0.18); it was 
decided to delete this item and re-run the PCA with the remaining seven items. The 
remaining seven items were once again deemed suitable for PCA as they obtained a 
strong KMO value (0.84), a statistically significant Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² 
(21) = 325.40, p < 0.001], many correlations over 0.3 (see Table 6.4) and all MSA 
values over 0.70.  
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Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 7-Item Solution for the 
CVD Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
The unrotated PCA for the remaining seven items revealed the presence of a single 
component with an eigenvalue over one and a clear break on the scree plot after the 
second component. This single component solution accounted for 54.57% of the 
variance in the data set; an improvement of almost 5% of the variance explained 
compared to the eight item PCA solution. The seven items that remained constituted a 
roughly equal balance of both negatively phrased and positively phrased items and a 
reliability analysis of these items revealed a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.85, with each 
item contributing significantly to the variance explained. Following this, the single 
component solution of the remaining seven items was deemed appropriate to be 
retained for further analyses (See Table 6.5 for factor loadings relating to this single 
component solution). 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M   SD 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an 
exciting new device. 
1.00       4.39 0.74 
2.  The CVD Risk Biochip 
makes me feel empowered 
about my health. 
0.42 1.00      3.73 1.00 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip will 
only serve to frighten people 
about their health. 
0.39 0.36 1.00     3.91 1.02 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip is a 
valuable new device. 
0.72 0.52 0.57 1.00    4.30 0.76 
5. Moving diagnostic testing 
from hospital settings to the 
home is a great idea. 
0.31 0.29 0.33 0.35 1.00   3.80 1.11 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip will 
encourage people to take a 
more active approach to their 
health. 
0.50 0.54 0.46 0.55 0.45 1.00  4.04 0.97 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip is an 
unnecessary device. 
0.46 0.41 0.59 0.67 0.37 0.45 1.00 4.28 0.85 
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Item Component 1 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 0.87 
2. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 0.78 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
0.77 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 0.75 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about their 
health. 
0.72 
6. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my health. 0.69 
7. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
0.57 
Table 6.5: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 7-Item Solution for the CVD  
Risk Biochip Attitude Scale 
 
6.2.3b PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
Suitability analyses for the CVD Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale revealed 
that the data were suitable for PCA (the data obtained a KMO value of 0.73, a 
statistically significant result on Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (15) = 263.55, p < 
0.001], many correlations for items in the scale over 0.3 and the majority of MSA 
values for individual items were above 0.7). However, the item ―At this moment, the 
thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel uncomfortable‖ produced a 
very low MSA value of 0.56. Consequently, this item was removed and the analyses 
were re-run with the remaining five items. This remaining data was found to be more 
suitable for PCA as the MSA values for each of the items was above 0.7. 
Additionally, the five-item solution obtained a KMO value of 0.76, a statistically 
significant result on Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (10) = 204.92, p < 0.001] and 
many correlations for items in the scale over 0.3. A correlation matrix and descriptive 
statistics for this data are presented in Table 6.6 below.  
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Table 6.6: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 5-Item Solution of the CVD 
Risk Biochip Behavioural Intentions Scale 
 
A single component was identified in the unrotated PCA for the remaining five items 
as there was only one component with an eigenvalue over one and a clear break on 
the scree plot after the second component. This single component accounted for 
58.43% of the variance in the data set and contained roughly the same amount of 
negatively phrased and positively phrased items (Table 6.7 below provides factor 
loadings for this single component solution). The data were also deemed highly 
reliable, obtaining a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.82 with each item contributing 
significantly to the variance explained. In light of the above, this five-item single 
component solution was retained for further analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 M   SD 
1.  If I saw this device in a supermarket or 
pharmacy, it is highly likely that I would 
buy it. 
1.00     3.19 1.37 
2.  I would buy the CVD Risk Biochip if my 
GP recommended it 
0.53 1.00    4.29 0.91 
3.   The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it 
could be a useful device but I probably 
wouldn’t use it myself. 
0.72 0.59 1.00   3.47 1.19 
4.  At this moment, I feel particularly 
motivated to use the CVD Risk Biochip. 
0.40 0.40 0.47 1.00  2.88 1.37 
5.  At this moment, the thought of using the 
CVD Risk Biochip is particularly 
unappealing. 
0.50 0.32 0.36 0.46 1.00 3.64 1.15 
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Item Component 1 
1. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly likely 
that I would buy it. 
0.84 
2. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
0.84 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
0.75 
4. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
0.70 
5. I would buy the CVD Risk Biochip if my GP recommended it 0.67 
Table 6.7: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 5-Item Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intentions Scale 
 
6.2.3c PCA of the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale 
As with the suitability analyses for the other two scales, the initial seven-item CVD 
Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale was deemed suitable for PCA. In this case, the 
seven-item scale obtained a KMO value of 0.82, a statistically significant result on 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity [X² (21) = 206.15, p < 0.001], many item inter-
correlations that were over 0.3 and the majority of MSA values for individual items 
were above 0.7. As one item had a particularly low MSA value of 0.46 (―Risk factor 
results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip are more important 
than my own sense of health and well-being that I experience from my body‖) and 
was the only item that loaded strongly onto a second factor in the initial unrotated 
PCA result (which accounted for 15.18% of the variance in the sample), it was 
deleted and the suitability analyses were re-run. This set of suitability analyses 
indicated that the remaining six-item solution was appropriate for PCA due to the 
following results; a KMO value of 0.84, a statistically significant result on Bartlett‘s 
Test of Sphericity [X² (15) = 196.87, p < 0.001], many inter-item correlations over 0.3 
and all MSA values above 0.7. The unrotated PCA for the six-item solution revealed a 
single component upon examination of the scree plot and the eigenvalues over one. 
This single component solution accounted for 52.34% of the variance alone, which 
was within the realistic expected range for social science research (as per Pett et al., 
2003). A subsequent reliability analysis of the six items revealed a highly reliable 
Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.81. Inter-item correlations and descriptive statistics for the 
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six-item solution are presented in Table 6.8 below and factor loadings for this single 
component solution, which was retained for further analyses, are given in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.8: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for the 6-Item Solution of the CVD 
Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 M   SD 
1.  The risk factor information I 
receive from a diagnostic test like 
the CVD Risk Biochip cannot be 
easily related to my own bodily 
experiences 
1.00      3.40 1.13 
2.  Using a technology like the CVD 
Risk Biochip to detect risk factors 
for a disease that I cannot feel 
with my body seems unreal to me. 
0.44 1.00     4.12 0.98 
3.  Focusing on risk factor results 
from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip draws my 
attention away from my own 
personal experiences of my body. 
0.26 0.47 1.00    3.47 1.15 
4.  I would be sceptical about results 
from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of 
risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of 
general health and well-being 
from my body. 
0.31 0.48 0.49 1.00   3.74 1.00 
5.  Thinking about risk factor results 
from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip makes me 
feel passive towards my body.   
0.25 0.38 0.43 0.50 1.00  4.01 0.99 
6.  Diagnostic technologies like the 
CVD Risk Biochip that focus on 
risk factors make me less reliant 
on my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
0.31 0.51 0.56 0.46 0.49 1.00 3.88 1.09 
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Item Component 1 
1. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on risk 
factors make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and sensations. 
0.79 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk factors 
for a disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal to me. 
0.76 
3. I would be sceptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of general health and well-being from 
my body. 
0.76 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the 
CVD Risk Biochip draws my attention away from my own personal 
experiences of my body. 
0.75 
5. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my body.   
0.71 
6. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the 
CVD Risk Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily 
experiences 
0.55 
Table 6.9: Factor Loadings from the PCA on the 6-Item Solution of the CVD Risk Biochip  
Body-Relatedness Scale 
 
6.2.4 Data Clean-up, Tests of Normality and Transformations of the Data Scales 
Following PCA, participants‘ scores on the remaining items in each of the scales 
were summed to form composite attitudes, behavioural intentions and body-
relatedness scores respectively. Tests of normality were then conducted on each of 
these sets of composite scores. While the behavioural intentions data appeared to 
approximate normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, Shapiro Wilks statistics, 
histograms with normality plots and Normal Q-Q Plots indicated that both sets of 
composite scores pertaining to the attitudes and body-relatedness scales appeared to 
have a negative skew. In order to remedy this issue, several different transformations 
were attempted for each data set in line with Tabachnick & Fidell‘s (2001) data 
transformation guidelines. Square root transformations were found to achieve Shapiro 
Wilks values, Kolmogorov-Smirnov values and histogram shapes for the two 
composite data sets that approximated normality more closely. These transformed 
data sets were then retained for further analyses.  
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Additionally, tests of normality were conducted on the Essay Evaluation 
questionnaire data. In line with previous research using Goldenberg et al.‘s (2001) 
Existential Prime methodology (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 2002; 
Cox et al., 2007), composite scores of participants‘ responses to these items had 
initially been created by taking the mean responses to the six items (Cronbach‘s 
Alpha = 0.91). The resultant data set was found to closely approximate normality on 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, Shapiro Wilks statistics, histograms with normality 
plots and Normal Q-Q Plots. Consequently, no data transformations were deemed 
necessary for this data set.  
 
6.2.5 ANOVA on the Essay Evaluation Questionnaire 
Following Goldenberg et al. (2001) and subsequent research using the Existential 
Prime methodology (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2007), participants‘ 
mean responses to the Essay Evaluation items were examined with a 2 (Existential 
Prime) x 2 (Self-Esteem task) ANOVA. The results revealed no significant effects for 
the Existential Prime, the Self-Esteem tasks or either of the two independent 
measures in combination; F (1, 107) = 2.94, p = 0.09; η² = 0.03, F (1, 107) = 0.07, p = 
0.79; η² = 0.00 and F (1, 107) = 1.65, p = 0.20; η² = 0.02. Descriptive Statistics 
pertaining to this measure are given in Table 6.10. 
 
 Existential Prime M SD Self-Esteem M SD 
Literature  Creaturely 5.47 1.50 Bolster 5.68 1.66 
Evaluation Uniqueness 5.97 1.60 Threat 5.76 1.44 
Table 6.10: Descriptive Statistics for the ANOVA Dependent Variable Scores for the 
Literature Evaluation Questionnaire by Existential Prime and Self-Esteem Prime 
 
6.2.6 MANCOVA on CVD Risk Biochip Attitudes Scale and CVD Risk Biochip 
Behavioural Intentions Scale  
A 2 x 2 x 2 MANCOVA was carried out with the attitudes and behavioural intentions 
data as dependent variables and gender as a covariate in order to investigate whether 
or not there were differences in participants‘ appraisal of the CVD Risk Biochip 
based on their membership of one of the four experimental conditions (Self-Esteem 
Bolster / Creatureliness Prime, Self-Esteem Threat / Creatureliness Prime, Self-
Esteem Bolster / Uniqueness Prime and Self-Esteem Threat / Uniqueness Prime). In 
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keeping with the first two studies of the programme, gender was included as a 
covariate to remove any potential bias in participants‘ appraisal of the CVD Risk 
Biochip arising from their gender.  
 
As neither of the data sets violated any of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, 
multicollinearity, independence of the covariates from the experimental treatments 
and reliability of the measurement of the covariates, the data were deemed suitable 
for MANCOVA. The respective results for the MANCOVA with the combined 
dependent variables pertaining to the Existential Prime, Self-Esteem task and these 
two independent measures in combination were; F(2, 106) = 0.75, p = 0.47; Wilk‘s 
Lambda = 0.99; η² = 0.01; F(2, 106) = 0.12, p = 0.89; Wilk‘s Lambda = 1.00; η² = 
0.00 and F(2, 106) = 0.06, p = 0.94; Wilk‘s Lambda = 1.00; η² = 0.00. Since these 
analyses uncovered no statistically significant differences between any of the groups 
on the combined dependent variables after controlling for gender as a covariate, no 
further post-hoc tests of between-subjects effects were deemed necessary between the 
groups. Descriptive statistics pertaining to the MANCOVA are presented in Table 
6.11. 
 
 Existential 
Prime 
M SD Self-
Esteem 
M SD Gender M SD 
Attitudes  Creaturely 27.86 5.21 Bolster 28.32 5.05 Male 28.05 4.12 
 Uniqueness 29.05 4.11 Threat 28.59 4.38 Female 28.70 5.04 
Behavioural  Creaturely 17.00 4.88 Bolster 17.29 4.94 Male 17.64 4.11 
Intentions Uniqueness 17.93 4.32 Threat 17.64 4.30 Female 17.36 4.92 
Table 6.11: Descriptive Statistics for the Untransformed MANCOVA Dependent Variable 
Scores by Existential Prime, Self-Esteem Prime and Covariate of Gender 
 
6.2.7 ANCOVA on CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale 
In order to examine if there were differences in participants‘ assessment of the body-
relatedness of the information proposed to be reported by the CVD Risk Biochip 
depending on their membership of one of the four experimental groups, a two-way 
between subjects ANCOVA was conducted on the body-relatedness data as a 
dependent variable and gender as a covariate. As with previous analyses, gender was 
included as a covariate to remove any potential bias in participants‘ assessment of the 
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body-relatedness of the information proposed to be reported by the CVD Risk 
Biochip arising from their gender. 
 
The body-relatedness data did not violate any of the assumptions of ANCOVA 
relating to normality, linearity, univariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices, multicollinearity, reliability of the covariate and homogeneity of 
regression slopes. Therefore, this data was deemed suitable for ANCOVA. The 
respective results of the analyses are as follows for the Existential Prime, Self-Esteem 
task and these two independent measures in combination: F(1, 107) = 0.33, p = 0.57; 
η² = 0.00, F(1, 107) = 0.30, p = 0.59; η² = 0.00 and F(1, 107) = 0.04, p = 0.84; η² = 
0.00. These analyses revealed no significant differences between the groups on body-
relatedness after controlling for gender as a covariate. Consequently, no further post-
hoc tests of between-subjects effects were conducted. Table 6.12 provides descriptive 
statistics for the ANCOVA. 
 
 Existential 
Prime 
M SD Self-
Esteem 
M SD Gender M SD 
Body-  Creaturely 22.39 4.71 Bolster 22.41 4.78 Male 23.02 3.17 
Relatedness Uniqueness 22.86 4.45 Threat 22.84 4.37 Female 22.39 5.23 
Table 6.12: Descriptive Statistics for the Untransformed ANCOVA pertaining to the CVD 
Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale Scores by Existential Prime, Self-Esteem task and 
Covariate of Gender 
 
6.2.8 Logistic Regression of De Facto Intentions  
In keeping with the first two studies of the current research programme, a logistic 
regression was performed with the De Facto Intentions Measure as a dependent 
variable. The main purpose of this analysis was to examine whether or not receipt of 
either one of the Existential Primes or one of the Self-Esteem tasks would help to 
predict the odds of whether or not participants chose to sign up for a CVD Risk 
Biochip pilot study. Additionally, gender was included to control for the potential 
differences between middle-aged males and females in their participation of health-
oriented behaviours that have been previously discussed in the health psychology 
literature (e.g. Parslow, et al., 2004; Evans, et al., 2005; Janda, et al., 2004).   
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As a means of preparation for this analysis, each of the variables had been initially 
coded into sets of separate binary dichotomous variables. For the dependent variable 
itself, a score of 0 indicated that a participant had not signed up for the pilot study, 
whereas a score of 1 indicated that a participant had signed up for it. Each of the 
condition variables were also coded with either a score of 0 or a score of 1; 0 
represented that a participant had received the Uniqueness Prime and 1 represented 
that a participant had received the Creatureliness Prime for the Existential Prime 
conditions, whereas 0 signified a participant‘s receipt of the Self-Esteem Bolster task 
and 1 signified a participant‘s receipt of the Self-Esteem Threat task. Finally, a score 
of 0 was used to indicate a male participant and a score of 1 was used to indicate a 
female participant for the gender variable. 
 
An initial check for the assumptions of logistic regression confirmed that there was an 
absence of multicollinearity between the sets of independent variables. Testing the 
model with the three predictors (Existential Prime, Self-Esteem task and gender 
respectively) against a constant-only model indicated no significant improvement of 
the logistic regression model upon the odds of whether or not participants signed up 
for the CVD Risk Biochip pilot study that were accountable by chance; X² (3, n = 78) 
= 1.62, p > 0.05. In other words, neither the receipt of one of the Existential Primes, 
nor receipt of one of the Self-Esteem tasks, nor a participant‘s gender helped to 
reliably predict whether or not they had signed up for the pilot study. Regression 
coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals pertaining to 
the odds for each of the three predictors are presented in Table 6.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
191 
 95% Confidence Interval 
For Odds Ratio 
Variables B Wald Chi- 
Square 
Odds  
Ratio  
Lower Upper 
Existential Prime 0.15 0.15 1.17 0.54 2.52 
Self-Esteem 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 2.16 
Gender -0.47 1.22 0.63 0.28 1.42 
Constant 0.73 2.83 2.07   
 Table 6.13: Logistic Regression Analysis, containing Regression Coefficients, Wald 
Statistics and Odds Ratios for the Predictors and the Constant Term and 95% Confidence 
Intervals Relating to Odds Ratios for the Predictors  
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
Contrary to the predictions derived from TMT in the current study, there was no 
evidence that existential concerns relating to either human creatureliness or self-
esteem had any substantial impact on participants‘ appraisal of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. In relation to the Existential Prime, the lack of significant differences 
between participants who received an essay emphasising the similarity of humans to 
other animals and those who received an essay emphasising the creatureliness of 
humans on either their attitudes towards the device or their behavioural intentions and 
commitment towards its use led to a rejection of the hypothesis that priming human 
creatureliness and providing a subsequent distraction would lead to greater avoidant 
responses towards the device than priming human uniqueness and providing a similar 
distraction. Similarly, the lack of significant differences on the same measures 
between participants who had completed the task that was designed to threaten their 
self-esteem and those who had completed the task designed to boost their self-esteem 
engendered the rejection of the hypothesis that threatening participants‘ self-esteem 
would produce more avoidant responses towards the device than boosting 
participants‘ self-esteem. Finally, the hypothesis that those participants who received 
both the Self-Esteem Threat task and participants who were given the Creatureliness 
Prime would exhibit the most avoidant responses towards the device compared to the 
other three groups was rejected on the grounds that there was a lack of significant 
results between this group and the other groups on the attitudes scale, behavioural 
intentions scale and ―De Facto Intentions‖ measure. 
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As expected by the alternative hypothesis, there were also no significant differences 
between participants from any of the groups‘ responses on the CVD Risk Biochip 
Body-Relatedness Scale. However, it should be noted that the means scores for these 
items were generally in the unexpected direction, with all of the items that had been 
included in the composite CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale achieving 
mean scores above 3; the middle score of the Likert Scale. Consequently, the 
composite CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness data do not appear to support the 
alternative hypothesis that all participants would indicate that the proposed risk 
information to be derived from the CVD Risk Biochip could not be easily related to 
the general sense of health and well-being that they normally experienced from their 
bodies. In other words, participants did not suggest that they would experience 
feelings of disembodiment or dissociation towards the risk information that the CVD 
Risk Biochip was proposed to provide.  
 
6.3.1 Possible Explanations for the Rejection of the Central Hypotheses Relating to 
TMT  
The lack of significant differences between the groups who received the 
Creatureliness and Uniqueness Primes respectively on their appraisal of the CVD 
Risk Biochip and commitment towards its use suggests that thinking about the 
creaturely aspects of being human and receiving a subsequent distraction did not 
elicit more avoidant responses towards the device compared to thinking about a 
control topic. In other words, the current study failed to demonstrate that there were 
any barriers to the use of the CVD Risk Biochip resulting from receipt of the 
Creatureliness Prime and a distraction. Furthermore, despite the fact that the studies 
carried out by Goldenberg and colleagues (Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 
2009) relating to cancer detection appear to be analogous to the current study in their 
design (i.e. due to their analogous assessment of participants‘ behavioural intentions 
to perform body-focused behaviours with the potential to detect a life-threatening 
condition following a Creatureliness Prime and distraction task), the results of the 
current study differ substantially from these studies by virtue of the fact that the 
Creatureliness Prime did not lead to more fearful and avoidant reactions towards the 
detection-orienting behaviour of using the CVD Risk Biochip. These findings are 
particularly pertinent as they run contrary to Goldenberg‘s (2005) predictions that the 
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human creatureliness construct may be particularly relevant to health-orienting 
behaviours that involve a degree of confrontation with the human body.  
 
As mentioned earlier, use of the CVD Risk Biochip involves a degree of bodily 
confrontation by necessitating the use of a blood sample; an act which draws one‘s 
attention to the mortal process of bleeding and is accompanied by an analytic search 
for the presence of the potentially life-threatening condition of CVD. However, in 
spite of the potential bodily confrontation involved in the use of the CVD Risk 
Biochip, the Creatureliness Prime did not have any impact on participants‘ appraisals 
of the device in the current study. Consequently, Goldenberg (2005) may have 
exceeded the explanatory power of the evidence used to support her claim that human 
creatureliness is particularly relevant to health-orienting behaviours involving bodily 
confrontation. Indeed, the evidence that she had used to support this claim amounted 
to the results of the set of studies that were subsequently published as Goldenberg et 
al. (2008); a set of studies that specifically involved breast self-exams rather than a 
variety of different health-orienting behaviours involving bodily confrontation. While 
subsequent TMT research on health threat detection behaviours since Goldenberg‘s 
(2005) commentary article was published have examined participants‘ responses 
towards mammograms and testicular examinations (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2009), this research has yet to examine health threat detection 
behaviours that involve a degree of bodily confrontation other than cancer screening 
(e.g. the use of a POCT device like the CVD Risk Biochip).   
 
Interestingly, it appears that the most likely explanation for the results from the 
current study pertaining to the Creatureliness Prime may be attributed to participants‘ 
appraisal of the task itself. Previous TMT research that incorporated this task had 
found that the essay on human creatureliness was consistently evaluated in a more 
negative fashion by participants than the essay on human uniqueness (e.g. 
Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008). In each of these studies, this finding was taken as evidence that the 
Creatureliness Prime was more threatening to participants than the Uniqueness Prime. 
In other words, by the logic of previous TMT researchers who employed this task, 
greater negative evaluations of the Creatureliness Prime among participants served to 
confirm that these participants were defensively reacting towards the content of these 
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essays, presumably due to the existentially threatening nature of the creaturely 
descriptions of humans contained within them. However, in stark contrast to these 
studies, there was no significant difference between participants‘ evaluations of the 
essay on human creatureliness and participants‘ evaluations of the essay on human 
uniqueness in the current study. This implies that the Creatureliness Prime did not 
represent a substantial existential threat to participants in the current study by virtue 
of the fact that they were not compelled to react defensively towards the author of the 
essay when they were given the opportunity. This absence of existential threat among 
participants who read the creaturely essay may also account for the lack of 
significantly different appraisals of the CVD Risk Biochip between these participants 
and those who read the uniqueness essay. That is to say, neither group were 
threatened enough by the essay they received to exhibit more fearful or avoidant 
reactions towards the device on the basis of this measure. 
 
There are a number of possible ways of accounting for the finding that participants 
were not threatened by the Creatureliness Prime in the current study. One possible 
explanation is that the Self-Esteem Threat task which preceded it served to override 
the existentially-threatening potency of the Creatureliness Prime. However, this 
explanation does not seem plausible for a couple of reasons. Firstly, previous research 
using the Creatureliness Prime did not uncover evidence to support the idea that the 
existentially-threatening potency of this task could be superseded by a prior 
existential threat. In contrast, numerous studies have demonstrated more severely 
existentially-related defensive reactions among participants who received a Mortality 
Salience task and a subsequent Creatureliness Prime in combination compared to 
participants who were presented with one or the other of these existentially-relevant 
tasks in combination with a Control task (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et 
al., 2009). For instance, Goldenberg et al. (2008) found that only a Creatureliness 
Prime rather than a Uniqueness Prime led to reduced intentions to conduct breast self-
exams following Mortality Salience. The second reason why it is unlikely that the 
Self-Esteem Threat task served to override the existentially-threatening potency of the 
Creatureliness Prime relates to the fact that the current study contained a 2 x 2 
independent measures design as a function of the Self-Esteem task and Existential 
Prime that participants received. This study design means that, even in the event that 
the existential threat associated with the Creatureliness Prime was superseded by the 
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existential threat accompanying the preceding Self-Esteem Threat task, one would 
still expect that the Creatureliness Prime would elicit defensive reactions among 
participants who received it following a Self-Esteem Bolster task (i.e. following the 
previous research relating to this task such as Goldenberg et al., 2008). However, as 
indicated above, such defensive reactions were not displayed among participants who 
received a Self-Esteem Bolster task followed by a Creatureliness Prime. 
Consequently, the explanation that the Self-Esteem Threat task served to override the 
existentially-threatening potency of the Creatureliness Prime does not appear to be 
plausible.   
 
An alternative explanation for the failure of participants who received the 
Creatureliness Prime to find the task existentially threatening relates to the previous 
use of the task in the TMT literature. Since this task had only ever previously been 
used with American participants and involves the evaluation of essays that are 
purported to have been written by students from the University of Missouri, it is 
possible that cultural in-group/out-group biases may have had an influence on 
participants‘ evaluations of the essays (for a detailed review of the intergroup bias 
literature see Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Much prior TMT research has found 
that in-group/out-group biases may be particularly important for people when they are 
faced with reminders of their mortality (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 
1994; Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 2000; Arndt et al., 2002; Schimel et al., 
2007). Furthermore, previous TMT research has found that one‘s national identity 
may be particularly important with respect to the relevance of particular worldviews 
to oneself. For instance, Schimel et al. (2007) found that Canadian participants who 
read an essay that derogated a valued component of their national identity exhibited 
increased distal defensive responses compared to Canadians who read an essay that 
derogated a valued component of Australians‘ national identity. Following such 
ideas, Irish participants‘ perceptions of the authors of the essays in the current study 
may have been more informed by their perceptions of American students generally 
than by their emotional reactions towards the essays themselves. In other words, Irish 
participants may not have found these essays to be particularly existentially relevant 
as they might have identified the authors of these essays as representing a cultural 
out-group on the basis of their national identity.  
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In a slightly different but somewhat related fashion, it is possible that creaturely 
descriptions of humans may not be as repulsive to the Irish. For instance, there is a 
wealth of historical evidence and anthropological accounts that demonstrate that 
many Irish people had to deal with racial slurs that involved likening them to animals 
at least up until the late 19
th
 Century (e.g. Earls, 1988; Curtis, 1997; Orser Jr., 1998; 
Mullin, 1999; Engle, 2001; Knobel, 2001; Hinds, 2004; Lloyd, 2005; Soper, 2005). 
This set of experiences may have culturally habituated the Irish to ideas about their 
potential similarity to other animals, thereby moderating their experience of the sort 
of creaturely reminders that were proposed by Goldenberg et al. (1999). Indeed, Irish 
people seem to have no problem referring to others in their cultural group as 
―creatures‖ (a common Irish colloquial term used to affectionately refer to others). In 
contrast, Americans may have more vehement reactions against animalistic 
depictions of humans in the ways that have been demonstrated in previous TMT 
studies (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 1999; Goldenberg et al., 2001; Goldenberg et al., 
2002; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that Americans may even be more 
squeamish about body-confrontations than their European equivalents. For instance, 
while cross-cultural studies concerning disgust-related phobias are rare, a couple of 
exploratory studies from the health psychology literature have shown that Americans 
are more fearful of injections and blood draws than Dutch counterparts (e.g. Arrindell 
et al., 1987; Olatunji, Sawchuk, de Jong & Lohr, 2006). When taken together, these 
results suggest that Irish participants may not have found creaturely reminders to be 
as existentially threatening as those American participants who have participated in 
prior TMT research involving this method. 
 
Following the above set of explanations, it is possible that the cross-cultural 
reliability of the creatureliness manipulation may require further investigation. 
Firstly, human creatureliness and human uniqueness essays that have been written by 
American students may not be identified as relevant mortality reminders to non-
American participants due to a perceived lack of cultural relevance of such reminders. 
Additionally, the effects of the creaturely manipulation that have been reported in the 
TMT literature so far may not be relevant to cultural groups who have become 
habituated to thinking about their similarity to other animals following racial slurs 
involving their alleged animality (e.g. Africans, American Indians or the Irish, as per 
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Mullin, 1999; Hinds, 2004; Soper, 2005). Consequently, the TMT-related defences 
that have been reported in these prior studies involving the creatureliness 
manipulation need to be replicated in a variety of cultural contexts in order to 
establish the reliability of this method. 
 
The separate finding that receipt of one of the Self-Esteem tasks did not elicit 
significant differences in participants‘ attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip and 
behavioural intentions and commitment towards its use also suggests that, contrary to 
the expectations of TMT, threats to self-esteem did not have any effect on 
participants‘ subsequent appraisal of the device. Similarly, the pattern of results 
relating to the Self-Esteem task implies that attempts to boost participants‘ self-
esteem also had no effect on their appraisal of the device. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that self-esteem threats may not lead to more avoidant responses 
towards the CVD Risk Biochip as a way of sidestepping the potential for further 
existential anxiety that use of a device to indicate the presence or absence of a life-
threatening condition entails. This finding appears to conflict with previous TMT 
research that has found that self-esteem threats increase the accessibility of death-
related thoughts (e.g. Hayes et al., 2008; Routledge et al., 2010), that high state self-
esteem can provide a buffer to the effects of existential anxiety, whereas the 
experience of low state self-esteem can make one more vulnerable to the effects of 
existential anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1992b; Greenberg et al., 1993; Harmon-
Jones et al., 1997; Van Den Boss, 2001; Hart et al., 2005; Schmeichel et al., 2009; 
Routledge et al., 2010) and the more specific findings that threats to self-esteem may 
result in avoidant responses towards health-orienting behaviours when people are in a 
distal mode of defence (e.g. Routledge et al., 2004).  
 
As with the Existential Prime, the most likely explanation for the lack of significant 
differences between the Self-Esteem Bolster and Self-Esteem Threat conditions is 
that participants did not find the Self-Esteem Threat task to be particularly 
existentially threatening. This idea appears to make sense when one notes that 
participants in the Self-Esteem Bolster condition more consistently indicated that they 
found the task of writing about a great personal success to be very difficult. More 
specifically, many participants in this condition spent a huge amount of time on this 
task and sought clarification from the researcher with regard to the types of responses 
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that were deemed acceptable. In contrast, participants who received the Self-Esteem 
Threat task appeared to find the completion of this task to be relatively straight-
forward. This was tacitly demonstrated by the shorter amount of time that they spent 
completing the self-esteem task and the observation that few of these participants 
asked for clarification in relation to the task. In other words, participants appeared to 
be less hesitant with the Self-Esteem Threat task than with the Self-Esteem Bolster 
task. While these effects would need to be replicated under more controlled 
circumstances (e.g. with the use of a stopwatch or computer-based software to 
measure participants‘ reaction time towards completion of the task), such reactions 
suggest that participants may have been more comfortable completing the Self-
Esteem Threat task than the Self-Esteem Bolster task. This may also mean that those 
who completed the Self-Esteem Threat task did not find the task to be particularly 
existentially threatening. Furthermore, this finding may be linked to the phenomenon 
that Irish people tend to value humility and self-deprecation over self-
aggrandisement.  
 
The tendency for Irish people to favour self-deprecation over the lauding of their 
achievements has been acknowledged in the sociological literature. For instance, in a 
sociological analysis of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in forging a national 
identity for the Irish people, William Crotty (2006) suggests that the obedience to 
church teachings emphasizing humanity, docility and obedience to authority led the 
Irish to display a personality type that was characterised by passivity, self-criticism 
and self-deprecation. In a similar sociological analysis of the cultural heritage of self-
denial among the Irish people, Tom Inglis (2006) has suggested that the common 
Irish characteristic of self-deprecation may be closely linked to the strong traditional 
Catholic values of self-denial and ―making do‖. In order to elucidate this claim, he 
points towards the fact that Irish people ―love to hear the high and mighty tell self-
deprecating stories about themselves‖ (p. 36). The idea of self deprecation as a 
common Irish trait seems to have even filtered into popular media representations of 
the Irish people. For instance, in the most recently published Lonely Planet guide to 
Ireland, Fionn Davenport (2012) has provided anecdotal evidence that the Irish 
people are ―very suspicious of praise and tend not to believe anything nice that is ever 
said about them‖ (p. 48).   
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This cultural pattern of self-deprecation may have meant that the Irish participants in 
the current study were not existentially threatened by a task that asked them to report 
a time when they failed to live up to an important value. On the contrary, they may 
have unconsciously found the completion of such a task to be a normal or everyday 
expression of their ―Irishness‖. Additionally, negative cultural perceptions of self-
aggrandisement could account for the absence of a more positive appraisal of the 
CVD Risk Biochip among Irish participants who received the Self-Esteem Bolster 
task and their seeming perplexity in completing the task. In other words, these 
participants may have had difficulty with the Self-Esteem Bolster task as it instructed 
them to describe living up to an important value; a description that they may have 
found difficult due to cultural norms where the lauding of one‘s accomplishments is 
frowned upon. When these ideas are considered in combination with the evidence of 
delays and discomfort among participants who received the Self-Esteem Bolster task 
in comparison to those who received the Self-Esteem Threat task, it appears likely 
that Irish cultural norms of self-deprecation and wariness about self-aggrandisement 
may have interfered with the potential for this measure to elicit existential anxiety 
among participants. As with the creaturely manipulation, this particular measure had 
also only been previously used on American participants. Consequently, it is possible 
that the cross-cultural reliability of this measure may also be questionable. That is to 
say, this particular measure may not work with cultural groups like the Irish who are 
prone to self-deprecation; an idea that may require further investigation.   
 
In sum, in a similar fashion to the results of the first two studies in the current 
research programme, participants‘ reactions towards the CVD Risk Biochip in the 
current study did not appear to resemble the pattern of avoidant responses following 
mortality reminders and a distraction that had been found in seemingly analogous 
TMT research studies relating to cancer screening (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Furthermore, neither of the two 
independent measures in combination led to any significant differences in either 
attitudes towards the device or behavioural intentions towards its use or commitments 
to using the device in the future. As a result, the third experimental hypothesis 
following TMT that those participants who received both the Self-Esteem Threat task 
and the Creatureliness Prime together would exhibit the most avoidant responses 
towards the device was also rejected. This result is in keeping with the lack of 
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significant results found with respect to each of the dependent measures relating to 
TMT when either the Self-Esteem tasks or the Existential Primes were considered in 
isolation. In other words, since there was no effect of existential threat on 
participants‘ appraisal of the device with either of these independent measures in 
isolation, it is perhaps unsurprising that there were no significant effects of these 
tasks in combination on participants‘ appraisals of the device. As noted above, the 
lack of existential threat to participants relating to these tasks may have resulted from 
the fact that Irish participants took part; a cultural group who are commonly known to 
belittle themselves and have difficulty with praising themselves (e.g. Crotty, 2006; 
Inglis, 2006) and who may be less vulnerable to the effects of the creaturely 
manipulation (e.g. as a result of having become habituated to thinking about their 
similarity to other animals due to a history of being compared to animals in a 
pejorative sense; e.g. Earls, 1988; Curtis, 1997; Orser Jr., 1998; Mullin, 1999; Engle, 
2001; Knobel, 2001; Hinds, 2004; Lloyd, 2005; Soper, 2005). Following this, the 
cross-cultural reliability of both the self-esteem and creaturely manipulations may 
need to be further established in future TMT research (i.e. these measures should be 
used on other non-American samples of participants). 
 
6.3.2 The Body-Relatedness of CVD Risk Information and the Value of 
Experiential Knowledge to Participants 
As previously noted, while there was a lack of significant differences between 
participants‘ responses on the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale as a 
function of their group, the fact that the mean scores for these items were above the 
middle Likert rating in relation to their ―body-relatedness‖ meant that the alternative 
hypothesis that participants could not easily relate the CVD Risk information to their 
normal body-related sense of health and well-being was not supported. From this it 
can be surmised that the lack of significant differences on participants‘ appraisal of 
the CVD Risk Biochip depending on whether or not they received one of the TMT-
related existential primes was not due to a moderating effect of existential anxiety as 
a result of the abstract nature of the information that the device is purported to 
provide. This indicates that participants‘ lack of existential threat when asked to rate 
their attitudes, behavioural intentions and commitment to use the device did not 
derive from an experience of a Baudrillardian ―hyper-reality‖ (e.g. 1983; 1995; 2000) 
in relation to the device. In other words, the apparent lack of evidence of participants‘ 
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attempts to avoid the potential for existential threat that use of such a device entails 
did not occur because of a ―cooling‖ of their responses towards the abstraction and 
seeming intangibility of the future projections of risk that such diagnostic devices 
appear to convey (i.e. due to the apparent lack of a clear delineation between whether 
this risk information is imminent or merely represents a possible future projection 
that could be modified). In contrast, this apparent lack of existential threat may have 
more to do with some of the issues concerning the TMT primes used in the current 
study that have already been discussed above.  
 
An additional point that should be noted concerning the finding from the results of 
the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale that participants did not find 
diagnostic devices like the CVD Risk Biochip to be disassociated or disconnected 
from their bodily experiences is that the Cartesian Dualistic view of the body that is 
often linked to the analysis of ―objective indicators of the body‖ through such devices 
may not represent the ―natural‖ way that people experience their sense of health and 
well-being. That is to say, the perspective that there is a real separation between 
mental and physical life which is present in the biomedicalisation of human bodies 
may constitute a way of seeing that is inherently separate from normal people‘s 
everyday experiences of their bodies. Certainly, if the Cartesian perspective were to 
have been adopted by participants in this study, one might have expected that they 
would have considered the information to be gained from the CVD Risk Biochip to 
be unrelated to their own subjective bodily experience in this way due to the potential 
mind-body separation accompanying this perspective. However, these participants 
appeared to suggest that the more ―objective‖ information derived from the device 
could be related to bodily experiences; thereby suggesting that one‘s bodily 
experiences and biological physicality are intimately connected. This may mean that 
the desubjectifying language concerning sick and healthy bodies and the focus on 
―objective indicators‖ of the body derived from screen images, stained samples or 
machine readouts (e.g. Shaw, 2003; Martínez, 2005; Blaxter, 2009; Salter et al., 
2011) may be a somewhat artificial perspective that is solely adopted by medical 
practitioners in order to carry out their work.  
 
Lyon & Barbalet (1994) have suggested that the field of medicine has been central in 
perpetuating the Cartesian myth of the body-as-object in this way as a means of 
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establishing their authority over questions relating to the body. Indeed, this vantage 
point can be seen as a method of distancing the body as an object that is discrete and 
separate from the practitioners who study it, who may be considered as authorities on 
the body due to their ability to ―see what‘s wrong‖ with bodies. Moreover, this 
―distancing‖ may relate to Foucault‘s (1977) explicit suggestion that the process of 
viewing the body as if it were a lifeless corpse divested of psychological, social and 
dynamic biological histories through biomedicalisation can serve to transfer the 
socio-cultural representations of the power that one may have over one‘s own body to 
those medical professionals who are capable of ―seeing the body‖ in such ways. For 
instance, such processes have helped to establish individual sub-disciplines in 
medicine with their own specific categories of objectification and classification of 
bodies (e.g. Foucault, 1975; Lupton, 1997); categories which could serve to alienate 
laypeople.  
 
In contrast to this Cartesian framework derived from biomedicine, laypeople‘s 
understanding of their own physical health and their bodies may constitute a more 
―embodied‖ perspective that incorporates both subjective experiences of the body and 
so called ―objective indicators‖ of health and illness. In this context, the idea of 
―embodiment‖ may be seen to refer to how our bodies are active and engaged entities 
that interact with the material and social world, incorporating the contingency of our 
bodily processes, social and individual histories and the integration of our body, 
psychology and social interactions together into unified experiences (Krieger, 2005). 
One of the central proponents of this idea of embodied experience was the French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (e.g. 1962), who suggested that there is a 
fundamental difference between conceptions of the body as a mere object for 
perception (often denoted by the German word Körper) and the lived experience of a 
self through the body (denoted by the German word Leib). Whereas the Körper can 
be seen to refer to the structural aspects of the body or the body as viewed by another 
person (i.e. the Cartesian view of the body from medicine described above), the Leib 
constitutes a ―living body‖ that finds expression through feelings, sensations, 
perceptions and emotions (Ots, 1995). Merleau-Ponty argued that a person‘s 
relationship with their body is more accurately understood by the latter concept. He 
conceived of the body, not as a passive host for a mind, but as ―the vehicle‖ through 
which we experience the world as a unified portrait of sensorial phenomena 
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(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Further to this, he suggested that, rather than being privileged 
with a ―bird‘s eye view‖ of the world in the ways implied by scientific-technical 
rationality, our relationship to this ―world‖ is inevitably one-sided and phenomenal. 
In other words, we each hold a vantage point at any given moment that is inevitably 
grounded in our bodily ―host‖. In this way, interpretations of our individual ―world of 
experience‖ at any given moment are necessarily dependent on our opening up to the 
information that we receive through our eyes, ears, nose, mouth, limbs, skin and even 
our proprioceptive sense through which we experience movement and spatial 
orientation. In sum, Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggested that it is impossible for us to 
fully understand our bodily experiences and physical health without some 
understanding of our own sensations, perceptions and ways of structuring and 
interpreting the information that we might receive about such subjects. 
 
Support from the current study for the idea that lay people‘s perspectives on their 
health may be ―embodied‖ in this way also comes from the fact that participants 
appeared to indicate that they did not value diagnostic information more than their 
own bodily sense of health and well-being. Specifically, the low mean scores in 
relation to the item ―Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD 
Risk Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and well-being that I 
experience from my body‖ (M = 2.81, SD = 1.25) appeared to suggest that the 
participants in this study valued their body-related experiences at least to the same 
degree as the sorts of risk information from diagnostic devices like the CVD Risk 
Biochip. This item had also been found to load highly on to a second factor in the 
initial PCA on this scale; potentially suggesting that the item itself represented a 
different construct from the other items in the composite CVD Risk Biochip Body-
Relatedness Scale. Indeed, this item appears to represent participants‘ appraisals of 
the importance of the risk information that the CVD Risk Biochip was purported to 
deliver in comparison to their own sense of health and well-being from their bodies. 
In contrast, many of the other items on the scale related to how surreal the risk 
information from the device may appear or how easily this information may be 
understood in relation to a participant‘s own sense of health and well-being derived 
from their bodies. The subtle difference between this item and the other items from 
the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale is that the former focused on how 
valuable diagnostic risk information is perceived compared to one‘s sense of bodily 
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health, while the latter items focused on the surreal or body-dissociating effects of the 
CVD Risk Biochip. In other words, while most of the questions on the scale relate to 
the potential for the CVD Risk Biochip to promote feelings of disembodiment or 
dissociation towards the risk information the device provides, the item that had been 
excluded from the composite scale as a result of PCA could be seen to have related to 
the perceived value of this information and how this value may have related to 
participants‘ own sense of health and well-being.  
 
In light of the above, the low mean score in relation to this item potentially suggests 
that participants perceived that there was at least as much value to be derived from 
their own intuitive sense of health and well-being from their bodies than from the risk 
information that devices such as the CVD Risk Biochip convey. In other words, 
objective indicators derived from the view of the body as a lifeless Körper that is 
subject to mechanical laws of causality were not considered by participants to be a 
sufficient way of understanding health and illness. Instead, these participants‘ own 
subjective experiences of their bodies and local intuitive understandings of their own 
health were also deemed to be important. Caron-Flinterman, Broerse & Bunders 
(2005) have given the term ―experiential knowledge‖ to these local understandings of 
health and illness; a type of knowledge that people gain from the implicit lived 
experiences that they may have of their own bodies through illness and wellness. 
These authors have argued that such sources of knowledge can be seen to have very 
real practical value for both biomedical researchers and patients themselves; not only 
do patients‘ needs lead to the formulation of research questions, thereby launching 
new research projects, but patients‘ own ideas on etiological aspects of diseases are 
often translated by practitioners into biomedical hypotheses. Despite this, Caron-
Flinterman et al. (2005) provide evidence that there is an almost institutionalised 
opposition from certain biomedical researchers towards patient participation in 
biomedical research. For instance, one biomedical researcher in their study 
commented that ―Patients should not interfere in processes of which they know 
nothing about‖ (Caron-Flinterman et al., 2005; p. 2576).  
 
The finding that individuals tend to place substantial value on their experiential 
knowledge is also particularly salient when one notes the findings from the medical 
sociology literature that biological, psychological and socio-cultural processes are 
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often implicated in the biomedicalisation of disease. On the one hand, the very 
process of identifying a disease or a risk for developing a disease can serve to 
accelerate the experience of illness and re-interpretation of one‘s health status; 
conferring a certain privileged knowledge to medical professionals who specialise in 
making the invisible processes within the body visible (e.g. Sachs, 1995; 
Chrysanthou, 2002; Salter et al, 2011). On the other hand, this re-interpreted health 
status can cause the newly conferred patients to have an increasing ambivalence or 
anxiety towards the diagnostic information that usually consists of medical images 
and test results as ―objective indicators‖ of illness rather than on the patients‘ 
subjective experiences of the disease or illness (e.g. Martínez, 2005; Blaxter, 2009; 
Griffiths, Bendelow, Green, Palmer, 2010). Such research illuminates that there is a 
certain amount of value that people tend to attribute to the subjective experience of 
feeling that they are ill. A corollary of this attribution of value is that such people may 
experience a growing resentment towards processes of medicalisation that serve to 
undermine their subjective experiences. In light of this, the participants in the current 
study could be seen to have affirmed the value of their experiential knowledge in 
spite of the possibility that a diagnostic device like the CVD Risk Biochip had the 
capacity to provide them with information that could alter their health status.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the lack of significant differences between the four 
experimental groups with regards to participants‘ results on the composite CVD Risk 
Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale suggests that there was no evidence of distal 
defences in participants‘ responses towards the items relating to this dimension. In 
this regard, following TMT, one might have expected that participants who received 
either the Self-Esteem Threat task or the Creatureliness Prime or both of these tasks 
in combination would have been loathe to emphasise the relatedness of the 
information to be derived from the CVD Risk Biochip to their own bodily 
experiences. This is because, as discussed earlier, previous TMT research has 
demonstrated patterns of avoidance of bodily confrontation among participants 
following the priming of an existential threat (e.g. Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Additionally, one would have expected that 
threatening self-esteem or priming the creaturely aspects of the human body would 
have led participants to undermine their experiential values in favour of the more 
abstract risk information from the device as a way of avoiding further reminders of 
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their mortality, following previous TMT research (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2001; 
Goldenberg et al., 2002; Goldenberg, 2005; Cox et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008). However, in opposition to such ideas derived from TMT, it appears that 
participants in the current study neither sought to avoid the relatedness of CVD Risk 
Biochip information to their body experiences, nor did they give more status to CVD 
risk information. This lack of evidence of distal defences provides further support to 
the proposal that participants in the current study were not existentially threatened by 
either the Self-Esteem Threat task or the Creatureliness Prime.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The General Discussion which follows highlights a number of implications of the 
results of the current programme of research for the broader literature concerning 
TMT and health threat detection behaviours. In particular, the four sections which 
follow 1) relate the main results of the four studies in the research programme back to 
the TMT health threat detection literature, 2) relate these results back to the TMHM, 
3) discuss the contribution of the current research programme to a critical 
examination of TMT and 4) explore the implications of these ideas for the wider 
literature concerning TMT and health threat detection behaviours, including some 
recommendations for future TMT research. Two subsequent sections combine some 
of the findings from the studies in the current programme together in order to present 
a more complete picture of them. The first of these sections explicitly examines the 
potential for gender differences among middle-aged participants on the central 
dependent variables in the current research programme by examining the results of 
these studies in combination with respect to such potential gender differences. The 
second of these sections integrates the results of the content analyses of the first three 
studies with a view to presenting an account of the potential similarities and 
differences between younger, middle-aged and older adults with respect to their views 
on death and health-related subjects. Finally, a separate critique is given in relation to 
the potential limitations of the measurement of DTA in the TMT literature that arose 
from the current programme of research and strengths and limitations of the current 
programme of research are more explicitly outlined. 
 
7.1 The Current Research Programme in the Context of Prior TMT Research 
Concerning Health-Threat Detection Behaviours 
As already explored in the Discussion Sections of Chapters 3-6, none of the results of 
the studies from the current research programme supported the central hypotheses 
following TMT. More particularly, the findings from Studies 1, 2 and 4 did not 
support the hypotheses derived from TMT that presenting participants with mortality 
reminders (e.g. Heart Attack Salience, Mortality Salience or Creatureliness Primes) 
and distracting them or undercutting their self-esteem (e.g. by presenting them with a 
Self-Esteem Threat task) would lead them to exhibit defensively avoidant reactions 
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towards the CVD Risk Biochip. Additionally, the results of Study 3 did not support 
the central hypothesis that getting participants to complete a Heart Attack Salience 
task under conditions of cognitive load would lead to increased DTA compared to 
controls and participants who received a Heart Attack Salience task and subsequent 
distraction task. The following paragraphs compile these findings from the results of 
the current programme of research together and relate them back to the previous TMT 
research on cancer screening behaviours. 
 
The first three studies in the current research programme which included a Heart 
Attack Salience task failed to replicate Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings in relation to 
Cancer Salience. These TMT authors had demonstrated that presenting participants 
with a Cancer Salience task led to an increase in DTA under conditions of high 
cognitive load compared to participants who received Cancer Salience in combination 
with a distraction task and those participants who received analogous Control tasks 
(Study 2 in their research programme). Additionally, in their content analyses of 
participants‘ responses to Cancer Salience and Mortality Salience, these authors had 
found that the former measure elicited a greater number of death-related words and 
focus on death and survival themes than the latter measure (Studies 1 & 2 in their 
research programme). From this set of findings, Arndt et al. (2007) had suggested that 
cancer potentially represents a more existentially threatening construct than thoughts 
about death, thereby leading to an increase in the suppression of death-related 
thoughts following Cancer Salience except when an individual is under conditions of 
high cognitive load. In contrast to the above findings, there were no significant 
differences between participants who received a Heart Attack Salience or Control 
task either under conditions of cognitive load or with an accompanying distraction 
task in the third study. Nonetheless, the results of the content analyses of the first two 
studies revealed that Heart Attack Salience was just as likely to elicit a high number 
of thoughts concerning death and focus on death and survival themes as Mortality 
Salience. This is evidenced by the lack of significant differences on these dimensions 
between those participants who received a Mortality Salience task and those who 
received a Heart Attack Salience task and the significant differences on these 
dimensions between participants who received either of these measure and those who 
received a Control task.  
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These results tend to suggest that, while responses to the Heart Attack Salience task 
may lead to more death-related words and focus on death and survival themes 
compared to a Control task, this does not appear to translate into an increase in the 
accessibility of such constructs beyond completion of the task itself. Additionally, 
Heart Attack Salience and Cancer Salience may not be equivalent measures in terms 
of their capacity to elicit existential threat, as evidenced by the lack of DTA increases 
in the results of the third study and the similarity between participants‘ death-related 
responses to the Heart Attack Salience task and participants‘ death-related responses 
to the Mortality Salience task in the first two studies (i.e. rather than there being 
significantly fewer death-related responses among participants who received a 
Mortality Salience task, following Arndt et al., 2007). In sum, the above pattern of 
results from the current research programme relating to Heart Attack Salience did not 
replicate Arndt et al.‘s (2007) results in relation to Cancer Salience. Furthermore, the 
results from the current studies do not suggest that thoughts about having a heart 
attack lead to a sustained and continued suppression of death-related thoughts, as one 
might have expected following Arndt et al.‘s (2007) studies.  
 
The results of the first two studies in the current programme also failed to support the 
hypothesis following Arndt et al. (2007) that participants in a distal mode of defence 
would express greater defensive avoidance towards health threat detection behaviours 
than controls. Specifically, in Study 5 of their research programme, Arndt et al. 
(2007) had found that male and female participants expressed lower intentions to 
perform gender-relevant cancer screening behaviours following the receipt of a 
Cancer Salience task under conditions of high cognitive load compared to controls 
and those who received a Cancer Salience task and a distraction. In other words, their 
participants who were in a distal mode of defence expressed lower intentions to 
perform cancer screening; presumably because such health-oriented behaviours had 
the potential to threaten their health status. From these results, it had been 
hypothesised that those participants in the current research programme who were 
given either a Mortality Salience task or a Heart Attack Salience task to complete (i.e. 
those participants who could be seen to have been in a distal mode of defence) should 
have exhibited a greater amount of defensive avoidance to the CVD Risk Biochip due 
to their increased accessibility of death-related concepts, leading to lower behavioural 
intentions to use the device. It is important to note here that one would have expected 
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those participants who completed a Heart Attack Salience task and a subsequent 
distraction to have exhibited distal defences, in contrast to the participants from Arndt 
et al.‘s (2007) studies who received Cancer Salience and a subsequent distraction who 
had been deemed to be in a proximal mode of defence. This is because Heart Attack 
Salience elicited a similar amount of death-related thoughts and focus on survival 
themes as Mortality Salience among participants in the content analyses of 
participants‘ responses in the first two studies of the current programme. In this way, 
Heart Attack Salience and a distraction should have led to a distal defensive response 
in the same fashion as Mortality Salience and a distraction or Cancer Salience and a 
high cognitive load. However, neither those participants in the first two studies who 
were given a Heart Attack Salience task nor those who received a Mortality Salience 
task expressed lower intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip in this way.  
 
It can be surmised from the above that the results of the first two studies appear to 
differ from Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings. While this apparent lack of defensive 
avoidance following Heart Attack Salience may have resulted from a lack of 
sustained suppression of death-related thoughts following thoughts of having a heart 
attack (as per the results of Study 3 of the current programme that were described 
above), one would still have expected that Mortality Salience and a subsequent 
distraction might have led to an increase in defensive avoidance. This is because 
defensive avoidance responses towards body-oriented health threat detection 
behaviours have typically been found among participants who were in a distal mode 
of defence in previous TMT research (e.g. Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; 
Goldenberg et al., 2009). However, this was not supported by the results of the 
current study. In other words, there was no evidence for distal defensive avoidance 
towards the CVD Risk Biochip following Mortality Salience and a distraction. 
 
Since the design of the fourth study in the current research programme was also partly 
analogous to Study 1 from Goldenberg et al. (2008) and Study 1 from Goldenberg et 
al. (2009), it is interesting to note that the results of the former study also failed to 
replicate the findings from these TMT studies. Study 1 from Goldenberg et al. (2008) 
had demonstrated that providing creaturely reminders and a Mortality Salience task 
followed by a distraction led younger women to reduce their intentions to conduct 
breast self-exams compared to younger women who were given a human uniqueness 
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reminder in conjunction with a Mortality Salience task and a subsequent distraction. 
Similarly, Study 1 from Goldenberg et al. (2009) had found that highly neurotic 
younger women were less willing to imagine undergoing a mammogram after they 
had received a Mortality Salience task and a creaturely reminder followed by a 
distraction compared to highly neurotic younger women who had received a 
Mortality Salience task and a human uniqueness reminder followed by a distraction. 
Study 4 from the current research programme followed a similar design to these two 
studies. However, instead of initially presenting participants with a Mortality Salience 
or a parallel Control task, participants in this study were given either a Self-Esteem 
Threat or a Self-Esteem Bolster task. As with the previous TMT studies, these 
measures were then followed by either a Creatureliness Prime or a Uniqueness Prime 
and a subsequent distraction before being participants were introduced to the 
information pertaining to the CVD Risk Biochip and subsequent appraisal questions. 
This minor alteration in design to the similar studies by Goldenberg and colleagues 
(2008; 2009) should not be seen to constitute a substantial methodological change 
from the perspective of TMT. This is because previous TMT research has found that 
threatening an individual‘s self-esteem can lead to similar effects to Mortality 
Salience (e.g. Hayes et al., 2008; Routledge et al., 2010), that low state self-esteem 
can make one more vulnerable to the effects of existential anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et 
al., 1992b; Greenberg et al., 1993; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Van Den Boss, 2001; 
Hart et al., 2005; Schmeichel et al., 2009; Routledge et al., 2010) and that pervasive 
self-esteem deficits in an individual can lead to the elicitation of more vigorous TMT-
related defences (e.g. Simon et al., 1996; Goldenberg et al., 1999; Goldenberg et al., 
2009). In spite of this, there was no evidence of a reduced intention to use the CVD 
Risk Biochip among participants who received the Creatureliness Prime in 
combination with a Self-Threat task and a subsequent distraction compared to any of 
the other groups. Consequently, it can be inferred from this that the results of the 
fourth study did not provide any further support for the findings of the prior research 
studies by Goldenberg and colleagues (2008, 2009). 
 
7.2 The Current Research Programme in the Context of the TMHM 
The following section relates the results of the four studies in the current research 
study to the three main propositions that were laid out by Goldenberg & Arndt (2008) 
in their TMHM. As outlined in Chapter 2 (page 1-29 - 1-30), the central idea behind 
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the TMHM is that an individual will utilize either the most appropriate proximal 
defence strategy or the most appropriate distal defence strategy to defend against 
mortality reminders depending on the individual‘s level of conscious awareness of the 
reminders and the availability and relevance of appropriate proximal and distal 
defence strategies for them. The paragraphs which follow explore the research 
questions and findings of the four studies in the current research programme in 
specific relation to the three central propositions of the TMHM. 
 
While none of the studies in the current research programme set out to explicitly test 
the first proposition of the TMHM relating to proximal defence strategies, the central 
research question in Study 3 could be seen to relate strongly to this proposition. The 
first proposition of the TMHM contends that an individual will engage in either 
threat-avoidance or health-oriented behaviours towards conscious mortality reminders 
depending on which of these proximal defensive strategies most effectively removes 
mortality reminders from their conscious awareness. In this regard, Goldenberg & 
Arndt (2008) proposed that the prior research of Arndt et al. (2007) was evidence for 
the proximal defence strategy of threat-avoidance. Specifically, Arndt et al. (2007) 
had found that the very threatening nature of thinking about cancer led to a continued 
suppression of death-related thoughts for participants in their Cancer Salience 
conditions after a distraction task and that placing participants under conditions of 
increased cognitive load prevented this suppression process from occurring. 
Goldenberg & Arndt (2008) argued that these results supported the hypothesis that 
individuals will suppress the connection between a grave health threat and its 
accompanying mortality reminders. In a similar fashion, Study 3 in the current 
research programme sought to investigate the degree to which participants might 
suppress the connection between heart attacks and death-related thoughts; a health 
threat which could be considered to be comparable to cancer with respect to its life-
threatening nature. More particularly, this study set out to explore whether or not 
participants who received a Heart Attack Salience task would continue to suppress 
thoughts about having a heart attack after they were given a subsequent distraction 
task compared to control participants and participants who received a Heart Attack 
Salience task to complete under conditions of high cognitive load. However, the 
results of this study did not support the suggestion that participants would suppress 
the associations between heart attacks and their mortality as there were no significant 
  
 
 
213 
differences between any of the experimental conditions in this study. As such, the 
findings of Study 3 failed to support Goldenberg & Arndt‘s (2008) hypothesis 
following proposition one of the TMHM that threat-avoidance (i.e. suppression of the 
links between heart attacks and mortality) would be the most effective proximal 
defence against a grave health threat such as heart attacks. Consequently, the first 
proposition of the TMHM was not upheld by the results of the third study.  
 
In line with proposition one of the TMHM; it could also be argued that the CVD Risk 
Biochip Information Sheet primed proximal defensive responses in the responses of 
participants from Studies 1, 2 and 4 towards the device. As discussed extensively in 
the Discussion Section of Chapter 3 (pages 1-85 - 1-87), participants may have 
reacted against the mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information Sheet 
by using the availability of the CVD Risk Biochip as a means to distract themselves 
from their potential vulnerability to the potential risk of obtaining a diagnosis of 
CVD. However, as already outlined, this explanation does not appear to make sense 
for a number of reasons. Most pertinently for the current critical examination of 
TMHM, one would expect that a threat-avoidance proximal defence strategy would 
be a more effective way of removing mortality reminders from conscious awareness 
than a health-oriented proximal defence strategy which has the potential to provide 
the existentially-threatening news that one has CVD. This is because the first 
proposition of the TMHM contends that the individual will select either threat-
avoidance behaviours or health-oriented behaviours as a proximal defensive strategy, 
depending on which of them is most effective at removing mortality reminders from 
cognisance. However, as the mean attitude and behavioural intention scores towards 
the CVD Risk Biochip and the likelihood of committing to use the device appeared to 
represent a health-oriented response for participants in Studies 1, 2 and 4 of the 
current research programme irrespective of their experimental group, the first 
proposition of the TMHM does not appear to be supported by the results of these 
studies.  
 
The first two studies in the current research programme had been designed to 
explicitly test whether or not older or middle-aged participants would exhibit 
defensive avoidance responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip when mortality 
reminders were just below their conscious awareness. As outlined in Chapter 2 (page 
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1-30), this relates to the part of proposition two of the TMHM which states that 
health-oriented or risky health behaviours will be adopted by an individual to the 
extent that such behaviours serve to either boost their self-esteem when mortality 
reminders are just below their conscious awareness or protect them from the 
damaging effects to self-esteem that such reminders might engender (Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2008). In the current scenario, defensive avoidance would appear to be an 
effective distal defence strategy of maintaining self-esteem in the face of receiving a 
very threatening health status. In support of this, many studies from the health 
psychology literature have shown that people often display patterns of defensive 
avoidance towards particular health-oriented behaviours that could threaten their 
health status (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; Cameron, 1997; Luce & Kahn, 1999; Kahn & 
Luce, 2003; Brett et al., 2005). Within the context of the CVD Risk Biochip, 
defensively avoidant behaviours could be seen to undercut the potential blow to an 
individual‘s self-esteem that could result from the receipt of an indication that they 
are at risk for developing CVD. Despite this, there was no evidence that defensive 
avoidance occurred following the presentation of either a Mortality Salience task or a 
Heart Attack Salience task and a distraction compared to control participants in either 
of the first two studies in the current research programme. Consequently, the 
suggestion derived from proposition two of the TMHM that participants would 
display a defensively avoidant response towards the CVD Risk Biochip following 
mortality reminders that were below consciousness as a way of protecting themselves 
against a negative blow to their self-esteem was not supported by the results of these 
studies. 
 
In a similar fashion, one of the central research questions in Study 4 of the current 
research programme related to the part of the second proposition of the TMHM that 
suggests that an individual should engage in health-oriented or risky health 
behaviours which protect them against potential blows to their self-esteem when 
mortality reminders are just outside of their current conscious focus. More 
specifically, this particular study examined a corollary of this proposition; i.e. 
whether or not explicitly providing an individual with a potential blow to their self-
esteem and subsequently distracting them would make them more avoidant of the 
CVD Risk Biochip due to its potential to uncover a potentially life-threatening result. 
Once again, however, this derivation of the second proposition of the TMHM was 
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unsupported by the results of the fourth study, which found no significant differences 
in participants‘ responses to the attitudes, behavioural intentions or behavioural 
commitment measures concerning the CVD Risk Biochip depending on whether they 
were presented with a self-esteem enhancing task or a self-esteem threatening task 
and subsequently distracted.  
 
One could also argue that the relatively subtle mortality reminders in the CVD Risk 
Biochip Information Sheet may have elicited a distal defence of health-protective 
responses among all participants from Studies 1, 2 and 4 (i.e. positive appraisals, 
increased behavioural intentions and commitments to use the device) that reflected 
meaning-orientation on their behalf. In particular, the subtle mortality reminders in 
this sheet could have increased a participant‘s support for the cultural worldview of 
scientific progress (e.g. as per Becker, 1975; Rutjens et al., 2009; Rutjens et al., 
2010). This follows the portion of proposition two of the TMHM that suggests that an 
individual may engage in health-oriented behaviours after receiving mortality 
reminders and a subsequent distraction if these behaviours allow the individual to 
position themselves as an important contributor to a cultural worldview. Nevertheless, 
as previously discussed in depth in the Discussion Section of Chapter 3 (see pages 1-
87 - 1-89), this proposition is unlikely to have occurred in the current research 
programme for a number of reasons. Principally, it is unlikely that the subtle 
mortality reminders would be particularly threatening to participants who read the 
CVD Risk Biochip Information sheet unless they had already completed either a 
Heart Attack Salience task or Mortality Salience task. This is because prior health 
psychology research has found that general mortality reminders such as prevalence 
estimates often tend to be psychologically minimised by people (e.g. Croyle & Sande, 
1988; Van Steenkiste et al., 2004; Peretti-Watel et al., 2007). Additionally, prior TMT 
cancer-screening research (Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et 
al., 2009) involved similar general mortality reminders and found that participants 
only reacted towards these mortality reminders after having been specifically primed 
with a personal mortality reminder. That is to say, general mortality reminders should 
not normally invoke a defensively avoidant response among individuals unless they 
have already received a more personal mortality reminder, as they may be more likely 
to minimise the importance of this information. Moreover, a distal defence which 
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allows the potential for one to receive an existentially threatening health status would 
appear to be an ineffective distal defence strategy. 
 
Finally, the third proposition from TMHM was explicitly examined in Study 4 of the 
current research programme. The primary hypothesis relating to this proposition is 
that an individual will seek to avoid body-oriented health behaviours (e.g. health 
screenings) when reminders of mortality relating to the physical or creaturely aspects 
of humans are just below their conscious awareness. Use of the CVD Risk Biochip 
constitutes the performance of a body-oriented health behaviour since the device 
would require the user to confront the physicality of their bodies by getting them to 
take a blood sample from themselves and drawing their attention towards whether or 
not certain cardiac markers are present in this blood sample. Following this 
observation, the third proposition of the TMHM was tested in the fourth study by 
giving participants a Creatureliness Prime or a Uniqueness Prime and a subsequent 
distraction task before presenting them with information pertaining to the CVD Risk 
Biochip and assessing their attitudes, behavioural intentions and commitments to 
using the device. The lack of significant differences between the responses of 
participants who received the Creatureliness Prime and participants who received the 
Uniqueness Prime on these measures led to a rejection of the third proposition in this 
instance. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 6 (pages 1-192 - 1-194), these non-
significant results apparently contradict Goldenberg‘s (2005) proposal that the human 
creatureliness construct may be particularly relevant to health-orienting behaviours 
that involve a degree of confrontation with the human body. 
 
7.3 Contribution of the Current Research Programme to a Critical Examination of 
TMT 
As is evident from the two preceding sections, the results of the four studies in the 
current research programme failed to support either the presence of processes and 
defences that had been demonstrated in previous analogous TMT research on cancer 
screening (i.e. Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009) or 
the principal propositions behind Goldenberg & Arndt‘s (2008) TMHM. While some 
alternative explanations for the non-significant findings from each of these studies 
with respect to TMT have been discussed separately in Chapters 3-6, potential global 
reasons for these effects have yet to be discussed in relation to the wider context of 
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the research programme taken as a whole. A global approach to these non-significant 
TMT-related findings may be enlightening as some of the explanations for these 
results that have been reported thus far have been confined to individual studies. For 
instance, one of the principal explanations for the non-significant results relating to 
the first study was that the moderating effect of age on death anxiety may have served 
to reduce the impact of Mortality Salience or Heart Attack Salience on participants‘ 
subsequent attitudes, behavioural intentions and behavioural commitments towards 
the CVD Risk Biochip in that study. However, since none of the three studies which 
followed demonstrated significant differences between middle-aged or undergraduate 
participants who received a mortality reminder and those who received a Control task 
on any of the main dependent variables, this explanation for the results of the first 
study can be rejected. The section which follows provides a critical examination of 
some potential global reasons for the lack of significant differences among the main 
dependent variables in this research programme. 
 
One potential explanation for the lack of significant differences between the groups in 
Studies 1, 2 and 4 of the current research programme on the main dependent variables 
of attitudes and behavioural intentions relates to the potential for hypothetical bias 
concerning the CVD Risk Biochip. More particularly, one could argue that 
hypothetical bias may have had an impact on participants‘ responses to these 
measures because their potential contact with the device was seemingly remote and 
thereby did not constitute a sufficient threat to them to warrant a defensive reaction 
(as per Ajzen et al., 2004). Although this explanation is supported in each of these 
studies by the consistent findings of a negative skew in the behavioural intentions and 
attitudes data, it appears to be unlikely for a number of reasons. Firstly, participants in 
these studies had been assured that the device was a real tangible device that was 
intended for retail use before they had been presented with these dependent measures. 
Such an assurance may have served to reduce hypothetical bias relating to thoughts 
about the device. Additionally, negatively skewed results are often associated with 
attitude and behavioural intention scales in health-related research (e.g. Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001), so there is no reason to suggest that such a pattern of results in the 
current study were specifically related to hypothetical bias. Furthermore, this 
explanation fails to account for the fact that participants in several prior TMT studies 
had displayed significantly different responses towards various hypothetical health 
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behaviour scenarios when they were asked to think about their own mortality rather 
than when they were asked to think about a control topic such as dental pain (e.g. 
Hirschberger, et al., 2002; Arndt et al., 2003; Routledge et al., 2004; Taubman - Ben-
Ari, 2004; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005; Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Arndt et al., 2009). For instance, in Taubman - Ben-
Ari & Findler‘s (2005) Study 1, young and middle-aged adults reported a higher 
willingness to participate in 10 different hypothetical health-oriented behaviours (e.g. 
changing their diet after getting a high cholesterol test result) following mortality 
reminders and a subsequent distraction compared to young and middle-aged adults 
who received a control topic and the same distraction. Older adults who received 
mortality reminders and a distraction also tended to show a significantly lower 
willingness to participate in the hypothetical behaviours compared to older adults 
who received a control topic and a distraction. Following this finding that 
hypothetical scenarios concerning health-related behaviours can elicit different 
reactions even among older adults depending on whether they have received mortality 
reminders or a control topic and a subsequent distraction, one would have expected to 
see patterns of significant differences in Studies 1, 2 and 4 between participants who 
received mortality reminders and participants who received a control task on their 
attitude and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip.  
 
Similarly, an explanation that hypothetical bias may have interfered with participants‘ 
reactions to the CVD Risk Biochip does not account for the finding that receiving 
mortality reminders or a control topic and a subsequent distraction did not add to the 
predictive power of how likely a participant was to respond to the De Facto Intentions 
measure. This measure had been explicitly designed to address the issue of 
hypothetical bias by giving participants the option to sign up for a potential CVD 
Risk Biochip pilot study, thereby allowing them to be relatively certain that the 
device itself existed and providing them with the opportunity to commit to using the 
device in the future. In this way, receipt of mortality reminders and a distraction 
should have at least added to the prediction of how likely a participant was to sign up 
to the CVD Risk Biochip pilot study in the absence of significant differences between 
the groups on the other dependent variables, given that so many other TMT studies 
have demonstrated significant differences in responses towards health-relevant 
behaviours between groups who received either a mortality reminder or a control 
  
 
 
219 
measure (e.g. Taubman - Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Taubman -Ben-Ari, et al., 2000; 
Hirschberger, et al., 2002; Arndt et al., 2003; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2003; 
Routledge et al., 2004; Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2004; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 
2005; Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Jessop et al., 2008; Arndt et al., 
2009; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2010; Martin & Kamins, 2010). In light 
of these features of Studies 1, 2 and 4 in the results of the current programme, 
hypothetical bias seems to be an unlikely explanation for the pattern of non-
significant and highly positive results that had been found in those studies. 
 
An alternative explanation for the lack of significant differences between the groups 
in these studies is that the attitudes and behavioural intentions scales may not have 
sufficiently tapped into participants‘ attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the 
device. Nonetheless, this explanation also seems unlikely as the two scales that had 
been developed specifically for this study were derived from two standardised health 
scales, which were drawn from the health psychology and TMT literature (see pages 
1-60 - 1-61). Specifically, the attitude scale used in both studies drew on questions 
from the well-established KHOS (Krantz et al., 1980), reformulated them and added 
additional questions so that the content was broad enough to cover a range of aspects 
of participants‘ attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip, including their emotional 
reactions towards the device, evaluations of its usefulness and attitudes towards 
diagnostic testing for patient use more generally. The behavioural intentions scale 
was also an adaptation of a standardised scale; ―the breast self exam intention 
questionnaire‖, that had been previously used in the TMT literature (e.g. Arndt et al., 
2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008). It is important to note that participants from those 
prior TMT studies gave significantly different responses towards items on ―the breast 
self exam intention questionnaire‖ depending on whether or not they received a 
mortality reminder (e.g. Mortality Salience, Cancer Salience or a Creatureliness 
Prime) or a control measure. The adaptation of this scale for the relevant studies of 
the current research programme remained quite close to the content of the items in the 
original scale, but substituted questions relating to breast self exam screening for 
questions pertaining to using the CVD Risk Biochip. It follows that the items in both 
of these scales, which had been developed specifically for the current research 
programme, appear to have covered quite a broad range of content concerning 
attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the CVD Risk Biochip. As a result, these 
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scales are likely to have sufficiently tapped into participants‘ attitudes and 
behavioural intentions towards the device. In support of this suggestion, the majority 
of participants from these studies who completed the questionnaire spontaneously 
discussed how they felt that the device was of great benefit after they had completed 
the questionnaire, suggesting that the overwhelming positive responses to the device 
probably reflected participants‘ genuine attitudes and behavioural intentions towards 
the device, irrespective of their condition.  
 
It is also possible that the negative skew and lack of significant differences between 
the groups in the results of Studies 1, 2 and 4 arose from a demand characteristic, 
where participants felt obliged to respond in a positive manner towards the device. 
There are a number of reasons to suggest that this explanation is unlikely. Firstly, 
participants were explicitly asked to give their gut-level reactions to each of the items 
in the Questionnaire Booklets in the instructions at the front of these booklets and 
they were specifically encouraged to give their own personal responses to the 
behavioural intentions and attitude questions. Participants had also been ensured that 
all of the information in the questionnaire would be kept anonymous and confidential 
at the outset of the study and that there would be no way that anyone would be able to 
identify individual participants by their answers alone. Additionally, despite the fact 
that the majority of participants‘ evaluations of the device were positive, there were 
several participants in each of the studies whose responses indicated that they were 
ambivalent towards the CVD Risk Biochip. Many other participants indicated that 
they thought that the device was useful but that that they had no particular desire to 
use it in the future or that they did not wish to sign up for a pilot study where they 
would be required to use the device on themselves. Such responses are unlikely to 
reflect a demand characteristic, as they appear to reflect realistic responses towards 
the device.  
 
Moreover, discussion with participants during the debriefing sessions indicated that 
many of them had very specific opinions as to why they considered the CVD Risk 
Biochip to be useful. For example, several participants indicated that they were 
familiar with the blood glucose monitors used by diabetics to self-monitor their 
condition. These individuals considered the CVD Risk Biochip, which works on a 
similar principle, to have great potential utility due to their impressions of the success 
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of these blood glucose monitors. Such considered responses would suggest that 
participants were not positively appraising the device by default. Finally, one would 
have expected participants to have responded more negatively to the De Facto 
Intentions measure in these studies if participants had biased their answers to items on 
the attitudes and behavioural intentions scales (i.e. since this measure reflects a 
certain amount of behavioural commitment to using the device in the future and could 
therefore be seen as a more implicit measure of participants‘ personal appraisals of 
the device). However, since most of the participants in these studies signed up to the 
pilot study, it would appear unlikely that participants‘ responses to the attitudes and 
behavioural intentions measures demonstrated a demand characteristic.  
 
A further explanation for the non-significant results in the current research 
programme may have been a generalised lack of existential threat among Irish 
participants. As previously noted in the Discussion Section of Chapter 6 (pages 1-198 
- 1-199), Irish people may not react strongly to blows to their self-esteem due to a 
cultural behavioural pattern of self-deprecation (e.g. Crotty, 2006; Inglis, 2006) and 
they may not find creaturely reminders to be as existentially threatening as those 
American participants who have participated in prior TMT research involving this 
method (e.g. due to their historical dealings with racial slurs that have involved 
likening them to animals; Earls, 1988; Curtis, 1997; Orser Jr., 1998; Mullin, 1999; 
Engle, 2001; Knobel, 2001; Hinds, 2004; Lloyd, 2005; Soper, 2005). Furthermore, 
there is reason to suggest that Irish participants may be less prone to existential 
anxiety or fears of death due to a cultural heritage where death is openly discussed. 
Following Becker, TMT authors have assumed that there is an elaborate death-
denying function in all cultural worldviews (e.g. Solomon et al., 1997). Indeed, 
Becker himself suggested that it is the repression of death that allows an individual to 
feel secure; ―The great boon of repression is that it makes it possible to live decisively 
in an overwhelmingly miraculous and incomprehensible world, a world so full of 
beauty, majesty, and terror that if animals perceived it all they would be paralysed to 
act‖ (1973; p. 50). However, such an argument does not sufficiently account for 
cultures where death is explicitly represented and openly discussed among its cultural 
proponents.  
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The Irish cultural heritage appears to include such a characteristic acceptance of 
death. For instance, in an anthropological study of wake and funeral customs in Co. 
Tyrone, Cashman (2006) noted how Irish ―wakes‖ point towards a cultural tradition 
which embraces death as an important transitional phase in the life cycle. Wakes 
typically involve a social gathering following a funeral, where people celebrate the 
life of the deceased person while the body lies nearby in an open casket. The 
transitionary focus of such gatherings typically involves the exchanging of anecdotes 
about the deceased person in order to simultaneously invoke their presence, celebrate 
their lives and bid them farewell (Cashman, 2006). Indeed, the term ―wake‖ evokes 
this transitionary emphasis itself with its implication that the mourners seek to invoke 
the spirit of the dead person and involve them in the proceedings. Additionally, while 
it has been noted that the traditional purpose of a wake was to watch the body during 
the period of time between death and burial, Irish wakes came to be regarded as social 
events which often involved playing games, drinking and story-telling (Harlow, 
1997). This would appear to suggest that the process of death and dying is not 
necessarily inherently tied with sadness, fear or mourning for the Irish. On the 
contrary, this symbolic Irish cultural ritual appears to embrace death and dying as a 
natural part of everyday life and even celebrates death as a time to reflect on the value 
of the dead person (O‘Gorman, 1998). There is also evidence that death has been 
included in everyday practices for thousands of years in Ireland. For instance, early 
Irish settlers often incorporated the remains of the dead in structural post- and stake-
holes, ditches and even walls as a way of symbolically tying the living to the land 
their kin once inhabited (Cleary, 2005). It has even been argued that the traditional 
placement of cemeteries may have acted as a way of asserting ownership over a 
particular area by Irish settlers dating back to the Bronze Age (Cleary, 2005).  
 
Such practices tend to imply that there has traditionally been a great respect for the 
dead among the Irish and that death was even once incorporated into everyday ritual 
practices. Sinead Donnelly‘s (1999) phenomenological enquiry into the processes of 
dying and folklore associated with dying in the West of Ireland provides further 
support for the suggestion that the Irish cultural heritage embraces death through her 
findings of a great respect for the dead and acceptance of the processes involved in 
death and dying among local people from the north-west, west and south-west of the 
country. In her series of unstructured interviews with over 30 locals from these areas 
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over a six-month period, she found that the moment of death for a dying person in 
care was particularly sacred, involving silent recitations of prayer and candle-lighting 
by the dying person‘s bedside rather than more personal expressions of grief and 
anguish towards their death. The interviewees also indicated that they felt that it was 
important for young people to be familiar with death and to realize its naturalness. 
This acceptance of death appeared to allow carers to help the dying person to ―enter 
into the presence of God‖. Indeed, the gradual and prepared death has been 
traditionally seen as a ―good death‖ among the Irish; whereby the dying person is 
allowed to settle their spiritual and earthly affairs, ending in the death-bed scene with 
the family gathering round (Taylor, 1989). 
 
Many Irish people also appear to find humour in the subject of death. In this regard, 
many qualitative accounts have suggested that Irish people commonly joke about 
their own deaths, dead bodies or the dead that they are mourning (e.g. Messenger, 
1978; Taylor, 1989; Harlow, 1997; Donnelly, 1999; Cashman, 2006). Interestingly, 
there are even accounts of wakes involving practical jokes such as the ―re-animation 
of the dead body‖, where a dead body was made to move as though alive in order to 
provide some humour and shock to the proceedings (Harlow, 1997). Such practical 
jokes may appear shocking and disrespectful towards the dead for those who are not 
from Ireland. Nonetheless, they are in keeping with the transitionary focus of the 
tradition of ―waking the dead person‖ at such occasions and appear to reflect an Irish 
attitude of humour in the face of death.  
 
The above accounts suggest that Irish culture has traditionally involved a certain 
amount of openness and acceptance in relation to death. Such openness and focus on 
death-related matters appears to contrast starkly with the principal propositions of 
TMT that culture provides people with a sense of symbolic immortality that allows 
them to temporarily ―deny death‖ by associating themselves with systems of valued 
ideas and practices that have the capacity to outlive them (e.g. Greenberg, et al., 
1986). This Irish characteristic of openness would also seem to contradict Becker‘s 
assertion that ―everything that man does in his symbolic world is an attempt to deny 
and overcome his grotesque fate‖ (p. 27; 1973). This is because, the Irish cultural 
heritage of openness in the face of death appears to involve a certain embracing of the 
concept of death, rather than attempts to repress or deny it. In other words, death may 
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not have to be repressed or sublimated by Irish people as they have culturally 
acceptable ways of dealing with the concept openly.  
 
A central implication of this cultural acceptance of death is that Irish people tend to 
be less afraid of death itself and more concerned with how one might die. This very 
idea is reflected in a recent national survey on Irish views on death and dying 
involving 667 participants which has demonstrated that most Irish people may be 
more concerned with the quality of their dying than death itself (McCarthy, Weafer & 
Loughrey, 2010). This idea would also appear to account for the seeming lack of 
existential anxiety experienced by younger, middle-aged and older adults in each of 
the studies in the current research programme in relation to any of the mortality 
reminders (i.e. receipt of a Mortality Salience, Heart Attack Salience, Creatureliness 
Prime or Self-Esteem Threat task) presented to them. In other words, the Irish 
participants in each of these studies who were presented with mortality reminders 
may not have experienced existential anxiety due to their attitude of openness and 
acceptance in the face of death as a result of their cultural heritage. This lack of 
existential anxiety may then have manifested in the non-significant differences on the 
main dependent variables in these studies between those participants who received 
mortality reminders and those who did not. In sum, Irish participants may not be as 
vulnerable to the effects of existential anxiety that have been uncovered in other TMT 
studies as a result of their openness in discussing death-related ideas, rather than 
making attempts to deny or repress such ideas. 
 
In support of this proposition, one of the only published TMT studies involving a 
sample of participants from the Republic of Ireland (Carey & Sarma, 2011) 
contradicted previously TMT-related research involving risky driving behaviours 
among young adult males. While these researchers found evidence that priming 
mortality-related information related to risky driving led to increases in intentions to 
take driving risks among young adult males compared to priming neutral information 
concerning driving, they also found that priming the mortality-related information did 
not lead to increases in driving-related self-esteem among these adults compared to 
controls. This finding departs from previous TMT research on risky driving 
behaviours, which had found that mortality reminders led to higher intentions to 
perform risky driving and higher risky driving behaviours on a driving simulator 
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among younger adults only when driving was relevant to their self-esteem (e.g. 
Taubman - Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Taubman - Ben-Ari, 2000). Such a finding also 
departs from the contention of TMT researchers that mortality reminders tend to lead 
to increased efforts to enhance self-esteem (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994; Harmon-
Jones et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2008). Furthermore, Carey & Sarma (2011) found impulsiveness to be a 
significant predictor of their participants‘ intentions to take driving risks. Since 
impulsiveness has been found to be strongly associated with sensation seeking, risk 
taking, novelty seeking, boldness, adventuresomeness, boredom susceptibility, 
unreliability, and unorderliness (e.g. Depue & Collins, 1999), the supposedly TMT-
related effect of increased intentions to take driving risks following receipt of 
mortality reminders may have related more to participants‘ heightened arousal from 
the mortality-related risky driving information than from their attempts to enhance 
their self-esteem.  
 
There was only one other published study with participants from the Republic of 
Ireland found in a literature search for TMT research and this study did not contain a 
control group (Hughes & Black, 2006; a study involving the association between 
body esteem and cardiovascular stress reactivity towards cadaver dissections among 
medical students). The lack of a control group in this study means that it is difficult to 
draw conclusions as to whether or not the effects attributed to TMT defences arose as 
a result of existential anxiety or some other characteristic of the study (in other words, 
the correlations that were found between body esteem and cardiovascular stress 
reactivity may have been attributable to a hidden third variable and may not have 
been necessarily linked to TMT processes). Furthermore, there have been several 
unpublished studies involving Irish participants that have found no evidence of the 
effects of existential anxiety on a variety of dependent variables following the 
predictions of TMT. For instance, three TMT studies conducted by masters and 
undergraduate students at Trinity College Dublin (two of which involved Mortality 
Salience and one of which involved the subliminal priming of death-related words) 
failed to support hypotheses derived from TMT (Professor Malcolm MacLachlan, 
personal communication, 14
th
 April 2012). This is particularly interesting in light of 
the findings of a recent meta-analysis of the Mortality Salience Hypothesis in the 
TMT literature, where little evidence was found of any unpublished TMT studies that 
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did not support the central hypotheses of the theory (Burke et al., 2010). In this 
context, the Irish studies that have failed to support TMT processes would appear to 
add further weight to the proposition that Irish adults may be less susceptible to the 
TMT-related effects of existential anxiety. 
 
A major advantage of the above explanation is that it has the potential to account for 
the results of each of the studies in the current research programme, in contrast to 
many of the previously explored explanations (i.e. which only focused on the results 
of some of the studies in the current programme, such as Studies 1, 2 & 4 taken in 
combination). In particular, this explanation has the capacity to explain the findings 
that there were no significant differences between younger, middle-aged and older 
Irish adults‘ responses to a range of dependent variables (DTA, behavioural 
intentions, attitudes and De Facto Intentions) following mortality reminders (Heart 
Attack Salience, Mortality Salience, Creatureliness Prime or Self-Esteem Threat 
tasks) due to their familiarity with openly discussing death. Additionally, this 
explanation has the capacity to account for the findings of the content analyses of the 
first three studies that demonstrated that, while both Heart Attack Salience and 
Mortality Salience led to a significantly greater number of death-related words and 
focus on death and survival themes compared to a Control task, these measures did 
not lead to increases in death-thought suppression or defensive avoidance of health 
threat detection behaviours like using the CVD Risk Biochip; i.e. because mortality 
reminders may not lead to TMT-related defences among Irish participants.  
 
It should also be noted that this explanation does not necessarily suggest that TMT is 
invalid, despite the fact that it appears to be opposed to the findings of previous TMT 
research. This is because the Irish cultural context may be unique in its incorporation 
of mortality-related concepts into the dominant cultural worldviews. In this regard, 
O‘Gorman (1998), in her sociological analysis of death and dying, has drawn 
attention to the fact that wakes, funeral customs and the general attitude towards 
death among Irish people tend to contrast starkly with the scant grief that is typically 
expressed in contemporary society. On the other hand, concepts relating to death may 
have already been integrated into the Irish cultural systems of meaning that constitute 
their CAB (following Solomon et al., 1991) in such a way that they do not need to 
adopt modes of defence against mortality reminders. That is to say, Irish cultural 
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representations of death (e.g. images of death as a humorous subject) and the 
adoption of cultural practices and beliefs that allow the anticipation and acceptance of 
mortality (e.g. following qualitative research concerning the Irish temperament in the 
face of death; Messenger, 1978; Taylor, 1989; Harlow, 1997; O‘Gorman, 1998; 
Donnelly, 1999; Cashman, 2006) may have moderated the experience of existential 
anxiety for the Irish people to such a degree that such anxiety no longer manifests 
itself. In this way, Irish people may not need to utilise TMT defences in response to 
mortality reminders in the manner that has been uncovered within the TMT 
methodological framework. Nonetheless, some of the cultures that have typically 
been examined in TMT research may have different attitudes or predispositions 
towards death when compared to the Irish attitudes that are more reflective of TMT 
mechanisms. For instance, in a highly cited review of cross-cultural accounts of 
death, Palgi & Abramovitch (1984) have pointed towards a wealth of anthropological 
research that has suggested that Americans (who have been the primary focus of 
TMT research to date) may have a particular problem dealing with death and often try 
to avoid death-related encounters such as meetings with dying or bereaved persons. 
Consequently, individuals from cultures such as America, who have not explicitly 
incorporated death into their cultural worldviews in the same manner as the Irish, may 
need to utilise proximal and distal defences in the face of mortality reminders. 
 
On a slightly separate but related note, the accompanying proposition derived from 
the recent national survey on Irish views on death and dying that Irish people may be 
more concerned with the quality of their dying than death itself (e.g. McCarthy et al., 
2010) would also appear to account for the fact that the majority of participants in 
Studies 1, 2 and 4 of the current research programme gave a positive appraisal of the 
CVD Risk Biochip and gave relatively high behavioural intentions and commitment 
to using the device in the future. That is to say, these Irish adults‘ concern with the 
potential quality of their dying may have provided them with an interest in the device 
itself that may have over-ridden any potential anxiety that they may have had towards 
its use, resulting in more positive appraisals towards the device and high behavioural 
intentions and commitments towards its use. In conclusion, the lack of evidence for 
significant differences between participants who received a mortality reminder or 
Control task in their responses to any of the dependent measures in each of the studies 
in the current research programme and the highly positive appraisals and approach-
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oriented responses of participants towards the CVD Risk Biochip would appear to 
lend support to the idea that the responses of Irish participants in these studies 
reflected a lack of existential anxiety and greater concern with the quality of their 
dying. 
 
7.4 Implications of the Current Research Programme for TMT, Future Directions 
and Applications 
The current set of studies failed to support the central hypotheses of the research 
programme following TMT that mortality reminders would lead to more defensively 
avoidant responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip. As suggested above, this may 
relate to the findings from anthropological, historical and sociological studies that 
Irish people tend to exhibit characteristic openness in the face of death (e.g. 
Messenger, 1978; Taylor, 1989; Harlow, 1997; Donnelly, 1999; Cashman, 2006; 
McCarthy et al., 2010) rather than exhibiting death-denying cultural practices, as 
suggested by TMT (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 1991; Pyszczynski et 
al., 2000; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). An implication of this idea is that Irish people 
may not be vulnerable to the effects of existential anxiety that are proposed by TMT. 
This may also mean that people from different cultures and countries where death is 
seen in a similar light may not experience proximal and distal defences in the face of 
mortality reminders in the manner posited by TMT researchers. For instance, TMT-
related processes might not work for Mexican people who are said to scorn and laugh 
at death, are seemingly comfortable in the presence of death and even celebrate death 
in their annual ―Day of the Dead‖ (e.g. Brandes, 2003). There are currently no 
reported TMT studies that have taken place in Mexico, but the current pattern of 
findings and the lack of TMT-related effects in previous research studies involving 
Irish participants (e.g. Carey & Sarma, 2011; Professor Malcolm MacLachlan, 
personal communication, 14
th
 April 2012) who also exhibit acceptance and openness 
towards the concept of death would appear to suggest that Mexicans may not be 
particularly affected by mortality reminders due to their similar openness towards the 
subject. If this is the case, TMT effects and processes may not be generalisable to the 
general population in the ways proposed by TMT researchers (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1986; Solomon et al., 1991; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). 
Instead, TMT defences may be limited to cultural groups who have not explicitly 
incorporated death into their cultural representations or worldviews (e.g. such as 
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Americans; Palgi & Abramovitch, 1984). Consequently, the external validity of TMT 
defences may be limited to those cultural groups that have been found to exhibit 
proximal and distal defences in response to mortality reminders. Similarly, as 
indicated in Chapter 6 (pages 1-196 - 1-197), the cross-cultural reliability of methods 
such as Goldenberg et al.‘s (1999) Creatureliness Prime may need to be established 
among cultural groups who may be habituated to creaturely comparisons, such as 
Africans or American Indians (e.g. Mullin, 1999; Hinds, 2004; Soper, 2005), since 
individuals from such cultures may not be as existentially threatened by creaturely 
reminders due to a habituated response to such reminders. Underlining the potential 
limitations of the TMT research paradigm with such research is important in order to 
establish the boundaries within which cultural defences towards existential anxiety 
may operate.   
 
An additional implication arising from the potential moderation of existential anxiety 
within cultures that have adopted explicit cultural representations of death is that 
qualitative TMT-related research may need to be conducted on a particular cultural 
group of interest in order to establish the content of its cultural worldviews before 
TMT defences may be proposed for that particular cultural group. Thus far most TMT 
research on cultural worldviews have made assumptions about the particular cultural 
worldviews that their participants may have rather than investigating the specifics of 
these cultural worldviews (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 1991; 
Greenberg et al., 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Arndt et al., 1997a; Arndt et al., 
1997b; Greenberg et al., 2000; Greenberg et al., 2001; Arndt et al., 2002; Schmeichel 
& Martens, 2005; Schimel et al., 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2009). For instance, one of 
the most common TMT-related dependent variables (i.e. worldview threat responses 
towards an anti-American essay) has relied on the assumption that Americans will 
defend against anti-Americans when they are in a distal mode of defence (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 1997a; Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 
2000; Greenberg et al., 2001; Schmeichel et al., 2009). However, since TMT authors 
have also emphasised that meaning and values are the most important determinants of 
an individual‘s cultural worldviews (e.g. Solomon et al., 1991; Mikulincer & Florian, 
2002), it would appear to be particularly important to more specifically illuminate the 
contents of the meanings and values of a particular culture of interest. Indeed, TMT 
was originally based on the writings of the cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker who 
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had specifically outlined the importance of the idiosyncrasies of individual cultures‘ 
reactions towards reminders of their mortality that had been established through 
ethnographic research (e.g. 1973; 1975). Since quantitative methods are typically 
criticised for their lack of depth, poor validity and shallowness of analysis with 
respect to meaning-oriented variables (e.g. Karpatschof, 2007), it may be more 
beneficial for TMT authors to employ qualitative research methods as a way of 
establishing the meaning and value-related dimensions of particular cultural 
worldviews before proceeding with theory-testing quantitative research studies. 
Future TMT-related research programmes that involve the investigation of the 
contents of cultural worldviews through qualitative methods in this way would have 
stronger validity with respect to cultural meanings and values and would allow for 
more specific hypotheses to be developed with respect to cultural worldview defences 
(or lack of cultural worldview defences as the case may be).  
 
Another major implication of the results of the current research programme is that 
diagnostic devices like the CVD Risk Biochip may have a beneficial effect on the 
potential uptake of screening behaviours generally. For instance, the majority of 
participants in Studies 1, 2 and 4 gave highly positive appraisals of the device and 
expressed a high amount of behavioural intentions and commitment to use the device. 
This result appears to suggest that the introduction of POCT diagnostic devices like 
the CVD Risk Biochip could improve the uptake of screening behaviours generally. 
Nonetheless, this result also contrasts with the substantial body of previous research 
in health psychology that has found that people often display patterns of defensive 
avoidance when they perceive that health threat detection behaviours such as 
cholesterol tests or cancer-screening could threaten their health status (e.g. Horowitz 
et al., 1980; Horowitz et al., 1983; Croyle et al., 1993; Millar & Millar, 1993; 
Cameron & Leventhal, 1995; Millar & Millar, 1995; Cameron, 1997; Mengden et al., 
1998; Ketterer et al., 1998; Luce & Kahn, 1999; Newell et al., 1999; Emslie et al., 
2001; O‘Carroll et al., 2001; Kahn & Luce, 2003; Ketterer et al., 2004; Van 
Steenkiste et al., 2004; Brett et al., 2005; Arndt et al., 2007; Caldwell et al., 2007; 
Huerta et al., 2009).  
 
Despite this seeming inconsistency, there are a number of reasons why a device like 
the CVD Risk Biochip may be different to some of the health threat detection 
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behaviours investigated in these prior health psychology research studies. For 
instance, this sort of POCT device appears to give a less imminent indication of a 
potentially fatal health threat, which may serve to make the device itself appear to be 
less threatening in comparison to health threat detection behaviours such as cancer-
screening or cholesterol tests. By way of explanation, since the CVD Risk Biochip is 
only purported to give an indication of future risk of developing CVD, participants 
may have felt that they could have modified their future health behaviours in order to 
directly reduce their risk for developing CVD. In contrast, cancer-screening 
behaviours, cholesterol tests or diagnostic tests which indicate the presence or 
absence of a condition do not appear to allow for the prevention of the associated 
health condition through the behavioural modification of risk factors to the same 
degree (e.g. Millar & Millar, 1993; Millar & Millar, 1995; Cameron, 1997). Instead, 
these behaviours appear to confer a favourable or unfavourable health status that may 
seem less modifiable. The loss of control associated with the revealing of a potential 
condition could be one of the motivating factors behind defensive avoidance of health 
threat detection behaviours such as cancer-screening or cholesterol tests (e.g. in the 
manner exhibited in the previous TMT studies depicted in Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg et al., 2009). On the other hand, POCT devices 
like the CVD Risk Biochip, while not health-promotion behaviours per se, could be 
seen as somewhat closer to health-promotion behaviours due to their capacity to 
allow for a person to improve their health status. In other words, a POCT device like 
the CVD Risk Biochip may be qualitatively different from other sorts of health threat 
detection behaviours in the sense that it does not confer a negative health status to an 
individual. What may be particularly important about the framing of this sort of 
health threat detection behaviour is that one has a ―risk of developing‖ a particular 
condition rather than ―having‖ the condition. In this regard, future research could 
establish if framing health threat detection behaviours as ―risk factor tests‖ may lead 
to an improved uptake of such behaviours compared to framing them as diagnostic 
measures that indicate the presence or absence of a condition.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that such a device does not confer a negative health status to an 
individual may mean that the development of POCT devices of a similar nature to the 
CVD Risk Biochip by research institutions like the BDI may actually have a positive 
effect on the uptake of screening practices. Indeed, the results of the current research 
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programme tentatively suggest that the availability of devices of this nature that give 
an indication of the future risk of developing a condition may be beneficial in 
increasing screening practices more generally as the overwhelming majority of 
participants in Studies 1, 2 & 4 gave a positive appraisal of the device and indicated 
their commitment to using the device. This may mean that analogous devices which 
provide individuals with risk factor estimates for fatal conditions could increase the 
uptake of screening practices for such conditions. For instance, as there have been 
recent biomedical advances in the identification of early biomarkers for the 
development of specific forms of cancer like ovarian cancer (e.g. Raja, Hook & 
Lederman, 2012), prostate cancer (e.g. Killick, Bancroft, Kote-Jarai & Eeles, in press) 
and lung cancer (e.g. Liloglou, Bediaga, Brown, Field & Davies, in press), it may be 
possible to develop POCT devices that give risk factor estimates for the future 
development of these cancers. The results of the current research programme suggest 
that such devices may be received more favourably by the general public than 
secondary screening practices that effectively provide an individual with a cancer 
diagnosis. It may even be possible to target such POCT devices for use in the home 
where they could be used for primary prevention (i.e. since modifiable risk 
behaviours for cancer development have been identified; e.g. Stein & Colditz, 2004). 
In this way, it may be possible to reduce the morbidity and mortality rates of various 
conditions such as cancer through the development of POCT devices that indicate 
early risk of developing such conditions and targeting of such devices for use in 
primary care settings where they may be used for preventative purposes.  
 
Another reason why use of a POCT device like the CVD Risk Biochip may be 
different from other health threat detection behaviours is the potential sense of 
autonomy and independence that such behaviours may offer users. Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that participants in the current research programme considered this 
device to be beneficial in its capacity to empower them. Firstly, participants‘ 
responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale in Study 4 
indicated that they did not find diagnostic devices like the CVD Risk Biochip to be 
disassociated or disconnected from their bodily experiences. This would seem to 
imply that these participants felt that they would be able to incorporate the risk 
information that a device like the CVD Risk Biochip provides into their 
understanding of their own physical health and their bodies. Additionally, as 
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previously mentioned in Chapter 6 (pages 1-203 - 1-205), participants‘ low mean 
scores in relation to the item ―Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the 
CVD Risk Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and well-being 
that I experience from my body‖ in Study 4 would appear to suggest that they valued 
their sense of experiential knowledge from their bodies to at least the same degree as 
the risk information to be gained from devices like the CVD Risk Biochip. When 
these results are taken in combination with the high positive appraisals of the CVD 
Risk Biochip and high behavioural intentions and commitments to use the device 
among participants in the current research programme, they appear to suggest that 
these participants may have found the CVD Risk Biochip to be useful in its potential 
to empower them. That is to say, participants may have found the CVD Risk Biochip 
to be particularly favourable as it could afford them with the opportunity to make 
their own health decisions by combining their own experiential knowledge with 
―objective indicators‖ of illness from the device. Such ideas appear to tally with 
previous research on the use of POCT devices by nurses and patients that has 
indicated that such devices can give such users a sense of empowerment as they can 
obtain results quickly and act on them directly without having to directly ask the 
advice of a physician or trained laboratory professional (e.g. Hicks, 2004; Spriggs, 
2004). In particular, devices such as the blood glucose monitors used by diabetics 
have been found to afford patients with a sense of control over their own health status 
(Spriggs, 2004). In a similar fashion, POCT health threat detection devices such as 
the CVD Risk Biochip could provide individuals who are potentially at risk for 
developing CVD with the capacity to monitor their condition; thereby endowing them 
with a sense of autonomy in relation to their health. Future research could establish 
whether or not the apparent autonomy afforded by POCT devices like the CVD Risk 
Biochip could improve their uptake in comparison to other forms of risk factor tests 
such as cholesterol tests or central laboratory research testing that are conducted by a 
trained professional. 
 
To conclude, there are a number of striking implications of the current research 
programme. Firstly, the priming of mortality reminders does not appear to elicit 
defensive responses among Irish participants, suggesting that TMT processes may not 
be cross-culturally reliable and that qualitative investigations of the contents of the 
meanings and value-oriented dimensions of cultural worldviews may be needed in 
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future TMT research. Secondly, POCT devices such as the CVD Risk Biochip appear 
to encourage approach-oriented responses among participants in comparison to other 
sorts of health threat detection behaviours like cancer-screening or cholesterol-testing. 
This may result from the fact that devices like the CVD Risk Biochip have the 
capacity to provide a less immanent indication of a potentially fatal health threat and 
have the potential to endow lay individuals with a sense of autonomy in relation to 
their health by allowing them to test themselves and monitor their condition. Thirdly, 
it may be particularly important to frame such POCT devices as having the capability 
to give an indication of ―risk‖ for developing a condition in order to prevent 
defensively avoidant responses among individuals in response to potential threats to 
their health status. Finally, it may also be important to encourage autonomy in 
relation to the use of such devices as lay people appear to put a substantial amount of 
value into their own experiential knowledge of health and illness.  
 
7.5 Gender Differences among Middle-aged Participants 
As explored in the Discussion Section of Chapter 4 (pages 1-120 - 1-121), there was 
partial support in Study 2 of the research programme for the hypotheses that middle-
aged male participants would be less likely to commit to using the CVD Risk Biochip 
in a proposed pilot study and would display more negative appraisals of the device 
compared to middle-aged female participants. Specifically, these results support some 
of the data from the health psychology literature that has found that men tend to 
participate in a greater number of behaviours that are damaging towards their health 
than women (e.g. Huselid & Cooper, 1992; Garrison et al. 1993; Stillion, 1995; 
McCreary et al., 1999; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2000; Courtenay, 
2000a; Courtenay, 2000b; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2003; McCreary et al., 
2005; Cotto et al., 2010), that women tend to engage more frequently in health-
oriented behaviours and tend to have more knowledge of health concerns than men 
(e.g. Liang, et al., 1999; Van Wijk, 1999; Brunswick et al., 2001; Wardle et al., 2001; 
Janda et al., 2004; Parslow et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2005) and that men tend to 
exhibit more avoidance of health-oriented behaviours compared to women (e.g. 
Liang, et al., 1999; Tamres et al., 2002; Parslow et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2005). The 
results of Study 1, which found that both male and female older adults provided 
highly positive appraisals of the CVD Risk Biochip and did not express any 
significant differences in their attitudes or behavioural commitments towards its use, 
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also conformed to the findings of previous health psychology research which had 
found that patterns of gender differences in health-oriented behaviours tend to 
decrease among older adults (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Airey et al., 1999; Liang et 
al., 1999; Tseng & Lin, 2008; Apostolidis et al., 2009). However, this pattern of 
results did not appear to be supported in the results of Study 4, where there was no 
significant impact of the gender covariate on participants‘ behavioural intentions or 
attitudes towards the CVD Risk Biochip and gender did not appear to contribute to 
the odds of whether or not a participant chose to sign up for the proposed pilot study.  
Nonetheless, when taken together, the pattern of results from the current research 
programme relating to gender differences in health-seeking and health-related 
behaviours provides some moderate support for some of the health psychology 
literature relating to this topic. This moderate support for gender differences suggests 
that the design of future TMT research involving health-related behaviours may need 
to take account of such differences.  
 
7.6 Content analyses of the Salience Measures from First Three Studies 
In addition to the gender differences with respect to the main dependent variables in 
the current research programme, there were a number of similarities and differences 
between the responses of younger, middle-aged and older adults in the first three 
studies with respect to their open-ended responses to the salience measure. One 
notable consistency across these studies was observed with respect to the ―number of 
death-related words used‖ and the ―degree of focus on death and survival themes‖ in 
participants‘ responses towards the Heart Attack Salience task. Specifically, the 
results of the content analyses of the first three studies taken together revealed that 
getting participants to think about having a heart attack was significantly more likely 
to elicit thoughts of death and survival on these dimensions than thinking about dental 
pain. Such a pattern of results is illuminating as it suggests that participants in this 
study considered having a heart attack to be a death-related event. In this way, it does 
not appear likely that thinking about heart attacks failed to elicit thoughts about death, 
survival and related themes among participants. On the contrary, these findings 
indicate that thinking about having a heart attack results in increased thoughts of 
death and an increased focus on death and survival themes, irrespective of an 
individuals‘ age or whether or not they are under cognitive strain.  Furthermore, 
getting adults of any age to think about heart attacks appears to focus them on themes 
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relating to death and survival. Consequently, it would appear that, while Heart Attack 
Salience does not seem to lead to increases in death-thought suppression in the same 
way as Cancer Salience (as per Arndt et al., 2007), Heart Attack Salience does appear 
to entail the use death-related words and focus on death and survival themes in a 
comparable fashion to Mortality Salience, thereby making it a valid method of 
priming death-related cognitions that could be used in future TMT research. 
 
While the above results demonstrate that heart attacks were consistently perceived as 
a death-relevant construct by participants in the first three studies, it is worth 
explicating the finding that the negativity and threat dimensions were perceived 
differently by participants in each of the respective studies. In particular, it is worth 
noting that older participants from the first study found the concept of death to be 
significantly less threatening (on the revised threat-negativity dimension) than either 
dental pain or heart attacks in contrast to participants aged 40-55 years from the 
second study who considered thinking about death and heart attacks to be 
significantly more threatening than thinking about dental pain (on the ―degree of 
threat expressed‖ dimension). This finding is consistent with death anxiety literature 
that has demonstrated that older adults do not find death particularly threatening, 
while middle-aged adults up to about the age of 60 years exhibit anxiety about death-
related ideas (e.g. Neimeyer & Van Brunt, 1995; Neimeyer et al., 2004; Russac et al., 
2007; De Raedt & Van Der Speeten, 2008). Additionally, while they may not be 
anxious about death per se, the results of the first study on the combined threat-
negativity dimension suggest that older adults may perceive dental pain and heart 
attacks as being highly negative and threatening. This may be because such health 
concerns represent more tangible negative threats to older adults which have the 
capacity to interfere with their current lifestyle; a finding that tallies with health 
psychology research suggesting that older adults have increasing concerns about their 
health status impeding their quality of life (e.g. Stoller & Pollow, 1994; Airey et al., 
1999; Apostolidis et al., 2009). Similarly, the results of study three on the combined 
threat-negativity dimension suggest that younger adults may find heart attacks to be 
significantly more negatively threatening than dental pain as thinking about having a 
heart attack may undermine prevalent views that they may have about their own 
invulnerability (e.g. Jemmott et al., 1986; Avis et al., 1989; Wild et al., 2001; 
Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005).  
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In contrast to these sets of results, it is interesting to note that middle-aged 
participants from study two expressed differences with respect to the threat and 
negativity dimensions. Firstly, the results of the ―degree of threat expressed‖ 
dimension indicate that these middle-aged adults found death and heart attacks to be 
more threatening than dental pain; potentially as these middle-aged individuals were 
more concerned with death or serious disability heart attacks impeding their life goals 
(e.g. Becker, 1973; Erikson et al., 1986; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). However, 
individuals from this age cohort also found death, heart attacks and dental pain to be 
comparably negative (each M > 2.5). This may be because middle-aged adults 
consider death, heart attacks and dental pain to be negative in the sense that they may 
impede their ―Generativity‖ in the short-term (Erikson et al., 1986; Erikson & 
Erikson, 1997), even if heart attacks and death are seen as more threatening as they 
constitute long-term threats to their life goals. In sum, there appear to be age-related 
differences in participants‘ responses towards the ―degree of threat expressed‖ and 
―negativity expressed‖ dimensions of the content analyses of the first three studies 
which may reflect differences in health-related concerns across these different 
cohorts.  
 
The differences between the respective cohorts on their results for the ―deep vs. 
shallow writing‖ dimension are also worth considering. Indeed, when the results of 
participants‘ responses towards this item from each of the first three studies are 
considered together, they appear to suggest that thinking about heart attacks led to a 
greater symbolic orientation among younger adults than thinking about the control 
topic of dental pain and that thinking about death led to a greater symbolic orientation 
among older adults than thinking about either heart attacks or death but that middle-
aged adults did not demonstrate any significant differences between groups on this 
dimension. The finding that older adults display more symbolic reactions towards 
death appears to be supported by existing research that older adults are more 
accustomed to thinking about death, less concerned with death impeding their life 
goals and tend to represent their lives in a more transcendent fashion (e.g. Erikson et 
al., 1986; Thorson & Powell, 1988; Tornstam, 1994; Erikson & Erikson, 1997; 
DePaola et al., 2003). This is presumably because these older adults have had a 
greater opportunity to think about the topic and may have read a greater amount of 
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literature on the subject of death (as evidenced by the fact that older adults were more 
likely to refer to philosophical or spiritual ideas in their encounters with Mortality 
Salience, as mentioned in Chapter 3, pages 1-94 - 1-95). Additionally, the lack of 
significant differences in depth of writing between thinking about heart attacks and 
thinking about dental pain among this group may be related to previous findings from 
health psychology and TMT research that older adults are more used to dealing with 
their declining health status (e.g. Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005; Russac et al., 
2007). In other words older adults may deal with specific health-related problems in a 
more concrete and practical manner; a suggestion that may warrant future 
investigation in health psychology research.   
 
Similarly, middle-aged adults may exhibit more shallow characteristics of writing 
about heart attacks due to greater concerns that they may have about their own health 
and well-being as they are more used to thinking about such concerns (e.g. Taubman - 
Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005). In contrast, the finding that younger adults wrote about 
heart attacks in a symbolic fashion is a unique finding in the context of TMT. This 
pattern of results could be explained by the suggestion that, since younger adults 
generally consider themselves to be less vulnerable to health threats (e.g. Jemmott et 
al., 1986; Avis et al., 1989; Wild et al., 2001; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005), 
thinking about a health threat with potential fatal consequences such as heart attacks 
may be novel to them. A consequence of this novelty in thinking about heart attacks 
may be that they tend to focus more on the fatal aspects of heart attacks and they may 
think about heart attacks in a more abstract and symbolic level as they have not begun 
to consider such ideas in a more concrete fashion due to their age. Nonetheless, as 
evidenced by the low DTA levels exhibited by participants who received the Heart 
Attack Salience measure in the third study, these younger adults may have failed to 
find heart attacks to be existentially threatening, potentially because they held 
steadfast beliefs that heart attacks were not relevant to their health (e.g. following 
previous research by Jemmott et al., 1986; Avis et al., 1989; Davis et al., 1998; Wild 
et al., 2001; Taubman - Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005). 
 
7.7 Word Frequency and Word Ambiguity Effects in the DTA literature 
As highlighted in Chapter 5 (pages 1-143 - 1-149), the third study uncovered potential 
word frequency effects and word ambiguities in Greenberg et al.‘s (1994) original 
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word fragment completion task for the measurement of DTA. This finding has 
potential implications for the measurement of DTA in TMT research. Indeed, TMT 
researchers who have used this method have consistently failed to report any steps 
that they have taken to control for such potential word frequency effects or word 
ambiguities. Additionally, despite this failure to control for word frequency and word 
ambiguity in Greenberg et al.‘s (1994) initial version of the word fragment 
completion task, there is evidence of similar word frequency and word ambiguity 
effects within the broader context of TMT studies that have used subsequent word 
fragment completion tasks to measure DTA; including those who have employed 
either minor variations to the method such as including more or less potential death-
related word fragments (e.g. Arndt et al., 1997b; Arndt et al., 2007) or more 
substantial variations to it like translating it into Hebrew (e.g. Mikulincer & Florian, 
2000). This failure to control for word frequency and word ambiguity may mean that 
the DTA studies that have used such measures have overlooked the potential 
confounding effects of word frequency and word ambiguity on their results. The 
following examination of such word frequency and word ambiguity effects contains 
only published TMT studies that used an English language version of the word 
fragment completion task. DTA studies that used a translation of the word fragment 
completion task could be examined for word frequency effects in a similar fashion.  
 
Common variations on the DTA word fragment completion task that can be examined 
for word frequency and word ambiguity effects include versions of the task that 
contain additional word fragments that were absent from Greenberg et al.‘s (1994) 
original measure. Two common additional word fragments in this literature are STI_ 
_ used by Silvia (2001) and Dunkel (2009) and CO_ _SE used by Goldenberg et al. 
(1999), Silvia (2001), Burris & Rempel (2004) and Landau et al. (2004a). The former 
word fragment can be completed as either the death-neutral word ―still‖ or the 
potentially death-related word ―stiff‖ and the latter can be completed as either the 
death-neutral word ―course‖ or the death-related word ―corpse‖. However, as 
illustrated in Table 7.1, the words ―still‖ and ―course‖ have considerably higher 
frequencies per million than their respective death-related counterparts ―stiff‖ and 
―corpse‖; indicating a potential for the confounding influence of word frequency 
effects. Additionally, the more common adjective-form of the word ―stiff‖ does not 
have a death-related meaning. Consequently, it is difficult to tell if participants who 
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responded with the word ―stiff‖ in the DTA studies documented by Silvia (2001) and 
Dunkel (2009) intended the word to represent the death-related vernacular noun or the 
more common non-death-related adjective-form as these participants were not given 
the option to clarify which meaning they had intended.  
 
Word 
Fragment 
Death 
Completion 
Frequency  Death-Neutral 
Completion 
Frequency  
STI_ _ Stiff 1, 310 Still 72, 774 
CO_ _SE Corpse 1, 153 Course 57, 776 
Table 7.1: Word Frequencies per One Hundred Million Words Derived from Kilgarriff 
(1996) for the Death Completions and Most Common Death-Neutral Completions of Some 
Common Additional Word Fragments from the DTA literature 
 
Another common variation on the DTA word fragment completion task involves 
minor alterations to pre-existing word fragments. For instance, both Silvia (2001) and 
Burris & Rempel (2004) modified the word fragment ―DE_ _‖ to ―D_ _D‖, which can 
be completed as either the death-neutral word ―deed‖ or the death-related words 
―died‖ or ―dead‖. Additionally, the word fragment ―GRA_ _‖ has been altered by 
Burris & Rempel (2004) and Norenzayan, Dar-Nimrod, Hansen & Proulx (2009) to 
become ―_RAVE‖, which can be completed as either the death-neutral word ―brave‖ 
or the death-related word ―grave‖.  In the case of the former word fragment, the 
death-related word ―dead‖ and the death-related headword ―die‖ have much higher 
frequencies than the death-neutral word ―deed‖ (see Table 7.2 below). This suggests 
that there may have been a potential confounding influence of word frequency effects 
in the completion of the word fragment ―D_ _D‖ in these studies, where participants 
may have favoured the death-related completions. In contrast, the death-related word 
―grave‖ appears to have a very similar frequency of occurrence to the death-neutral 
word ―brave‖ (Table 7.2), suggesting that it is probably unlikely that word frequency 
had a confounding influence on participants‘ responses to the word fragment 
――_RAVE‖ in those studies that used this word fragment. Nevertheless, as indicated 
previously in Chapter 5 (page 1-145), it is unclear whether participants who respond 
with the completion ―grave‖ to this word fragment intend this response to represent 
the death-related noun or the death-neutral adjective. Consequently, while this word 
fragment initially appears to have improved upon its alternative ―GRA_ _‖ by 
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shortening the gap between the word frequencies pertaining to its death-related and 
death-neutral completions, the ambiguity concerning whether or not the completion 
―grave‖ constitutes a death-related word suggests that this death-related word is still a 
problematic item for the measurement of DTA.  
 
Word 
Fragment 
Death 
Completion 
Frequency  Death-Neutral 
Completion 
Frequency  
D_ _D Dead 11,341 Deed 1, 282 
 Died (Die*) 22,087   
_RAVE Grave 1, 740 Brave 1, 760 
*The frequency of the word lemma in parenthesis is reported for this word fragment 
completion. 
Table 7.2: Word Frequencies per One Hundred Million Words Derived from Kilgarriff 
(1996) for the Death Completions and Most Common Death-Neutral Completions of Some 
Commonly Modified Word Fragments from the DTA literature 
 
A good example of a DTA study with the word fragment completion task that has 
employed both additional word fragments and variations on pre-existing DTA word 
fragments is Burris & Rempel‘s (2004) study, where the authors presented 
participants with 13 different word fragments that could be completed in either death-
neutral or death-related ways. Table 7.3 presents these 13 word fragments and their 
potential death-related and death-neutral completions. It is clear from this table that 
there is once again great variation between many of the death-related and death-
neutral completions to the word fragments used in this study. Indeed, it is particularly 
notable that many of the death-related or death-neutral completions were absent from 
Kilgarriff‘s (1996) word frequency database (i.e. the completions which have a 
corresponding frequency of 0 beside them on the table), while their alternative death-
related or death-neutral counterparts had a frequency listing in the same database. In 
addition to this evidence of a confounding influence of word frequency effects in the 
completion of the word fragments, many of the novel word fragments have 
purportedly death-related completions that are arguably not specifically death-related. 
For instance, in conjunction with the potentially death-ambiguous word fragment 
completions ―buried‖, ―grave‖ and ―stiff‖ that have been mentioned previously, the 
alleged death-related completions ―ashes‖, ―bones‖ and ―rotting‖ may each be 
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interpreted in non-death-related ways depending on their use in a particular context. 
Specifically, ―ashes‖ may refer to ―the ashes of a fire‖, ―bones‖ may refer to ―the 
bones of the matter‖ or ―rotting‖ may refer to ―rotting food‖; each of which do not 
appear to have anything to do with the concepts of human death or mortality. Since it 
cannot be ruled out whether or not participants who responded with one of these latter 
interpretations intended them to represent a death-related or death-neutral word, they 
can each be seen as problematic items for the measurement of DTA. 
 
Word 
Fragment 
Death 
Completion 
Frequency  Death-Neutral 
Completion 
Frequency  
_ _FFIN Coffin 1, 241 Muffin 0 
ST_FF Stiff 1, 310 Stuff 6, 627 
BON_ _ Bones (Bone*) 4, 665 Bonds (Bond*) 3, 753 
BU_Y Bury 2, 987 Busy 5, 221 
D_ _D Dead 11,341 Deed 1, 282 
 Died (Die*) 22,087   
_RAVE Grave 1, 740 Brave 1, 760 
S_ULL Skull 1, 234 Scull 0 
RO_ _ING Rotting (Rot*) 0 Rolling (Roll*) 5, 202 
_E_EASED Deceased 
(Decease*) 
0 Released (Release*) 7, 822 
CO_ _SE Corpse 1, 153 Course 57, 776 
_OMB Tomb 0 Bomb 3, 703 
AS_ES Ashes (Ash*) 1,051 Asses (Ass*) 0 
*The frequencies of the word lemmas in parenthesis are reported for these word fragment 
completions. 
Table 7.3: Word Frequencies per One Hundred Million Words Derived from Kilgarriff 
(1996) for the Death Completions and Most Common Death-Neutral Completions of Word 
Fragments in Burris & Rempel (2004) 
 
7.7a Recommendations for Future DTA Research  
The potential confounding factors of word frequency and the use of supposedly 
death-related word fragment completions that are arguably not specific to mortality or 
death-related concerns outlined in Chapter 5 and in the above examination serves to 
demonstrate that more experimental rigour is necessary in the measurement of DTA 
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within the TMT literature. Future DTA research using the word fragment completion 
method should eliminate the potential confounding variable of word frequency by 
redesigning the method to control for word frequency. The word fragments should be 
designed in such a way that they can be completed with either a death-neutral or 
death-related word that are of comparable frequency, as per word fragments such as 
―DE_ _‖. Additionally, DTA researchers should ensure that the word fragment 
completions that are supposed to be of a death-related nature cannot be interpreted in 
non-death-related words, as one could with the words stiff, grave, bury, ashes, bones 
and rotting listed above. Indeed, since these sorts of words could be considered 
ambiguous with regard to their relatedness to the concepts of death and mortality, 
they should be avoided and henceforth removed from the design of future versions of 
the word fragment completion task for the measurement of DTA.   
 
There have also been a couple of other notable methodologies from the TMT 
literature that have been developed for measuring DTA that may be used in the event 
that the above guidelines regarding the word fragment completion task are too 
constraining. The most common alternative to the word fragment completion 
methodology is the lexical decision task method that has been used in several DTA 
studies (e.g. Bassett, 2005; Koole & Van den Berg, 2005; Schimel et al., 2007; Hayes 
et al., 2008). In particular, a recent version of this methodology developed by Schimel 
et al (2007) may specifically eliminate the potential biases of word frequency effects. 
As with other lexical decision tasks, participants in this study were asked to determine 
whether a string of letters was a word or not and the authors argued that people 
should react faster and more accurately towards death-related words compared to 
other words when death thoughts were highly accessible to them. In order to test this 
prediction, the authors randomly presented their participants with 40 non-words, 18 
neutral words, 6 negative words and 6 death-related words for lexical decision. 
Importantly, following the recommendations of Bargh and Chartrand (2000), they 
chose negative and neutral words that would be roughly comparable to the death 
words on word frequency and word length in order to control for the possibility that 
word frequency effects might have interfered with the priming effects with which 
they were primarily interested in their study. Consequently, the authors selected 
death-related, negative and neutral words for use in their lexical decision task that 
were matched on a word-to-word basis by their frequency of occurrence (per million 
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words). This led the authors to be fairly confident that they had eliminated the 
influence of word frequency effects on their participants‘ subsequent lexical 
decisions. However, it should be noted that these researchers still used the words 
―buried‖ and ―grave‖ in their lexical decision task, which are potentially ambiguous 
with regard to their relatedness to the concepts of death and mortality. As a result, 
future versions of this lexical decision task should replace these words with 
alternatives such as ―corpse‖, ―deceased‖ or ―murder‖ which are more specifically 
death-related.  
 
The other notable methodology for the measurement of DTA developed by Gailliot et 
al. (2006) avoids the issue of word frequency entirely. Specifically, the authors 
developed a method where images that were presented to participants could be 
perceived as being death-neutral or death-related. For instance, one of their images 
could be perceived as either a lady sitting in front of a large mirror or as a skull. 
These researchers argued that a participant‘s level of DTA could be inferred on the 
basis of their perception of such images (i.e. if participants perceived such images in 
the death-related mode, it was taken as an indication of a high level of DTA). Since 
this methodology uses images rather than words as its dependent variable, word 
frequency and word ambiguity effects are avoided.  
 
Another common measure that has the potential to be adapted for use as a measure of 
DTA is the masked-word identification or anagram task. This task involves the re-
arrangement of nonsensical anagrams into words by participants and the possible 
solutions typically involve both a target word relating to a recently primed or 
activated concept and a control word that bears no relation to the recently primed or 
activated concept. For instance, a study which initially asks participants to think about 
talk show hosts might increase such participants‘ likelihood of solving the anagram 
―HAPOR‖ with the solution ―Oprah‖ rather than ―Harpo‖ (Sia et al., 1999). Many 
studies using this method have found that recently primed or activated concepts are 
more likely to be recognised within such nonsensical anagrams (e.g. Roediger, 1990; 
Sia et al, 1999). Consequently, this measure could be adapted for the study of DTA 
by creating anagrams for death-related words that have a corresponding death-neutral 
counterpart. For instance, following Mortality Salience or a similar measure, 
participants could be presented with nonsensical anagrams such as ―SLIKL‖, which 
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could be solved with the death-neutral word ―skill‖ or the death-relevant word ―kills‖. 
As per the above recommendations, however, such anagrams should control for word 
frequency effects and should use target words that are specifically death-relevant. In 
this regard, while there is a substantial difference in word frequency between the 
word ―skill‖ and the word lemma ―kill‖ according to Kilgarriff‘s (1996) word 
frequency database (11, 423 and 15, 620 occurrences per one hundred million words 
respectively), the specific word-form ―kills‖ is less common and may therefore 
arguably constitute an appropriate death-related target word for the nonsensical 
anagram ―SLIKL‖.  
 
To conclude this examination of current forms of measuring the DTA construct, 
researchers who seek to operationalise this construct should choose a measure which 
controls for the effects of word frequency and should avoid using dependent variables 
that are not specifically death-related. Additionally, if the word fragment completion 
method is to be used as a measure of DTA in the future, it should be redesigned to 
eliminate such potential confounding factors. Alternatively, future DTA research 
could adapt a pre-established method for the measurement of DTA such as the 
anagram task used in other studies involving construct accessibility or utilise already 
established alternative methodologies for the measurement of DTA such as the 
counterbalanced lexical decision task method employed by Schimel et al. (2007) or 
the ambiguous image method developed by Gailliot et al. (2006). 
 
7.8 Strengths and Limitations of the Current Research Programme 
A major strength of the current research programme is that it did not rely on student 
populations to examine its principal research questions. TMT research has typically 
involved the use of psychology student samples who often participate in order to earn 
course credit. However, there are several problems that have been noted regarding the 
use of student participants in this fashion. For instance, Foot & Sanford (2004) have 
noted that, in addition to the fact that student samples are inherently biased in age, 
experience, intellectual ability, ethnicity and social class, the practice of providing 
course credit in exchange for research participation perhaps unfairly coerces these 
students to serve as participants. In contrast, the three central studies in the current 
research programme (Studies 1, 2 & 4) targeted middle-aged and older adults who 
volunteered to participate; thereby providing a more ecologically valid cohort of 
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participants who were potentially at risk for developing CVD and avoiding the 
potential pitfalls of course credit coercion. Additionally, while the third study in the 
current programme incorporated student participants, these students participated on a 
voluntary basis rather than participating in exchange for course credit.  
 
Another major strength of the current research programme was the inclusion of the 
novel Heart Attack Salience task as a method of priming death-related thoughts 
among participants. Following on from Arndt et al.‘s (2007) Cancer Salience task, the 
Heart Attack Salience task was developed specifically for this study in order to allow 
participants to explicitly think about having a heart attack and what happens to their 
bodies when they have a heart attack. Across the first three studies in the research 
programme, three separate content analyses on different cohorts of participants 
established the potential validity of this task for priming death-related thoughts in 
participants through the findings that it was significantly more likely to elicit thoughts 
of death and survival than a control task. Furthermore, the content analyses of the first 
two studies demonstrated that thinking about heart attacks was just as likely to elicit 
thoughts concerning death as thinking about the subject of death itself (i.e. Mortality 
Salience). Thinking about having a heart attack may also be a more naturalistic way 
of eliciting death-related thoughts among participants for future TMT research 
compared to thinking about the abstract concept of death. This is because thinking 
about heart attacks may represent a more tangible everyday concern for people, in 
contrast to thinking about the abstract topic of death; the latter of which is normally 
confined to academic or artistic investigations. Following such ideas, the Heart 
Attack Salience task appears to be a valid and naturalistic form of priming death-
related cognitions in participants.  
 
One limitation of the studies in the current research programme is that the studies 
involving participants‘ reactions towards the CVD Risk Biochip (i.e. Studies 1, 2 & 
4) did not incorporate a measure of participants‘ actual use of the CVD Risk Biochip. 
On this subject, one could question the ecological validity of these studies since they 
involved participants‘ reactions towards a description of the device rather than a 
physical presentation of the device. In other words, a physical presentation of the 
device might have helped to establish more closely whether or not mortality 
reminders would have had any bearing on participants‘ real life encounters with the 
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device. However, in the current context, physical presentation of a prototype version 
of the CVD Risk Biochip was not possible. Despite this potential limitation, there are 
a number of reasons to suggest that the absence of a research study involving the 
actual presentation of a device like the CVD Risk Biochip to participants may not 
have been a major hindrance to the validity of the results of the relevant studies in the 
current programme. Firstly, each of the participants in these studies had been assured 
that the CVD Risk Biochip was a genuine device that was being developed by the 
BDI. Additionally, the De Facto Intentions measure in each study had been explicitly 
designed to approximate participants‘ potential real life encounters with the device. 
This could be seen to represent an ecologically valid measure in its potential removal 
of hypothetical bias and implicit confirmation of the existence of the device. 
Moreover, participants‘ responses towards this more ecologically valid measure did 
not appear to depart substantially from participants‘ responses towards the attitudes 
and behavioural intentions measures in these studies (apart from a slight gender bias 
between middle-aged males‘ and females‘ commitment to using this device, as 
discussed previously), suggesting that there may not be a major gap between 
attitudes, behavioural intentions and behavioural commitment to use health threat 
detection devices like the CVD Risk Biochip following mortality reminders.  
 
It should also be noted that some prior TMT research concerning the effects of 
mortality reminders on participants‘ engagement with health threat detection 
behaviours had included ecologically valid measures and subsequently reported 
findings that were analogous to their own measurements of attitudes and behavioural 
intentions towards the same detection behaviours. For instance, Goldenberg et al. 
(2008) found that presenting younger women with mortality reminders led to a 
reduction in their intentions to perform breast self-exams (Study 1) and led them to 
conduct shorter exams on a plastic breast model (Study 2). Interestingly, these authors 
also found that presenting older women at risk for developing breast cancer with 
similar mortality reminders resulted in them performing shorter breast self-exams on 
themselves (Study 3). Likewise, Goldenberg et al. (2009) demonstrated that mortality 
reminders led highly neurotic younger women to be less willing to imagine 
undergoing a mammogram (Study 1) and subsequently found that highly neurotic 
older women who were given mortality reminders just before they received a 
mammogram perceived a greater amount of discomfort with the procedure (Study 2). 
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These studies suggest that the more hypothetical scenario of examining younger 
adults‘ intentions to perform health threat detection behaviours following mortality 
reminders led to an equivalent outcome with respect to the ecologically valid scenario 
of examining older at-risk adults‘ actual performance of such behaviours following 
mortality reminders. Following these prior findings, it appears likely that participants‘ 
reactions towards a description of the CVD Risk Biochip that had been uncovered in 
the current research programme should be akin to participants‘ reactions towards a 
physical presentation of the device itself. 
 
Another potential limitation of the research programme relates to the use of the Heart 
Attack Salience task in the first two studies of the current programme. Specifically, 
these studies presented participants with a Heart Attack Salience task or 
corresponding salience measure and a distraction and examined these participants‘ 
subsequent reactions to the CVD Risk Biochip but did not present them with one of 
these measures in combination with a Cognitive Load task. In this regard, since Arndt 
et al. (2007) had found that presentation of a Cancer Salience task under conditions of 
high cognitive load led female participants to express lower intentions to perform 
breast self-exam behaviours and male participants to express lower intentions to 
perform testicular self-exam behaviours compared to those who were presented with 
a Control task under similar conditions of high cognitive load, one could argue that 
presenting participants with a Heart Attack Salience task under conditions of high 
cognitive load may have led to more defensively avoidant responses towards the 
CVD Risk Biochip in these studies.  
 
Nonetheless, there are a couple of reasons why such a finding may have been 
unlikely. Firstly, as previously noted, the content analyses of participants‘ responses 
towards the salience measures in these studies revealed that Heart Attack Salience 
was just as likely to lead to a high number of thoughts concerning death among 
participants as Mortality Salience and that participants‘ responses towards this task 
contained an equal focus on death and survival themes compared to Mortality 
Salience. This finding contrasts with Arndt et al.‘s (2007) findings that Cancer 
Salience led to a greater focus on death and survival themes and a greater number of 
death-related words in participants‘ open-ended responses to the measure when 
compared to participants‘ responses towards the Mortality Salience measure. In other 
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words, thinking about developing cancer appears to be more threatening than thinking 
about one‘s death but thinking about having a heart attack may be just as threatening 
as thinking about one‘s death. Therefore, by the logic of TMT authors, Heart Attack 
Salience and a distraction should lead to roughly analogous responses among 
participants to receiving Mortality Salience and a distraction or Cancer Salience and a 
Cognitive Load task (i.e. since each of these sets of conditions should lead a 
participant to experience a distal mode of processing mortality reminders according to 
TMT; e.g. Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Arndt et al., 2007; 
Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Secondly, the results of Study 3 of the current research 
programme demonstrated that there was no difference in DTA between participants 
who received a Heart Attack Salience and distraction task and participants who 
received a Heart Attack Salience task under conditions of cognitive load. This would 
appear to suggest that receipt of a Heart Attack Salience task and subsequent 
distraction should be comparable to receiving a Heart Attack Salience task under 
conditions of cognitive load. Consequently, it is unlikely that participants who 
received a Heart Attack Salience task under conditions of cognitive load would have 
exhibited more defensively avoidant responses towards the CVD Risk Biochip than 
those participants in the first two studies who received a Heart Attack Salience task 
and subsequent distraction.  
 
It could also be argued that the placement of a ―darkly phrased‖ distraction task, the 
CVD Risk Biochip information sheet and the emotively-phrased attitude and 
behavioural intentions items may have had an impact on the likelihood of whether or 
not participants signed up for the pilot study in the first two studies. In other words, 
the fact that participants in these studies were presented with each of these sections in 
the questionnaire before they encountered the De Facto Intentions measure may have 
led them to be less likely to sign up for the pilot study as these sections could have 
conceivably elicited negative emotions such as fear and anxiety among participants. 
Nonetheless, such an effect is unlikely for a number of reasons. Firstly, most 
participants who read the distraction task in these studies reported that they found the 
passage to be ―boring‖ and many participants spontaneously commented that the task 
was very suitable as a distraction during the debriefing session after they had 
completed the questionnaire. Consequently, it is unlikely that such a passage would 
have elicited fear and anxiety among such participants. Likewise, as indicated earlier 
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in the Discussion Section of Chapter 3 (see pages 1-87 - 1-89), it is unlikely that 
subtle mortality reminders in the CVD Risk Biochip Information sheet would have 
elicited fear and anxiety among participants who read it as prior health psychology 
research has found that such general mortality reminders tend to be psychologically 
minimised by people (e.g. Croyle & Sande, 1988; Van Steenkiste et al., 2004; Peretti-
Watel et al., 2007) and prior TMT cancer-screening research involving similar 
general mortality reminders (Arndt et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2008; Goldenberg 
et al., 2009) also found that participants only reacted towards these mortality 
reminders after having been specifically primed with a personal mortality reminder. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, most of the participants in these studies signed up 
for the pilot study and many spontaneously discussed how they felt that the device 
was of great benefit after they had completed the questionnaire, suggesting that it is 
unlikely that fear and anxiety resulting from encountering these sections of the 
questionnaire had a negative impact on their desire to participate in the proposed pilot 
study. Finally, it should also be noted that the high behavioural commitment to use 
the device that was found in the first two studies was replicated in the Study 4 in the 
current programme, where a neutral word search distraction task was used and the 
emotionally neutral CVD Risk Biochip Body-Relatedness Scale was presented to 
participants after they received the distraction task, information sheet, attitude and 
behavioural intentions scales but before they completed the De Facto Intentions 
measure. In light of the above, it is unlikely that emotional reactions of fear or anxiety 
arising from encounters with these sections of the questionnaire affected the 
likelihood of whether or not participants in the first two studies signed up for the 
proposed pilot study. 
 
7.9 Conclusions 
The current research programme had been established in order to investigate whether 
or not existential anxiety could act as a barrier to the voluntary uptake of the CVD 
Risk Biochip by individuals (e.g. in a GP‘s office or in a home setting). In exploring 
such an area of investigation, the programme was the first of its kind to apply TMT 
mechanisms to the psychosocial study of POCT devices and was the first study to 
examine the relationship between existential anxiety and CVD through a TMT 
framework. The first three studies in the programme also pioneered the use of a Heart 
Attack Salience task as a way of effectively priming death-related thoughts and the 
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third study uniquely examined the cognitive dynamics underpinning the use of this 
task. The results of the content analyses of the salience measures in these studies also 
support the proposition that this novel Heart Attack Salience task has the capacity to 
prime thoughts about death among participants to the same extent as Mortality 
Salience; indicating that this task is a valid independent measure for the future study 
of TMT. 
 
The main results of the research programme also uniquely demonstrated that POCT 
devices like the CVD Risk Biochip may have a beneficial effect on the potential 
uptake of screening behaviours generally. On the former point, the overwhelmingly 
positive evaluations of the CVD Risk Biochip and high behavioural intentions and 
commitment to use the device displayed by middle-aged and older adults‘ responses 
in Studies 1, 2 and 4 suggests that such POCT devices may have a high uptake, in 
contrast to other forms of health threat detection that have been reported in the health 
psychology literature to have a low uptake among similar cohorts of adults. This 
potential high uptake may be due to the fact that such POCT devices furnish 
individuals with a risk status for developing a condition rather than indicating the 
presence or absence of a condition and have the capacity to provide a sense of 
autonomy to such individuals. In this respect, it may be particularly important to 
emphasize that such devices have the potential to be used by lay people to monitor 
their health status and to explicitly frame such POCT devices as providing an 
indication of ―risk‖ for developing a condition.  
 
The results of the research programme were also exceptional in demonstrating that 
TMT may not work in an Irish context; an idea that is supported by prior TMT studies 
involving Irish participants and can be interpreted in the light of qualitative research 
that has found that Irish people hold cultural representations of death that may protect 
them from existential anxiety. A central implication of this finding is that that TMT 
processes may not be cross-culturally reliable. Moreover, a clearer picture of the 
meaning and value-oriented contents of cultural worldviews may need to be 
established through qualitative research or with reference to established 
anthropological evidence before carrying out TMT research in the future in order to 
ensure the validity of TMT defences to a particular cultural group.  
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Some additional findings that were uncovered in the current programme also provide 
moderate support prior health psychology literature concerning gender differences 
with respect to health threat detection behaviours and age-related differences with 
respect to death-related perceptions. Older adults considered heart attacks and dental 
pain to be more negative and threatening than death and represented death in a more 
symbolic fashion; a set of findings which potentially reflects a moderating existential 
concern among these adults and growing concern with their health status. In contrast, 
middle-aged adults considered thinking about death and heart attacks to be 
significantly more threatening than thinking about dental pain, potentially because 
both may serve to impede their life goals. Younger adults also found heart attacks to 
be particularly threatening but represented them in a more symbolic fashion than 
older adults or middle aged adults, potentially due to the novelty of reflecting about 
such a topic. There was also evidence that middle-aged males displayed more 
negative behavioural commitment towards the CVD Risk Biochip compared to 
middle-aged females in the current research programme, suggesting that gender-
related concerns may need to be factored into future TMT research concerning health 
behaviours.  
 
Finally, the results of Study 3 in the current programme uncovered some limitations 
to the current methods of measuring DTA in the TMT literature. Specifically, the 
potential confounding effects of word frequency and the ambiguity of certain death-
related words in the standard DTA measures were highlighted. In order to control for 
such effects, word fragment completion, lexical decision task and anagram task 
methodologies that remove the confounding effects of word frequency and word 
ambiguity should be employed in the future measurement of DTA.  
 
In conclusion, the current research programme was the first to study the psychosocial 
aspects of the use of POCT devices through a TMT framework and involved a 
primary examination of CVD in the context of TMT. The central results of the study 
demonstrate that POCT devices like the CVD Risk Biochip may have a beneficial 
effect on the potential uptake of screening behaviours generally and highlight the 
potential for cross-cultural variability in responses towards TMT methodologies. The 
findings of the programme also suggest some unique recommendations for the future 
study of TMT, including the performance of initial qualitative investigations of the 
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cultural worldviews of a particular cohort before examining TMT processes and the 
necessity of controlling for the confounding effects of word frequency and word 
ambiguity in future DTA research. 
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APPENDIX A: COMMON CARDIAC MARKERS USED IN POCT 
 
Myoglobin  
Myoglobin is the earliest-appearing marker to indicate myocardial injury, appearing 
at a highly clinically significant level within 2 hours of presentation and remaining in 
the blood at high levels up to 6 hours after presentation (McCord et al., 2001). 
However, its clinical specificity is questionable as it has been frequently found to 
appear in clinically high levels in patients with skeletal muscle injury (e.g. 
Christenson & Collinson, 2004; Hudson et al., 1999; Yang & Zhou, 2006) and 
patients with renal insufficiency also have been found to present with elevated 
myoglobin levels (Azzazy & Christenson, 2002).    
 
Creatine Kinase-MB  
Creatine-Kinase-MB (CKMB) is another protein released in response to muscle 
damage. It is more specific than myoglobin (Christenson & Collinson, 2004) but does 
not present at such an early stage. Serial sampling of this cardiac marker at 8-12 hours 
yields high sensitivity to myocardial injury (Hudson et al., 1999). Unfortunately, like 
myoglobin, CK-MB also appears in large amounts in skeletal muscle injury (e.g. 
Christenson & Collinson, 2004; Hudson et al., 1999; Yang & Zhou, 2006). 
Nonetheless, CK-MB can be uniquely used to detect the quantity of infarcted tissue 
and re-infarction in a patient if used in conjunction with other cardiac markers (Yang 
& Zhou, 2006).  
 
The Troponins 
Cardiac Troponin T (cTnT) and Cardiac Troponin I (cTnI) are regulatory proteins of 
the thin filament of striated muscle (Wu et al., 1998). They are considered to be the 
gold standard cardiac markers for measuring myocardial injury (McDonnell et al., 
2009) and have emerged as the preferred cardiac biomarkers for risk stratification due 
to their high specificity and length of elevation for many days after myocardial injury 
(e.g. Wu et al., 1998; Hudson et al., 1999; Christenson & Collinson, 2004; Yang & 
Zhou, 2006; Christenson & Azzazy, 2009). CTnT has been demonstrated to have high 
prognostic power, especially in the prediction of CVD risk in patients with symptoms 
of chest pain (Ordóñez-Llanos et al., 2006). However, there has been recent evidence 
of some discrepancy between cTnT and cTnI measurement results, with cTnI being 
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found to be more accurate at assessing cardiac risk (Cramer et al., 2007). Issues with 
Troponin surrounding false positive results, questions over its use for detection of 
reinfarction and its inability to detect infarct size have led to the continued usage of 
CK-MB and myoglobin measurement (Christenson & Azzazy, 2009).    
 
B-type natriuretic peptide  
B-type natriuretic peptide (BNP) is a neurohormone secreted from the cardiac 
ventricles as a reaction to increasing volume and pressure (Harrison et al., 2002). 
Measurement of BNP in the first few days after presentation of symptoms of ischemia 
can indicate the severity of ischemic damage (McDonnell et al., 2009), the degree of 
underlying impairment in left ventricular function (Maisel et al., 2002) and can 
provide risk stratification information for multiple acute coronary syndromes (De 
Lemos et al., 2001). It is used frequently as a ―rule-out‖ test for heart failure (Tang et 
al., 2007; Peacock, 2002) and predicts mortality in patients with chronic heart failure 
(Cowie et al., 2003). It is particularly useful in clinical judgements in relation to the 
presentation of acute dyspnea in the emergency department (e.g. McCullough et al., 
2002; Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison, 2005). Specifically, a high level of BNP in 
presentation with dyspnea predicts potential risk for CHF (Harrison et al., 2002). In 
general, it has been found that the greater the BNP concentration in the blood, the 
greater the cardiac damage (Cowie et al., 2003).  
 
C-Reactive Protein  
C-Reactive Protein (CRP) is a non-specific inflammatory marker that has been shown 
to serve as a powerful predictor of future myocardial infarction (Yang & Zhou, 2006).  
CRP is a protein that is produced in response to inflammatory tissue damage in order 
to stimulate tissue factor production (de Ferranti & Rifai, 2002). Because of this, CRP 
measurement has also been found to be useful in predicting both short and long-term 
CVD risk and in assessing interventions for CVD, as it only exists in elevated levels 
in the presence of inflamed tissue damage (de Ferranti & Rifai, 2002). However, high 
CRP concentrations have been linked to many other common and uncommon 
inflammatory conditions other than CVD, including pulmonary inflammation, cancer, 
gastro-dudenal inflammation, urinary inflammation and musculoskeletal 
inflammation (Dhingra et al., 2007). In addition, the use of CRP in risk stratification 
for CVD may be confounded in obese individuals, blacks and individuals with 
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chronic pulmonary levels, as these groups of people tend to exhibit elevated levels of 
CRP (Kraus et al., 2007). As a result, CRP should be used in conjunction with other 
markers (e.g. the troponins) in CVD risk assessment.  
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APPENDIX B: PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENTS AND CONSENT FORMS 
B1: Study 1 Plain Language Statement and Consent Form 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study relating to aspects of 
health and better ways of knowing about your health. Mr. Simon Dunne is 
carrying out this study in the Dublin City University School of Nursing, with 
assistance from Dr. Pamela Gallagher and Dr. Anne Matthews. The study is 
being funded by a Science Foundation Ireland grant. 
 
You are eligible to take part if you are over 55 years of age and have not had 
a major heart related event (e.g. a heart attack). If you agree to take part in 
this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire 
contains four sections of questions, which will ask you to give your opinions 
on various topics. Some of the questions may make you feel a little 
uncomfortable. However, your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. 
If any aspect of the study makes you feel unduly uncomfortable or distressed 
at any stage, you may withdraw from the study without prejudice. Additionally, 
you may withdraw to participate at any time and without giving any reasons 
for your withdrawal. Withdrawal will not result in penalization of any kind.  If 
you wish to discuss any unpleasant or distressful thoughts or emotions that 
you experienced when completing the questionnaire, please feel free to do so 
with Mr. Simon Dunne after you have completed the questionnaire.    
 
The research will form the basis of reports, academic publications, 
conference papers and other scientific publications. The information that will 
be obtained from the study should greatly benefit the community by informing 
medical practitioners about attitudes towards health and healthcare methods. 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, all information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential. The form that you sign to give your consent to participate 
in the study will be kept in a secure location that is separate from where the 
completed questionnaire will be stored. All of the completed questionnaires 
will be kept for a minimum of five years. After this time they will be shredded 
and disposed of by Mr. Simon Dunne.  
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Should you require any further information on the study, or if you have any 
concerns about any aspect of it at a later stage, please do not hesitate to 
contact the principal investigator, Mr. Simon Dunne from the Dublin City 
University School of Nursing on 01 7007796. 
 
The Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee has approved this 
research project. If participants have concerns about this study and wish to 
contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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Research Study Title:  Psychosocial Aspects of Biomedical Diagnostics 
Principal Investigator: Simon Dunne  
Other Investigators: Dr. Pamela Gallagher; Dr. Anne Matthews 
Faculty:   DCU School of Nursing   
 
Please Circle “Yes” or “No” for the following questions, where 
appropriate. 
I confirm that I have read the Plain Language Statement for the above project 
and that I understand the information provided therein.   
          Yes / No 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.       
          Yes / No 
I confirm that I have never experienced a major heart-related event (e.g. a 
heart attack)?          
          Yes / No 
I understand that this consent form will be kept in a location separate from the 
completed questionnaire and the questionnaire will only collect information 
that does not identify me by name.      
Yes / No 
I understand that the anonymous data collected in this study will be used to 
form the basis of reports, academic publications, conference papers and 
other scientific publications.     
Yes / No 
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without any 
penalisation for doing so.  
Yes / No 
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I have read and understood the information in this form.  The researchers 
have answered my questions and concerns, and I have a copy of this consent 
form.  Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project. 
 Participants Signature:        
 Name in Block Capitals:        
 Witness:           
 
 
 Date:            
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B2: Study 2 Plain Language Statement and Consent Form 
You are being asked to participate in a research study relating to aspects of 
health and better ways of knowing about your health. Mr. Simon Dunne is 
carrying out this study in the Dublin City University School of Nursing, with 
assistance from Dr. Pamela Gallagher and Dr. Anne Matthews. The study is 
being funded by a Science Foundation Ireland grant and an Irish Research 
Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences Post-Graduate Scholarship. 
You are eligible to take part if you are between 40 and 55 years of age and 
have not had a major heart related event (e.g. a heart attack). If you agree to 
take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. This 
questionnaire contains four sections of questions, which will ask you to give 
your opinions on various topics. Some of the questions may make you feel a 
little uncomfortable. However, your participation in this study is entirely 
voluntary. If any aspect of the study makes you feel unduly uncomfortable or 
distressed at any stage, you may withdraw from the study without prejudice. 
Additionally, you may withdraw to participate at any time and without giving 
any reasons for your withdrawal. Withdrawal will not result in penalization of 
any kind.  If you wish to discuss any unpleasant or distressful thoughts or 
emotions that you experienced when completing the questionnaire, please 
feel free to do so with Mr. Simon Dunne after you have completed the 
questionnaire.    
The research will form the basis of reports, academic publications, 
conference papers and other scientific publications. The information that will 
be obtained from the study should greatly benefit the community by informing 
medical practitioners about attitudes towards health and healthcare methods. 
If you agree to take part in this study, all information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential. The form that you sign to give your consent to participate 
in the study will be kept in a secure location that is separate from where the 
completed questionnaire will be stored. All of the completed questionnaires 
will be kept for a minimum of five years. After this time they will be shredded 
and disposed of by Mr. Simon Dunne.  
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Should you require any further information on the study, or if you have any 
concerns about any aspect of it at a later stage, please do not hesitate to 
contact the principal investigator, Mr. Simon Dunne from the Dublin City 
University School of Nursing on 01 7007796. 
 
The Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee has approved this 
research project. If participants have concerns about this study and wish to 
contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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Principal Investigator: Simon Dunne  
Other Investigators: Dr. Pamela Gallagher; Dr. Anne Matthews 
Faculty:   DCU School of Nursing   
 
Please Circle “Yes” or “No” for the following questions, where 
appropriate. 
I confirm that I am between 40-55 years of age. 
          Yes / No 
 
I confirm that I have read the Plain Language Statement for the above project 
and that I understand the information provided therein.   
          Yes / No 
 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.       
          Yes / No 
I confirm that I have never experienced a major heart-related event (e.g. a 
heart attack)?          
          Yes / No 
I understand that this consent form will be kept in a location separate from the 
completed questionnaire and the questionnaire will only collect information 
that does not identify me by name.      
Yes / No 
 
I understand that the anonymous data collected in this study will be used to 
form the basis of reports, academic publications, conference papers and 
other scientific publications.     
Yes / No 
 
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without any 
penalisation for doing so.  
Yes / No 
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I have read and understood the information in this form.  The researchers 
have answered my questions and concerns, and I have a copy of this consent 
form.  Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project. 
 Participants Signature:        
 Name in Block Capitals:        
 Witness:           
 
  
 Date:            
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B3: Study 3 Plain Language Statement  
You are being asked to participate in a research study, which has been 
designed to investigate the relationship between personality characteristics 
and how well people can perform two tasks at the same time. Mr. Simon 
Dunne is carrying out this study in the Dublin City University School of 
Nursing, with assistance from Dr. Pamela Gallagher and Dr. Anne Matthews. 
The study is being funded by an Irish Research Council for the Humanities 
and Social Sciences Postgraduate Scholarship and a Science Foundation 
Ireland grant.  
You are eligible to take part if you are over 18 years of age and have not had 
a major heart related event (e.g. a heart attack). By agreeing to participate in 
this study, you are confirming that you are at least 18 years of age and have 
not had a major heart-related event. If you agree to take part in this study, you 
will be asked to complete the attached questionnaire. This questionnaire 
contains several sections of questions, which will ask you to give your 
opinions on various topics or to perform one or two simple tasks. Some of the 
questions may make you feel a little uncomfortable. However, your 
participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If any aspect of the study 
makes you feel unduly uncomfortable or distressed at any stage, you may 
withdraw from the study without prejudice. Additionally, you may withdraw at 
any time and without giving any reasons for your withdrawal. Withdrawal will 
not result in penalization of any kind.  If you wish to discuss any unpleasant or 
distressful thoughts or emotions that you experienced when completing the 
questionnaire, please feel free to do so with Mr. Simon Dunne after you have 
completed the questionnaire.    
The research will form the basis of reports, academic publications, 
conference papers and other scientific publications. The information that will 
be obtained from the study should greatly benefit the community by informing 
clinicians about attitudes towards health and healthcare methods. 
If you agree to take part in this study, all information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential. All of the completed questionnaires will be kept in a 
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secure location for a minimum of five years. After this time they will be 
shredded and disposed of by Mr. Simon Dunne. Involvement/non-involvement 
in this study will not affect your ongoing assessment/grades or your 
relationship with DCU in any way.  
Should you require any further information on the study, or if you have any 
concerns about any aspect of it at a later stage, please do not hesitate to 
contact the principal investigator, Mr. Simon Dunne from the Dublin City 
University School of Nursing on 01 7007796. 
 
The Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee has approved this 
research project. If participants have concerns about this study and wish to 
contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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B4: Study 4 Plain Language Statement and Consent Form 
You are being asked to participate in a research study, which investigates 
personal reactions towards various topics such as personal life experiences, 
aspects of health and better ways of knowing about your health. Mr. Simon 
Dunne is carrying out this study in the Dublin City University School of 
Nursing, with assistance from Dr. Pamela Gallagher and Dr. Anne Matthews. 
The study is being funded by a Science Foundation Ireland grant and an Irish 
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences Post-Graduate 
Scholarship. 
You are eligible to take part if you are between 40 and 55 years of age. If you 
agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. 
This questionnaire contains five sections of questions, which will ask you to 
give your opinions on various topics. Some of the questions may make you 
feel a little uncomfortable. However, your participation in this study is entirely 
voluntary. If any aspect of the study makes you feel unduly uncomfortable or 
distressed at any stage, you may withdraw from the study without prejudice. 
Additionally, you may withdraw to participate at any time and without giving 
any reasons for your withdrawal. Withdrawal will not result in penalization of 
any kind.  If you wish to discuss any unpleasant or distressful thoughts or 
emotions that you experienced when completing the questionnaire, please 
feel free to do so with Mr. Simon Dunne after you have completed the 
questionnaire.    
The research will form the basis of reports, academic publications, 
conference papers and other scientific publications. The information that will 
be obtained from the study should greatly benefit the community by informing 
medical practitioners about attitudes towards health and healthcare methods. 
If you agree to take part in this study, all information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential. The form that you sign to give your consent to participate 
in the study will be kept in a secure location that is separate from where the 
completed questionnaire will be stored. All of the completed questionnaires 
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will be kept for a minimum of five years. After this time they will be shredded 
and disposed of by Mr. Simon Dunne.  
Should you require any further information on the study, or if you have any 
concerns about any aspect of it at a later stage, please do not hesitate to 
contact the principal investigator, Mr. Simon Dunne from the Dublin City 
University School of Nursing on 01 7007796. 
 
The Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee has approved this 
research project. If participants have concerns about this study and wish to 
contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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Principal Investigator: Simon Dunne  
Other Investigators: Dr. Pamela Gallagher; Dr. Anne Matthews 
Faculty:   DCU School of Nursing   
 
Please Circle “Yes” or “No” for the following questions, where 
appropriate. 
 
I confirm that I am between 40-55 years of age. 
          Yes / No 
 
I confirm that I have read the Plain Language Statement for the above project 
and that I understand the information provided therein.   
          Yes / No 
 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.       
          Yes / No 
I understand that this consent form will be kept in a location separate from the 
completed questionnaire and the questionnaire will only collect information 
that does not identify me by name.      
Yes / No 
 
I understand that the anonymous data collected in this study will be used to 
form the basis of reports, academic publications, conference papers and 
other scientific publications.     
Yes / No 
 
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without any 
penalisation for doing so.  
Yes / No 
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I have read and understood the information in this form.  The researchers 
have answered my questions and concerns, and I have a copy of this consent 
form.  Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project. 
 Participants Signature:        
 Name in Block Capitals:        
 Witness:           
 
  
 Date:            
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STUDY 1 
C1: Mortality Salience Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 55-64   65-74   75+  
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU 
ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
 
How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
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Figure 1: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
 
Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
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The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
 
 
Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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C2: Heart Attack Salience Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 55-64   65-74   75+  
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF HAVING A HEART ATTACK AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY HAVE A HEART 
ATTACK AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY HAD A HEART 
ATTACK. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
 
How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
 
Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
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amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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C3: Control Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 55-64   65-74   75+  
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF EXPERIENCING DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE 
DENTAL PAIN AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCED 
DENTAL PAIN. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
 
How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
 
Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
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The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
 
 
Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
339 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STUDY 2 
D1: Mortality Salience Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU 
ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that people with just one risk factor for Cardiovascular Disease in 
middle age have a strong chance of developing the disease in later life. 
Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of death from 
Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 4: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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D2: Heart Attack Salience Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF HAVING A HEART ATTACK AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY HAVE A HEART 
ATTACK AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY HAD A HEART 
ATTACK. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
355 
On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that people with just one risk factor for Cardiovascular Disease in 
middle age have a strong chance of developing the disease in later life. 
Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of death from 
Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 5: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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D3: Control Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF EXPERIENCING DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE 
DENTAL PAIN AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCED 
DENTAL PAIN. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a couple of 
different passages and answer the questions that follow them. 
These questions will mainly ask you to give your opinion about 
certain aspects of the preceding passage. Please follow the 
instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order 
they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
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soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year.  
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that people with just one risk factor for Cardiovascular Disease in 
middle age have a strong chance of developing the disease in later life. 
Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of death from 
Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 6: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. 
Please turn over to the last page of the booklet for further instructions. 
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The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
379 
APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STUDY 3 
E1: Heart Attack Salience/Distraction Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 _____ 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
Please follow the instructions provided on the following pages and 
complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented.  
 
 
It is extremely important that you do not skip around, talk to 
anybody else who may be next to you about any of the questions 
or refer back to any previous part of the booklet. 
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On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF HAVING A HEART ATTACK AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY HAVE A HEART 
ATTACK AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY HAD A HEART 
ATTACK. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a short passage 
and answer the questions that follow it. These questions will 
mainly ask you to give your opinion about certain aspects of the 
preceding passage.  
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LITERATURE TASK 
 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
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stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Please complete the word fragments on the following page by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.   
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WORD COMPLETION TASK 
Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind.  
Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank 
you. 
 
1.  BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
 
2.  PLA _ _       15. KI _ _ ED 
 
3.  _ _ OK       16. CL _ _ K 
 
4.  WAT _ _       17. TAB _ _  
 
5.  DE _ _       18. W _ _ DOW 
 
6.  MU _ _       19. SK _ _ L 
 
7.  _ _ NG       20. TR _ _  
 
8.  B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
 
9.  M_ J _ R       22. COFF _ _ 
 
10. P _ _ TURE      23.  _ O _ SE 
 
11. FL _ W _ R      24. POST _ _ 
 
12. GRA _ _       25. R _ DI _ 
 
13. K _ _GS 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
388 
E2: Heart Attack Salience/Cognitive Load Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 _____ 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
Please follow the instructions provided on the following pages and 
complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented.  
 
 
It is extremely important that you do not skip around, talk to 
anybody else who may be next to you about any of the questions 
or refer back to any previous part of the booklet. 
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Please take no more than 30 seconds to memorise the following 
number, which you will be asked to recall later: 
 
98730524816 
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On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF HAVING A HEART ATTACK AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY HAVE A HEART 
ATTACK AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY HAD A HEART 
ATTACK. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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Please complete the word fragments on the following page by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.   
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WORD COMPLETION TASK 
Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind.  
Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank 
you. 
 
1.  BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
 
2.  PLA _ _       15. KI _ _ ED 
 
3.  _ _ OK       16. CL _ _ K 
 
4.  WAT _ _       17. TAB _ _  
 
5.  DE _ _       18. W _ _ DOW 
 
6.  MU _ _       19. SK _ _ L 
 
7.  _ _ NG       20. TR _ _  
 
8.  B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
 
9.  M_ J _ R       22. COFF _ _ 
 
10. P _ _ TURE      23.  _ O _ SE 
 
11. FL _ W _ R      24. POST _ _ 
 
12. GRA _ _       25. R _ DI _ 
 
13. K _ _GS 
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Please write down the 11-digit number that you were asked to 
memorise in the space below. Once you have done so you can 
forget it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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E3: Control/Distraction Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 _____ 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
Please follow the instructions provided on the following pages and 
complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented.  
 
 
It is extremely important that you do not skip around, talk to 
anybody else who may be next to you about any of the questions 
or refer back to any previous part of the booklet. 
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On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF EXPERIENCING DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE 
DENTAL PAIN AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCED 
DENTAL PAIN. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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On the following pages, you will be asked to read a short passage 
and answer the questions that follow it. These questions will 
mainly ask you to give your opinion about certain aspects of the 
preceding passage.  
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LITERATURE TASK 
 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the 
questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone 
trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—
first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet 
metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could 
be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible 
at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored 
to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame 
lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground 
and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. 
Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of 
light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back 
outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light 
from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man 
signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark 
motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far 
beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see 
on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man 
turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, 
turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the 
man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came 
back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an 
invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, 
the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining 
intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage 
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stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had 
soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying 
the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the 
black sky misty stars flickered.   
 
1. How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the 
story? (Please rate it on the following scale from 1-9, where 1 
indicates that it is not at all descriptive and 9 indicates that it is 
very descriptive) 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
            1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2.  Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ Male       _______ Female 
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Please complete the word fragments on the following page by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.   
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WORD COMPLETION TASK 
Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind.  
Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank 
you. 
 
1.  BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
 
2.  PLA _ _       15. KI _ _ ED 
 
3.  _ _ OK       16. CL _ _ K 
 
4.  WAT _ _       17. TAB _ _  
 
5.  DE _ _       18. W _ _ DOW 
 
6.  MU _ _       19. SK _ _ L 
 
7.  _ _ NG       20. TR _ _  
 
8.  B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
 
9.  M_ J _ R       22. COFF _ _ 
 
10. P _ _ TURE      23.  _ O _ SE 
 
11. FL _ W _ R      24. POST _ _ 
 
12. GRA _ _       25. R _ DI _ 
 
13. K _ _GS 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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E4: Control/Cognitive Load Questionnaire 
Please state your current age 
 
 _____ 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
Please follow the instructions provided on the following pages and 
complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented.  
 
 
It is extremely important that you do not skip around, talk to 
anybody else who may be next to you about any of the questions 
or refer back to any previous part of the booklet. 
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Please take no more than 30 seconds to memorise the following 
number, which you will be asked to recall later: 
 
98730524816 
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On the following page are two open-ended questions, please 
respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE 
THOUGHT OF EXPERIENCING DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE 
DENTAL PAIN AND ONCE YOU HAVE PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCED 
DENTAL PAIN. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________ 
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Please complete the word fragments on the following page by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.   
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WORD COMPLETION TASK 
Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind.  
Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank 
you. 
 
1.  BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
 
2.  PLA _ _       15. KI _ _ ED 
 
3.  _ _ OK       16. CL _ _ K 
 
4.  WAT _ _       17. TAB _ _  
 
5.  DE _ _       18. W _ _ DOW 
 
6.  MU _ _       19. SK _ _ L 
 
7.  _ _ NG       20. TR _ _  
 
8.  B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
 
9.  M_ J _ R       22. COFF _ _ 
 
10. P _ _ TURE      23.  _ O _ SE 
 
11. FL _ W _ R      24. POST _ _ 
 
12. GRA _ _       25. R _ DI _ 
 
13. K _ _GS 
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Please write down the 11-digit number that you were asked to 
memorise in the space below. Once you have done so you can 
forget it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STUDY 4 
F1: Creatureliness Prime/Self-Esteem Threat Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
In the following questionnaire booklet, you will be asked to 
complete several different questionnaires on various topics 
relating to personality and health. Please respond to them with 
your first, natural response.  
 
We are looking for people’s gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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LIFE EVENTS ASSESSMENT 
The following task asks you to think about and describe an important life 
event. Since life events help shape personality, knowing about some personal 
experiences you have had will help us better understand your personality. 
Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Remember, all of your responses are completely anonymous. 
 
PLEASE BRIEFLY THINK ABOUT AND DESCRIBE A TIME IN WHICH YOU 
FAILED TO LIVE UP TO ONE OF YOUR MOST IMPORTANT VALUES. 
THAT IS, DESCRIBE ONE OF YOUR GREATEST PERSONAL FAILURES. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
HOW DID THIS PERSONAL FAILURE MAKE YOU FEEL? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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On the following page you will receive an essay randomly selected 
from a pool of essays written by honour students at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. Please read the essay at your own pace. At 
the end of the study there will be a couple of questions about the 
essay. The questions will be looking for your first natural gut 
impression of the essay. 
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THE FOLLOWING SHORT ESSAY WAS A SENIOR HONORS STUDENT 
AT UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS. STUDENTS WERE ASKED TO 
WRITE ON THE TOPIC: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS I HAVE 
LEARNED ABOUT HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 
The boundary between humans and animals is not as great as most people 
think. Although we like to think that we are special and unique, our bodies 
work in pretty much the same way as the bodies of all other animals. Whether 
you're talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we're all made 
up of the same basic biological products. We're all made up of skin, blood, 
organs, and bones. We're all driven by needs for food, water, sex, and 
comfort. Although some people like to claim that we humans are vastly more 
intelligent than other animals, this doesn't really seem to be true. What 
appears to be the results of complex thought and free will is really just the 
result of our biological programming and simple learning experiences, just like 
all other animals. Research shows that chimps have the capacity for 
language, even pigeons are able to solve pretty complex problems, and all 
animals show caring for and attachment to their offspring. Human beings are 
just another species of animals, maybe a little more intelligent than others, but 
not different in any really important or meaningful way. Seeing ourselves as 
special or different from the cows we eat for lunch or the insects we wash off 
our windshields is just another example of human vanity and self-delusion. 
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WORD SEARCH PUZZLE 
 
Circle as many words as you can in the puzzle below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S R E T U P M O C O 
W P H O N E R E E B 
A M U S I C P Z S N 
B T N R O T C A S K 
B M R K S E D E A O 
R F O A G O L B R O 
E L G V I Z B O G B 
P A N U I N E L W Q 
A G T A B E T G D O 
P S C H O O L N I T 
 
 
 
Book  Computer   Beer    
Desk  Phone   Actor 
Movie  Train   Music  
Paper  School  Grass  
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that both males and females with just one risk factor for 
Cardiovascular Disease in middle age have a strong chance of developing 
the disease in later life. Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of 
death from Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for 
the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 1: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: Diagnostic Technology  
 
Diagnostic detection of risk factors for diseases like CVD is potentially 
becoming easier with technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip described 
earlier. Specifically, devices like the CVD Risk Biochip are being 
developed with a view to being used in the home as an indication for 
future risk of developing CVD.  Try to clearly imagine what it might be 
like to use a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip yourself (for example, 
using the device in your own home) and answer the questions that 
follow. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of 
the following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement. Please respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the 
CVD Risk Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily 
experiences. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk 
factors for a disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal 
to me.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and 
well-being that I experience from my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip draws my attention away from my own 
personal experiences of my body. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
5. I would be skeptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of general health and well-being from 
my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies 
like the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my 
body.   
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on 
risk factors make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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CVD Risk Biochip Pilot Study Sign-up Sheet (Optional) 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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Opinion Questionnaire 3: Literature Evaluation 
 
Please recall the earlier essay that was presented in the Questionnaire 
Booklet concerning “The most important things that I have learned about 
human nature” and answer the questions that follow. Please respond to 
them with your first, natural response.   
 
1. How much do you think you would like this person? 
         Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. How intelligent do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very intelligent 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
3. How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very knowledgeable 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
4. Is this person’s opinion well-informed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very well-informed 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
5. How much do you agree with this person’s opinion? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
6. From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s 
opinion is of the topic they discussed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very true 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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F2: Creatureliness Prime/Self-Esteem Bolster Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
In the following questionnaire booklet, you will be asked to 
complete several different questionnaires on various topics 
relating to personality and health. Please respond to them with 
your first, natural response.  
 
We are looking for people’s gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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LIFE EVENTS ASSESSMENT 
The following task asks you to think about and describe an important life 
event. Since life events help shape personality, knowing about some personal 
experiences you have had will help us better understand your personality. 
Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Remember, all of your responses are completely anonymous. 
 
PLEASE BRIEFLY THINK ABOUT AND DESCRIBE A TIME IN WHICH YOU 
SUCCESSFULLY LIVED UP TO ONE OF YOUR MOST IMPORTANT 
VALUES. THAT IS, DESCRIBE ONE OF YOUR GREATEST PERSONAL 
SUCCESSES. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
HOW DID THIS PERSONAL SUCCESS MAKE YOU FEEL? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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On the following page you will receive an essay randomly selected 
from a pool of essays written by honour students at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. Please read the essay at your own pace. At 
the end of the study there will be a couple of questions about the 
essay. The questions will be looking for your first natural gut 
impression of the essay. 
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THE FOLLOWING SHORT ESSAY WAS A SENIOR HONORS STUDENT 
AT UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS. STUDENTS WERE ASKED TO 
WRITE ON THE TOPIC: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS I HAVE 
LEARNED ABOUT HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 
The boundary between humans and animals is not as great as most people 
think. Although we like to think that we are special and unique, our bodies 
work in pretty much the same way as the bodies of all other animals. Whether 
you're talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we're all made 
up of the same basic biological products. We're all made up of skin, blood, 
organs, and bones. We're all driven by needs for food, water, sex, and 
comfort. Although some people like to claim that we humans are vastly more 
intelligent than other animals, this doesn't really seem to be true. What 
appears to be the results of complex thought and free will is really just the 
result of our biological programming and simple learning experiences, just like 
all other animals. Research shows that chimps have the capacity for 
language, even pigeons are able to solve pretty complex problems, and all 
animals show caring for and attachment to their offspring. Human beings are 
just another species of animals, maybe a little more intelligent than others, but 
not different in any really important or meaningful way. Seeing ourselves as 
special or different from the cows we eat for lunch or the insects we wash off 
our windshields is just another example of human vanity and self-delusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
433 
WORD SEARCH PUZZLE 
 
Circle as many words as you can in the puzzle below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S R E T U P M O C O 
W P H O N E R E E B 
A M U S I C P Z S N 
B T N R O T C A S K 
B M R K S E D E A O 
R F O A G O L B R O 
E L G V I Z B O G B 
P A N U I N E L W Q 
A G T A B E T G D O 
P S C H O O L N I T 
 
Book  Computer   Beer    
Desk  Phone   Actor 
Movie  Train   Music  
Paper  School  Grass  
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that both males and females with just one risk factor for 
Cardiovascular Disease in middle age have a strong chance of developing 
the disease in later life. Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of 
death from Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for 
the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 7: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: Diagnostic Technology  
 
Diagnostic detection of risk factors for diseases like CVD is potentially 
becoming easier with technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip described 
earlier. Specifically, devices like the CVD Risk Biochip are being 
developed with a view to being used in the home as an indication for 
future risk of developing CVD.  Try to clearly imagine what it might be 
like to use a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip yourself (for example, 
using the device in your own home) and answer the questions that 
follow. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of 
the following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement. Please respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the 
CVD Risk Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily 
experiences. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk 
factors for a disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal 
to me.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and 
well-being that I experience from my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip draws my attention away from my own 
personal experiences of my body. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
5. I would be skeptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of general health and well-being from 
my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies 
like the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my 
body.   
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on 
risk factors make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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CVD Risk Biochip Pilot Study Sign-up Sheet (Optional) 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
445 
Opinion Questionnaire 3: Literature Evaluation 
 
Please recall the earlier essay that was presented in the Questionnaire 
Booklet concerning “The most important things that I have learned about 
human nature” and answer the questions that follow. Please respond to 
them with your first, natural response.   
 
1. How much do you think you would like this person? 
         Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. How intelligent do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very intelligent 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
3. How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very knowledgeable 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
4. Is this person’s opinion well-informed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very well-informed 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
5. How much do you agree with this person’s opinion? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
6. From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s 
opinion is of the topic they discussed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very true 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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F3: Uniqueness Prime/Self-Esteem Threat Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
In the following questionnaire booklet, you will be asked to 
complete several different questionnaires on various topics 
relating to personality and health. Please respond to them with 
your first, natural response.  
 
We are looking for people’s gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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LIFE EVENTS ASSESSMENT 
The following task asks you to think about and describe an important life 
event. Since life events help shape personality, knowing about some personal 
experiences you have had will help us better understand your personality. 
Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Remember, all of your responses are completely anonymous. 
 
PLEASE BRIEFLY THINK ABOUT AND DESCRIBE A TIME IN WHICH YOU 
FAILED TO LIVE UP TO ONE OF YOUR MOST IMPORTANT VALUES. 
THAT IS, DESCRIBE ONE OF YOUR GREATEST PERSONAL FAILURES. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
HOW DID THIS PERSONAL FAILURE MAKE YOU FEEL? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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On the following page you will receive an essay randomly selected 
from a pool of essays written by honour students at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. Please read the essay at your own pace. At 
the end of the study there will be a couple of questions about the 
essay. The questions will be looking for your first natural gut 
impression of the essay. 
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THE FOLLOWING SHORT ESSAY WAS A SENIOR HONORS STUDENT 
AT UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS. STUDENTS WERE ASKED TO 
WRITE ON THE TOPIC: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS I HAVE 
LEARNED ABOUT HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 
The one thing that my education has made clear to me is that, although we 
humans have some things in common with other animals, human beings are 
truly unique. Although our bodies may be pretty similar to simpler species, the 
potential of the human mind and spirit go far beyond anything remotely similar 
to what is found in simple animals. First there are the obvious things: Humans 
have language and culture. We create works of art, music, and literature that 
enable us to live in an abstract world of the imagination -- something no other 
animal is capable of. Although simple animals may communicate with grunts 
and groans, and chimps can be taught basic sign language by humans, this is 
a far cry from the complex and inspiring works of human culture: 
Shakespeare, Beethoven, and Picasso, to name just a few. Unlike animals, 
humans live in a world of ideas and concepts, morals and values. We can 
even come to understand ourselves, as in the works of the great philosophers 
and psychologists. More importantly, humans have the capacity for love, 
generosity, and kindness ---- putting the welfare of others above themselves. 
We are not simple selfish creatures driven by hunger and lust, but complex 
individuals with a will of our own, capable of making choices, and creating our 
own destinies. Although we certainly have some things in common with 
simple animals, we humans are truly special and unique. 
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WORD SEARCH PUZZLE 
 
Circle as many words as you can in the puzzle below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S R E T U P M O C O 
W P H O N E R E E B 
A M U S I C P Z S N 
B T N R O T C A S K 
B M R K S E D E A O 
R F O A G O L B R O 
E L G V I Z B O G B 
P A N U I N E L W Q 
A G T A B E T G D O 
P S C H O O L N I T 
 
Book  Computer   Beer    
Desk  Phone   Actor 
Movie  Train   Music  
Paper  School  Grass  
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that both males and females with just one risk factor for 
Cardiovascular Disease in middle age have a strong chance of developing 
the disease in later life. Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of 
death from Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for 
the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
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How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 1: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: Diagnostic Technology  
 
Diagnostic detection of risk factors for diseases like CVD is potentially 
becoming easier with technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip described 
earlier. Specifically, devices like the CVD Risk Biochip are being 
developed with a view to being used in the home as an indication for 
future risk of developing CVD.  Try to clearly imagine what it might be 
like to use a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip yourself (for example, 
using the device in your own home) and answer the questions that 
follow. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of 
the following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement. Please respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the 
CVD Risk Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily 
experiences. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk 
factors for a disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal 
to me.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and 
well-being that I experience from my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip draws my attention away from my own 
personal experiences of my body. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
5. I would be skeptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of general health and well-being from 
my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies 
like the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my 
body.   
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on 
risk factors make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
462 
CVD Risk Biochip Pilot Study Sign-up Sheet (Optional) 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
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Opinion Questionnaire 3: Literature Evaluation 
 
Please recall the earlier essay that was presented in the Questionnaire 
Booklet concerning “The most important things that I have learned about 
human nature” and answer the questions that follow. Please respond to 
them with your first, natural response.   
 
1. How much do you think you would like this person? 
         Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. How intelligent do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very intelligent 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
3. How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very knowledgeable 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
4. Is this person’s opinion well-informed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very well-informed 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
5. How much do you agree with this person’s opinion? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
6. From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s 
opinion is of the topic they discussed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very true 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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F4: Uniqueness Prime/Self-Esteem Bolster Questionnaire 
Please state your current age: ____ 
 
 
 
Please state your sex 
 
 
 Male        Female  
 
 
 
In the following questionnaire booklet, you will be asked to 
complete several different questionnaires on various topics 
relating to personality and health. Please respond to them with 
your first, natural response.  
 
We are looking for people’s gut-level reactions to these 
questions. 
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LIFE EVENTS ASSESSMENT 
The following task asks you to think about and describe an important life 
event. Since life events help shape personality, knowing about some personal 
experiences you have had will help us better understand your personality. 
Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Remember, all of your responses are completely anonymous. 
 
PLEASE BRIEFLY THINK ABOUT AND DESCRIBE A TIME IN WHICH YOU 
SUCCESSFULLY LIVED UP TO ONE OF YOUR MOST IMPORTANT 
VALUES. THAT IS, DESCRIBE ONE OF YOUR GREATEST PERSONAL 
SUCCESSES. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
HOW DID THIS PERSONAL SUCCESS MAKE YOU FEEL? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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On the following page you will receive an essay randomly selected 
from a pool of essays written by honour students at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. Please read the essay at your own pace. At 
the end of the study there will be a couple of questions about the 
essay. The questions will be looking for your first natural gut 
impression of the essay. 
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THE FOLLOWING SHORT ESSAY WAS A SENIOR HONORS STUDENT 
AT UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS. STUDENTS WERE ASKED TO 
WRITE ON THE TOPIC: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS I HAVE 
LEARNED ABOUT HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 
The one thing that my education has made clear to me is that, although we 
humans have some things in common with other animals, human beings are 
truly unique. Although our bodies may be pretty similar to simpler species, the 
potential of the human mind and spirit go far beyond anything remotely similar 
to what is found in simple animals. First there are the obvious things: Humans 
have language and culture. We create works of art, music, and literature that 
enable us to live in an abstract world of the imagination -- something no other 
animal is capable of. Although simple animals may communicate with grunts 
and groans, and chimps can be taught basic sign language by humans, this is 
a far cry from the complex and inspiring works of human culture: 
Shakespeare, Beethoven, and Picasso, to name just a few. Unlike animals, 
humans live in a world of ideas and concepts, morals and values. We can 
even come to understand ourselves, as in the works of the great philosophers 
and psychologists. More importantly, humans have the capacity for love, 
generosity, and kindness ---- putting the welfare of others above themselves. 
We are not simple selfish creatures driven by hunger and lust, but complex 
individuals with a will of our own, capable of making choices, and creating our 
own destinies. Although we certainly have some things in common with 
simple animals, we humans are truly special and unique. 
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WORD SEARCH PUZZLE 
 
Circle as many words as you can in the puzzle below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S R E T U P M O C O 
W P H O N E R E E B 
A M U S I C P Z S N 
B T N R O T C A S K 
B M R K S E D E A O 
R F O A G O L B R O 
E L G V I Z B O G B 
P A N U I N E L W Q 
A G T A B E T G D O 
P S C H O O L N I T 
 
 
Book  Computer   Beer    
Desk  Phone   Actor 
Movie  Train   Music  
Paper  School  Grass  
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: The “CVD Risk Biochip”  
 
Please read the following short passage about a new diagnostic device 
called The “CVD Risk Biochip” and answer the questions below it. 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip System for Assessing Cardiac Risk 
“Cardiovascular Disease” is any disease that affects the heart or the system 
of blood vessels leading to and from the heart. According to the American 
Heart Association, such diseases cause more deaths globally each year than 
any other disease (approximately 30% of all deaths). Also, the World Health 
Organisation has estimated that at least 20 million people survive heart 
attacks and strokes every year. Many of these survivors require constant 
clinical care. This results in a significant number of people with 
Cardiovascular Disease going through the healthcare system every year. In 
fact, it is estimated that the disease costs every EU citizen approximately 
€230 in healthcare per year. The disease also affects the lives of 
approximately 4.4 million EU citizens every year. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that high risk for developing 
Cardiovascular Disease begins in middle-age. In particular, this research has 
shown that both males and females with just one risk factor for 
Cardiovascular Disease in middle age have a strong chance of developing 
the disease in later life. Furthermore, such people have a much higher risk of 
death from Cardiovascular Disease and a shorter estimated survival time for 
the disease. 
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin is developing a 
diagnostic system that assesses a person’s risk of getting Cardiovascular 
Disease. This system is being designed to be relatively simple to use in order 
to enable a quick and easy assessment of cardiac risk. By doing so, the BDI 
hopes to move cardiac risk assessment into General Practitioners’ offices, 
ambulances and the home. These factors could reduce the amount of money 
spent by EU tax-payers on healthcare for Cardiovascular Disease every year.  
  
 
 
471 
 
 
How it Works 
The system consists of two components; a “CVD Risk Biochip” and a “CVD 
Risk Biochip” reader.  The “CVD Risk Biochip” is a small device that will 
detect the concentration levels of a number of different proteins in the blood. 
Taken together, the concentration levels of these proteins can indicate a 
person’s risk for developing future cardiac problems.  
 
 
Figure 1: CVD Risk Biochip (approximate size) 
 
The system works on a similar principal to the Blood Glucose Meters that 
diabetics use to measure the concentration levels of glucose in the blood. In 
the case of the CVD Risk Biochip, a pinprick of blood would be taken from the 
patient and would then be placed on to the sample zone of the CVD Risk 
Biochip. Figure 2 illustrates how the device could work. Tiny structures on the 
chip allow the pinprick of blood to flow from the sample zone across the 
surface of the chip (Figure 2ii). The blood flows along the chip until it reaches 
a number of detection zones (Figure 2iii). Each detection zone is capable of 
detecting the presence of a specific protein in the blood.  
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Figure 2: CVD Risk Biochip (Component Parts) 
 
The chip is then inserted into the CVD Risk Biochip Reader to measure the 
concentration levels of the proteins of interest. Once inserted into the Reader, 
a certain amount of fluorescent light is emitted from each detection zone. The 
amount of light emitted from a detection zone indicates the concentration 
level of the appropriate protein that is present in the blood. The Reader 
measures the amount of fluorescent light coming from each of the detection 
zones on the CVD Risk Biochip and indicates these concentration levels in a 
display. When taken together, these concentration levels can show a person’s 
risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease.  
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Figure 3: CVD Risk Biochip and Reader 
 
Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement.  
 
1. The CVD Risk Biochip is an exciting new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
2. Diagnostic testing should be left to the professionals. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel empowered about my 
health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. The CVD Risk Biochip will only serve to frighten people about 
their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
5. The CVD Risk Biochip is a valuable new device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
6. Moving diagnostic testing from hospital settings to the home is a 
great idea. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
7. The CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel anxious.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
8. The CVD Risk Biochip will encourage people to take a more active 
approach to their health. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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9. The CVD Risk Biochip is an unnecessary device. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
10. If I saw this device in a supermarket or pharmacy, it is highly 
likely that I would buy it. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
11. If my GP recommended that I use this device, it is highly likely 
that I would use it.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
12. The CVD Risk Biochip sounds like it could be a useful device but I 
probably wouldn’t use it myself. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
13. At this moment, I feel particularly motivated to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
14. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip is 
particularly unappealing. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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15. At this moment, the thought of using the CVD Risk Biochip makes 
me feel uncomfortable. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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Opinion Questionnaire 2: Diagnostic Technology  
 
Diagnostic detection of risk factors for diseases like CVD is potentially 
becoming easier with technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip described 
earlier. Specifically, devices like the CVD Risk Biochip are being 
developed with a view to being used in the home as an indication for 
future risk of developing CVD.  Try to clearly imagine what it might be 
like to use a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip yourself (for example, 
using the device in your own home) and answer the questions that 
follow. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of 
the following statements by circling the appropriate number below the 
statement. Please respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
1. The risk factor information I receive from a diagnostic test like the 
CVD Risk Biochip cannot be easily related to my own bodily 
experiences. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
2. Using a technology like the CVD Risk Biochip to detect risk 
factors for a disease that I cannot feel with my body seems unreal 
to me.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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3. Risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk 
Biochip are more important than my own sense of health and 
well-being that I experience from my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
 
4. Focusing on risk factor results from diagnostic technologies like 
the CVD Risk Biochip draws my attention away from my own 
personal experiences of my body. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
5. I would be skeptical about results from a device like the CVD Risk 
Biochip that reveal a measure of risk for developing CVD that I do 
not feel relate to my feelings of general health and well-being from 
my body.  
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
6. Thinking about risk factor results from diagnostic technologies 
like the CVD Risk Biochip makes me feel passive towards my 
body.   
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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7. Diagnostic technologies like the CVD Risk Biochip that focus on 
risk factors make me less reliant on my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
 Strongly     Somewhat                      Somewhat     Strongly 
 Disagree     Disagree      Neutral            Agree           Agree 
        1                   2                        3                   4             5 
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CVD Risk Biochip Pilot Study Sign-up Sheet (Optional) 
 
The CVD Risk Biochip is currently being finalised in the laboratory. However, 
once the chip is ready for the marketplace, the developers may require some 
people to test the device in a pilot investigation. If you would be interested in 
taking part in such a test of the device, please provide your contact details in 
the space below. These contact details will be kept in a secure location and 
would only be forwarded on to the CVD Risk Biochip developers should the 
pilot investigation go ahead.  This information will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be made available to any other third party. 
 
 
Name Phone Number Address 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
481 
Opinion Questionnaire 3: Literature Evaluation 
 
Please recall the earlier essay that was presented in the Questionnaire 
Booklet concerning “The most important things that I have learned about 
human nature” and answer the questions that follow. Please respond to 
them with your first, natural response.   
 
1. How much do you think you would like this person? 
         Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
2. How intelligent do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very intelligent 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
3. How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very knowledgeable 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
4. Is this person’s opinion well-informed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very well-informed 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
5. How much do you agree with this person’s opinion? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very much 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
 
6. From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s 
opinion is of the topic they discussed? 
    Not at all       Somewhat         Very true 
1      2      3       4      5       6       7        8       9 
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You have now reached the end of the questionnaire booklet. 
Please inform the principal investigator that you have finished and 
you will be provided with a debriefing sheet and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about the 
study. 
 
Thank you!!! 
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APPENDIX G: DEBRIEFING SHEETS  
G1: Study 1 Debriefing Sheet 
This research project is entitled “Psychosocial Aspects of Biomedical 
Diagnostics”. We are interested in finding out whether or not anxieties about 
death could have an impact on people’s use of a new device called the “CVD 
Risk Biochip”. As detailed in the questionnaire you have just completed, this 
new device is being developed as a quick and easy method of assessing a 
person’s risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease. Cardiovascular Disease 
is an illness where death is a very real consequence. As a result, thoughts 
about receiving a diagnosis of Cardiovascular Disease may trigger high levels 
of death anxiety in people who are given the option to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. These people may avoid the use of this device in order to avoid the 
death anxiety that may come with its use.  
 
In this research project, we are interested in whether or not anxieties about 
death could have an influence on people’s intention to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip (e.g. in the home or in a GP’s office). We are also interested in 
people’s attitudes towards this device when they encounter death anxiety. 
People are generally not aware of their anxieties about death and how they 
affect their everyday lives. Nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated 
that anxieties about death can prevent people from participating in cancer 
screening behaviours that are potentially beneficial to their health and well 
being. We hope to expand on this research by investigating if anxieties about 
death could be a barrier to using the CVD Risk Biochip in the home. The 
results of this study will hopefully identify if a pattern exists in screening for 
illnesses with a high mortality rate, whereby death anxiety acts as a barrier to 
participating in these behaviours. Identifying such a pattern would allow for 
medical professionals to take account of this barrier to screening behaviours 
in the future. 
 
In order to test these effects of death anxiety, we have placed participants in 
this study in one of three groups. We have given the first group a 
questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended questions that ask them to 
write about what they think will happen to them when they die. We have given 
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the second group a questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended 
questions that ask them to write about what they think will happen to them 
when they have a heart attack. As a comparison to these two groups, we 
have given the third group a questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended 
questions that ask them to write about what they think will happen to them 
when they experience dental pain.  
 
As previously mentioned, people are generally not aware of the effects that 
their anxieties about death can have on their everyday lives. Therefore, the 
next part of the questionnaire booklet contains a neutral distracting task (a 
reading comprehension task) that is designed to remove thoughts of death, 
heart attacks or dental pain from conscious awareness. With death, heart 
attack or dental pain concerns now outside of focal awareness, we asked 
participants about their attitudes and intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip.  
 
We predict that thoughts of death or having a heart attack will reduce people’s 
desire to use the CVD Risk Biochip compared to thoughts of dental pain. We 
also predict that thoughts of death or having a heart attack will give people 
more negative attitudes towards the device than thoughts of dental pain. As a 
result, we expect to find significantly fewer people to express intentions to use 
the CVD Risk Biochip in the groups who we are asking to think about death or 
having a heart attack compared to the group who we are asking to think about 
dental pain. Similarly, we expect to find significantly more negative attitudes 
towards the device in the groups who we are asking to think about death or 
having a heart attack compared to the group who we are asking to think about 
dental pain. 
 
Please note that we are only using the back page of the questionnaire booklet 
(where you were given the option to supply your contact details) as a way of 
measuring intentions to use the device. As a result, any contact details that 
you may have supplied on this sheet will not be used by any third party and 
will now be detached from the rest of the questionnaire booklet and torn up. 
Please also note that the full nature of this research had to be hidden from 
you from the outset of the study. This is because the study involves the 
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effects of death anxiety on attitudes and intentions. If you had known that the 
study involved the effects of death anxiety on your attitudes and intentions to 
use the CVD Risk Biochip, research suggests that you may have biased your 
responses. Many previous studies have used a similar method to this one in 
order to remove this bias. 
  
The project is funded by a Science Foundation Ireland Centres for Science, 
Engineering & Technology grant, via the Biomedical Diagnostics Institute 
(BDI) in Dublin City University. If you have any further questions about the 
research project, please feel free to contact Mr. Simon Dunne, now or at a 
later stage on 01 7007796. The School of Nursing, via the “Healthy Living 
Centre” have recently established AKOS a “Centre for Psychological Health 
and Well Being”, which would provide support, should the need arise. 
Alternatively, if you wish to contact an independent person in relation to your 
concerns, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City University Research 
Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, Dublin City 
University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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G2: Study 2 Debriefing Sheet 
This research project is entitled “Existential Concerns in Point-of-Care 
Testing”. We are interested in finding out whether or not anxieties about death 
could have an impact on people’s use of a new device called the “CVD Risk 
Biochip”. As detailed in the questionnaire you have just completed, this new 
device is being developed as a quick and easy method of assessing a 
person’s risk for developing Cardiovascular Disease. Cardiovascular Disease 
is an illness where death is a very real consequence. As a result, thoughts 
about receiving a diagnosis of Cardiovascular Disease may trigger high levels 
of death anxiety in people who are given the option to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip. These people may avoid the use of this device in order to avoid the 
death anxiety that may come with its use.  
 
In this research project, we are interested in whether or not anxieties about 
death could have an influence on people’s intention to use the CVD Risk 
Biochip (e.g. in the home or in a GP’s office). We are also interested in 
people’s attitudes towards this device when they encounter death anxiety. 
People are generally not aware of their anxieties about death and how they 
affect their everyday lives. Nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated 
that anxieties about death can prevent people from participating in cancer 
screening behaviours that are potentially beneficial to their health and well 
being. We hope to expand on this research by investigating if anxieties about 
death could be a barrier to using the CVD Risk Biochip in the home. The 
results of this study will hopefully identify if a pattern exists in screening for 
illnesses with a high mortality rate, whereby death anxiety acts as a barrier to 
participating in these behaviours. Identifying such a pattern would allow for 
medical professionals to take account of this barrier to screening behaviours 
in the future. 
 
In order to test these effects of death anxiety, we have placed participants in 
this study in one of three groups. We have given the first group a 
questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended questions that ask them to 
write about what they think will happen to them when they die. We have given 
the second group a questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended 
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questions that ask them to write about what they think will happen to them 
when they have a heart attack. As a comparison to these two groups, we 
have given the third group a questionnaire booklet containing two-open ended 
questions that ask them to write about what they think will happen to them 
when they experience dental pain.  
 
As previously mentioned, people are generally not aware of the effects that 
their anxieties about death can have on their everyday lives. Therefore, the 
next part of the questionnaire booklet contains a neutral distracting task (a 
reading comprehension task) that is designed to remove thoughts of death, 
heart attacks or dental pain from conscious awareness. With death, heart 
attack or dental pain concerns now outside of focal awareness, we asked 
participants about their attitudes and intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip.  
 
We predict that thoughts of death or having a heart attack will reduce people’s 
desire to use the CVD Risk Biochip compared to thoughts of dental pain. We 
also predict that thoughts of death or having a heart attack will give people 
more negative attitudes towards the device than thoughts of dental pain. As a 
result, we expect to find significantly fewer people to express intentions to use 
the CVD Risk Biochip in the groups who we are asking to think about death or 
having a heart attack compared to the group who we are asking to think about 
dental pain. Similarly, we expect to find significantly more negative attitudes 
towards the device in the groups who we are asking to think about death or 
having a heart attack compared to the group who we are asking to think about 
dental pain. 
 
Please note that we are only using the back page of the questionnaire booklet 
(where you were given the option to supply your contact details) as a way of 
measuring intentions to use the device. As a result, any contact details that 
you may have supplied on this sheet will not be used by any third party and 
will now be detached from the rest of the questionnaire booklet and torn up. 
Please also note that the full nature of this research had to be hidden from 
you from the outset of the study. This is because the study involves the 
effects of death anxiety on attitudes and intentions. If you had known that the 
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study involved the effects of death anxiety on your attitudes and intentions to 
use the CVD Risk Biochip, research suggests that you may have biased your 
responses. Many previous studies have used a similar method to this one in 
order to remove this bias. 
  
The project is funded by a Science Foundation Ireland Centres for Science, 
Engineering & Technology grant, via the Biomedical Diagnostics Institute 
(BDI) in Dublin City University and an Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences Post-Graduate Scholarship. If you have any 
further questions about the research project, please feel free to contact Mr. 
Simon Dunne, now or at a later stage on 01 7007796. The School of Nursing, 
via the “Healthy Living Centre” have recently established AKOS a “Centre for 
Psychological Health and Well Being”, which would provide support, should 
the need arise. Alternatively, if you wish to contact an independent person in 
relation to your concerns, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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G3: Study 3 Debriefing Sheet 
The study that you have just participated in is part of a research project 
entitled “Existential Concerns in Point-of-Care Testing”. This research project 
is chiefly interested in whether or not death-related issues like thinking about 
your own death or thinking about having a heart attack could act as a barrier 
to people’s participation in screening behaviours for Cardiovascular Disease.  
 
Previous research in “Terror Management Theory” has demonstrated that 
people try to suppress death-related issues immediately after they are asked 
to think about them. In other words, death-related thoughts that are in 
people’s immediate conscious awareness are initially suppressed.  In 
contrast, research has found that death-related thoughts that are just below 
conscious awareness are extremely well recalled by people. Conditions 
where death-related thoughts are thought to be “just below conscious 
awareness” include; (a) when a delay or distraction follows someone’s 
conscious thoughts concerning death and (b) when someone thinks about 
death when they are pre-occupied with other thoughts. 
 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate if people are better able to 
recall death-related issues after they are asked to think about a death-related 
topic (in this case thoughts about having a heart attack) when they are pre-
occupied with other thoughts or when they are asked to think about this 
death-related topic and subsequently distracted. Additionally, we are 
interested in whether or not people are better able to recall death-related 
issues after they are asked to think about this death-related topic and 
distracted or pre-occupied with other thoughts than when they are asked to 
think about the death-neutral alternative topic of dental pain and subsequently 
distracted or pre-occupied with other thoughts. In order to test these ideas, 
we have placed participants in our study into one of four groups.  
 
Participants in the first two groups are given a measure of “preoccupation with 
other thoughts” and a death-related topic or death-neutral topic to think about. 
The first group are initially asked to memorise a number, which they are 
instructed to keep in their mind in order that they may easily recall it later. 
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This is a measure which is thought to provide a condition of pre-occupied 
thoughts for participants. They are then prompted to think about having a 
heart attack (the death-related topic) and given a task to perform that is 
thought to demonstrate the recall of death-related issues over non-death-
related issues (the “word completion task”). Finally, participants in this group 
are prompted to recall the number they were asked to memorise. Similarly, 
participants in the second group are initially asked to memorise this number in 
the same way and are subsequently prompted to think about the death-
neutral alternative topic of dental pain. These participants then complete the 
“word completion task” and are prompted to recall the number they were 
asked to memorise.  
 
Participants in the third and fourth groups are distracted from a death-related 
topic or death-neutral topic after they are prompted to engage in it. Those 
participants in the third group are initially asked to think about having a heart 
attack (the death-related topic) and are then given a task to perform that is 
thought to provide a distraction from this topic (the “literature task”). They are 
then instructed to perform the “word completion task”. In a similar fashion, 
participants in the fourth group are initially asked to think about dental pain 
(the death-neutral topic) and are prompted to complete the “literature task”. 
Finally, these participants are instructed to perform the “word completion 
task”.  
 
By comparing the results of the “word completion task” across the various 
groups described above, we hope to uncover whether or not participants from 
the different groups display differences in their recall of death-related words. 
 
Please note that the full nature of this research had to be hidden from you 
from the outset of the study. This is because the study involves the effects of 
thoughts about death on subsequent recall of death-related words. If you had 
known that the study involved such a topic, research suggests that you may 
have biased your responses. Many previous studies have used a similar 
method to this one in order to remove this bias. 
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The project is funded by an Irish Research Council for the Humanities and 
Social Sciences Postgraduate Scholarship and a Science Foundation Ireland 
Centres for Science, Engineering & Technology grant, via the Biomedical 
Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin City University. If you have any further 
questions about or concerns arising from the research project, please feel 
free to contact Mr. Simon Dunne, now or at a later stage on 01 7007796. 
Alternatively, if you wish to contact an independent person in relation to your 
concerns, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City University Research 
Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, Dublin City 
University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000. 
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G4: Study 4 Debriefing Sheet 
This research project is entitled “Existential Concerns in Point-of-Care 
Testing”. We are interested in finding out whether or not anxieties about death 
could have an impact on people’s gut-level responses towards the “CVD Risk 
Biochip”. As detailed in the questionnaire you have just completed, this device 
was planned as a quick and easy method of assessing a person’s risk for 
developing Cardiovascular Disease. Cardiovascular Disease is an illness 
where death is a very real consequence. As a result, thoughts about receiving 
a diagnosis of Cardiovascular Disease may trigger mortality concerns in 
people who are given the option to use the CVD Risk Biochip. These people 
may exhibit unfavourable responses towards this device in order to avoid the 
mortality concerns that may be associated with its use.  
 
In this research project, we are interested in whether or not getting people to 
think about mortality-related concerns could have an influence on people’s 
intention to use the proposed CVD Risk Biochip (e.g. in the home or in a GP’s 
office). We are also interested in people’s attitudes towards the proposed 
device when they encounter these mortality concerns. People are generally 
not aware of their anxieties about their mortality and how they affect their 
everyday lives. Nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated that mortality 
concerns can prevent people from participating in cancer screening 
behaviours that are potentially beneficial to their health and well being. We 
hope to expand on this research by investigating if mortality concerns could 
be a barrier to using a device such as the CVD Risk Biochip in the home. The 
results of this study will hopefully identify if a pattern exists in screening for 
illnesses with a high mortality rate, whereby mortality concerns acts as a 
barrier to participating in these behaviours. Identifying such a pattern would 
allow for medical professionals to take account of such barriers to screening 
behaviours in the future. 
 
We are also interested in two additional ideas with the current study. Firstly, it 
has been suggested that high self-esteem is a protective factor for people 
against mortality concerns, whereas low self-esteem makes people more 
vulnerable towards such concerns. Additionally, we are also interested in the 
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possibility that the device described here gives risk information that appears 
surreal or remote to people, thereby promoting diminished feelings of 
responsibility towards their personal health.   
 
In order to test these ideas, we have placed participants in this study in one of 
four groups. Participants in the first two groups are initially asked to describe 
a time when they succeeded in living up to one of their most important values. 
This measure has been used in previous research as a way of boosting 
participants’ self-esteem temporarily. After this is completed, participants in 
the first group are then given an essay to read that emphasises the similarity 
of humans to other animals. This measure has been used in previous 
research as a way of getting participants to think explicitly about mortality 
concerns (i.e. by getting them to think about how similar all humans are to 
other animals). In contrast to this measure, participants in the second group 
are given an essay to read that emphasises the uniqueness of humans as 
compared to other animals. This measure has been used in previous 
research to provide a comparison group to the first group, where participants 
are given a topic to think about that may serve to protect them from mortality 
concerns. 
 
Participants in the third and fourth group are initially asked to describe a time 
when they failed in living up to one of their most important values. This 
measure has been used in previous research as a way of lowering 
participants’ self-esteem temporarily. In a similar fashion to the first and 
second groups, participants in the third group then receive the essay that 
emphasises the similarity of humans to other animals and participants in the 
fourth group then receive the essay that emphasises the uniqueness of 
humans as compared to other animals. 
 
As previously mentioned, people are generally not aware of the effects that 
mortality concerns can have on their everyday lives. Therefore, the next part 
of the questionnaire booklet contains a neutral distracting task (a word search 
task) that is designed to remove thoughts about the human similarity to other 
animals or the human uniqueness compared to other animals from conscious 
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awareness. With such concerns now outside of focal awareness, we ask 
participants about their attitudes and intentions to use the CVD Risk Biochip. 
Additionally, we included a questionnaire for participants to complete 
concerning the extent that they consider the risk information from the CVD 
Risk Biochip appears surreal or remote to them. 
 
We predict that mortality concerns will reduce people’s desire to use the 
proposed CVD Risk Biochip compared to the group asked to think about 
human uniqueness. We also predict that mortality concerns will give people 
more negative attitudes towards the device than thoughts of dental pain. As a 
result, we expect to find significantly fewer people to express intentions to use 
the proposed CVD Risk Biochip in the groups who we are asking to think 
about mortality concerns compared to the group who we are asking to think 
about human uniqueness. Similarly, we expect to find significantly more 
negative attitudes towards the device in the groups who we are asking to 
think about mortality concerns compared to the group who we are asking to 
think about human uniqueness. Additionally, we expect that participants in the 
third and fourth groups who have their self-esteem lowered to have more 
negative attitudes towards the device and lower intentions to use the device 
when compared to the first two groups who have had their self-esteem 
boosted. Finally, if it is the case that we find none of the above effects, we 
expect that the majority of participants will have considered the proposed risk 
information from the CVD Risk Biochip to be surreal or remote to them. 
 
Please note that we are only using the page of the questionnaire booklet 
where you were given the option to supply your contact details as a way of 
measuring intentions to use the device. As a result, any contact details that 
you may have supplied on this sheet will not be used by any third party and 
will now be detached from the rest of the questionnaire booklet and torn up.  
Please also note that the full nature of this research had to be hidden from 
you from the outset of the study. This is because the study involves the 
effects of death anxiety on attitudes and intentions. If you had known that the 
study involved the effects of death anxiety on your attitudes and intentions to 
use the CVD Risk Biochip, research suggests that you may have biased your 
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responses. Many previous studies have used a similar method to this one in 
order to remove this bias. 
  
The project is funded by a Science Foundation Ireland Centres for Science, 
Engineering & Technology grant, via the Biomedical Diagnostics Institute 
(BDI) in Dublin City University and an Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences Post-Graduate Scholarship. If you have any 
further questions about the research project, please feel free to contact Mr. 
Simon Dunne, now or at a later stage on 01 7007796. The School of Nursing, 
via the “Healthy Living Centre” have recently established AKOS a “Centre for 
Psychological Health and Well Being”, which would provide support, should 
the need arise. Alternatively, if you wish to contact an independent person in 
relation to your concerns, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for 
Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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APPENDIX H: LEAFLETS FOR RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS 
H1: Leaflets for Study 2 
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H2: Leaflets for Study 4 
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APPENDIX I: E-MAIL AND WORD ATTACHMENT CONTENT FOR 
RECRUITING STUDY 4 PARTICIPANTS 
I1: E-mail Content for Recruiting Study 4 Participants 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a voluntary research study on 
personal life experiences, attitudes to health and better ways of knowing 
about your health. If you agree to take part in the study you will be asked to 
complete a questionnaire, which should take no longer than 30 minutes to 
complete. The questionnaire asks you to give your account of a life 
experience you may have had and to give your opinions on various topics, 
such as aspects of health and healthcare.  
 
You are eligible to take part in the study if you are between 40-55 years of 
age. Further information on the study is contained in the corresponding word 
attachment.  
 
If you are interested in taking part in this study, please reply to this e-mail and 
I will arrange a suitable time and convenient location for you to complete the 
questionnaire booklet.  
 
Thank you for your time and consideration 
 
Kind Regards 
 
Simon Dunne 
DCU School of Nursing Post-Graduate 
Phone: 01 7007796 
 
This research is funded by an Irish Research Council for the Humanities and 
Social Sciences Post-Graduate Scholarship and a Science Foundation 
Ireland Centres for Science, Engineering & Technology grant, via the 
Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) in Dublin City University. 
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I2: Word Attachment Content for Recruiting Study 4 Participants 
You are being asked to participate in a research study concerning personal 
reactions towards various topics such as personal life experiences, aspects of 
health and better ways of knowing about your health.  
 
You are eligible to take part if you are between 40-55 years of age. If you 
agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. 
This questionnaire contains five sections of questions and should take no 
more than 30 minutes to complete. The questionnaire asks you to give an 
account of a life experience you may have had and to give your opinions on 
various topics, such as aspects of health and healthcare. 
 
Mr. Simon Dunne is carrying out this study in the Dublin City University 
School of Nursing, with assistance from Dr. Pamela Gallagher and Dr. Anne 
Matthews. The study is being funded by a Science Foundation Ireland grant 
and an Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences Post-
Graduate Scholarship and has been approved by the Dubin City University 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, all information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential. The form that you sign to give your consent to participate 
in the study will be kept in a secure location that is separate from where the 
completed questionnaire itself will be stored. All of the completed 
questionnaires will be kept for a minimum of five years. After this time they 
will be shredded and disposed of by Mr. Simon Dunne. 
 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If any aspect of the study 
makes you feel unduly uncomfortable or distressed at any stage, you may 
withdraw from the study without prejudice. Additionally, you may withdraw to 
participate at any time and without giving any reasons for your withdrawal. 
The information that will be obtained from the study should greatly benefit the 
community by informing medical practitioners about attitudes towards health 
and healthcare methods.  
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The research will form the basis of reports, academic publications, 
conference papers and other scientific publications. Should you require any 
further information on the study, or if you have any concerns about any 
aspect of it at a later stage, please do not hesitate to contact the principal 
investigator, Mr. Simon Dunne, at the details provided in the corresponding e-
mail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
